CONFLICTING LOYALTIES IN THE BALKANS

THE GREAT POWERS, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND NATION-BUILDING

EDITED BY
HANNES GRANDITS, NATHALIE CLAYER
AND ROBERT PICHLER

I.B.TAURIS

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INTRODUCTION

SOCIAL (DIS-)INTEGRATION AND THE NATIONAL TURN IN THE LATE- AND POST-OTTOMAN BALKANS: TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer and Robert Pichler

This book project began with an exchange of personal conclusions reached in the course of our separate studies of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Southeast European societies.[1] Early in our discussion, we began to consider the possibility of bringing together a group of researchers working in different parts of the Balkans: in particular, researchers who placed a special emphasis on local actors at the local level. Our aim was to enable a comparison of the changing orientation of a variety of Balkan communities in response to the changing political environment during the nineteenth century, that is to say, the creation of new states in the Balkan region and the adoption of sweeping reforms throughout the Ottoman Empire. Above all, we wanted to better understand the following questions: What were the consequences of the shifting system of power in the realm of social, economic and cultural everyday realities? What were the consequences of violence and conflicts with respect to social integration or disintegration? What were the continuities and discontinuities in this period of far-reaching changes?

In order to approach these questions, we invited a group of colleagues to each contribute a special case study. The members of our group have worked both on the late Ottoman Empire and the new nineteenth-century Balkan nation-states. Accordingly, their chapters concern the evolution of societies both within and outside the Empire since, contrary to what is often alleged, the evolution of both the former and the latter was not necessarily dissimilar. Taken together, their contributions touch on many different aspects of the societal transformation of the communities under study: revolts and conflicts, education, economy, religion, professional activities, the status of notables, marginal groups, urbanization, migration, associative activities, charities, etc. Nevertheless, we believe that they clearly form a fruitful basis for comparative analysis, especially from the perspective of four main themes that emerged in the course of our research. These themes are represented by the four sections into which the book is divided.

The first section concerns the concept of "Europeanization", so often considered as an univocal process, and the necessary distinction between discursive dimensions and behaviours of various actors claiming an "Europeanness". The second part focuses on activities and behaviours of actors which are "ambiguous" in many ways and therefore do not fit within clear-cut categories often used to define their positions in "national narratives". The third section deals with group loyalties, which were, to a certain extent, "reconfigured" by the reformed state and (changing) authorities. The fourth part focuses on the competition, especially at the level of the participants, between elite projects and non-elite actions/reactions in increasingly "divergent realities". Let us consider each of these four sections more closely.

Janus-faced Europeanization

Modern-day research has usually approached the character of change in the late-Ottoman power system by referring to a number of different developments. The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the European-dominated capitalist global economy is one of the major themes in the interpretation of the "Europeanization" of the late-Ottoman power and social system. Thus, authors like I. Wallerstein described how the Ottoman Empire was placed at the "periphery" of the European capitalist system.[2] But works like those by Wallerstein usually pay much more attention to European economic expansion than to the dynamics at work in the economically "incorporated" Ottoman society. Nevertheless, other studies have examined these dynamics,[3] and have concluded that the advance of the capitalist world-economy is often related to a partial loss of control of the Ottoman state over the socio-economic development in ever larger areas of the Empire.[4] Recent studies have begun to challenge this interpretation, at least partially. M. Palairet, for instance, has shown that in regions of the

Empire that were directly under central Ottoman control – as was the case in some Bulgarian provinces (*vilayet*) – the establishment of capitalist modes of production proceeded even faster than in various more autonomous territories, such as Serbia.[5]

In particular, questions of the enforcement of reforms – oriented towards "European models" – hold a key position in many other studies.[6] Similarly, reform and "Europeanization" are usually key issues in studies dealing with the social system in the emerging post-Ottoman Balkan states.[7] During the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman Empire began its transformation from "empire" to "state", which in turn set off a systematic incorporation of hitherto tolerated "internal and external peripheries".[8] It was only during the second half of the nineteenth century that the central authorities were able to impose (again) their claim to power over ever larger parts of the Empire.[9] In order to comprehend the direction of the far-reaching changes of the Ottoman power system in the nineteenth century, it is helpful to look at the increasing conversion of the scribal services of the Sultan into an European-style administrative state bureaucracy – a group that can be seen as the motor for the reform endeavours, secularisation and a more effective rationalisation of state power.[10] C. V. Findley and others describe this developing modern Ottoman bureaucracy as an increasingly crucial factor in shaping the internal power relations in the Ottoman reform period. They also point out that it had by far more internal importance than comparable institutional groups within the other European Great Powers of that period.[11] Findley finds that these reforms were crucial for the "emancipation" of the bureaucracy from the religious establishment, the provincial notables and the Sultan. The Tanzimat reforms also began to treat the largely heterogeneous population with more legal equality. However, the reform movement encountered problems when attempting to implement greater equality among Muslim and non-Muslim populations within the state order.[12] Furthermore, a widening split developed between the emerging bureaucratic and economic bourgeoisies, in which case a confessional factor was also deeply inherent.[13]

These transformations of the Ottoman Empire, as well as changes initiated in the new Balkan States, were often described at the time, and are often appropriately analyzed today, as the result of "Europeanization" projects and policies. This concept also seems to be closely linked with the balance of power between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers. But, as Malte Fuhrmann states, "Europeanization", rather than being a reality, was often only a label giving legitimacy to very different kinds of agencies. The balance of power was not always as unbalanced for the Ottomans, as is usually assumed. Furthermore, in adopting a micro-level analysis and considering marginal groups of "European citizens" living in the Ottoman territories, Fuhrmann provides a more nuanced picture than that presented by studies of superior "modern Europeans" in Ottoman lands during a difficult process of "Europeanization".[14]

The concept of "Europeanization" was a particularly salient issue with respect to the matter of educational reforms. As has been shown by Benjamin Fortna, among others, we should not limit our understanding of the expansion of education solely as an aspect of "Westernization" (or "Europeanization") and modernization, but rather also consider how the Ottoman state adapted a Western-style education in order to counter Western pressure and thus safeguard the empire's future. Yet, in this process of adaptation, rather than of adoption, Islamic and Ottoman influences are at least as important as "European/Western" elements, and there is often no necessary conflict between the two models. The schools labelled as "Western" or "secular" provided courses in French and chemistry along with courses in Islamic morality and Islamic sciences.[15]

Bernard Lory argues in a similar vein in his contribution concerning the Orthodox Christian educational networks which developed in "European Turkey" and particularly in Macedonian Monastir/Bitola. The new Orthodox Christian schools, inspired by Western educational models, became one of the primary places of political contestation with respect to ethno-national rivalry and strife. The symbolic creation of nationhood and its dissemination among the populace served as powerful weapons in the hands of teachers who themselves had to struggle for social recognition and status. Lory shows that, beyond the discourses of progress and Europeanization suggested by the school promoters, teachers went so far as to enrol young boys and students in guerrilla bands. In this way, schools were sites for the cultivation of warlike values and directly operated as places of recruitment for a new generation of "freedom fighters".

Many studies consider that the formation of a "civil society," or more generally a public sphere, was one of the characteristics of the modernization process, which at that time was synonymous with "Europeanization". Ioannis Zelepos, in his study of the formation of private Greek associations, both within and outside the Ottoman Empire as well as within the newly founded Greek nation-state, provides insight into a process of cultural emancipation which was initially diverse and multifaceted. The networks of associations can be seen as early examples of trans-border communities engaged in imaginary processes of building a homeland. Zelepos shows that the aspirations of these associations – whether religious, cultural, or national – were far from univocal in their view or compatible in their activities to the point that they often remained in opposition to the political aspirations of the Greek state. With the appearance of Bulgaria as a powerful rival to Greek irredentism, the profile of many of these associations took on more nationalistic characteristics. The fact that many of these associations strongly influenced the political elite must be seen as a feature of the state's weakness vis-à-vis private actors.

Ambiguous actors, conflicting strategies

Previous historiography concerning these specific areas of Southeast Europe during the time of interest to us has, above all, tried to document and praise retrospectively the "heroic efforts" which led to the formation of new nation-states that succeeded an "outdated" Ottoman system of rule. The national "liberation" of the newly formed nation-states has usually been told in narratives that present the revolts against the Ottoman state of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a final stage and logical outcome of a multi-centuries-long struggle for independence.[16] Such a teleological interpretation has dominated research and remained unchallenged for many decades. And although it has recently received increasing criticism, it remains very much alive as a "master narrative", not only in school curricula and museum presentations, but also in scholarly historiography.[17] The chapters in this book challenge any linear transformation to a new "nationalised" rationality. By offering detailed insights into a variety of social spheres, they illustrate the quite complex ambiguities characteristic of the new trends and movements that became a normal function of daily life during the period in question.

As shown in these papers, such everyday ambiguities were closely bound to established but also changing modes of social integration. The conceptual framework of social integration has helped the authors to better understand the complexities of social life in the late- and post-Ottoman Balkans. In particular, social integration can be seen as shaped by three mutually related notions that are closely interlinked with existing or changing modes of loyalty. These are: 1) the concept of multiple and competing loyalties; 2) a pronounced difference in loyalties during times of peace and times of war or violent conflict; and 3) the strong influence of the power apparatus on relations of loyalty.[18]

Let us consider social integration against the backdrop of "multiple/competing loyalties". In late- and post-Ottoman regions of Southeast Europe, depending on the social context, strong kin-based, patronage, class and/or confessional loyalties were present and might either complement or contest one another. Pronounced kin-based loyalties were particularly present in rural settings – often in interplay with relationships of patronage within the framework of *çiftlik* or pastoral economies – and these loyalties could be the most prominent aspect of social relations.[19] In urban settings, on the other hand, corporate organisations of *esnafs* were of particularly decisive importance in the daily social relations of many town dwellers.[20] Furthermore, social affairs were also strongly influenced by confessional affiliation – above all in their relation to the state and its institutions. The logic of the *millet* and the activities of confessional institutions were undoubtedly also very important in other inter-group relations,[21] but, at the same time, the other mentioned principles of loyalty were also usually relevant. Depending on the situation, they could assume even greater importance. The daily events portrayed in the regions of the late- and post-Ottoman Balkans discussed in these papers can only be partially understood in terms of confessional (and later national) dimensions of loyalty – an approach still often used in much of contemporary scholarly analysis.

However, a basic differentiation must be made between periods of peace and periods of war or conflict. This leads us to the second notion. While the above-mentioned multi-layered loyalty relations were always present in daily life during times of peace, this could greatly change in times of escalating violence. During times of war, revolt and organised violence, loyalties generally "narrowed" down,[22] i.e. people tended to be compelled by the warring parties to clearly "take sides". This was usually accompanied by a thorough revaluation of confessional antagonisms. Many regional societies of the Ottoman Balkans had a history of particularly frequent periods of war and organised violence, due to specific internal power struggles or because they bordered on "Christian states" (such as the Habsburg Empire, the Venetian Republic, etc.). The implementation of the reform measures of the Tanzimat again provoked uprisings and organised resistance in many places. During such periods of conflict, loyalties were also heavily influenced by the historical experiences and outcomes of earlier conflicts. Frequently, these earlier conflicts were often strategically "used" by political activists to advocate the "nationalisation" of what had often been multi-confessional regions.

The third notion of loyalty is related to developments within the official apparatus and arrangements of state rule. In an atmosphere of sweeping social change and a new definition of social hierarchies, relationships of power and consequently relationships of loyalty, entered a process of accelerated transformation. Some social actors made every effort to achieve far-reaching innovations in regional and local power relations, while others tried to hold on to "traditional" claims and resisted accepting any kind of "unjustified" novelties. In addition, the dynamics of modernization/reform did not proceed exclusively from the top down. Sometimes even the contrary could be the case; for example, the reformed Ottoman administration sometimes used "traditional" tools to rule, only to be resisted by local elites claiming to fight for a more progressive mode of social relations.[23]

Although social ambiguities are a recurrent theme in almost all the papers in this book, they are particularly prominent in the chapters constituting the second section. Nathalie Clayer presents a detailed analysis of a local conflict that took place in the area of Gjakovë and Prizren (in the West of present-day Kosovo/a) from 1907 to 1908. She cites four different contemporary accounts in order to introduce the local and regional constellation of social and political forces. These accounts refer to the same events – and the power relationships behind them – but in many respects present quite contrary interpretations regarding the motives and strategies of the involved actors. A recurring theme in all four interpretations is that the escalation of local conflicts tended to further a confessionalisation of public life in the region. Nevertheless, the confessional dimension remained closely tied to other social, economic and political questions in local settings. Clayer clearly shows that it is indispensable to look at those "other" dimensions to better understand the conflicting strategies of the involved persons and groups and the stated "confessionalisation" of daily life during such a period of confrontation.

Hannes Grandits examines the escalation of the so-called Herzegovinian revolt that led to an anarchic situation in Herzegovinian society in the mid-1870s. The dynamics of violence quickly polarised the society according to confessional affiliation. A closer look at this conflict makes obvious that an escalation of violence was organised very strategically. At least some leading actors calculated that a spiral of violence and counter-violence would not only undermine the existing political order but could also enforce new social loyalties, since loyalties created during violent conflict were usually less multi-faceted than those existing during previous times. Grandits shows that those individuals, social groups and "political interests" involved in the escalation of the revolt did not necessarily represent the concerns of a majority of political actors in the regional setting. On the contrary, most of the regional populations, as well as the Ottoman authorities, seemed to be willing to use all necessary means to avoid any deterioration of the situation. Even among the rural population, which was at the centre of the revolt, many wanted to find a consensual solution to an existing local conflict. But the study also shows that the spiral of violence did nevertheless "successfully" polarise and homogenise the society as a whole. It also shows that confessional affiliations and new "national" visions (although the latter probably occurred more in elite discourse than in the social realities of daily life) became increasingly important in social life as a result of the conflict.

Alexander Vezenkov describes a seemingly paradox situation in his chapter analysing the Bulgarian revolutionary movements of the 1860s and 1870s. In most cases, those revolutionary committees that were organised to bring about the de-stabilisation and eventual overthrow of Ottoman rule in the region consisted of people who were simultaneously members of the local Ottoman administrative councils and members of the mixed courts. Vezenkov reconstructs and contextualizes these parallel activities that have been treated as actually mutually exclusive in later Bulgarian historiography, but which did not seem contradictory to contemporaries. Both the Ottoman administration and the revolutionaries, respectively, tried to co-opt regional power holders to serve their own purposes. Many regional notables were involved in this parallel strategy, since they wanted to be sure of securing their future influence whatever the outcome of political events. In general, only a small number of notables were actually involved in the revolutionary committees and uprisings, and the percentage of "ordinary people" involved was also small. In retrospect, this strategy turned out to be very effective after the beginning of a series of local uprisings during the 1870s and in particular after the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–8, which resulted in the formation of a Bulgarian nation-state and totally changed the political situation in these former Ottoman provinces.

As can be concluded from these three examples, each of which involved a specific regional constellation of social and political forces during periods of violent tensions, conflicting strategies were pursued by ambiguously motivated actors.

Restricted loyalties

During the final years of the Ottoman Empire, its social and cultural space subsequently narrowed to such a point that even those communities who perceived themselves as closely linked to the Porte experienced mechanisms of exclusion and marginalisation. Political projects directed towards disintegration of the empire were tantamount to their primary aims to consolidate their guaranteed legal status. This was especially true for certain inaccessible mountainous areas that were often only loosely integrated into the imperial administrative system. In return for the obligation to maintain security, the

Ottoman authorities had transferred a number of legal guarantees for local self-administration to these communities.[24] This method of indirect rule favoured the preservation of a rich repertoire of local customary laws within a socially segregated milieu of patrilineal kinship groups. Segmented communities of this kind lacked a centralized system of political authority and a differentiated administrative system. The main obligations of everyday life, economic matters, security, political and even religious affairs were managed by each respective kinship-group.[25]

Eva A. Frantz examines exactly this kind of resistance to centralized authority in her contribution on the Catholic Fandi in Kosovo, an immigrant community from the present-day northern Albanian mountain area of Mirditë. Among the Fandi, it was difficult to communicate the idea of a common political identity stretching across the localized codes of belonging. Every sort of interference from outside was generally unwelcome, and the Fandi reacted with violent resistance when the government attempted to impose regular taxes. However, their resistance was in no way motivated ethno-politically, but a matter of their wish to preserve their traditional status within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. The same was also true, for instance, for the majority Muslim population living in the northern part of the *vilayet* of Kosovo. Having a local system of political authority that was partially based on political segmentation, they reacted with violent resistance when the authorities tried to impose new taxes.[26]

In his study of the Jewish community in Istanbul during the Balkan Wars, Eyal Ginio cites another intriguing example of how an ethno-religious community attempted to come to terms with the rapidly changing political environment in this last period of the Ottoman Empire. Embedded within a transnational network of cultural life, Jewish elites regarded themselves as a driving force towards modernisation, the promotion of scientific progress, and the adoption of Western civilisation. Ottomanism and "Europeanization" were seen by them as two complementary components of one common political goal. The close attachment of the educated Jewish elites to the Ottoman Empire was also rooted in the conviction that this attachment conferred protection against Christian anti-Semitism. Obviously, the Empire had provided many of those prerequisites necessary for a religious community to maintain its identity, while also fitting into the concept of a common fatherland. The Balkan Wars and the cruelties committed against Muslim citizens finally changed the ideological underpinnings of Ottomanism, which would lead to a gradual exclusion of non-Muslims from the "national community". Hence, the Balkan Wars came to be a watershed in the way the

(Turkish-speaking) Ottoman elite perceived the boundaries of the Ottoman nation. Even the Jews' adaptation to the new virtues of a warlike community, after the introduction of the obligatory military service, could not satisfy the needs of cultural integration. The concept of Ottoman Zionism, which propagated Hebrew language and culture rather than a territorial-political agenda, well illustrates that the Jews had no need for a territorial solution for their "national" claims, unlike, for example, those living under Habsburg rule.[27] It was only in the context of the crumbling empires in Europe, the proliferation of nationalisms in the eastern half of the continent and the cruelties of the Balkan Wars, that the concept of a Jewish national state in its ancient homeland could gain acceptance and have any chance of political success. The Jewish example is a good illustration of the growing importance of space as one of the key markers of modern nationhood.[28] The idea to transform a multicultural space into homogenous national territories gained ground among intellectuals and nationalist-minded elites who deliberately disseminated national narratives in order to reinforce national loyalties. But these processes, often described as uniform, had quite different outcomes in the milieus considered in this chapter.

Elite projects, divergent realities

Because of the nature of the historical sources mainly provided by state administrations, embassies and by non-state elites, many studies dealing with nationalism focus on the role, projects and discourses of states and elites. However, if elite projects and discourses are considered within their particular local contexts, as Nataša Mišković and Galia Valtchinova (as well as other contributors) have done in this volume, one can make a few basic remarks, which might help us to analyse the "national turn" in the Balkans from a different perspective. There are differences among the elites, their projects and their discourses. There is also in many instances a profound opposition between the elites' projects and existing social realities.

The pace and the degree of economic and political changes in Southeast Europe during the nineteenth century, as well as the strengthening and rationalization of central state control affected the roles and make-up of local elites. This was the case both within and outside the Ottoman Empire, as well as in the Arab Middle East.[29] In particular, new groups of elites emerged as a result of economic changes and the process of professionalisation in different sectors. These elites formed a kind of "middle class" which adopted discourses and strategies linked to changes in their political and social positioning, as well as to their search for power or their efforts to remain in power. The projects of these new elites could converge, for example, in a "national" or "Europeanization" sense (if we suppose that this sense is univocal). However, the projects of different segments of these new elites were in fact often conflicting or diverging, and this occurred not only in the case of competing national projects, but also in the absence of such competitions.[30]

However, the projects and discourses of elites were not only diverging among themselves, they were also far from corresponding to existing social realities. It has already been demonstrated that elites worked to build "imagined communities" based on "invented traditions".[31] Here, we want to show that there is also a gap between intellectuals, politicians and administrators and the mainly rural or newly urban population of Southeast Europe of that time. Mišković's contribution in this book perfectly illustrates this point. The Serbian elites declared themselves willing to be useful, to accomplish an educational mission, to set an example, to serve the country and modernize it. Some of them imagined building a nation structured as an extended family, a *zadruga*. They viewed the *zadruga* as an autonomous unit, inherited from the Serbian Middle Ages, unchanged by either Ottoman rule or by the young Serbian rule. However, even where villages and suburbs were relatively untouched by the modernization policies of the Serbian state, the administrative reforms actually suppressed the autonomy of the *zadruga*s. The policies of the educated elites not only ignored the peasants and new impoverished city dwellers living at the peripheries of Belgrade, they also condemned them for their ignorance, ill health and poverty. From 1884 forward, they even deprived the poorest of their political rights.

Beyond the debate on elite and popular nationalisms[32] and, more generally, the approach of subaltern studies, we have to consider that there are not only projects and actions initiated by elites, but also projects and moves undertaken by the general population as well.[33] We cannot understand these divergences if we do not take into account those local contexts and issues that determine the way elite projects are received, understood, transformed and adapted at the local level. The study by Valtchinova in the present volume allows us to see nationalism "at work" locally, that is, its meaning in the economic and social daily life and its translation into (or its rejection by) local social practices. Among the Christian Orthodox urban communities of Melnik and Stanimaka, national identifications are indeed closely linked to professional activities (notably in vine growing), to the status of migrants and non-migrants, to the status of peasants and city dwellers, but also to social strategies and especially, to marriage strategies. Thus, local dynamics are crucial for an understanding of the loyalty mechanisms in the society, both in times of peace as well as during conflicts.

The chapters in this book demonstrate that conflicting strategies were pursued by ambiguously motivated actors at various levels of late- and post-Ottoman societies. These tensions had various dimensions and political actors were typically engaged in multi-layered ways. Loyalties might be openly celebrated in one's own confessional group, but a closer look reveals that this might be strongly dependent on local economic competitions or group interests. Social actors could be willing to affirm their loyalty to the existing administration of power, but nevertheless were forced by an organised escalation of violence to "take sides". And actors could at the same time be working for the existing system of power, but nevertheless also be involved in conflicting political projects. Such situations seem to have existed more often than one might conclude from the prevailing historiography concerning late- and post-Ottoman Balkan countries. An analysis that uncovers the several layers and contradictions at the local level promises to foster more complex views and lead to alternative hypotheses heretofore barred by narrow historical approaches often still used today. The papers included in this volume endeavour to interpret the "national turn" in the late- and post-Ottoman Balkans in precisely this more complex manner.

PART I

JANUS-FACED EUROPEANIZATION

1

VAGRANTS, PROSTITUTES AND BOSNIANS: MAKING AND UNMAKING EUROPEAN SUPREMACY IN OTTOMAN SOUTHEAST EUROPE[1]

Malte Fuhrmann

"Are you from among those whom we could not turn into Europeans?"[2]

In August 1904, the German house painter Franz-Josef Kranz caught a ride with a sailing boat across the Sea of Marmara from İzmit to Rodosto (Tekirdağ) and continued on foot to the Dardanelles. According to one account, he was dressed in rags, begging and constantly drunk. When some locals made fun of him in Judeo-Spanish, which he understood, he picked a fight with them and ended up in police custody. But he was soon released, and the local vice-consul of the German Reich, Hanthopoulos, handed him a free ferry ticket to Salonica.[3]

In the summer of 1910, Smajo Mašinović and his wife, citizens of Banja Luka in Austria-Hungary, travelled to Üsküp (Skopje) in the neighbouring Ottoman Empire to visit friends. While in Üsküp, the relationship between the couple soured and in September Smajo decided to return home on his own. But when trying to leave town, he was stopped by the Ottoman police and his passport was confiscated. He was informed he would have to remain in town until his dispute with his wife had been settled by the local Sharia court.[4]

The twelfth of December 1913 began as a normal workday like any other for Duplica and Mustafa, employees of the Habsburg consulate in Constantinople. Two well-known pimps of Austrian nationality were to be escorted to the Galata police office for paperwork before they could be deported via steamer and tried in the Monarchy for deprivation of liberty of Habsburg subjects. But as their carriage approached the police station, one of the detainees called out to the crowd on the street that he was an Ottoman subject being illegally imprisoned by foreigners. An angry mob attacked the consulate carriage and liberated the pimps, and the local policemen joined in the fun by landing a few blows on the heads of the astonished consulate employees.[5]

At first glance, these three events seem unrelated. At best, one might conclude that the Ottoman Empire, in its final years, was a land where xenophobia was wide-spread and laws were arbitrarily applied or ignored entirely. However, there is more to be learned from these incidents. In each case, we see a construction or deconstruction of what the term "Europe" meant in the Ottoman context.[6] But first it is necessary to turn to a more general discussion of the term "Europe" as it was understood in the Ottoman sphere.

The metropolis' ambivalent relation to the northwestern Ottoman Territories

The delimitation of "Europe" vis-à-vis the Ottoman lands

The question how to delimitate "Europe" in what is commonly perceived to be its southeastern outback, has for centuries been a matter of successive decisions and revisions.[7] No matter how the borderline was defined, whether on the grounds of topography, trade relations, ethnographic phenomena, or group identity markers such as the proliferation of certain religions or more vague notions such as history, culture, or civilization, this definition has never been innocent, but has always been a matter of confirming, challenging, or establishing hegemonies and redistributing access to resources. This has again become a site for contention in recent years, as negotiations about EU association and accession of several East Mediterranean and Balkan states have received much intense debate.

With regard to the Ottoman state, the question has been posed time and time again, ever since the house of Osman arose as a regional great power and each period found a different answer to it. The answer depended on whether the Ottoman Empire emphasized its uniqueness and Islamic nature, or chose to enter more freely into the practices of its European rivals, and on the other hand, whether these rivals stressed their uniqueness, or whether they opted for more neutral ways of comparing themselves with others. Not surprisingly, Europe's brief moment of unrivaled world hegemony, the "Long Nineteenth Century", takes on an exceptional role in the struggle to demarcate Europe, and we are still coping with the hegemonic and epistemological repercussions of that century today. According to Jürgen Osterhammel, although massive anti-Turkish propaganda accompanied the incessant wars between the houses of Habsburg and Osman in the seventeenth century, the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century saw a return to a fairly dispassionate study of states and their institutions and thus described the Ottomans as a European great power. The decisive turn towards a romantic interpretation and a shift of focus from structures to culture, believed to be a marker of intrinsic qualities, came with Herder and his quest for retrieving the cultural uniqueness of all peoples.[8] While Herder and some of his contemporaries attempted to describe the "other" as part of a philanthropic project, they laid out a basic pattern for less benign versions of "othering" that took on an increasingly self-congratulatory tone as the nineteenth century progressed.[9] Europeans now saw themselves as the pinnacle of biological evolution, as masters in the art of shaping production and social processes, as role models for informing and disciplining the mind and the body for the challenges of contemporary life and as a result, entitled to rule and reshape the globe according to their image.[10]

While the imposition of these far-reaching claims provoked mixed reactions wherever they were enforced, the situation was particularly complex in the northwestern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Nineteenth-century Europeans were confident in opposing black and white, Asian and European, savage and civilized; but regarding the Balkans, the Aegean Islands and Western Anatolia, there was no clear consensus on exactly how to construct a binary divide. Some sought to see all locals as savages (as they might in Indochina) and severely limit exchanges with them;[11] others tried to posit religion as the most important dividing marker;[12] yet others saw the difference not in absolutes, but measured them according to how much of Western language, etiquette and knowledge the locals had adopted.[13] The parameters for measuring Europeanness changed according to the politics and fashions of the day.

The liminal position of Southeast Europe

The region's liminality with regards to its Europeanness was to some degree echoed in its position in world politics. Economically, while many other world regions had been carved up into spheres of influence, the Ottoman realm remained an open market, where Europeans as a whole had tremendous influence, but no one power truly managed to monopolize trade to the detriment of the others.[14] Politically, its formal sovereignty, despite the countless incursions upon it, continued to be upheld because its immediate vicinity made any large-scale dismemberment impossible to negotiate among the European Powers.[15] Even in legal terms, the Ottoman Empire was defined as a "semi-civilized" space.[16] As a whole, the region constituted an in-between space in an age that carved up the world between colonizers and colonized, a space that, for lack of a better word and to keep in line with other recent observations of the phenomenon, shall be labelled "semi-colonial".[17] "Semi-colonial" in this sense is not meant to describe simply domination by indirect rule. Rather, it refers to a space where older hegemonies had become unsettled and new ones remained to be field-tested; an arena, where a number of parties rushed in to find a more secure base for established loyalties or to create unprecedented new ones; and where the intended subjects of these loyalties chose to rapidly adopt and reject or eclectically combine them. In this scenario, it is not at all certain to those involved, who will eventually ascend to undisputed hegemony: the outsiders, local forces, or the old center reinventing itself. The point to be made here is that in the late Ottoman period, there was no single seat of power that steered and directed political, social and cultural processes; they were the result of constantly shifting constellations and sometimes unpredictable alliances. Without belittling the political, social and cultural creativity of the Ottoman institutions and agents in adapting to the ever changing circumstances, it can be said that such a scenario of fluctuating and liminal hegemonies is characteristic of empires which, having passed the zenith of their power, face growing problems in integrating their diverse populations, but are not yet confronted by a single player or coalition of players that have amassed the capability and resolution to topple and replace the old order entirely. In this space, negotiations about how to delineate Europe became an important site for affirming and challenging hegemonies.

This scenario is not meant to downplay the role of the Great Powers in late-Ottoman affairs.[18] They assumed vital roles in domestic and international security, center-to-province relations, domestic politics, communal affairs, fiscal matters, legislation, trade, infrastructure, military and civic organization and culture. In retrospect, some historians have wondered how a few thousand consuls, merchants, trade agents, advisors, officials and workers, plus the occasional gunboat, could install an order so clearly detrimental to the objective material interests of the vast majority of Ottoman subjects.[19] They have searched for an Ottoman version of the Herero War, the Indian Mutiny, or the Boxer Uprising, but have found only fairly isolated incidents of this sort. The reason for this is partially to be found in the question of European identity vis-à-vis the northwestern Ottoman provinces. A brief look at the most spectacular anti-European event in this area will show why no broad and stable anti-imperial movement could arise here.

Salonica, Saint George's Day 1876: an attack against "Europe"

The year 1876 saw a heightened tension in all of the Ottoman Balkans due to the uprisings in Bosnia and Eastern Rumelia. This led to several incidents of assault on and even murder of European foreigners, both in the countryside and the cities.[20] On Saint George's Day, fighting between Orthodox Christians and Muslims broke out in downtown Salonica, and the next day saw the lynching of the French consul and the German honorary consul.

This attack had targeted "Europe" as a community of all Christians. In fact, this is how the Muslim mob had seen the consuls' role in the preceding days. A Christian girl seeking to be converted in order to marry her Muslim fiancé had been seized and abducted by a Christian-Orthodox crowd in a public skirmish with Muslims. Periklis Hadjilazaros, a member of one of the wealthiest local families as well as consul of the USA, had supported the Christians by sheltering the abducted girl. The German and French consuls, although not as proactively involved in the dispute, resembled their American colleague in several ways. They were representatives of Western powers, and at least the German officeholder, Henri Abbott, was Greek-Orthodox and a member of a local rich merchant family. The next day, when the two made their way to the governor's office to demand more security for the Christians, they were seized and murdered.

The anti-Western and anti-Christian riots came to a quick end when gunboats from almost all major European states reached Salonica. They refrained from shelling the city after several high officials had been removed from office, indemnities were paid, an honorary funeral for the consuls had taken place and a number of wantonly chosen riot "ringleaders" had been hung.[21]

Beyond the immediate effect of striking fear into foreigners in the Levant for months to come,[22] this event failed to erode European superiority. Instead, it strengthened it. The Great Powers were forced to demonstrate that they actually had the power and readiness to destroy Salonica, and gunboats were increasingly present for years to come; Germany and France had to overcome their hostilities and find a common approach towards the Porte; and foreigners were driven to identify with the local Greeks, which they otherwise might not have done. Thus, violent protest, when directed against either the indigenous Christians or the resident western foreigners, caused the two sides to move together and see themselves as a community.

Europe, all appearances to the contrary, was not a detached, omnipotent other onto whom protest could easily be projected. Europe also lay within the Ottoman Empire, and the daily renegotiation of who was within and who was outside was important for the internal power struggle. Europeanness was too vital a source of symbolic capital for most interested parties to renounce it outright. Thus, the adherents of the Tanzimat reforms tried to prove their Europeanness by their exemplary adaptation of modern principles of administration; the citizens of Smyrna flaunted their new part of town, built copying French street grids; Greek nationalists tried to stress their affinity to ancient civilization, while Bulgarian separatists appealed to Christian solidarity. Gaining symbolic capital by being accepted as European also meant proving that one's neighbor or rival – the Old Turks, the Muslims, the unenlightened peasantry, etc. – were not qualified to be labelled in this way. As a result of this competition to reap the benefits of recognition as European, people who actually interacted regularly or lived in close proximity with each other found themselves pouring derogatory rhetoric on each other's collectivities as if they were from different continents, separated by unsurpassable chasms of difference. This situation, which to a certain point has reproduced itself in the 1990s, has aptly been termed "nesting orientalisms" and has played an important role in Southeast European nationalism.[23]

While the appeal of possibly attaining superior status for one's particular collectivity prevented the formation of large and stable anti-European alliances, the uncertain macro-economic and macro-political situation favored individual local claims to Europeanness, and these claims managed to adapt legitimizing strategies that lent them a certain degree of credibility in Western eyes, such as Christianity, Hellenic civilization, or modernity. Nonetheless, during the "Long Nineteenth Century", the Great Powers and their subjects certainly attempted to install in the Ottoman sphere the more hypertrophic and exclusivist meanings "Europe" had acquired in outright colonial settings and to distance themselves more strongly from local society. Much of the well-known and much-criticized nineteenth-century travel literature attests to this effort. Despite the foreigners' partial success, local actors enviously countered the Westerners' attempts to set themselves apart from them, realizing that this would detach them from an important source of symbolic capital. When the British and some other foreign missions to Constantinople (Istanbul) were rebuilt in the mid-nineteenth century into spectacular "embassy seraglios" to represent Western power in the Orient, Abdülmecid countered with a bombastic palace at Dolmabahçe; when several Protestant and Catholic girls' schools opened in Smyrna (Izmir) and they all claimed that they were "the first enterprise to bring to the female sex of the Orient occidental education and worldview, an enterprise that has founded a new epoch,"[24] the Greek-Orthodox community soon opened a girls' school that managed to empty their competitors' classrooms.[25]

Challenging European superiority through its weakest spot: the marginalized

It is in this context that strategies to undermine European superiority, other than massive collective violence, were far more subtle and apparently more effective in the long run. It has been claimed that the analysis of (semi-)colonialism as a set of intentions that met with success or failure, obedience or resistance, must be enhanced beyond simple action-reaction scenarios. Actions should also be tested for their spillover onto other, seemingly unrelated arenas, as well as for unwanted and unpredicted effects i.e. changes in discursive inclusions and exclusions and a shifting in social emphasis from one field to another. The value of such an approach is most obvious in the late-Ottoman semi-colonial space, where almost all of the players from among the Ottoman center, its regional contenders, and outside intruders fell short of the farfetched plans that they had set for themselves.[26] It is in this function – to change what is visible and what becomes invisible in the Ottoman public sphere – that actors usually considered marginal, both in the Western and Central European context and in Southeast Europe, came to play vital roles. These actors were the ones mentioned in the beginning: Austro-Hungarian and German itinerant workers and vagrants, pimps and prostitutes from the Dual Monarchy, as well as the Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were not subject to a centrally planned policy, but to a diffuse practice that, because of its success, was repeated, copied and reinforced. It was founded on the basic instinct to challenge an enemy by attacking his weakest points, and to divide one's opponents rather than to scare them into unifying. It is in the above-mentioned struggle – the imperial powers trying to assert their superiority and the local institutions trying to hinder this – that the marginalized subjects of the imperialist centers became important, because their very presence could tarnish the glory of the West. To explain this, one must start with their dialectic "others:" the "decent" foreigners in the Balkan and Aegean provinces.

West and Central European residents of the northwestern Ottoman lands in general were the designated agents to advertise European civilization. For if the Great Powers tried to impose their notions of exclusivity and superiority in the Ottoman realm, the Westerners who could be seen locally would have to exemplify these qualities. To this extent, the respective European motherlands tried to focus the loyalties of their expatriate communities in the Ottoman lands towards promoting their civilizations' acclaimed superior culture vis-à-vis the locals. In short, they promoted identity politics based on Empire, or, to put it more bluntly, they tried "to transform their colonies into national 'storm troops' of imperialist interest politics".[27] Almost all occasions in urban public life were used to promote this superiority; whether it was the inauguration of a church or a consulate, the visit of a renowned scholar or an impressive navy ship from the motherland, or perhaps a rich merchant's or a school's annual ball. This is not the place to describe in detail how this policy was applied.[28] In summary, it might be said that while usually merchants, trade agents, teachers, nuns and deaconesses, as well as military and civic advisers did not oppose assuming an identity based on Great Britain's, France's, Italy's, Austria's, or Germany's claim to a superior civilization, and often found it useful for their own daily interactions with Ottoman subjects, the matter was very different when it came to individuals, who due to their occupation, social background, lifestyle, or regional origin, were less easy to integrate into an imperialist master narrative.

Although research on European foreigners in the Sultan's lands has focused on so-called elites, the majority of them were of far more humble background, living or surviving from construction or industrial work and minor services.[29] As these lower classes have not yet attracted much scholarly attention, in the following I will briefly outline how certain subgroups from among them came to establish themselves in the Ottoman sphere. I will then continue by describing how their identities, influenced by both local forces and the motherland, came to be the objects of a struggle between the imperialist states trying to reassert their superiority and local institutions trying to foil their plan. For matters of practicality, I am limiting the study of the "Orient drifters" to those originating from the German lands and the Habsburg Empire. The study of individuals involved in prostitution is restricted to Habsburg subjects (and former subjects), as is, for obvious reasons, the case of the Bosnians and Herzegovinians.

Citizens' rights activist here, public enemy there: the Orient drifter

A forgotten migration: European workers in the Ottoman Empire

We do not know exactly when itinerant artisans from Central Europe began to venture forth into the Ottoman Empire. For a long time the guild system in the Holy Roman Empire fended off unemployment and ruinous competition by banning young artisans to years of life on the road as journeymen. They would migrate as far as St. Petersburg and Amsterdam, learning additional skills, accepting temporary work and biding their time until they had hopes of finding a position back home.[30] Early in the nineteenth century, this system virtually collapsed, with the abolition of the guild system and with land reform, because the countryside was no longer capable of serving the needs of the growing population, nor could the cities absorb the large numbers seeking employment. As a result, subjects from the German lands and the Habsburg hereditary domains (*Erbländer*) wandered in all directions looking for work. As early as 1835, the Prussian government published a warning against emigration to the Ottoman lands because of the risk of impoverishment, but despite this, in 1845, the Prussian consul in Smyrna complained that Berlin did not reimburse him for his considerable expenses providing emergency help to destitute Prussian travellers. Furthermore, the Constantinople German hospital was founded by resident Germans in 1844, aiming to alleviate the plight of sick and penniless German journeymen.[31] These were desperate times, so expatriate merchants and officials did not question the necessity of charity. As the economic conditions in the German lands and in the core provinces of the Dual Monarchy improved, the pressure to emigrate decreased, but nonetheless migration to the Ottoman lands did not cease. Among the Habsburg subjects, the inhabitants of the Adriatic littoral figured particularly prominently among lower-class migrants to the Sultan's lands: Dalmatians from Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and surrounding areas served as sailors;[32] Istrians were mostly sailors, but also worked as carpenters or day labourers; Cattaro (Kotor) furnished day labourers and farmers; lumbermen and day labourers, as well as some carpenters and smiths, came from distant Tyrol, especially from Trento.[33]

The 1870s and particularly the 1880s were a watershed, not only for the forms of lower-class migration into Ottoman Southeast Europe, but especially with respect to the accompanying debates. Developing and operating the large new infrastructure projects of the Ottoman Empire, such as railways, ports, roads and mines, created a need for workers with training or experience that could not be satisfied by the local labour market alone. As a consequence, infrastructure companies offered working conditions and wages that could attract candidates from Italy, Austria-Hungary, or Germany.[34] A job in the Ottoman Empire was an opportunity for upward mobility for skilled workers.[35]

By the turn of the century, this trend had revolutionized labour migration from the Monarchy. Traditional professions such as shoemaker, bricklayer, or carpenter almost completely disappeared. While a number of unskilled or badly paid labourers still figure in the registers, such as tailors, seamstresses, painters, decorators and day labourers, their places of origin in the Habsburg Empire are more evenly distributed and many more "modern" professions appear.[36]

The vagabonds and imperial prestige

By the turn of the century, labour immigrants from Central Europe to the Ottoman realm were divided. While one half of them were specialists that were in demand in the Orient and were – by working-class standards – appropriately rewarded, the other half was increasingly pauperized and considered a problem. They were now being labelled as "vagabonds." While their living conditions were probably not worse than during the crisis-stricken 1840s, by the mid-1870s vagabonds had become a topic for the consulates and churches on the Eastern Mediterranean. This period saw the dichotomy "honest victims of circumstances" and "morally decadent poor" applied to them. While this reflected, up to a point, the increasing bifurcation between trained workers and the no longer in-demand traditional artisans, the more important factor is the new self-image of Germany in particular, after its triumph in the war against France, and of the European Great Powers as a whole, after assuming guarantor status for the Ottoman Empire in the Berlin Congress of 1878. Persons whose appearance did not reflect the self-ascribed supremacy vis-à-vis the Orient had to be excluded from the collective by individualizing their deficiency based on moral ineptitude. The following is one early but paradigmatic lament about destitute countrymen from Smyrna:

> Those who want to acquaint themselves with the German at his utmost lowest must come to the Orient and see the class of German vagabonds who, in regular turns, travel from Constantinople to Smyrna, Jerusalem, Alexandria and back at the expense of charitable people who open their pockets for them.[37]

The German consul in Smyrna from 1873 to 1875, Julius Fröbel, a former radical republican turned Bismarckist, was more sympathetic to them than most. He described the process of becoming an Orient drifter as a gradual process. Individuals who were wandering throughout the German-speaking lands looking for employment would move from Vienna to Budapest, on a rumour that opportunities were better in one place or the other. In Austria-Hungary, orientalist legends circulated about the tremendous wealth that could be made in Constantinople or other parts of the East.[38] Those who chose to try their luck there would set out, often on foot, down the Morava and Vardar valleys in the footsteps of medieval pilgrims and crusaders to the Holy Land. Since job opportunities were not as rosy in the Balkans as predicted, what was at first a strategy for surviving while on the road became a permanent way of living. Vagabonds would pass on information amongst each other concerning which churches, foreign consulates, or private persons would provide financial help, which *hans* (inns) were cheap to stay in, etc. Since the charity of private donors would soon be exhausted, the Orient drifters would move on, often following the noblemen's "grand tour" of an earlier age around the Eastern Mediterranean, as sketched in the quote above.[39]

The presence of a group of countrymen, whose appearance did not match the self-image but whose numbers were too great to be overlooked, undermined the bid for European supremacy on the basis of class, as the social standing of locally established foreigners relied on their association with progress. One propaganda text describes the German self-image in the following manner:

> Germans are to be found in almost all branches of Turkish public life, including several military pashas, one of them with the navy, and several other German officers in Turkish service. Germans have revised the Ministries of Justice and Construction and a German heads the Customs Department, and both the deputy directors of the Post and the Ottoman Bank are German. The officials of the Anatolian Railway are by majority German, also the directory of the Oriental Railways is in German hands; the director of the much-used underground line in Constantinople is our countryman. The gas company in Constantinople and the water works have been built with German money and are administered by Germans; in the army arsenal of Tophane, German instructors and mechanics are at work; the guns are of German manufacture and the Turkish torpedo boats are built in German wharfs, the same goes for the Krupp cannons. In all important

> enterprises from recent times, German capital has been invested, and in all larger shops German personnel is to be found that is reputed to be hard-working and reliable.[40]

If the Europeans were actually so much more developed than the locals, if they could utilize both their minds and their bodies more efficiently and claim a superior position in the workplace of the international companies and local administration,[41] how could they explain these disheveled, drunk and unproductive individuals from their home regions? Why should the locals accept Western and Central Europe as the pinnacle of progress, if the Orient drifters exemplified the poorest human qualities? Were the foreigners to be trusted to build efficient railways, discipline the army and manage municipal public works?

Those Europeans who wished to uphold the claim to superior development had to react to the vagabonds. Ignoring them was not an option, because their destitute state, debts to local residents and unmannerly behavior would tarnish the image of their respective motherland. Locally established Germans, Austrians and Hungarians often saw no other way to deal with the vagabonds than acquiescing to their demands. Attempts to discipline and punish them failed miserably. From 1890 onwards, the German consulates in the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria kept blacklists of their subjects they considered to be vagabonds and circulated them amongst each other, so as to distinguish them from "honest" itinerant workers who had unexpectedly come into dire straits.[42] But the lists were bureaucratically slow, while their subjects were highly mobile. An effective institutional knowledge about the Orient drifters was not established. Repatriating penniless travellers was usually not an option either. This exceeded local consular, church and private funds, and most travellers had no interest in being sent home. Instead, Orient drifters usually received small amounts of money and often a free ticket to the next larger city.[43] This practice at least rid the local community of Germans of their unwanted countrymen, but dumped them on the next.[44]

Consequently, the Orient drifters became vociferous supporters of European superiority in order to survive, as this promised alms, support in emergencies, tickets and the guarantee of one's rights when confronted with the Ottoman authorities. In their appeals for national solidarity, they had to remind their countrymen of the shame that would befall the motherlands if they were left to their fate.[45] Knowing that the consulates were practically forced to help them, they made use of them with impunity. The wall painter Krantz, mentioned at the beginning, after having used his free ferry ticket to

Salonica, complained to the German representative there that the Dardanelles consulate (*kavas*) had supposedly stolen his savings.[46]

The making of a public menace: Orient drifters and the Ottoman authorities

While this form of mobility went on fairly unhindered for several decades, it became a major cause of contention during the time leading up to the First World War. The Ottoman administration targeted the Orient drifters as a public security threat. By stigmatizing this group of "Europeans" as uncivilized and dangerous, the authorities tried to prove their own worthiness of a seat among the civilized nations. The confrontation slowly moved from the rural periphery into the cities and finally into government politics and diplomacy.

Throughout Europe in the nineteenth century, the unprecedented rise in urban population caused anxiety among those already established in the cities.[47] These fears were, however, publicly suppressed, because freedom of movement was believed to be necessary for political and economic reasons.[48] While the growing production sector managed to absorb a huge number of rural migrants, a minority that could not be integrated was relegated to the growing number of workhouses and similar institutions.[49] In the Ottoman sphere, the urbanization process was no less rapid and was even augmented by the constant influx of refugees. But the slower growth in production could not integrate the arriving masses, who mainly found employment in the diverse services of the big ports and the related import-export sector. More importantly, the empire was slow in creating public institutions, such as orphanages and poorhouses, to cater to and to control the marginalized urban poor. Accordingly, the city dwellers' fear of rural migrants had a much stronger impact on politics, and the Sublime State tried throughout the nineteenth century to curb the urbanization process through a bureaucratic system of enforcing both internal and external passports.[50] The state lacked the resources to efficiently regulate the migratory process by means of these regulations, as demonstrated by the growing urban population figures; instead, it lashed out at those non-licensed migrants which it could seize.

In the countryside, German and Austrian workers or vagabonds travelling on foot and by themselves or in small groups had always been in danger. Authorities often arrested them on the charge that their papers were supposedly not in order, that they were causing public disorder in a drunken state, or that they were begging. The local authorities blatantly disrespected the capitulatory stipulation that Europeans should be turned over to their respective consulate immediately, detaining and mishandling them and, in the

Central Balkans, escorting them to the border under arrest. The reactions to these acts depended on the individual consular agents' assessments of whether the reputation of Austria-Hungary or Germany was truly in danger, or whether the respective victim was not worth the bother.[51]

During Hamidian times, the European consulates had already taken the precaution not to cooperate with the local authorities, when the latter tried to take measures against vagabonds.[52] After 1908, however, it was no longer only in the provinces or the remote country districts that the vagabonds attracted so much attention, but also in the urban centers. In 1909 the Ottoman parliament passed a law on vagabondage. The text did not create instruments to control a social phenomenon or to deliver justice, but rather demonstrates the desire to viciously punish. The penniless, those who had been seeking jobs for more than two months, aimless travellers and able-bodied beggars should be arrested and forced to work for the city if the situation allowed, though knowing the chronic under-funding of Ottoman municipalities, this was mostly for décor. The law allowed for multiple and exchangeable punishment (arrest, exile or, for foreigners, expulsion, whipping) and, in almost all cases, without demanding substantial evidence of criminal activity. Faced with the alternatives of endorsing near-wanton punishment of their derelict countrymen or championing the civic rights of a sub-proletarian group they themselves considered a nuisance, the European Great Powers chose the latter. Thus, the dependency became binary: the Orient drifters needed the capitulary powers to survive, and they in turn needed the drifters to defend their claim to being a model civilization and, as a consequence, their status as capitulary powers. The embassies commonly decided to reject the law, criticizing mainly its element of physical punishment on the grounds that flogging and caning were unacceptable practices in the civilized world. To his embarrassment, the British delegate could not support the note because caning was part of his country's penal code. Nobody mentioned the common practice of severe corporal punishment in the colonies. The Porte insisted on its right to autonomously determine its internal affairs and the great danger to public security posed by vagabonds, but the Powers continued to refuse to comply with the law.[53]

There is no evidence that the law was applied to foreigners, but the general climate inspired the authorities, both in the provinces and in the big cities, to act more aggressively against them. The embassies and consulates were in a constant state of alert, as they helplessly watched the security of their subjects deteriorate. They reacted with increasing hypersensitivity to new Ottoman legislation to the point that their resistance against it became frenzied. In 1911, the mere rumor that a new secret order had been issued, calling for arrested foreigners to be taken to the public prosecutor before being turned over to their country's consul, generated protest notes and many diplomatic exchanges.[54] Meanwhile, the Ottoman government had not changed its goal of emancipation, but had learned not to produce such unrealistic legislation as exemplified by the law on vagabondage. In 1912 it produced new regulations concerning passports, which again received much criticism from the European embassies, although, in many respects, the new legislation improved the freedom of movement and its rules appear reasonable. The much-criticized paragraph declared that foreigners arriving on Ottoman soil without proper papers were to remain under police surveillance, giving them 48 hours to obtain a passport from their consulate. The embassies were afraid that "surveillance" was identical with "custody". However, the Porte reminded them that the regulation was identical to one contained in the law of 1895. If the Habsburg embassy staff had looked into their own files, they would have found a note from that year, praising the Hamidian administration for taking into account all concerns (on totally unrelated matters) that the capitulatory powers had voiced towards the draft, and adding that the law of 1895 completely conformed to their wishes.[55]

This nervousness testifies to the fact that the foreign powers were caught on the defensive. Far from imposing the blessings of progress by means of brilliant engineers, generals and managers, they found themselves involuntarily having to side with their most unproductive countrymen to defend their claim to indemnity and supremacy, while at the same time undermining this claim by making the socially marginalized Europeans more conspicuous than intended.

Tarnishing the imperial mistress, emasculating the imperial master: pimps and prostitutes

From Galicia to Galata and beyond: prostitution in the Levantine context

The second group that came to be contested consisted of pimps and prostitutes, though their role in the making and unmaking of European superiority in the Ottoman Empire was entirely different. Prostitution in the Levantine context was used to describe a number of different phenomena: from the highly professional, well-off and well-connected traffickers, to the poor and clumsy efforts to follow in their footsteps; from coercion and force, to voluntary subjugation to its system; or simply immoral conduct. However, professional international networks played an important role, and Constantinople was at their center. The sex market in the Ottoman capital itself was extensive, but it is hard to ascertain the actual number of prostitutes of Habsburg origin working in Constantinople. The largest crackdown on this particular group resulted in only 19 arrests; although knowing the difficulties involved in such operations, it is safe to assume that the number was higher. A local Habsburg resident petitioning his consulate to take sterner action in this matter, claimed the number to be as high as 300.[56] These women came mainly from the Eastern Habsburg provinces of Galicia and Bukovina. The names which figure prominently in the Foreign Ministry's dossiers are both German-Jewish and Slavonic. A much smaller but also prominent group included women from Southern Hungary with predominantly Slavonic names.[57] They originated from families living under conditions of extreme poverty.

The road to prostitution could take different forms. Most had already engaged in sex work in Austria. Others had run away from home and, while on the road, had been contacted by human traffickers, who proposed prostitution outright, or promised employment as waitresses or stage performers. Several routes led to Constantinople. For those who had strayed from home, the initial step was often crossing the border – from Neusatz (Novi Sad/Uj Vidék) to Belgrade (Beograd), from Transylvania to Romania. For those who were already acquainted with a trafficker in the Monarchy, the path often led directly to the steamers leaving Trieste. Once in Constantinople, most new arrivals were escorted to the local houses in Galata and Pera.[58] While some traffickers served merely as couriers, many operated on their own initiative, were contacted on arrival by intermediates, or made their way independently to bars that served as "marketplaces."[59] The brothels were divided according to price range and the acclaimed beauty of the women, as well as between uptown and downtown, that is, Pera and Galata. Women who had not accepted prostitution were tortured there until they submitted. To perpetuate their dependency, they were presented inflated bills for transport and clothes that had to be paid off.[60]

But, as mentioned, the role of human trafficking in this city went far beyond serving local demand. Constantinople was an international hub for supplying sex workers. The recruitment for Latin American brothels was negotiated here;[61] at the same time, the Constantinople-based traffickers' reach and business journeys also extended eastwards, from the Bosporus to Alexandria (al-Iskanderiya) and Port Said, and they even supplied Bombay and Calcutta with "white" sex workers.[62] The traffickers and pimps were almost exclusively German Jews from Galicia and Bukovina, mostly men, but also some women.[63]

The changing policies of the Habsburg consulates on prostitution

Originally, the Habsburg consulates' attitude towards Austrian and Hungarian prostitutes abroad was one of "live and let live", inspired by the consular officials' desire not to overburden themselves with interventions into their subjects' life-worlds. Due to their complacency, but also due to their greater exposure to the clientele concerned, they in part even championed deviant lifestyles. Faced with charges of ineptitude in one newspaper article in 1875, the Alexandria and Cairo consulates responded that no measures could stop the immigration to Egypt of women willingly dedicating themselves to prostitution and that such measures would possibly even be illegal. The immoral lifestyle they would adhere to there would probably be no different to the one they would have chosen in the Monarchy.[64] When pimps and involuntary prostitutes fell into the hands of the consular authorities, the consulates often avoided long and potentially complicated prosecution by fining the pimps no more than the expenses for the women to travel home.[65]

But such indifference to matters of imperial prestige would not survive for long. European women forced to engage in sex work outside the "civilized" world became a major international concern towards the end of the nineteenth century. Although the proportion of women involved in this type of work, when compared to overall prostitution, was not very large, and local officials often observed the predominance of voluntary prostitution, several well-financed societies formed to combat it and to push European governments to take action, with some success.[66] In Constantinople, the Ashkenazi Jewish community lamented the presence of its co-religionists in the nearby brothels of Galata, "located on a long strip, in a tightly packed row, those houses are a dark spot that stain the reputation of our German community."[67] In particular, beginning in the 1890s, private pleas by Habsburg subjects living in the city played a vital role in prompting the consulate to take a more proactive role. In their petitions, they claimed that the Austrian and Hungarian women were being held against their will. If the consulates did not take action promptly, they would petition the Viennese Foreign Ministry or even the Emperor and claim that the consular employees were corrupt or inept. They would appeal to the sense of imperialist rivalry among the European capitulatory powers:



Fig. 1: Police photos taken following mass arrests of "white slave traders" in 1915. From the left to the right: Wolf Haim Postel, aged 47, Austrian, deported January 18 (9-945). Bertha Haimtov, aged 44, Austrian, brothel keeper (9-969). Michael Moses Salamovitz (Michel Paşa, alleged mastermind of human traffickers of Galician origin in Constantinople), aged 63, Ottoman subject, deported January 29 (10-136). Source: National Archives Records Group, College Park (Maryland), USA: Records Group 59, Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey (1910–29), March 4, 1915 reference. 8657.1152/2; first published in Rıfat Bali, *The Jews and Prostitution in Constantinople 1854–1922*, Istanbul, Isis, 2008, pp. 58–62, 103–23 (my kind thanks to the author).

> I thus had the opportunity to see how an Imperial German dragoman protects and represents his subjects, what kind of appearance, as if he was the owner and ruler of Turkey, and what respect and esteem he was shown by the Turkish court authorities.[68]

Thus, suppressing prostitution became a matter of imperial prestige. Krassay, the Monarchy's consul in Constantinople in the early 1890s, attempted to take more rigorous steps. After securing promises of support from a society under the protection of Lady Rothschild, he convinced the governor general, Mecid Bey, to aid him in attempting to arrest all prostitutes from the Monarchy. Lacking other facilities, Krassay detained the prostitutes on an Austrian Lloyd steamer anchored in the port. He hoped to free them from any pressure by the pimps in this way, and he offered them material support during their reintegration into society. However, all but one refused. They did not trust the offer of support for finding new long-term job prospects, believed it impossible and undesirable to work in other professions and stated that if forcibly sent home, they would return to Constantinople at the first opportunity. They also claimed to have no home in the Monarchy; they had either no relatives or none they wished to return to, fearing shame and contempt, and supposedly could not describe their places of origin accurately. They lauded the Constantinople brothels as a place where they were materially better off, socially integrated and protected.

Krassay finally sent only six of them to Trieste, and restricted himself to making more low-level offers to them, which, however, did not prove much more fruitful.[69] The consulate basically limited its interventions to helping women who explicitly asked for its help. But even this proved difficult, because the pimps began to manipulate the consulates in order to rid themselves of their competition. They would write faked letters in the name of prostitutes (or their mothers) working for their rivals, pleading to be freed, thus prompting the consulates into action against them. The authorities in the Monarchy made even less of an effort after Sara Friedmann, a minor engaged in prostitution in Constantinople, had been deported to her native Cieszanów, where she sought out the county officials and eloquently gave testimony about her refusal to renew her loyalty to the Habsburg state. The statement, written in Polish, was subsequently translated into German and sent to the Ministry of the Interior. Friedmann described her childhood growing up in utter poverty in the Far East of the Monarchy and how, at an early age, she had started working as a small town prostitute. The offer by a trafficker to secure her employment in Constantinople was free of false pretences, and her life in the Galata brothel seemed luxurious when compared to the misery she had known while living with her mother.[70]

Both Krassay's failure and Friedmann's statement taught the relevant authorities a bitter lesson about the Dual Monarchy's failure to meet the promises of Empire. Austria had annexed Galicia and Bukovina in the 1770s, claiming to end Polish anarchy in the former and Turkish despotism in the latter. While initially some steps had been taken to integrate these eastern outposts, namely by replacing Polish aristocratic rule with unification and a centralized administration, Vienna remained undecided as to whether to see Galicia as a province on par with the others, as a backwater to be exploited by the central regions of the Monarchy, or as a temporary protectorate. The Constantinople affair was evidence that even after 100 years, some of the locals shared neither a language, nor a sense of geography with the Viennese, let alone reverence for the monarch. The limited degree of home rule in these provinces after 1868 only confounded local grievances with nationalisms.[72] The living conditions in these forgotten outposts remained so miserable that some women preferred indentured sex work in the Orient.

The Habsburg predicament and Ottoman reactions

The Austro-Hungarian predicament did not escape the attention of the authorities or the general population of Constantinople. Samuel Cohen, sent to Constantinople in 1914 by the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women, felt that the city's Muslim men embraced a double moral standard. While being unequivocally protective of their own community's women, they felt no compunction about tolerating or making use of the Austrian prostitutes' services, because these women were governed by foreign laws and religious codes.[73]

The prostitutes provided a convenient field to challenge claims to European superiority on the grounds of gender. The popular assumption that Muslim and Christian-Orthodox societies are more restrictive on sexuality per se than Western Christianity does not hold true, as shown by historical studies of particular periods and milieus.[74] However, controlling sexuality took on an important role in the context of colonial and semi-colonial struggles for hegemony. The subjugation of women's sexuality metaphorically represented the subjugation of their country. Restrictions on women's presence in the public sphere were, in many cases, enforced by local communities as a reaction to nineteenth-century European expansionism and justified with recourse to reputed indigenous morals.[75] As the restriction of women's sexual availability fell under the family's right to privacy, the public women, whose sexuality could not be controlled through these channels, became a particular topic of debate. This concerned both sides involved: protecting the public women of one's own collectivity from foreign invaders,[76] but also protecting the women originating from the (real or imagined) colonial rulers' motherland from the hands of the colonial subjects. If Austria's and Hungary's women were not impeccable, but could be bought and sold in the streets of Constantinople, they were thus subject to the rules of free trade that supplied any Ottoman holding the necessary cash with European knives, pocket watches and bicycles. This implied that the colonial rulers had symbolically lost their potency to govern in Constantinople. It was of no consequence for this scenario that the women concerned usually did not originate from the Monarchy's centers of Vienna and Budapest, but from its peripheral population – Serbs from Bačka, Jews and Poles from Galicia –[77] or that the Habsburg state had adopted a policy of regulation, rather than prohibition, with regard to its internal prostitution.[78] Habsburg subjects as a whole had to be objects of respect in the Ottoman sphere, if the Monarchy was to maintain its stakes in the Eastern Question.

The increased visibility of indecent European women led to generalizations about Western decadence. Women from Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland, etc. played a vital role in education in the Ottoman Empire. Institutions were in danger of losing their prestige if they came to be associated with prostitution, as was the case in 1895 when one of the charges of the Prussian deaconesses in Smyrna was found to be working in a local brothel.[79] But more importantly, West European women staffed the more prestigious schools, whether as nuns, deaconesses, or secular teachers. If their morality came to be doubted, the institutions themselves were affected.

The impact of inner-Ottoman discussions about Western female decency becomes most apparent with regard to domestic educators. Many upper-middle- and upper-class families hired women from France, Switzerland, Austria, or Germany to teach their children European languages and customs from a young age onwards. But this custom came under strong criticism. As early as 1888, the Salonica newspaper *Pharos tis Makedonias* warned that the newly-established railway link between that city and Austria-Hungary would inundate Macedonia with women of loose morals, seducing the helpless local male youth to their "Western perversions" and "the poisonous seeds of social dissipation and corruption which we euphemistically call European civilization."[80] The strong anti-European language that is induced by the mere fear of the arrival of Austrian loose women is noteworthy for a newspaper that, in other contexts, did not hesitate to portray Salonica and its Greeks in particular as exemplary of European refinement. In the course of the next decades, the newspapers at various times elaborated on the moral dangers of the young women to whom the upper class entrusted their children. According to local standards, the foreigners wore very revealing clothing and were too unashamed in the presence of the other sex. Although these articles are clearly influenced by their authors' petit bourgeois envy of the high society's access to education, in 1901 the Ottoman government considered measures for the removal of foreign women considered indecent from private employment as wet-nurses, dry-nurses and educators. It was particularly offended by the domestic employee's immodest or obscene way of dressing that was supposedly incompatible with Islamic morals and negatively influenced the children in their care, especially the girls.[81] In 1904, the Smyrniote German Protestant pastor noticed a trend in local society to replace Western educators with indigenous ones versed in French or German.[82]

The reputation of European (and in particular Austrian) women's chastity was at stake, and so, indirectly, was Western predominance in the Ottoman educational field, if Habsburg subjects publicly practiced prostitution in the streets of Pera and Galata. If these spheres were to be protected, the pimps and prostitutes would have to disappear outright or at least keep a low profile. To succeed in this endeavor, the diplomats were obliged to clamp down hard on their compatriots' activities. They repeatedly reminded Vienna to pressure the Monarchy's municipalities to be more scrupulous when issuing passports. They cooperated with police authorities in Galicia and Bukovina to clamp down on itinerant traffickers. To escape the consulate's pressure, many pimps and some prostitutes acquired Ottoman passports. Within a short time, with local help, the Galician pimps started to beat the consulates at their own game. While claiming to protect the rights of their subjects, the foreign consulates attempted to have a word in Ottoman affairs, thus giving their subjects, even the Orient drifters, a strong resource to call on, in their social interactions in the Ottoman sphere. However, when the actions of Habsburg subjects were clearly detrimental to the Dual Monarchy's image, they managed to escape persecution by defecting to the enemy camp, i.e. claiming Ottoman nationality. A mixture of corruption by lower-level policemen and immigration officers, the stalemate of the two authorities trying to assert their executive powers against each other and a nationalist glee at seeing the Austrians and Hungarians unable to stop their pimps from walking freely through the streets of Constantinople or to save their women from being bought and sold in the local brothels, combined to create a carefree atmosphere for Austrian pimps on the shores of the Bosporus.

Needless to say, this confrontation worsened after the declaration of constitutional rule and the annexation crisis in 1908. Not only were the local authorities scrupulous about protecting the rights of their newly-won Galicia-born citizens, but they also declined to arrest foreigners at their embassy's request. In 1911, the Pera police's refusal to arrest two Austrians, sparked a note by the European Powers to the Porte, threatening to make such arrests in the future by means of a mob recruited from the embassies' staffs. The Viennese ministry had to remind the Constantinople embassy of the futility of such threats.[83] The situation continued to deteriorate. The consulate next attempted a much more rigorous policy of deportations of prostitutes and punishment of pimps. However, many prostitutes and most pimps had by now adopted Ottoman citizenship. The consulate had forgotten the bitter lessons learnt from the 1890s and claimed that any resistance to clamping down on prostitution stemmed from the constitutionalist regime.[84] In December 1913, it deported 15 prostitutes by ship to Trieste.[85] A few weeks later, the scene mentioned at the beginning of this chapter occurred, where Galata policemen liberated a Galician pimp from Austro-Hungarian custody by beating up the Habsburg consulate employees.

But the Ottoman authorities soon came to realize that the genie could not be leisurely put back into the bottle. They had been willing to turn a blind eye or even be protective of traffickers' and pimps' networks in their capital because of their corrosive effects on European supremacy. They had actively encouraged the pimps' and prostitutes' willingness to casually forfeit king and country. However, when the geopolitical situation changed at the outbreak of the World War, and the council of ministers decided to unilaterally abolish the capitulations and at roughly the same time entered into an uneasy alliance with the German and the Habsburg Empire, the underworld networks and their potential disloyalty continued to cause anxiety. This anxiety now spread to all three governments involved in the alliance. The foreign diplomats and their allies suspected the underworld of siding with the enemy. International counter-espionage investigations were launched against them. The fact that pimps and prostitutes were thought to be associated with the foreign and internal archenemies of the German-Austro-Ottoman alliance – Russians, Armenians and Greeks – demonstrates the degree of fear felt in the face of non-governmental international networks, indentured sexuality and disloyalty, all of which had flourished as a result of the previous Austro-Ottoman confrontation.[86]

Recipients of higher civilization or colonially suppressed? Bosnian Muslims

The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims between two empires

The third group of "European" foreigners in the Ottoman Empire that became the focus of self-assertive measures by the authorities was the one whose Europeanness was contestable not only on social or moral, but especially on geographical grounds: Bosnians and Herzegovinians of Muslim background. It was also by far the largest affected group. In this case, the area of symbolic struggle was neither class, nor gender, but ethnicity. The relevant question was how a number of individuals who are believed to be a collectivity are accommodated into a larger state. More precisely, it was neither the productivity nor the morals of the European powers that were being questioned, but their capability of running an empire or, as the twenty-first century jargon would have it, of "managing multiethnic societies". While Russia, Great Britain and France all occupied territories that were or had been de jure Ottoman, attention was now focused on Bosnia. Austria-Hungary seemed the obvious choice as a member of the Great Powers, whose weaknesses could be publicly demonstrated. Its time of great military might and conquests was over; it had proven itself unable to win a war either with Prussia or the Italian states, nor to independently put down its internal insurrections. It had become necessary for Austria-Hungary to accommodate its internal centrifugal forces by partially integrating them into the state structures and at the same time pitting them against each other in a game of divide et impera. Its activity in the Ottoman economy was noteworthy, but had been far surpassed by others. Also, since the two empires were immediate neighbours, sharing a long land border (allowing for fairly uninhibited exchanges and migrations, as has already been demonstrated) the frictions resulting from these contacts could be exploited, especially after the Habsburgs laid claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Monarchy had portrayed itself as locked into an antagonistic duel with the Sultan during previous centuries, but at the 1878 Berlin Congress it claimed to bring enlightened rule to the neighboring Ottoman provinces that had been the site of recent communal and agrarian strife. The Habsburgs promised communal peace, resolution of the agrarian question, education, rule by law and social and economic progress. In contrast to Great Britain's or Russia's stakes in the Eastern Question, and their respective expansions into Cyprus and Bessarabia, Austria-Hungary's claim did not derive from the questionable strength of its weapons, but had to depend solely on a European *mission civilisatrice* as its justification. Bosnia's traffic infrastructure was developed, and municipal and confessional institutions were restructured to match the Habsburg system. A plethora of academic institutions was established for the purpose of researching and displaying Bosnia as the Austrians wished to see it. Because of Austrian preoccupation with Serbian nationalism after the turn of the century, Muslims were not at the center of imperial attention. The Monarchy's imported administrators explained the Muslims' reluctance both to side with Serbian anti-Habsburg agitation and to openly embrace the Habsburg state institutions as an oriental inability to adapt to "Central European conditions."[87] Their silence was welcome in a state where many groups were very much accustomed to voicing their grievances by playing the ethnic card in an angry and insolent way.

When referring to Bosnia, the Monarchy's elites spoke quite frankly of their colony or *Ersatzkolonie*, congratulating themselves on pacifying a romantic, but barbaric land. The question of why the Habsburg authorities adopted a policy resembling overseas colonialism in order to rule Bosnia, or why, despite large-scale investments, the provincial population was not successfully pacified, will not be discussed here, as this has been dealt with elsewhere.[88] But, it is important to remember that this claim was an affront to the Ottoman side, not least because of the concrete danger of losing two provinces. It also demanded an answer, because Vienna no longer accepted being Constantinople's rival, but claimed to be part of a superior civilization. Once more, resistance took the form of picking on the weakest link, namely the Bosnians and Herzegovinians themselves.

For over a century, the European Great Powers had managed to intervene in Ottoman domestic politics on the pretext of defending the human rights of an oppressed Christian population under Muslim domination. The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the opportunity to turn the tables on a Great Power by challenging that Christian empire's ability to protect the rights and interests of a Muslim population. Immediately after the Berlin Congress, the Hamidian administration began a propaganda campaign among the new Balkan Muslim Diaspora, depicting as mere lip service the attempts by Austria (as well as Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania and, after 1881, Greece) to integrate its new Muslim subjects into the state. Instead, it was suggested that the Balkan Muslims should repatriate to the Ottoman Empire, to live freely among their coreligionists. The Ottoman authorities, however, used the influx of Muslims not to create a militant irredenta, but rather to make the remaining empire demographically more Islamic. In determining where the groups of refugees (*muhacir*) should settle, expediency and demographic manipulation often acted hand in hand. To settle them in the *vilayet* of Kosova (Kosovo) and in Macedonia spared them long voyages to far corners of the empire, but also helped to lower the Christian predominance in the Central Balkans. Likewise, settling them in the *vilayet* of Aydın was facilitated by using the port of Smyrna, but also lowered the local percentage of Christians in a sensitive area. Naturally, the agitation for resettlement resulted in many promises that could not be kept, both concerning the degree of material support and the quality of the land distributed to the *muhacirs*. But contrary to the propaganda, emigration did not simply take the form of giving up everything in order to escape the land of the unbelievers. Following the Berlin Congress, many Bosnian landowners chose to relocate to Constantinople, but they continued to exploit their lands through administrators.[89] Because the Dual Monarchy did not want to give the impression that it was forcing the Bosnian Muslims off their lands, it did not intervene to stop this activity, or the common practice of re-immigration. Thus, the two empires, by competing for the loyalty of the

Bosnian Muslims, created a space in which individuals could maneuver to make the best of both worlds.

The propaganda (and the emigration it caused) was not only used to recruit new Muslim subjects for the remaining Ottoman territories. As in the other two cases mentioned, focusing on Austria's capability or incapability to incorporate the multi-confessional society of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Muslims in particular, served to eclipse other discourses, in this case the Christian empires' self-ascribed role as protectors of Ottoman Christians and as educators for managing multiethnic societies. If the subject was Bosnia, one would not mention Macedonia. Following the 1903 uprisings, the Great Powers had deployed a number of civil and military advisers in the affected provinces. The Ottoman side wished to limit this mission's influence and duration. If Austria-Hungary proved itself incapable of installing good governance in its part of the Balkans, the desire to become more deeply entangled in other parts would wane and the Western public would be more open to the ideas expressed by the influential German Turkophile, Colmar von der Goltz Pasha. Having described the dangerous mix of regional nationalisms all laying claim to Macedonia, he concludes:

> One must concede to the Turkish administration that, despite all its shortcomings, it knows perfectly how to dampen the conflicts and to prevent a violent outbreak of national rivalries through an intricate system of changing preferences. Maybe no other would master this difficult task so skilfully. Herein lies its best claim to its rights.[90]

If the Balkan inhabitants were too hopelessly entangled in their strife for a Westerner to make sense of it, and the Turks had somehow in the last few centuries managed to pacify the "powder keg," then Europe might be better off leaving it to the regional experts in managing multiethnic societies. Furthermore, Europe might then refrain from further meddling in Macedonia and Bosnia and respect Ottoman sovereignty in Southeast Europe.

The annexation: new constraints, new shifting loyalties

Although the Austrians' intention to stay in Bosnia for good had been obvious for some time, the formal annexation in 1908 struck a blow to the Ottoman self-image at a time when the new regime was in desperate need to demonstrate the advantages of popular government. An offensive war was beyond the Sublime State's capabilities, even though it was considered.[91] The government was forced to formally accept the loss rather quickly. For a time, public sentiment was harnessed in a show of strength to boycott Austrian and Hungarian products.[92] This was, however, accompanied by the strategy the authorities had also chosen to utilize in the case of the prostitutes and the vagabonds, namely to use the internal contradictions in Habsburg's claim to a higher civilization against it.

Once the Ottomans had acquiesced to the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attention was once more focused on Macedonia. Instead of ending the propaganda urging Bosnian Muslims to leave, members of the Committee for Union and Progress and other activists radicalized it beyond the constraints applied during Hamidian times. Their hope was to use a mass exodus to colonize Macedonia, in this way manipulating the religious and ethnic balance in that part of the Balkans on an unprecedented scale; they intended to mess up the *Macedonia di frutta* by adding a heavy tinge of green. In an interview Nazim Bey gave in 1909, he claimed that 200,000 Bosnian Muslims were waiting to emigrate at the first signal from the Ottoman government and that as many as one million Muslims under Christian sovereignty in Southeast and East Europe were waiting to follow their lead. He even tried to convince Zionists to settle in Macedonia in order to diminish the Christian percentage of the population.[93] These megalomaniac plans, of course, met with much less favour with the addressees of the propaganda. Although many people had relocated to Ottoman soil immediately after the annexation, following the treaty between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, the majority of Bosnian Muslims felt they had been sold out cheap by their former de jure countrymen, and they were now carefully weighing the pros and cons of staying and leaving.[94] The Ottoman authorities tried to conquer their reluctance by raising small-scale bureaucratic hurdles and annoyances.

The annexation had further complicated the already confusing legal situation of Austrian and Hungarian residents and travellers in the Ottoman Empire under the capitulations. The Ottoman authorities continued to appeal to Bosnian Muslims to relocate to Ottoman soil and promised to integrate them into a Muslim society. The Dual Monarchy accepted their right to emigrate as part of the deal to have the annexation recognized by the Porte. Emigrants had to obtain a certificate from the Bosnian state government before leaving. But a large number of Bosnians, profiting from the two empires' efforts to woo them, preferred not to cut their ties to their homeland so definitely. They travelled to the Ottoman territories on a regular Austrian passport to see if the Sublime State could keep its promises to them and also possibly to retain property in Bosnia. Thus, their attitude was much more practical than the Young Turk propaganda would have it: in effect, they compared what the Ottoman and the Habsburg authorities had to offer and then decided which side of the border seemed more promising, or how to combine both – owning established landed property in the Dual Monarchy and profiting from land distribution by the Ottomans (which could be resold).[95] The problems arose when these travellers wished to return to the Dual Monarchy. Their passports had been confiscated upon entry. When the visiting Bosnians asked for them to be returned in order to go back to Austria, their request was denied, but they were offered Ottoman passports. Some travellers who had managed to retain their Austrian passports were hindered from returning because of some missing stamps. In another incident, Bosnians with official "*muhacir* status" were not permitted to leave Ottoman soil for Austria on the grounds that they had to repay a debt to the local association of *muhacirs* for supposed aid they had received. When criticized by Habsburg consulates for such disrespect of capitulatory rights, the local authorities simply replied truthfully that they had no new instructions from their superiors on how to treat Bosnians. Whereas the Habsburg state had hoped to end its entanglement with Ottoman internal affairs by annexing its *Ersatzkolonie* outright, thus creating a clear-cut division between civilized Europe on the one hand and Ottoman semi-barbarity on the other, the practical result was actually the opposite. Since many Bosnians returning home were forced to accept Ottoman passports, the number of "foreigners" in Bosnia rose. While the authorities were hesitant to hinder the return of those Bosnians who apparently preferred life in the Dual Monarchy, they were also wary of the fact that Ottoman propagandists for emigration might be among them. However, contrary to its intentions, the Sublime State was also creating a new population "loyal" to the Dual Monarchy, as many Habsburg subjects were stranded in the *vilayet* of Kosova while trying to get their passports back. Furthermore, the *muhacirs* willing to annul their emigration, despite being de jure Ottoman subjects, now turned to the Habsburg consulates for help.[96] Thus the two Southeast European empires became even more hopelessly entangled than before.

A new problem was created by the growing number of Bosnians on Ottoman soil, resulting from a legal loophole the Austrian government had overseen when the decision to annex had been promulgated. In the Bosnian reforms, the authorities had gone to great lengths to create an internal framework for Muslim public life in the Monarchy. The office of *reis-ül islam* as head of Muslim affairs, and of all Bosnian Sharia courts in particular, was established to replace the sovereignty of the Constantinople-based *sheikh-ül islam*. This had, aside from propaganda value, the advantage of severing ties with Constantinople. Even the army introduced the office of an Islamic military chaplain. But now the question became: who had jurisdiction over the Muslim Habsburg subjects on Ottoman soil? As Austrians, they had access to capitulatory status. But since their home state subjected them to Sharia courts and the Sharia was a law claiming validity for all Muslims independent of nationality, should they not be subject to the local Sharia courts in the Ottoman Empire? Or should the consulates, in order to uphold the Austrians' status of extraterritoriality, try them according to the civic code which was in force in the Austrian *Erbländer* (hereditary domains) but not in Bosnia? Or should the Habsburg consulates set up consular Sharia courts parallel to the Ottoman ones?

It was to enforce the view that all Muslims on Ottoman soil were subject to local Sharia jurisdiction that, as mentioned in the beginning, the *vilayet* of Kosova sided with Smajo Mašinović's wife in their family dispute, simply because Smajo intended to leave Üsküp and she was staying. The following months saw a number of similar private law cases with one empire siding with one family member, the other empire automatically defending the other. Once the urgency of the matter became apparent, the Vienna Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs struggled to come up with a solution. They decided that all Bosnians on Ottoman soil should resolve their legal matters before Sharia courts located in Bosnia, a ruling which the Ottoman side rightfully rejected as an undue hardship.[97] While these kinds of diplomatic and administrative squabbles did little to improve the security of the legal position of Bosnians abroad, it was successful in another way. It made apparent that the Habsburg state was, despite all propaganda to the contrary, not accepting Bosnians as full-fledged members in the family of nations under the umbrella of a multi-cultural state. If it had, it would have had to stand up for them in the semi-barbaric Ottoman territories and grant them full capitulatory status. Instead, the Monarchy referred them to their provincial institutions, which in this light appeared more like a limited colonial home rule than the justice of a glorious empire.

In the end, however, the Dual Monarchy was able to feel triumphant in the battle for the loyalties of expatriate Bosnians. When in 1912 the Serbian and Bulgarian army invaded the *vilayet* of Kosova, many Muslims, including those originating from Bosnia, fled to Salonica. Following the almost complete disappearance of Turkey in Europe, thousands of Bosnians petitioned the Habsburg consulate for permission to return to their homeland. According to the consul general, the number of applicants in Salonica at one point reached 10,000, but as their registration and verification took time, about half of them chose to once again change loyalties and opt to "repatriate" to Anatolia. The scenes in front of the consulate – the desperate, dirty, infected refugees pleading to be shipped off to Trieste – reaffirmed the Austrians in their attitude that they were bestowing an imperial magnanimous favour on their disloyal colonial subjects, rather than giving fellow citizens what was their right.[98]

Conclusions

Europe, in its imperialist self-image of the late nineteenth century, claimed to represent a superior civilization, which supposedly had a positive effect on both upper and lower classes, men and women and dependent ethnicities. In the Balkan, Aegean and West Anatolian regions of the semi-colonial Ottoman Empire, these claims to superiority were challenged, because various internal social groups desired a share of the symbolically valuable etiquette "European" for themselves and were not resigned to leave it to the Western and Central Europeans alone. While these internal groups had neither the unity, nor the resolve, nor the power to oppose the implementation of foreign notions of "Europe" as a whole, they nevertheless had some capability to sabotage it. In their challenge, they focused on the weakest link they could actually find in the imperialist reasoning of Western superiority, namely the sub-proletarian vagabonds, the underworld pimps and prostitutes, as well as Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims present in the Ottoman Empire. By increasing these marginal actors' visibility through public debate in newspapers, by criminalization or tolerance, by impeding or expediting their movements, the indigenous social groups hoped to focus attention on these less glorious subjects of the Great Powers and through them to counter the European self-congratulatory image. The vagabonds counteracted the image of the productive and intelligent foreman, engineer, instructor, or manager and their right to a superior class status; the prostitutes were used to erode the reputation of European women as educators possessing superior knowledge and morals; and the Bosnians were examples of the Christian states' failure to integrate a community of Muslim subjects into their empires.

The three targeted groups soon realized that the new attention they attracted opened windows of opportunities for them. The vagrants now more brazenly demanded and often received support; the pimps and prostitutes could change nationalities with ease, offering their loyalty to whoever would let them carry on their business in peace; and the Bosnian landowners, while publicly deploring the Austrian occupation, used the benefits they continued to enjoy under the Habsburgs to live the easy life in Constantinople. The affected European empires and their local representatives were early on aware of the detrimental effect the presence of their marginalized subjects could have on the former's role in the Ottoman lands, and tried to control them through repression or accommodation, but they failed in the end. They resigned themselves to appeasing the vagabonds through charity, tolerating the prostitutes and recognizing that Bosnians on Ottoman soil were effectively Ottoman subjects. The beginning of the twentieth century, with its heightened anxiety regarding issues of nation and empire, brought a confrontation concerning the status of all three groups. As vagabonds were branded a public security threat by the new constitutional regime, the Ottoman citizens' rights of Galicia-born pimps were discovered and efforts were made to transform Bosnians into a "settler-colonialist" community even against their will. The Habsburg and other diplomats countered by discovering the vagabonds' citizens' rights, clamping down on their countries' pimps and prostitutes, while branding the Bosnians as happy (but still semi-colonial) subjects within the Habsburg Empire.

Needless to say, this fight over identities and loyalties of groups that had arranged themselves to a life in-between the European and the Ottoman and profiting from that position was detrimental to the freedoms necessary for such an in-between life style, despite the short-term benefits they could reap by being championed by one or the other side. Failing to tackle the larger and more inclusive meaning of "Europe" itself, and focusing instead on those who fell short while trying to live up to it, led to the elimination of several distinct life-patterns that crossed the theoretically so impressive boundary between the metropolis and its Eastern Mediterranean periphery at the beginning of the twentieth century.

2

SCHOOLS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF SOCIETY: SCHOOL PROPAGANDA IN BITOLA, 1860–1912

Bernard Lory

The "Macedonian Question" has deployed a panoply of propaganda materials that have been translated into Western languages and widely disseminated. Contemporary researchers who are involved in exploring this central issue in Balkan history will invariably come across school statistics: they aim to show how many schools, students and teachers from each ethno-linguistic group were present in any given administrative district in any given year. These statistics are sometimes comparative, and include Greek, Bulgarian[1], Romanian and Serbian schools. It should be noted that Turkish and Jewish schools were almost always ignored. School maps were sometimes included as a complement to this propaganda, which aimed to show not only the geographical spread, but also the comparative numbers of the different schools. Two identical maps entitled "Maps of Christian Schools in Macedonia" were published in 1902. The first, obviously Bulgarian, covered all three *vilayets*; the other, obviously Greek, only included the *vilayets* of Salonica and Monastir. In both cases, the colour red was used for whichever group – either Bulgarian or Greek –was being highlighted.[2] It is worth exploring such an atypical use of cartographic materials.

An initial reaction is that the school maps echo the ethnic maps: it would be logical to assume that the presence of a Greek school indicated the presence of a Greek population. Yet this is not necessarily the case: children from Aromanian, Orthodox Albanian and Patriarchist Bulgarian villages often


5 СРПСКА КРАЉ. ПОШТА
5 СРПСКА КРАЉ. ПОШТА
Μοναστήριον. – Η' γυμναστική ἐν τοῖς ἑλλην. σχολείοις.
Monastir. — La gymnastique aux écoles grecques.

Fig. 2: Greek school girls from Monastir/Bitola doing gymnastics, postcard about 1910. Source: Basil Gounaris, *The Greek Struggle for Macedonia through the Photographer's Lens, 1904–08,* Thessaloniki, 2001.

went to Greek schools. In such cases, the school map was a way of establishing geographic landmarks in a cultural space or zone of influence that went beyond a strictly ethnographic framework. It is true that until the late nineteenth century, Greek education retained tremendous prestige among non-Greek speakers.[3]

The language of education was not necessarily the same as the language spoken in the home: there are multiple examples of this, both from the past and today. Therefore, these school maps allowed for the establishment of landmarks for a geographic space that was more advantageous for the national cause that they aimed at defending. They implicitly delimited a "national legitimacy zone", and as such sketched out the borders of a future carving up of the Ottoman Empire's European possessions. They also had another value as propaganda tools aimed at a Western public: they presented one or another group of the Balkans as being particularly advanced in the educational process, i.e. as being particularly open to modernity and civilization, and therefore qualified to join the ranks of European peoples. In this way, schools were a type of certificate of Europeanability that the people of the Balkans awarded themselves.[4]

The significance of these statistical tables and school maps therefore lies more in the implicit message that they carry than in the information they are supposed to provide: who would bother to go and check that a given village did indeed have a Bulgarian school on a given date? Cross-checking this information against non-Bulgarian sources would not be impossible, but it would require painstaking research. Indeed, there is an abundance of material on the school situation in Macedonia: it was produced by the Ottoman authorities, the Bulgarian Exarchate, the various Greek *Silloghos*, the Serbian Saint Sava Society, Catholic and Protestant missionaries, the AIU (Alliance Israélite Universelle) and others. These sources were used in monographs dealing with the different Macedonian communities.[5] An interesting tradition of memoir writing also exists in Bulgaria, where a great number of teachers' autobiographies can be found; they are detailed narratives that often make for very pleasant reading, and that one is terribly tempted to take at face value, the reader's captatio benevolentiae being skilfully brought into play.[6] Revolutionaries' autobiographies also provide some information about their school days. Furthermore, the activities of Western missionary schools were very well documented, although too often as a way of justifying their existence. Consuls appointed to Macedonia collected information of a diverse nature, but travellers' narratives, on the other hand, were superficial and only reflected the official party line of the local Balkan people they encountered.

For the most part, this information is quantitative: how many schools, students and teachers were there? Who paid for the buildings? How much were teachers paid and by whom? We have a fairly accurate picture of the teacher-training curriculum, their transfers from one post to another, their conflicts with their hierarchy or with their colleague-rivals from other communities. We also know all about school curricula, both annual and weekly programmes. However, it is difficult to come to terms with the most important issue: what results did these school systems achieve? Did they contribute effectively to the Europeanization of educated youth? Or did schools in fact contribute to plans that were less pure than simply spreading progress? We will try to address these questions, especially in the context of Bitola/Monastir, a particularly multi-cultural city in ethno-religious terms, where the different school systems were engaged in an intense competition with each other in the period between the Crimean and the Balkan Wars.

School education: serving which purpose?

The basic purpose of education is the reproduction of knowledge. For hundreds of years, from about the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Balkan education served to reproduce the medieval knowledge needed for the proper functioning of the religious life of each *millet*, whether it be Christian, Muslim, or Jewish. Its principal task was to teach the liturgical language, the



Fig. 3: Bridge on the Dragor – the first Western representation of Monastir/Bitola by Edward Lear in 1848. Source: *Macedonia, 4000 years of Greek History and Civilization,* Athens, 1892, p. 372.

texts needed for worship, the sacred or learned writings inherited from preceding generations. This knowledge was transmitted through reading and writing, which was of very limited use outside the religious domain, with the possible exceptions of marginalia, business correspondence, etc. The knowledge transmitted by schools was therefore only necessary for the religious elite of each *millet*. This knowledge could easily fulfil the community's social needs: the young Matija Nenadović was considered a paragon of science by the villagers because he could determine which days of the calendar were days of fasting.[7]

The knowledge disseminated in schools was strictly internal to each community.[8] It was taught in the form of a learned language different from the one used for oral communications: Arabic, Byzantine Greek, Slavon, or Hebrew. The fact that each of these languages required a different alphabet was not considered an obstacle: no one would ever have considered obtaining instruction from a neighbouring community.[9] The learning process itself was based on rote learning much more than on understanding; the same teacher would teach pupils of different ages and levels; religious texts were used as textbooks.

Until the nineteenth century, knowledge in the Balkans was essentially reproduced, not in schools but at home, in the street, in church and, above all, in the workplace. This involved an oral transmission, based on speech and practical knowledge, which did not require the use of writing. Community-based and "Ottoman," i.e. inter-community education, were intertwined. The *čaršija,* the town bazaar, and the *pazar*, the local market, were the main locations for learning behavioural norms and the linguistic basics needed for communicating with members of other communities.

A trend aimed at modernizing education arose in the Central Balkans towards the middle of the eighteenth century, in Moshopole or Siatista for example. But a dynamic city like Bitola was not affected by this evolution until the 1830s, when the first school for mutual education (*elleniko sholio*), based on the Bell-Lancaster method (*allilodhidhaktiki methodos*),[10] appeared in the Christian community. This represented a veritable watershed in teaching methods: the idea of dividing classes into levels was introduced; advanced students were drafted to teach beginners as a way of overcoming the shortage of teachers; for the first time, educational tools in the form of purpose-designed classroom display panels and textbooks were used.

Teaching content also evolved. Above and beyond reading and writing for religious purposes, secular subjects such as arithmetic, geometry, history, geography, earth sciences, the rudiments of physics and chemistry, etc. were introduced. Textbooks were often translated from the French, either directly or via Greek. They were fairly clumsily adapted for students living in an Ottoman context. The only subject that was directly aimed at Ottoman social life, learning Turkish, was not affected by this new teaching method: it was generally handled by a local *hoca* or *kâtib*, who applied the traditional rote learning methods. As time went by, the gap between the way Turkish and other subjects was taught lessened the value of Turkish, leading to a rejection of the language by pupils. French, on the other hand, was a much-valued language. In the late nineteenth century, Greek ceased to be taught in Bulgarian schools.[11] Teaching the languages of other ethno-religious groups was not the domain of the classroom.

Education in the Muslim *millet* experienced a similar evolution. In this case, however, the impetus came not from local communities, but from the Ottoman state. Alongside the traditional religious educational system for primary (*mekteb*) and secondary (*medrese*) schools, secondary schooling in secular subjects was offered at two levels (*rüşdiye*) (middle school, with a four-year curriculum), followed by *idadiye* (high school, with a three-year curriculum). While *medrese* were still financed by local funds from *vakf* and continued to provide only a religious education, *rüşdiye* and *idadiye* were paid for by the state and were open to all *millets*, at least in theory, since in practice language was a barrier. The flagship of Ottoman education in Bitola was the military



Fig. 4: The Third Battalion of Light Infantry of the Ottoman army sworn in the constitution by Remzi Bey, photography by the Manaki Brothers, Monastir/Bitola ca. 1908. Source: *Manastir'da Ilân-i Hürriyet 1908-09*, ed. Roni Margulies, Istanbul, 1997.

idadiye, one of only nine schools of this type in the Empire (Among the young men educated there was a certain Mustafa Kemal.)

An analogous dual-educational system can be found in the Jewish community in the late nineteenth century: the exclusively religious *Talmud-Torah* school was financed locally, while the AIU school was open to secular subjects.[12]

Even according to these new educational standards, schools were still the concern of each *millet* and hardly prepared pupils for a shared Ottoman lifestyle. Paradoxically, the body of lay knowledge presented in each of the different school systems (Ottoman, Greek, Bulgarian, Aromanian, Jewish and Serbian) was remarkably similar. It is therefore possible to say that a foundation of shared knowledge, inspired by Western Europe, was being dispensed simultaneously in each community. Nevertheless, there was no attempt to establish cross-community connections that would have contributed to weaving a unified Ottoman social fabric.

Who were the recipients of this new education? First of all, city children, boys from the classes of shopkeepers and trades people (*esnaf*), followed by children from larger villages, and gradually a school network spread throughout the entire province. Schooling for girls developed in a parallel fashion, also spreading from the cities and towns to the villages, but with a distinct time lag compared to schooling for boys. In concrete terms, the new forms of education were not particularly useful for the transmission of knowledge needed by trades people or agricultural workers: young boys went on learning their trades from their fathers or superiors. Granted, knowing how to read, write, or count was surely useful, but it was not indispensable. What then was the point of school learning? What justified the enormous schooling effort that unfolded in Macedonia in the late nineteenth century?

It would appear that the most immediate practical use of the skills acquired at school was the possibility of reading newspapers. This was the main method of mass communication elaborated in the nineteenth century. Books were still fairly rare in the Ottoman Balkans. Newspapers, however, circulated with some ease and offered their readers access to a range of information that went well beyond the information that could be spread orally. News had, of course, always travelled throughout the Empire, whether it was carried by swift Tatar messengers, disseminated haphazardly by caravans and regional fairs, brought home by workers returning from *gurbet*, or peddled by taxidiote monks. The development of newspapers changed both the temporal scale of this information (more recent, more frequent) and, more importantly, its spatial scale (the same news was spread in identical terms throughout an entire country). The themes addressed by the press went beyond the framework of Ottoman public life, providing an opening to Europe and the rest of the world. From this perspective, the boom in schooling, together with the boom in the press, was one of the conditions for the opening up of the Balkan peoples. In the time period which concerns us, it is undoubtedly what people meant by the word “progress”.[13] It is also worth noting that during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the social composition of cities was gradually growing with the introduction of new social categories: trained doctors were replacing empirical ones; the profession of law emerged along with a new judicial system; and the civil service grew, as evidenced by the *salname*.[14] Each of these professions required a good level of secondary education, with training completed at institutions of higher learning in Istanbul or abroad. As civil servants were mainly Muslim, competition arose between the *medrese* and the *rüşdiye* paths for the training of senior civil servants.[15]

Greenhouses for nationalism

The ideology of progress that triumphed in nineteenth-century Europe (and which was not discredited until the disaster of the First World War) also had its propagandists in the Balkans, namely teachers. The teacher's social position was not a particularly comfortable one, in that he or she was an employee. In a Balkan society that valued independent master-trades people and farmers, it was a position of inferiority, placing the teacher on the same level as the apprentice.[16] Nor were teachers public servants, which would have enhanced their status ("living off the imperial coffers"), but employees of the community, which meant that they were subject to their peers. The available autobiographies show how they had to fight with the community elites (*čorbadži*, *epitrops*) in order to have their social utility recognised, especially in cases where it was necessary to set up a school in a new area. Of course, we can observe a sort of emulation from city to city, from community to community, from village to village, to have a school and a teacher, but the reasons behind this desire remain elusive. We believe that, generally speaking, it was the teachers themselves, whose ideas were taken up by the national press (written by former teachers), who were responsible for promoting education for its own sake. The profession of teacher was justified for its own sake, rather than being a response to social demands. (Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, the profession of teacher became more and more that of a public servant: a significant number of teachers were paid by relatively distant institutions – *silloghos*, Exarchate, AIU – and therefore no longer depended on the low-level intrigues of the local community[17]).

In order to convince local elites of the necessity to employ them, teachers developed the themes of progress and Europeanization. However, these proved to be insufficient in the conservative atmosphere that predominated in the Ottoman province. It was therefore necessary to bolster these themes with a more convincing ideology: nationalism. We can affirm that it was teachers who introduced and spread national ideologies in Macedonia, where they gained much ground. They were in fact "professional patriots" who earned their livelihoods by convincing the denominational community that employed them that it was in reality a national community.

Elsewhere in Europe, education also served the national ideology, but it also served the state at the same time. National polarisation in Macedonia was exacerbated as education was less and less financed by local communities and more and more with assistance generously conferred by the Balkan states.[18] The local *obština* (*cemât*), organised and financed by the local ecclesiastical authority assisted by the council of *epitrops*, lost their financial control over education. The considerable patriotic donations that the evergetes made to educational works or to hospitals became very rare towards the end of the nineteenth century. They were replaced by political-cultural bodies financed externally. Macedonian schools were reliant on this external assistance for their investments (rent or construction of buildings) as well as for their operational budgets (salaries). The programmes and manuals used were those of neighbouring countries. Quite often teachers were not Ottoman subjects, but came from the relevant countries, even though Istanbul tried to exercise control at this level. With a view to eluding that control, the small Balkan states relied on the exceptional status already granted by the Ottoman Empire to the establishments of Catholic and Protestant missionaries, actively supported by the Great Powers.

It would appear that the inhabitants of Macedonia avoided taking responsibility for the education of their children: they gave free rein to the propaganda programs that they considered advantageous to them, in that they provided free education. We are struck by the very short term vision with which educational issues were treated. Only the families of major merchants had any genuine educational strategies for their offspring. Trades people, who were more numerous in Bitola, were very vulnerable to economic fluctuations and to life's misfortunes such as illnesses, deaths, or fires. "Eastern fatalism" was the dominant attitude to existence and not the "Weberian Protestant ethic". It was quite usual to take children out of school, sometimes at an early age, and place them in apprenticeships if the circumstances required; as such it was not unusual for a young man to complete his studies at the age of 18 to 20 years, after a number of years of professional life.[19] For parents, the existence of free education or the possibility of a scholarship were determinative factors in their decision to enrol a child in school or to allow him to continue his education. That children were to a certain extent moulded by their school education was a question of their personal destiny and not the responsibility of their parents.

This failure to take of responsibility also applied at the local community level and the percentage of external aid in the financing of Bitola's schools was significant:

– In 1889, the city's 11 Greek schools employed 36 teachers and received 1,680 pupils; the global budget amounted to 237,811 piastres, of which 85,000 were provided by the local community (*kinotis*), 105,000 (44,1%) by the Committee of Athens and 47,811 remained in deficit[20].
– In 1908–09, the 13 Bulgarian schools had 56 teachers and received 1,855 pupils; the local community (*obština*) contributed 330 Turkish lira to their upkeep and the Bulgarian Exarchate financed the rest.[21]

– In 1907, the three Jewish schools with 17 teachers had a budget of 21,540 gold-francs, of which 19,634 were guaranteed: 5,400 by the AIU, 250 by the Anglo-Jewish Association, 460 by the Ottoman State (or 31,1% of external subsidies), 5,074 by the local community, 8,450 by enrolment fees paid by parents; a deficit of 1,906 francs remained.[22]

It is not possible to understand the exacerbation of national conflicts in Macedonia unless we first understand the aspects of internecine war. Until around the time of the Crimean War, Orthodox Christians formed a single community, the *Rum milleti*, which exercised a type of monopoly over education. In Bitola, this was first contested in 1857 with the establishment of a Lazarite mission school: in an attempt to overcome the profound local aversion to Catholicism, French missionaries developed teaching methods in Bulgarian as a way of attracting support for their cause from the city's significant Slavic population. The Bulgarian propagandist they recruited, Vasil Mančev, left them after a few years to open a private Bulgarian school. In 1869, a Bulgarian school *obština* was created and was soon recognised by the local authorities. From then on, national rivalries were structured by the competition between Greek schools (which were in fact run by Aromanians) and Bulgarian schools (which were in fact run by Macedonian-Slavs). The picture was further complicated by the opening of Aromanian schools (financed by Bucharest) in 1878, Serbian schools in 1897 and Albanian schools in 1909. Not to mention the marginal and intermittent presence of a Protestant school. At this point, all these schools were actually courting the same school population, that of the Orthodox Christians of the former *Rum milleti.*

The fact that education was free was a highly attractive factor in winning over parents, but this was not a tenable strategy for the long term.[23] The local communities (*obština*), aided by their governing bodies at the Imperial level (*millet*) and with the support of institutions of the Balkan states, made every effort to provide diversified education by gradually enlarging their field of action: schools for girls were added to schools for boys; in the 1890s, kindergartens were introduced[24]; primary school curricula and later secondary school curricula, were progressively extended to baccalaureate level, qualifying students for enrolment at the University of Athens (1880) and of Sofia (1899); boarding schools were opened to allow gifted village children to be educated in the towns; primary schools were set up in the various city *mahalle*; specialised schools (seminaries, professional schools) appeared at the end of this period.

The buildings dedicated to education, which were originally simple residential buildings, were replaced by buildings with impressive neo-classic facades, often featured on postcards: the idea was to stand out in the urban landscape. Similarly, school holidays (the Three Holy Hierarchs, Saints Cyril and Methodius) were celebrated by processions that traversed the entire city. Visiting foreigners, in particular journalists, were invited to visit school establishments and award "Europeanization Certificates" to each community. At the end of the school year, Ottoman and Consular authorities were invited to "open house" events.

These interns in uniform, who could be seen parading the city streets, were de facto removed from traditional socialisation. Instead of spending their teenage years in the buzzing polyglot *čaršija*, they tended to be isolated in a protected and highly patriotic environment. If we consider the Patriarchist seminary established in 1900–01 in the monastery of Barešani, located some kilometres from the city, we can see that half of the teaching hours were devoted to learning the Greek language.[25]

Traditional "Ottoman" education, that of the street and bazaar, including a mix of distrustful courtesy, humour and ruse, was not able to withstand the shock of competition from the schools. It was totally empirical in nature, residing more in behaviour and in the art of dealing with certain situations than in doctrine or charters. A series of polyglot adages or humorous anecdotes exemplified this art, not of living together but of living alongside each other, which characterised the Ottoman city. In contrast, schools provided a structured and extremely consistent discourse. Nationalism had a response to every question; its power of persuasion could overcome even the most solid souls.

In what way did the education received by students prepare them for life in Ottoman society? They learnt the Empire's official language only summarily, although they might know how to sing "Padişahım çok yaşa" ("Long live my Sultan"). They did not learn any languages of neighbouring communities. During the Young Turk revolution, the city's intelligentsia realised that the only language with which it could communicate with representatives of other communities was French!

Nevertheless, it should be noted that certain families were aware that the educational choices they made for their children could limit their future careers, and we find cases of "school nomads", children who successively attended schools of different denominations. Vasil Šanov from the Kastoria region had lodgings at the Bulgarian boarding school but took courses at the Bitola *idadiye* with a view to becoming a Turkish teacher in the Bulgarian education system; Luka Džerov, born in Bitola, took five classes in Salonica's Bulgarian high school, followed by two years with the Lazarites in the city where he was born, to ensure a good level of French; Georgi Pophristov spent one year in the Greek school of the village of Bukovo, followed by four years in the Bulgarian progymnasium of Bitola. Greek families sent their daughters to the Catholic school. These "transfusions" were the source of many rivalries: a boy from the village of Vărbnik (Kastoria region) spent two years at the Serbian boarding school in Bitola and was then enticed away by the Greek Consul, who obtained a scholarship for him at the Greek high school of Korça.[26] The Jewish community appears to have been the most eclectic when it came to the education of its children. Jewish students, both boys and girls, were to be found in Catholic schools; in 1889, well-off Jewish families preferred sending their boys to the Greek high school and their girls to the Aromanian school, rather than to their own community schools. A Jewish student left the AIU school to follow the Turkish curriculum for two years and then obtained a scholarship for studying in Jerusalem. At the same time, the son of an Ottoman colonel took classes at the AIU, apparently with a view to perfecting his French.[27]

Nevertheless, these cases were exceptions to the rule, and the great majority of Bitola's youth was educated with a view to life not in the Ottoman Empire, but in a strange relationship with a far-off "homeland" centred in Athens, Sofia, or Belgrade. They were made to feel that they were not living in a real place at the right time, but that their lives should be elsewhere in a shadowy and idealised national dream. Schools were not moulding Ottoman citizens but suggested, on the contrary, that the Ottoman Empire was an anomaly on its way out.

Did this essentially patriotic education, which was xenophobic vis-à-vis its neighbours and disloyal to the State, at least provide an opening to the outside world, a form of access to universal culture? The judgment expressed in 1885 by the Russian Consul, Skrjabin, who adopted the conservative (reactionary) viewpoint that was fashionable under the reign of Tsar Alexander III, was extremely severe:

> We are amazed at the quantity of schools in the *vilayet* of Bitol', particularly in those regions where we find the greatest clash of these propagandas.
>
> Unfortunately for the future of the today's youth, all of these schools, which were established exclusively for political reasons, [are] lacking in the moral educational value that should form the basis of all popular

teaching. In primary schools of all nationalities, the need to have as many teachers as possible on salaries that are as low as possible [results] in teachers drawn from the riffraff who are not only barely literate, but even more wanting when it comes to religious knowledge and moral principles, [which should be] the main model for dispensing them among a people that is demoralised under the Moslem yoke and barely enlightened when it comes to religious beliefs.

In schools divided into classes (high schools) where we find better quality teaching staff, other obstacles prevent the valuable fruits of education from ripening. Improper relationships between community bodies and teachers, the absence of respect by students for their schools due to a poor primary education and, finally, the superficial assimilation of subjects due to a lack of teaching material, all of this has deplorable repercussions on the state of the intellectual and moral spirit of the young. Having only barely flirted with education, these young people consider themselves as being highly educated and confound love of freedom and independence with the lax attitudes they have developed in the absence of school discipline.

Furthermore, in certain high schools, for example the Greek high schools, the approach is exclusively aimed at training Greek students, the natural aptitudes of students being sacrificed to propaganda. Genuine subjects are neglected and attention is entirely given over to the study of the Greek classics. Forced to quote all the Greek poets and philosophers, the student of the Greek high school loses all faculty of reasoning as a result of excessive rote learning. During end-of-year ceremonies, for which the most brilliant students are selected, the overemphasis given to classical studies is obvious, despite the efforts of teachers. The explanations given by the older students of various extracts from Greek poets or philosophers are so naïve as to be implausible even for a younger student.

Finally, all sorts of artifices and immoral encouragements [deployed] by the Romanian schools, for example in recruiting additional students, bring the morality of educational institutions down to the level of a sheep market.

The only exception to this sullying of moral education is the Protestant school, where teaching is generally based on the Divine Word and on the application of sacred principles. However, its successes are not in line with the desired reinforcement and support of Orthodoxy in the East.[28]

Twenty years later, in 1906, the US journalist Sonnichsen was, on the contrary, impressed by the young girls in their final year of study in Bitola's Bulgarian schools: "I have never met better educated women of their age. Apart from educational activities, they have organised small groups for the study of literature and political economy. In the former they were more inclined to the realism of Zola, Victor Hugo, Maupassant and especially the Russian writers that they read in the original language. With such inclinations, it is not surprising that their political economy has led them towards socialism."[29] The journalist also observed that these students had supplemented a lexicon that was insufficient to the nuances of their thinking, with French, German or Russian terms. We are obviously dealing with an elite group within school age youth.

It is difficult to reconcile these two testimonies from persons who are so different and which were recorded 20 years apart. Nevertheless, we would tend to agree with the opinion of the Russian Consul: with its plethora of schools, the Bitola of the Hamidian period produced hardly any learned scholars or people of letters. The erudite Gelzer compiled the complaints of consuls: "For a cultured European, living in Monastir requires self-abnegation. It is an exclusively commercial city … This city has nothing that contributes to making life agreeable or elegant; it is necessary to renounce any hope of spiritual satisfaction there."[30]

Schools for violence

In the period between 1850 and 1912, the dominant themes disseminated by teachers (these "professional propagandists") evolved from a justification of the religious communities toward a linguistic-cultural competition, finally ending in a violent, destructive and self-destructive revolutionary struggle. We are here referring in particular to members of the IMRO (Internal Macedonian-Andrinopolitan Revolutionary Organisation). The latter was founded by teachers paid by the Bulgarian Exarchate, and the clandestine network of this group spread rapidly to all educational structures, in both Macedonia and in free Bulgaria.[31] Indeed, IMRO quickly came into conflict with its parent structure and resorted to violence as a way of imposing its policies.[32]

A revealing shift in the teaching function occurred in the exceptional importance that was given to "school inspectors" in Macedonia. Relying on this illusory title, nationalist militants were able to travel to every corner of the province and carry out their ideological activities on a full-time basis. Such was the case of Apostol Margarit, inspector of an extremely modest number of Aromanian schools; another example was Vasil Kănčov, whose inspection visits allowed him to collect a vast quantity of geographical and statistical material, which he devoted to the national cause. These activities were repeated by various other IMRO militants.[33]

By definition, teachers are in contact with youth. It was therefore easy for them to play the role of sergeant-recruiters for the national cause. Very early on, young people in schools were the object of manipulations that were of concern to the Ottoman authorities. As early as 1859, Jovan Hadžikonstantinov-Džinot was suspected of forcing his students to participate in very military-like gymnastic exercises. This was partly provocative on his part. In Bitola, in the 1860s, we note that the "Greeks" and the "Bulgarians" encouraged children to go about in gangs, insulting and harassing representatives of rival communities.[34] Toward the end of the century, reports by foreign consuls referred to fights among students of the different communities requiring police intervention.[35] The consensus in the pluralistic Ottoman society of the time was to consider these incidents as having little significance, given that children were not seen as responsible for their acts; it was clear, however, that these violent acts were being instigated by adults.

From 1894 onwards, IMRO militants found it incredibly easy to recruit new members among final year students.[36] The recruiters were enthusiastically received by romantic and impressionable teenagers. The following was reported from the Bitola boarding school around 1890: "Hailing from different social classes, different regions, and with different characters and perspectives depending on our familial environments, we were united by sacred ties: a fanatical love for the homeland. The national cause was our credo".[37]

A decade later, this conspiratorial fever gripped high school students:

> There were 24 of us in our final year at Bitolja. Over half were initiated. I am, of course, among them. I'm even one of the eldest, one of those who disseminates learning to the neophytes – Botev's works, 'Under the Yoke' or Zahari Stojanov's 'Notes', etc. – and who baptise the new. We have nothing but contempt for wisdom and science, and for those among our teachers who are not baptised. How superior to them we are! They fear for their lives – yellow-bellied cowards – and want to know nothing of what we are preparing underground against the Sultan's 'bloody and sinful empire'. While we are initiated and baptised. We know everything. We read banned Sofiote journals, we even receive copies of the local hectographed paper, 'To arms!', which we read and use to stir people up. In a few months' time, I will also be writing blazing articles and poems for that mysterious and terrifying paper!

> We are in permanent contact with our teachers. We are their comrades. We visit them on Sundays, call them by their first names, smoke with them and we even fill our pouches with their tobacco. We are proud, immensely proud, that they treat us as adults, as revolutionaries, companions in arms. The school year will soon be over and we will be their full equals: we will preach the perilous message to the young and old and we will baptise them; by our fearlessness we will bring to life the souls of these slaves.
>
> We know that a revolutionary is somewhat like an ascetic, renouncing all comfort and all personal happiness. As such, none of us will ever marry or found a family. None of us will ever leave Macedonia, none of us will ever pursue our education abroad. Whoever should marry, leave Macedonia or enrol in a university will be considered a coward, a traitor. Macedonia cannot wait; she does not need those who consider a university degree as more important than freedom; she rejects and damns those who betray her for a lover. We consider our teacher Dame Gruev as the model of self-abnegation of a High Priest of Macedonia, the incarnation of revolutionary asceticism. Why is our comrade Mart getting engaged, getting married? A revolutionary getting married? Bah! We cannot forgive Gruev for advising us to obtain our baccalaureate at any price. In that way, he argues, we will more easily be appointed school teachers and we will serve the cause. With or without the baccalaureate, the Organisation will have us appointed by the Exarchate or the *obština*, and ensures that each of us is made a teacher. That is, in any case, what we are convinced of.
>
> The disciples of Ignatius Loyola were no greater fanatics than we are. We are prepared to kill any non-baptised student who learns of our group and allows something to slip out. We know that the end justifies the means. As such, we break into the safes of our rich comrades at night and steal the tuition fees their fathers have sent them. Proud of this noble gesture, we give a few Turkish lira to the coffers of the Regional Committee. Gruev is in a quandary: he is not able to approve our initiative; nor is he able to reproach it…There is quite a commotion at the boarding school. The director complains, questions, threatens to expel. His furore is our delight…[38]

The result of this revolutionary indoctrination was terrifying. Towards 1900 the national battlefield shifted: it was no longer to be found in the churches and schools, but in the mountains, where armed gangs rebelled against the Ottoman constabulary and fought bloody battles with each other. Young people were eager to join these gangs. Two to three years after leaving the Bulgarian high school of Salonica, Pavel Šatev was able to cite the names of five of his classmates who had been killed for the cause.[39] The revolutionary moloch was devouring its children, both students and teachers, including gifted young intellectuals such as Paraskev Cvetkov of Pleven, graduate of a Russian Musical Conservatory, who was killed in May 1903 in Mogila near Bitola at the age of 28.

The transition from the life of a high school student to that of a *četnik* involved a harsh apprenticeship:

> In the 3rd Section of the Štip *četa* we also found Koce L. Arsov, my classmate at the Salonica high school… When I saw him there I was very moved. He was the son of very well-off parents, was raised with great care and, barely out of high school, he launched into the harsh life of a *četnik* with a revolutionary flame, with no experience of getting around in the rough and impenetrable mountains and forests. The piercing cold had so frozen the *četniks* that they were not able to warm up their joints numbed from the cold. And yet, by his heroism, Koce refreshed my soul and inspired me for the impending battle. For one whole night and the following day we talked of our wonderful lives as students at the Salonica high school.[40]

Life in the resistance was a school of crime: in January 1903, two high school students from Bitola, Fildišliev and Sprostranov, were ordered to use their bayonets to kill a woman of the Sviništa village who was accused of treason.[41]

The armed struggle, which was triggered by IMRO, cut down the pride of Macedonian intelligentsia. In the gang warfare that pitted "Bulgarians" against "Serbs" in the North, and "Bulgarians" against "Greeks" in the South of the province, retaliatory attacks were carried out in villages that had provided aid to the other side, executing first and foremost teachers and priests. This phenomenon grew to such an extent that from 1908 onwards, more and more schools were run by female teachers, women at that time usually (although there were exceptions) being spared from political violence.[42]

These externally-financed schools, structured on the basis of external considerations and belittling any future within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, led quite naturally to the exodus of intellectual elites. From 1912 to 1918, the chronological sequence of Vardar Macedonia saw the succession of the Ottoman regime, the Serbian regime, the Bulgarian regime and the

Serbian regime once again. This succession was fatal to the province's intelligentsia. All that was left to those who had been educated in the Greek, Bulgarian, or Aromanian school systems was to go into exile. They logically turned toward the country that their school books had always designated as their "homeland". Generally speaking, they were able to adapt quite easily, given that they had received a good education and were familiar with the literary language, as well as the whole system of cultural references.[43]

Very few Macedonian-Slavic intellectuals, once they were integrated in Bulgaria, returned to their native regions during the years of occupation between 1941 and 1944. The "intellectual desert" in which Macedonia found itself in 1945, after the Bulgarian and Serbian elite had left, offered an undreamed field of action for a handful of young graduates who had embraced the Macedonian cause: they reigned undivided over the scientific and literary life of Skopje for almost half a century.

Simplistic discourse often locates school education on the side of civilisation, progress and preparation for a better and more harmonious future for society. The example of Macedonia at the end of the Ottoman period shows that schools are also places where intolerance is encouraged to the point of armed violence. Unfortunately, this example is not unique in the history of the Balkans. In our own time, the parallel school system set up by Albanians in Kosovo between 1990 and 1999 arose from a drastic choice: it was better to have a highly patriotic education, albeit slapdash and thrown together in precarious material conditions, than to send one's children to the Serbian school system. This has undoubtedly produced a generation of young patriots, so patriotic that they know nothing of their "adversary's" language, and whose general knowledge remains rudimentary. Are we to consider this the sign of an encouraging future?

The wrangling that occurs among the different school programmes of Bosnia-Herzegovina's three communities arise from an analogous phenomenon. They can be considered as the symbolic manifestation of the tensions that continue to tear apart the country, as the focal point for grievances relevant to the well-being of an entire organism. However, it is clear that in a situation where it is not possible to use language to restrain young people who are ignorant and defiant in the face of the "adversary", the alternative is this rather pejorative substitute. The desire to focus education only on one's own national community, while suppressing anything that concerns one's neighbours, is a disturbing echo of the developments that we have described with respect to Ottoman Macedonia.

3

AMATEURS AS NATION-BUILDERS? ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSOCIATIONS FOR THE FORMATION AND NATIONALIZATION OF GREEK SOCIETY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Ioannis Zelepos

The founding of associations as a social phenomenon in Europe, which occurs with increasing frequency from the beginning of the nineteenth century, is closely connected with the formation of modern societies. Associations are important not only because they lead to an interest in and development of public spaces, but also for the dissemination of civil mentalities and patterns of behaviour. In this respect associations can be considered simultaneously as agents of civil society and as indicators of its state of development, which in quantitative terms can be checked with objective parameters, e.g. the numbers of associations founded in a specific geographical region and in qualitative terms with parameters such as organizational structures, the social make-up of the members, the ideological profile and aims of associations, etc.

This phenomenon occurred not only in Western and Central Europe but also in the southeastern part of the continent, especially in Greece. Nineteenth-century Greece presents a real panorama of "societies", "unions", "brotherhoods", "committees" and other associations, which came into existence for diverse reasons and used quite different methods to pursue their goals. Their spectrum ranges from small conspiracy circles to mass organizations with large membership figures and from temporary groupings with limited scope to durable societies with broad programmatic goals, some of which are still active today. But in spite of their heterogeneity, they all shared several characteristics as private associations, which concerned not only this specific type of organization, but also reflected on the self-understanding or rather the mentality of their members.

This paper deals with Greek associations from the nineteenth century, with a focus on their social integrative functions, while considering their role in the process of nation-building taking place in Greece during this time. The period examined here begins, after a short look at the preconditions in the Ottoman context, with the foundation of the Greek State in 1830 and continues up to the decade of wars from 1912 to 1922. The decade of wars marks a radical political turn with respect to the interrelated social and ideological shifts, and really divides modern Greek history into the periods "before" and "after" the wars.

The sheer number of associations founded during the years from 1830 to 1912 not only in Greece, but also in the Ottoman Empire and the Greek diaspora communities in Southeast Europe and elsewhere, forces a strict limitation on those cases considered to be representative. The choice was determined, on the one hand, by "external" criteria such as period of existence, number of members, extension of communication and activity networks and, not least, a provable socio-political impact and on the other hand, by the "internal" criterion of ideological and programmatic profiles. For this reason, special attention was paid to associations with aims of a more general character, including those of a religious, cultural, or national nature. These associations had more highly developed ideologies and were actually able to put them to practical use. On the other hand, organizations such as professional cooperatives[1] and clubs of a purely local or folklorist character have, of necessity, been omitted. Admittedly, this is a somewhat simplistic division, not only because in reality the transition lines between these categories are fluent, but also because it would be very naïve to suppose that the latter were devoid of ideology. However, they represented groups of more or less limited interests, while the associations under consideration in this paper principally applied to the society as a whole, regardless of whether the latter was conceived (or rather imagined) as the community of the "faithful" or the "nation", or – which was most common – some combination of both. Furthermore, their ability to develop activities with a broader impact distinguishes them from political splinter groups of this period.[2] Finally, they are also clearly distinguished from political parties[3] due to the fact that since their activities focused on special subjects and were explicitly private in nature, they generally did not seek to penetrate the official institutional hierarchies of the political system through elections or by other means.

Accordingly, the following text is divided into three thematic categories, trying in this way to cover the broadest possible spectrum of Greek association activities during the nineteenth century. The first section deals with religious movements and brotherhoods that emerged soon after independence and have had a significant place in Greek society up to the present. The second part discusses cultural societies emerging particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century. These societies promoted educational matters, which, until the end of the century, took on an increasingly-pronounced nationalistic character. The third part discusses associations with explicit nationalistic aims, which took an active part in Greek irredentism not only by organizing, but often even by resorting to more or less systematic acts of armed violence.

Preconditions

Different forms of collective organization have a long history in Greek-speaking regions and can even be considered as highly characteristic for the Ottoman period, at which time they were strongly connected with the general economic and social environment[4]. The specific legal status of non-Muslims and especially of the Orthodox Church in the context of the *millet*-system favoured the organization of Christians around their religious communities, which were involved in more than purely religious matters.[5] This pattern of organization was also valid outside the Ottoman Empire in the large Mid- and West-European diaspora communities of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects. Another representative type of collective organization was the trade company. Such companies emerged during the eighteenth century as socio-professional groups, consisting of merchants and producers from specific geographical regions; they developed operational networks all over Southeast Europe and beyond.[6] They functioned simultaneously as recipients and multipliers of communication and cultural exchange, in this way providing an important impetus to the emergence of public spheres in Southeast Europe.

One of the earliest organizations in this region that can be characterized as an association in a modern sense emerged in the milieu of Greek-speaking merchantmen: the Philiki Etaireia ("Society of Friends") which was founded in Odessa in 1814 and whose aim was the preparation of a general uprising resulting in the liberation of Greece from Ottoman domination.[7] When considering the question of modernization and the close connection between the formation of revolutionary impulses and specific group interests, it is noteworthy that this association was dominated by less successful entrepreneurs with a certain number of bankruptcies among them, while the Phanariot Greek establishment seems to have been almost absent here.[8] The internal structure of Philiki Etaireia was mainly based on the organizational patterns of the Freemasons, a group which first appeared in Southeast Europe at the end of the eighteenth century and was strongly influenced by Central European paradigms.[9] Although the Philiki Etaireia was able to promote the idea of revolution by means of effective networking (where the Masonic attributes, including principles of secrecy, proved particular useful), it lost any political influence with the outbreak of the Greek war of independence in 1821 and disappeared soon afterwards. The Philiki Etaireia is relevant to the present discussion because it represented a new organizational type and also because it functioned as a historical precedent for many later Greek associations, which, during the entire nineteenth century, constituted themselves as more or less direct descendents of the Philiki Etaireia, contributing in this way to their mutation into a national myth. Whether such lines of unbroken continuity really existed is doubtful in view of the deep political and ideological shifts caused by the foundation of the modern Greek state and the formation of Greek society along the “nation-paradigm”. This process inevitably caused frictions and created considerable discontent, which in turn formed the basis for the religious movements that emerged only a few years after independence and are to be examined in the following section.

Religious associations

The first of the religious associations was the so-called Philorthodoxos Etaireia (“Philorthodox Society”). It was founded in June 1839 by Nikitas Stamatelopoulos, a prominent veteran of the war of independence and Georgios Kapodistrias, the brother of the first governor of revolutionary Greece who had been murdered in 1831.[10] This secret organization[11] attracted those members of Greek society who were critical of the secular state concept as represented by the regime of King Otto of Wittelsbach and who openly rejected the break with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople which had been caused by the foundation of an autocephalous church of Greece in 1833.[12] The central aim of the Philorthodox Society was to revise this situation, to force the King to assume the Orthodox faith or to replace him with another monarch of Orthodox faith. The further objectives of the society were quite undefined and mainly reflect the founders’ general discontent with the changing socio-political environment in the new state – apart from very personal ambitions and animosities, e.g. the somewhat curious aim of erecting a splendid monument for Ioannis Kapiodistrias and denying rights of citizenship to the families of his murderers. The objectives included, on the one hand, strong opposition to Western influences such as the founding of American schools and the proselytizing activities of Protestant bible societies, but on the other hand, it also included the local chauvinistic demand for the purging of official services from "heterochthones", i.e. Greeks from outside the borders of the state. The latter, however, was obviously not seen as contradictory to the project of a general uprising of all Greeks in the European part of the Ottoman Empire, which the Philorthodox Society promoted as a further aim. This is not only very significant for the socio-ideological substrate of the so-called *Megali Idea*,[13] but shows simultaneously the narrow limits of the secularization process in Greek society at that time. While secularization is mainly characterized by the separation of religious and secular spheres, or rather the submission of the former to the latter, in the case of the Philorthodox Society and the traditional thinking it expressed, these two spheres obviously coexisted on equal terms and were closely intermingled.

To pursue its goals, the society prepared a nationwide conspiracy that failed, however, after some police officers accidentally detected the plans in December 1839. This led to a criminal prosecution of the leaders and the dismissal of the Minister of Interior, Georgios Glarakis, who, as was soon revealed, was himself an important member of the Philorthodox Society. However, the government handled the prosecution with great caution – even Stamatelopoulos and Kapodistrias were acquitted at the end of the trial because of procedural errors – something that seems astonishing not only in view of the extent of the failed conspiracy, but also the fact that it was directed ultimately against the head of state himself. This indicates the precarious position of the political leadership versus a private association that obviously had many influential sympathizers.[14]

In the following years, the Philorthodox Society continued to enlarge the number of followers virtually unimpeded, while concentrating its activities mainly in the Peloponnese. During this time, the leadership passed to Kosmas Flamiatos who had joined the society in 1842 and largely shaped its ideological profile in the following decade.[15] This itinerant preacher from Kefallonia had been exiled in the previous year from the Ionian Islands (then a British protectorate), due to his subversive and rebellious activities, and had met immediately after his arrival in Greece with leading protagonists of the

Philorthodox Society.[16] Under the leadership of Flamiatos, the association's propaganda activities increased, in particular with the publication of books and newspapers such as the *Foni tis Orthodoxias* ("Voice of Orthodoxy"). This journal was published in Patras beginning in 1848 and was the official organ of the movement; in 1849 an "exegesis" of the prophecies of Agathangelos was published, written by Flamiatos himself.[17] These propaganda activities were generally characterized by a strong anti-modernist impetus (e.g. steam-ships as the devil's work) and openly confronted the State and its institutions. Flamiatos and his fellows preached against the constitutional regime that had emerged after 1844 and which they simply presented as a product of British intrigues. Furthermore, they asked their audience not to send their children to school, to refuse military service and even installed so called "assemblies of patriots" for solving legal differences in open competition with the official organs of jurisprudence.[18]

In the beginning of the 1850s, a close relationship developed between the Philorthodox Society and the movement of Christophoros Panagiotopoulos (known as "Papoulakos"). This wandering "self-made monk" had already been in contact with Flamiatos since 1847. A first application for an official preaching licence, submitted by Papoulakos to the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, was initially rejected in 1850, but was approved in the next year. However, having achieved this badge of legitimacy, he only intensified his agitation against the State and the Church, something that unsurprisingly led to the withdrawal of the licence and his excommunication on 15 May, 1852. Nevertheless, due to his great popularity, he managed to recruit some 6,000 mostly armed followers within only a few days and to march to Kalamata in South-western Peloponnese. He arrived there on 26 May and prepared to openly confront the army detachment sent after him – a venture that failed in the end. Papoulakos was arrested and sentenced to prison, but pardoned only one year later, a decision that was strongly influenced by his continuing popularity and the generally heated public opinion at the beginnings of the Crimean War.[19] Shortly before the suppression of the Papoulakos movement, the Greek government had arrested Kosmas Flamiatos, together with about 150 members of the Philorthodox Society, at their headquarter in the monastery of "Mega Spilaion" near Kalavryta.

This blow marks the end of that organization but not of the ideological currents it represented in Greek society. After the death of Flamiatos in 1852, the former Philorthodox Society found another unifying figure in the person of Ignatios Lampropoulos. He had also been imprisoned but was set free after King Otto was dethroned in 1862. He subsequently devoted himself to publishing and preaching. In contrast to his predecessors, however, he strictly limited himself to the goals of an "inner mission", whereby he scrupulously avoided any open confrontation with the State and its institutions, obviously a lesson he had learned from his negative experiences in the past. Lampropoulos became the teacher and spiritual guide of Evsevios Matthopoulos, who subsequently went on to establish the theological brotherhood Zoi ("Life" – see below). This marked a change which can be interpreted as an aspect of the ongoing process of secularization.

The new orientation was accompanied by a successive professionalization of procedures, as can be observed especially in the case of Apostolos Makrakis, a central figure in the religious movement of Greece, beginning in the last third of the nineteenth century.[20] Makrakis had studied in Constantinople, where he also worked as a teacher during the Crimean War. His teaching and preaching activities soon brought him into conflict with the Greek community, so he left for Athens in 1859, where he applied for an official preaching licence, but without success. After a short return to Constantinople, he spent some years in Paris, and returned permanently to the Greek capital in 1866. Aside from the more conventional methods of agitation, such as by preaching in public places and publishing, – especially in his own newspaper *Logos* ("Word/Sense") founded in 1867 – Makrakis followed a new strategy, namely the founding of several associations with specific goals, partly of a religious, partly of a political nature. To the former group belonged the associations Ioannis o Vaptistis ("John the Baptist"- 1877) and Ioannis o Theologos ("John the Theologian" - 1884), to the latter Konstantinos o Megas ("Constantine the Great" - 1879) and Platon (1901). In addition, he founded (in 1876) the Scholi tou Logou ("School of the Word/Sense") as a private educational institution in explicit competition with the University of Athens, which he heavily criticized as *Panskotistirion* i.e. a place of mental darkening. This school was temporarily closed after two years, because the theological teachings of Makrakis conflicted with the official church and he was condemned for heresy in the beginning of 1879.[21] As a consequence, the faithful disciples he had assembled in the preceding years distanced themselves from him and followed their own ways, although they continued the strategies of their former master.

Aside from the formation of smaller groups,[22] one should mention the association Anaplasis ("Restoration") founded in Athens in 1886 by Konstantinos Dialismas, a former disciple of Makrakis. This association published its own newspaper under the same name and built up a network of branches all over Greece. Dialismas also established the Tameion Apostolou Pavlou ("Fund of Apostle Paul") to finance the "inner mission," and he established a school for "Christian journalism". Apart from those measures which represented steps toward more professionalized agitation, Anaplasis was structurally different from older associations of that type, pointing toward a general modernizing process. One sign of this process was the diminishing importance of past charismatic leaders, such as Flamiatos and Makrakis, as well as a changing profile of membership. Anaplasis included a considerable number of prominent personalities from Greek society among its members, something that is impressively illustrated by the fact that even Crown Prince Constantine was, for some years, honorary president of this association.[23]

This shift, from the more common people towards the social elites, corresponded with an analogous gain in prestige and a resulting increase in influence. For example, in 1891 the society, which had committed itself not only to fight "occultism, animism, pantheism and freemasonry" but also "rationalism, materialism and Darwinism" was actually able to enforce the closing of a scientific magazine named *Prometheus* because it was dealing with the theories of Darwin.[24] This indicates that religious societies were beginning to take part in the official discourse of Greek society which, it has to be stressed, was still evolving during this time. The main precondition for this integration was a clear break from the religious societies' non-conformist origins, something that allowed them later in the twentieth century to profile themselves as guardians of conservative if not reactionary values, and even to present themselves as defenders of a socio-political status quo, while simultaneously keeping the obscurantist substrate of their ideology.

This development found its full manifestation in the brotherhood Zoi, founded in 1907, which is rightly characterized as the peak of religious associations in modern Greece.[25] Its continuity with the older religious associations becomes evident, especially in the person of its founder, Evsevios Matthopoulos, a nephew of Ierotheos Mitropoulos (see above, note 22) and a disciple of Lampropoulos and later of Makrakis.[26] When considering its organizational structure, range of action, variety of activities and duration, this brotherhood, which is still in existence today, by far surpasses all its predecessors. The network of branches it established, up to the inter-war period, covered almost all of Greece. With their wide ranging but simultaneously specific focuses, these branches addressed a varied audience; Zoi attempted to get in touch with as many groups as possible and in this way to penetrate society as a whole.[27] New standards were also set in the field of publishing: an attempt was made to cover almost all literary genres, from children's books and *belles lettres* to specialized studies of more or less scientific character, by means of branch magazines and its own publishing house.[28] These activities developed most fully beginning in the 1920s and proved particularly effective in the period following World War II, which for this reason is called the "golden age" of Zoi – but this lies beyond the scope of the present paper.[29]

At this point it must be emphasized that the basis for this development can be found in the outgoing nineteenth century, when an obvious transformation of religious societies along modernist paradigms took place. This was clearly observable for the first time in the case of Anaplasis, founded in 1886. One must pose the question whether similar processes of transformation can be observed in the following two categories of associations.

Cultural associations

Associations with cultural aims could be found in Greek-speaking areas about one decade before the War of Independence. The first of these associations was the Philological or Graeco-Dacian Society. It was founded in 1810 in Bucarest at the initiative of Ignatios Oungrovlachias, Metropolitan of the Danubian principalities (then under Russian occupation) and was presided over by the Boyar Grigori Brâncoveanu; its goal was a general improvement and dissemination of literature and science.[30] Another example is the Filomousos Etaireia ("Society of Friends of the Muses") which was founded in 1813 in Vienna and probably had connections to the Philiki Etaireia, a question still not fully clarified up to this day.[31] The founding cities are characteristic, because Bucharest and Vienna were important centres of modern Greek culture, while at the same time being far away from those areas which were going to constitute the independent Greek State in 1830. This is significant insofar as the most important cultural centres of the Greeks were and remained outside the frontiers of the Kingdom during much of the nineteenth century. This is shown by the fact that associations generally developed much earlier and were more influential in the Greek communities of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the urban centres of Western Asia Minor, than in Greece itself.[32]

In Turkey, in the city of Smyrna, associations began to flourish as early as 1838 at the beginning of the Tanzimat period, while in the capital Constantinople, the founding of the Ellinikos Philologikos Syllogos Konstantinoupoleos ("Greek Philological Association of Constantinople") marks an important turn.[33] Its immediate predecessors were the previously established associations Iatrikos Syllogos ("Medical Association") and the Ekpaideftikon

Frontistirion ("Educational Seminar"), the latter having in its programme "[…] the dissemination of education in general among the Orthodox people of the Ottoman Empire and especially among women, without any discrimination in regard to descent or language".[34] A strong orientation toward education, including an interest in science, which in practice led to analogous mechanisms of exclusion, was characteristic for the Philological Association in its first phase. It had as historical precedent the ephemeral society of international scholars, Engümen-i-Daniş, founded in 1851.[35] However, the resulting academic isolation was overcome a few years later, when the association and its activities were opened to a broader public. From then on its influence grew significantly, and the Philological Association became not only a prototype for many similar associations founded in the following years but soon emerged as a main protagonist in the organization of the Greek-speaking school system in the Ottoman Empire.[36]

The Philological Association was, without doubt, a prototype for Greece as well. The mid 1860s saw the beginning of a boom in the founding of associations.[37] This was partly a consequence of the political changes after the overthrow of King Otto – the constitution of 1864 explicitly included the founding of associations as a civic right – and partly a manifestation of a general process towards the formation of a common public space with the capital as its centre. Some examples are the literary associations Parnassos (1865), Byron (1868), and the Etaireia ton Filon tou Laou ("Society of Friends of the People"), which was founded in 1865 by members of the Greek intellectual elite and was broadly focussed on education.[38] However, the association Syllogos pros Diadosin ton Ellinikon Grammaton ("Association for the Dissemination of Greek Literature") founded in 1869, became much more influential and during the following decades acted as a virtual Athenian "antipode" to the Philological Association in Constantinople.[39] The Athenian association was strongly nationalistic from the beginning, whereas its counterpart in Constantinople gradually became more nationalistic after the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870.[40] During the first years after its foundation, the Athenian association maintained, parallel to its "official fund" designated for educational activities inside Greece, a "secret fund" to finance activities aimed at the spread of Greek national consciousness in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, there were several personal connections with clandestine or openly operating irredentist associations which came into existence during the great Oriental Crisis of 1875–8 (see below).[41]

In the first half of the 1880s the association was, for some time, in competition with the Brotherhood Agapate Allilous ("Love each other") due to its activities among people living outside Greece.[42] The Brotherhood was founded in 1880 by the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III, who by this action clearly broke with the policy of his predecessors. Until then the attitude of the Great Church to association founding in the nineteenth century had definitely been a negative one; this was based on the argument that associations were undermining the religious concept of the unity of all the faithful as brothers in Christ. This attitude had greatly hindered the development of religious associations similar to those in Greece. However, it must be remembered that the authority of the autocephalous church in the Kingdom was quite precarious and in no way comparable to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in its time-honoured ethnarchical tradition.[43] In 1879 the principal of the Patriarchal Gymnasium in Constantinople forbade his pupils, under threat of severe consequences, to become members of associations or take any part in their activities.[44] However, the founding of the brotherhood "Love each other" only one year later marks a major turn that can be seen as a reaction to the changes that had taken place in the previous decade, causing dramatic losses in the traditional power of the Patriarchate. The losses were not only political but also financial, especially with the creation of a fully independent Bulgarian national church. There were also cultural-ideological aspects to this situation, since organizations like the Philological Association and others operated as clearly secular agents of education, thus undermining the until then widely uncontested hegemony of the church in this field and consequently diminishing its spiritual influence on the orthodox population, while the latter increasingly began to define itself along national criteria. In this sense, the founding of Agapate Allilous can be interpreted as an attempt to hold or to regain lost ground in this area, indicating that the Patriarch obviously considered associations to be the most adequate tool for this purpose.[45]

The growing social importance of associations is also shown by the fact that since the 1880s they underwent a process of specialization and extended into new fields such as theater,[46] music and sports, where Smyrna, in particular, again seems to have been a pioneer.[47] Comparable associations in Greece were founded at a slightly slower rate.[48] This may be explained to some degree by the preoccupation with the national question, which dominated and to a certain degree even monopolized Greek public discourse.[49]

A good example of this phenomenon is the association Ellinismos ("Hellenism"), whose educational aims were largely subordinated to the national-propagandistic goals it pursued. This organization, founded in 1892, continuously published a monthly magazine under the same name from 1898 to 1915 that soon developed into the most important mouthpiece of Greek irredentism. Neoklis Kazazis was president of the society from 1894 to 1936. He was professor of philosophy of law and national economy at the University of Athens who made his mark as a national propagandist, producing many publications and lecturing widely throughout Western Europe.[50] But Ellinismos also included other illustrious members of the Greek academic establishment, e.g. the historian Pavlos Karolidis and the linguist Georgios Chatzidakis. Consequently, the association and its publications enjoyed a considerable and to some degree even quasi-official authority in Greek public opinion, in spite of its small membership numbers.[51] Its ideological influence remained important during the decade of wars, but diminished significantly from the mid 1920s onward, a trend that continued, in spite of a clear thematic shift from national-irredentist matters to a pronounced anti-communism.[52] In short, Ellinismos can be characterized as something between a cultural association and a nationalist organization of the type to be examined in the following section. At the same time, it is a good example of the intense nationalizing process that can generally be observed in Greek cultural associations during the end of the nineteenth century.

"Ellinismos", in spite of pursuing its goals with quite efficient means of propaganda, in fact preserved and continued the conventional ideological patterns of nineteenth-century Greek irredentism. Let us turn to another cultural society which had a different profile and shows signs of a change in this respect. The Syllogos Pros Diadosin Ofelimon Vivlion ("Association for the Dissemination of Useful Books") was founded in 1899 by the merchant and writer Dimitrios Vikelas.[53] Although its name has an obvious similarity to the thirty-years-older Association for the Dissemination of Greek Literature, its activities actually differed greatly from the latter, especially in their strategies of dissemination of their publications. The "Association for the Dissemination of Useful Books" was the first organization to make Greek literature accessible to a broad public by the mass production of cheap books, resulting in high circulation rates. It published a series of so-called "red editions" that included more than a hundred titles for broad popular use, accompanied later (1908) by a series of so called "green editions" addressing a more erudite readership. In contrast to the Association for the Dissemination of Greek Literature of 1869, the Association for the Dissemination of Useful Books focused exclusively on the territory of Greece and obviously abstained from any irredentist activity.[54] These efforts can be characterized as an attempt to systematically penetrate the literate population of Greece and simultaneously to create a coherent canon of national literature. Although this was obviously connected with a strong nationalist impetus, it clearly belonged to a new, more introverted type of nationalism that included modernizing elements.[55]

It should be noted that Vikelas had early on distanced himself from those arguments about Greek nationalism which were based on the idea of an "historical mission" of Hellenism in the Orient and which found a more or less vague expression in the slogan of the *Megali Idea*. As early as 1885, in a lecture given in Paris with the title *Le rôle et les aspirations de la Grèce dans la Question d'Orient*, he had characterized the *Megali Idea* as a chimera of the past and in contrast articulated quite concrete proposals about the political future of Southeast Europe, including the desirable extension of the Greek State.[56] In this sense, Vikelas was an advocate of a modern type of nationalism characterized by a comparatively greater degree of pragmatism than its older forms, something that is also reflected in the profile of the association he founded.

The Association for the Dissemination of Useful Books, which today is an old and respected institution, marks a change of paradigm at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, and even today remains a prime example of cultural association activities in Greece. Whether comparable developments can be observed in the realm of "national societies" will be examined in the following section.

National associations

The founding of associations with explicit nationalist goals reached an initial high point in Greece at the end of the 1840s, although the above-mentioned Philorthodox Society of 1839 had also included such aims in its program. It is characteristic for these associations that they were usually founded as secret organizations in a more or less direct line from the already legendary Philiki Etaireia. One such example is the Etaireia Patrioton ("Society of Patriots"), founded in 1848 by the famous revolutionary general Makrygiannis.[57] His memoirs impressively illustrate how the experience of the War of Independence was still strongly imbedded in the consciousness of his contemporaries, many of whom – especially veterans such as Makrygiannis himself – looked at the creation of the Greek State more in terms of an armistice than as a final result of the war.

From the union of such associations, whose actual number can no longer be determined but who obviously also operated beyond the frontiers (see above, note 11), there emerged in the summer of 1853, (at the beginnings of the Crimean War) an unspecified Etaireia ("Society") whose aim was a general solution of the Greek national question.[58] The initial military successes of Russia in this conflict had generated hopes for radical changes of the political status quo of the region and thus for the realization of the Megali Idea. The Etaireia, dominated by the Russophile Napaioi (see above, note 14), exerted pressure on the Greek government to enter the war, mobilizing public opinion and making threats about an imminent coup against the government.[59] Apart from this, by purchasing arms and organizing guerrilla units in the frontier zone, the Etaireia prepared local uprisings in Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia which actually broke out in the beginnings of 1854. Regardless of the fact that these uprisings were doomed to fail, they persuaded the Greek government to circumvent its initial policy of strict neutrality, thus triggering repressive measures from Great Britain and France, who in their capacity as guarantors occupied Greek harbours and paralyzed the country's economy for the following four years.

The above-outlined sequence of events turned out to be stereotypical, with many repetitions until the end of the nineteenth century. The numerous national associations that appeared on different occasions characteristically operated virtually autonomously with regard to the political priorities of the State and consequently often acted against the interests of the latter. This reflects the rather secondary importance the Kingdom of Greece had in the far reaching goals of a visionary Greek nationalism, which seemingly remained virtually unaffected by any kind of political pragmatism during this time.[60] Even when this basic ideological position began to shift, beginning in the last third of the nineteenth century, bringing the State more and more into a position to establish itself as a "national centre", the characteristic autonomy of private activities remained unchanged for a long time. This can be observed not only in the practice of Greek irredentism, but also in the self-consciousness of national associations, which, in their relation to the government of Greece, saw themselves principally at least as equal (sometimes even as more legitimate) interpreters and executors of the "national will".

This phenomenon can be observed in the case of the Revolt of Crete (from 1866 to 1869), in which the political goals – either union with Greece or autonomy for the island – had an admittedly more pragmatic character than the "Greek Empire" of the Crimean War. But this is less true with regard to the strategies applied in practice, which were again dominated by private agents. At this time the Kentriki Epitropi yper ton Kriton ("Central Committee for the Cretans"), which was founded in July 1866 in Athens, soon established itself as a leading organization and even attempted to take over responsibilities of the Greek Foreign Ministry.[61]

During the following decades, national associations usually appeared in periods of crisis and were repeatedly able to become important factors of national policy and sometimes even exercised major influence on the course of events. However, in the 1870s and especially since the great Oriental Crisis of 1875 to 1878, several changes took place with respect to the membership profile and the ideological orientation of such associations. The revolts in Southeast Europe, which were to lead to a reshaping of frontiers and the independence of Bulgaria, confronted Greek nationalists with a problem. Although it had occurred much earlier (at the latest with the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870), now it could no longer be ignored by anyone: the existence of other national movements competing with Greek irredentist aspirations in the region and generally undermining the claims of Hellenism on the "Sick Man's" inheritance in Europe.

The new situation started a process during which the objectives, the concepts of enmity and finally even the strategies of Greek irredentism underwent a thorough transformation. One indicator of an ideological shift is the fact that the idea of a confederation of all Christian Balkan peoples, a vision that had repeatedly found followers in Greece since the times of Rigas Pheraios in the eighteenth century, now obviously began to fade away. This resulted in the successive marginalization of organizations committed to the Balkan Federation during the years from 1875 to 1878 and their general decline in the following decades. Some examples are the Dimokratiki Omospondia tis Anatolis ("Democratic Federation of the Orient") of 1865, the association Rigas of 1875 and the Anatoliki Omospondia ("Oriental Federation"), founded by Leonidas Voulgaris in 1884.[62] In contrast, those associations that appeared in 1876 and 1877 in reaction to the military developments became very influential. They were motivated by the fear that in the supposedly imminent general reshaping of the political frontiers in the Balkans, Greece might loose its share, and therefore they supported an enlargement of state territory.

The two largest organizations of this kind were the Adelfotis ("Brotherhood"), which emerged in April 1876 from a secret organization called Adelfiki Enotis ("Brotherly Union") and the Ethniki Amyna ("National Defence"), which was formed in the same year from various committees that had remained from the times of the Cretan Revolt from 1866 to 1869. Both associations were united in July 1877 under the leadership of a common Central Committee[63] and used its resulting increase in influence to prepare revolts in Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia, giving clear priority to the latter region through installation of a separate "Macedonian Committee". These activities followed the well-known patterns of public mobilization, fundraising, development of logistic networks and acquisition of arms, etc. Despite their final failure, these preparations were generally carried out with greater efficiency than in previous cases. This is shown by the fact that the Central Committee, due to its broad popular support, was even able to induce the Greek government to officially declare war in January 1878, a step, however, that had no further consequences.[64] The considerable financial means at the disposal of the Central Committee in the beginning of 1878 were the result of a broadly inclusive membership, even incorporating some from the social elites.[65] The association also accommodated those from different political camps without one being dominant – in contrast to the situation during the Crimean War, where the Etaireia was clearly dominated by the Russophiles (i.e. the followers of the Napaioi). This not only resulted from the structural transformation experienced by the Greek party system since the 1860s,[66] but also shows that the phenomenon of national associations was having an increasingly greater impact on society in general. One can also observe, as an aspect of modernization, a relative decline of oaths and secret behaviour, so characteristic for the older organizations.[67] Although these were not abandoned completely in the following years, it seems that they progressively lost their former ritual importance and essential functions.

This becomes clear in the case of the Ethniki Etaireia ("National Society") which is also the prime example for national associations in Greece during the period under examination. Founded by army officers in November 1894 as a secret society and initially limited to their narrow circle,[68] the Society made a radical break with its initial principles two years later by announcing its existence in the daily press.[69] As a consequence, the former circle of discontented army soldiers quickly mutated into a mass movement. It became politically influential and went on to play a central as well as fatal role in the Greek-Ottoman war of 1897.

Of crucial importance for this gain in power, during the following weeks and months, were not only the rapidly increasing numbers of members from the civil sphere, which again largely represented the economic and intellectual elites of the country,[70] but also the society's obvious ability to create a far-reaching network of branches that even seems to have integrated the Greek diaspora to some degree.[71] On the basis of a broad wave of sympathy and consent of a public, whose nationalist euphoria was further intensified by the society's own jingoistic propaganda efforts, it was able to exert heavy pressure on the government and the king and to decisively influence the course of events leading to the Greek attack on the Ottoman Empire in the spring of 1897.[72] This was the first war declared and carried out by the Greek State since its creation in 1830, and it resulted in a major disaster. The society soon became, with some justification, a scapegoat for the defeat, lost most of its members, and subsequently sank into complete insignificance until its dissolution in 1900.[73]

As a social phenomenon the National Society marks a peak and simultaneously a turning point with regard to national associations in Greece. Unlike previous associations, the National Society was able to mobilize public opinion and to influence government policies, in fact nearly replacing them in the crucial matters of war and peace. Furthermore, it was more tightly organized, as is evident from the extensive archival material the National Society produced in the six years of its existence; this may also stem from the military background of the founders. Finally, regardless of the degree to which it was actually achieved, the obvious attempt at a systematic integration of the Greek diaspora was a new feature showing aspects of a qualitatively different conception of the nation as an "imagined community" (in the sense of Anderson), while the Greek State meanwhile functioned uncontested as the "national centre". On the other hand, a turning point was reached insofar as the disastrous failure of the National Society was simultaneously the final declaration of bankruptcy for the methods that Greek irredentists had applied during the previous half century, making unmistakeably clear to everyone that strategies needed to be changed if a successful outcome was to become reality. Signs of a change in this respect became apparent during the guerrilla war in Macedonia from 1904 to 1908, known in Greek historiography as the "Macedonian Struggle", which differed significantly from the earlier irredentist conflicts. In previous cases, armed violence in the form of local uprisings had occurred mostly on occasions of major political crises, with the aim of large scale changes in the political status quo. The expectation was that the European Great Powers would settle the problem through diplomatic intervention. But now local uprisings were organized in a continuous and systematic manner, being part of a long-term strategy that consisted of national "homogenization," thereby preparing the region for future partition along "ethnic" lines.[74] This strategy, first introduced with some success by the Bulgarian IMRO, required planned action and methodical discipline to a degree which until then had never been considered necessary in Greek irredentist circles and was thus completely unknown. It became increasingly clear that in the long term it would not be private associations, but only the State and its organs which could organize such strategies.

It is significant that the Makedoniko Komitato ("Macedonian Committee"), founded in autumn 1903 by the newspaper publisher Dimitrios Kalapothakis, provided in its statutes for the explicit participation of representatives of the government, thus also seeking legitimacy for its own activities.[75] Nevertheless, the committee, while initially playing an important role in the organization of Greek guerrilla activities, especially in Western Macedonia, soon came into conflict with the state-run guerrilla policy, which since April 1904 had been carried out under the committed leadership of Lampros Koromilas, Greek general consul in Thessaloniki. He increasingly perceived the committee as an impediment to his own activities, something that generated growing tensions and finally resulted in the disempowerment of the committee. Because it was still difficult (for reasons of public resentment) to openly ban the association, the government saw a way around this by founding Panellinios Organosis ("Panhellenic Organization") in September 1908. This organization had the outward structure of an association, but in fact functioned as a section of the Greek Foreign Ministry for the purpose of getting control over all privately run irredentist activities.[76] This event, quite inconspicuous at first glance, had far-reaching consequences because it marked – some eighty years after Greek independence and virtually on the eve of the Balkan Wars – the final stage in the monopoly on violence exercised by the Greek State in the national question. It simultaneously marked the end of national associations of the type outlined above as a specific phenomenon that had characterized Greek irredentism throughout the nineteenth century and had contributed decisively to the nationalization of Greek society in this period.

Thus, during the Macedonian Struggle at the beginning of the twentieth century (the only conflict where Greek irredentism was successful to some degree) a change of paradigm can be observed. Until this time, national associations had kept an explicit distance between themselves and the State, but this was gradually replaced by a clear subordination to the institutions and prerogatives of the latter. This change is one aspect of a general process of transformation, as will be shown in the following final section, where the previous observations about Greek associations will be combined and compared.

Conclusions

> Thus the most democratic country on the face of the earth is that in which men have, in our time, carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common desire and have applied this new science to the greatest number of purposes [...]. In

> democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all depends upon the progress it has made.

With these words, Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1840, characterized the role of associations as a substantial motor of social and cultural progress in the United States of America.[77] In view of the impressive number of associations founded in the nineteenth century, one could conclude that Greek society was not different from American society with respect to democratization and civic consciousness during this time. However, the observations made in this paper speak a slightly different language, as becomes clear in the case of religious associations.[78] But Tocqueville´s somewhat idealized description can nevertheless be applied to nineteenth-century Greek society on one issue: he points out that associations take over functions that, under different circumstances, belong to the field of competence of more powerful and usually legitimate official actors.[79] This was the case in most of the associations examined here. The most characteristic precondition for their establishment was the absence of such powerful actors, be it in the context of the Ottoman Empire or the early Kingdom of Greece, because both of them were institutionally "weak states" that did not penetrate the lives of their populations in any meaningful way. Apart from this, the fact that association founding as a social phenomenon occurred generally later in Greece than in the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire clearly shows that a nation-state does not automatically provide more favourable conditions for the emergence of a civil society than traditional models of statehood. Even though the institutional framework that a nation-state usually has at its disposal is theoretically more suitable to promote social homogenization and civil behaviour, such a framework remains without impact if it fails to prove its efficacy in practice. This framework is provided, among others, by public schools, compulsory military service and a unified legal system[80], and exactly these institutions were vehemently opposed by Kosmas Flamiatos and his religious fanatics in the middle of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the suppression of the Philorthodox Society by the Greek government in 1852 marks a turning point and the beginning of a process, during which confrontation strategies were successively abandoned, resulting in the full integration of religious associations with the value-system of the nation-state. This first became obvious in the case of Anaplasis in 1886 and was fully achieved with Zoi in 1907.

A similar process of integration (i.e. subordination) to the nation-state paradigm can be observed in the case of cultural associations, although in other aspects their development followed a rather different course. Due to the structural socio-geographic preconditions of Greek society, this process started in the Ottoman cities of Western Asia Minor, which remained the most important centres of Greek culture until the twentieth century. The establishment of the Greek Philological Association of Constantinople in 1861 was of exceptional importance, not only because it was the first association of its kind committed to systematic work with the public, but also because it functioned as a precedent for many similar Greek associations that followed. It initially hoped to educate the whole orthodox community (*millet*) (see above, note 34), but this gave way, beginning with the foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, to an increasingly nationalistic orientation, whereby the Kingdom of Greece emerged as its main reference point. Cultural associations inside Greece came into existence in the mid 1860s, showing a much stronger nationalist orientation from the beginning, something that can be explained by the almost complete absence of multi-religious and multi-ethnic urban environments such as existed in the Ottoman Empire. A prime example is the Association for the Dissemination of Greek Literature, founded in 1869, which for decades carried out systematic educational efforts, but occasionally also committed itself to irredentism. This was even more characteristic for the Hellenism Society, founded in 1892, where educational aims were principally subordinate to (if not actually concealing) nationalist propaganda. The Association for the Dissemination of Useful Books (founded in 1899 and still in existence today), represents a turning point, not because it had abandoned nationalism, which was in any case the central constitutive ideology of nineteenth-century Greek society, but because it distanced itself from its older irredentist-visionary patterns inherited from the times of romantic philhellenism.

The ideological and political importance of this shift becomes clear when compared with the activities of national associations, which dominated Greek irredentism until the beginning of the twentieth century. In the case of the associations, the previously-mentioned structural precondition of the "weak state" resulted in virtually unlimited autonomy of the actors, and obviously also led to a general blurring of the spheres of official and private action. Private associations typically intruded into the actual area of state competence, such as foreign policy decisions with regard to regional and international conflicts brewing in Southeast Europe during this period. This typical behaviour pattern leads one to the conclusion that for a long time the associations were unable to recognize potential or real conflicts between the privately defined "national" interest and the interests of the State, as well as other correlated loyalty conflicts. This phenomenon turned out to be a major impediment for the modernizing process in Greece: in view of the still unsolved national question which could easily claim absolute priority, policies of inner consolidation (such as Trikoupis had tried to apply), were seriously impaired, thus perpetuating not only the structural weakness of the Greek State, but unfortunately also the futility of the irredentist efforts. Ironically, the officers who founded the National Society in 1894 (see above, note 68) seemed to be the first to become aware of this vicious circle, but this had no further consequences, since the association mutated into a mass organization two years later, and soon returned to the by now "classical" patterns of privately-run foreign policy – although certainly surpassing its predecessors in destructive energy, as shown by the outcome of the war of 1897. Finally, the Macedonian Struggle in the first decade of the twentieth century caused a change in the paradigm, terminating the phenomenon of national associations in the specific form outlined above. Significantly, this was a new type of conflict, where the real enemy was not the Ottoman Empire, in contrast to previous cases, but a competing national movement with great dynamism and superior organization, at least in the beginning. The Greek officer corps played an important role in the struggle with the Bulgarian IMRO, and it does not seem an accident that it subsequently emerged as a powerful factor in Greek politics.

When taking an overview of the associations presented in this paper, it is possible to observe several attributes which allow a general comparison, despite the great heterogeneity which the presentation tried to indicate. A process took place in each of the three association categories, which started from a "structural distance" to the State (in a socio-ideological sense) and resulted finally, though under quite different circumstances in each case, in acceptance of its prerogatives and integration with its institutional networks. It is virtually impossible to exactly date this shift, but it can be approximately localized in the period from the last quarter of the nineteenth to the first decade of the twentieth century. This period also saw a generally increasing efficiency of association activities, regardless of their specific subjects, and this was accompanied by a respective growth in actual membership figures. The quantitative development of membership (insofar as incomplete evidence allows its reconstruction) also shows that until the end of the nineteenth century it became obviously more and more appealing to the broader urban strata to commit themselves to association activities, whereas public servants acted as freelancers, not to mention the social elites from both categories. In this context, the numerous double- and triple-memberships, as well as fluctuating movements, are quite instructive, because they show that

Greek associations during this period scarcely functioned as bearers of exclusive group identities, despite the rivalries they developed on several occasions.[81]

Apart from the large-scale promotion of social networking, they contributed much to the intensification of public communication by means of providing organizational frameworks and channelling the interaction of their members into behaviour patterns of an undoubtedly civil character. It is this very function – and not the various and often far-reaching goals by which they defined themselves – that makes the associations significant for the formation of Greek society, a process that was strongly and almost inevitably connected with Greek nationalization.

PART II

AMBIGUOUS ACTORS, CONFLICTING STRATEGIES

4

THE DIMENSION OF CONFESSIONALISATION IN THE OTTOMAN BALKANS AT THE TIME OF NATIONALISMS

Nathalie Clayer

It is common to view the end of the Ottoman period, especially in Southeast Europe, as the era of nationalisms, the era of transition from *millet* ("religious community") to a nation.[1] This approach sheds light on nationalism as a new motive of mobilisation, a new way of identification, a new line of solidarity and a new expression of loyalty in Ottoman society. This approach is also often closely linked with the secularisation paradigm, which postulates that modernity brings the diminution of the social significance of religion.[2] In this case, it tends to see religious identification as "withdrawing" behind the new national identities. However, particularly as far as the Balkan "Christian" nationalisms are concerned, many studies do not stress such a withdrawing, but rather the combination between an "old" religious identification and a "new" national identity. As I have shown elsewhere, this process is also evident in the Albanian case, despite the plurality of confessions.[3] However, in both types of analyses (i.e. those dealing with the transition from *millet* to nation and those concerning the combination of religious and national identifications), the dynamics and changes of religious identifications have not sufficiently been taken into account. Indeed, the existence of *millets* in the Ottoman Empire implied neither an unalterable way of thinking and living according to a religious identification, nor an unchangeable relationship between members of different religious groups. These *millets* were institutionalised in the course of the nineteenth century and contributed to a process of "confessionalisation", i.e. reinforcement and normalization of religious identification, which might even be accomplished by violent means.

In the first years of the twentieth century, there was serious tension between Christians and Muslims in Northern Albania and Kosovo: pigs with their throats cut were placed in some mosques, there were broken crosses, boycotts and kidnappings. Group frontiers were marked by violence and constraint; they were sometimes also crossed under constraint. The frontiers in question here are denominational frontiers and the events are not directly related to "inter-ethnic" confrontations, or to local reactions against the imperialism of the Great Powers, or to confrontation between nationalisms, even at a time when the latter was gaining strength in Southeast Europe. Rather, they reveal another concomitant phenomenon, namely confessionalisation. This results from the evolution of religious practices and a stricter framework imposed by the religious authorities. It is also a consequence of the policy followed by the Ottoman authorities, as well as by the Balkan countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro) and the Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, France, etc.).

In the events cited in this paper, the protagonists (Muslims and Christians) are mostly Albanian-speaking people, and not Albanian-speaking Muslims vis-à-vis Serbian-speaking Christians, a case that is often focused on through a projection of a later state of affairs onto the past. Indeed, we must be careful not to ethnically define or nationalise a posteriori the nature of conflicts in late-Ottoman Balkan society. If ethnicisation/nationalisation was a process in progress, it was not the only one. Multiple dynamics of social integration coexisted in a non-exclusive way.

This paper intends to go beyond the development of nationalism in late-Ottoman Balkan society, as well as beyond discourses imbued with nationalism. For that, it is necessary "to investigate relational configurations that are active and dissymmetrical, as well as the labile and evolving nature of things and situations, to scrutinise not only novelty but also change", as the "*histoire croisée*" suggests.[4] In particular, we should use varying levels of analysis and varying points of views. With this in mind, I will analyse a series of events which occurred in 1907 and 1908 in the area of Gjakovë and Prizren (in the west of present-day Kosovo): the removal of a Franciscan priest, followed by the profanation of a mosque, the destruction of some Catholic houses, the rumour of another mosque profanation and a boycott directed at Catholic shopkeepers and peasants.[5]

The region in which the events took place was at that time a border region (close to Serbia and Montenegro) enjoying an exceptional status: there



Fig. 5: Entrance to the church of the monastery Visoki Dečani in Kosovo guarded by two Albanians, beginning of twentieth century. Source: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. Bildarchiv Austria. No. 65.852-B.

was no conscription, but rather other ways of military mobilisation; only the traditional taxes were levied and the reformed law courts had not really been established. Muslims formed the majority of the population and Christians were mainly Orthodox and, to a lesser extent, Catholic. The population could be divided into three groups: the city dwellers (craftsmen, merchants, civil servants, landowners, etc.); the villagers (peasants or shepherds); and the "Malisors", i.e. the mountaineers, who lived on the western fringe of the region (being generally shepherds and brigands because of the lack of resources).

Some of the Muslims and Christians lived in extended families, with a certain degree of solidarity among families with the same clan origin. As for the mountaineers, some of them still lived in a clan-based structure. In the region, power was mainly held by "chiefs" competing with each other for local supremacy,[6] but also by religious figures. With some difficulties and compromises, the Ottoman authorities exerted their power through different channels led by the local *mutessarıf*, the *vali* residing in Skopje, the Grand

Vizier, the Sultan himself and, since the end of 1902, the Inspector General posted in Salonica and his military envoy, Şemsi Paşa. Last, but not least, consular representatives were also important figures on the local political scene.[7]

From 1903 onwards, the area was in a state of acute crisis, due to the attempted introduction of reforms. Pressured by the Great Powers that intervened within the framework of the "Macedonian Question", the Ottoman authorities were obliged to really act at the local level. Consequently, in early 1903, Christians were recruited to the gendarmerie, and new regional courts with Muslim and Christians judges were established. This aroused the anger of Muslims, who felt that these reforms were introduced only for the benefit of Christians, under the aegis of the Great Powers. Uprisings and repression followed. The introduction of new taxes triggered new uprisings in 1904 and again in 1906.[8]

It is in this particular context that the aforementioned conflict between Catholics and Muslims occurred. First, we will take a detailed look at the conflict by means of four different accounts: that of a European traveller, the reports of the Italian Consul in Skopje, the account of a Young Turk officer of Albanian extraction, and a report by the Austro-Hungarian Vice-Consul in Prizren. In the following section, we will deduce the issues and the balance of power behind the events, as well as behind their presentation, in order to understand the various dimensions of this "confessionalisation" in relation to other simultaneous social phenomena.

Four eyes on the same events

The eye of a British woman traveller

Edith Durham (1863–1944), the famous British woman traveller and publicist,[9] was well acquainted with the Balkan era when she undertook a trip through "High Albania" soon after the Young Turk revolution. A champion of the Albanian cause against the Slavs and denouncing the "Austrian intrigue",[10] she came to Gjakovë one year after the events we are considering. In her book *High Albania*, she recounts her visit to that town, where she seems to have been impressed by the strained relations between Catholics and Muslims, despite the proclamation of the Constitution.[11] She herself experienced some problems, such as occurred when going unveiled through the town with her escort, as well as when one of her statements to the mayor was interpreted as the interference of an infidel (*giaour*) in Ottoman affairs. She mentions the events that occurred during the preceding months to explain this state of affairs.

Edith Durham presents the events as clashes between Catholics and Muslims.[12] According to her, in October 1907,[13] a Franciscan from Gjakovë/ Djakovica, Friar Luigi, was captured by numerous armed Muslims while riding to Ipek and was taken to the village of Smolitza (today Smolicë, west of Gjakovë) as a hostage, in exchange for the release of the brother of one of the captors, held by the Ottoman authorities. The latter did not react, even after the intervention of the Austro-Hungarian Consulate in Prizren, in charge of protecting the Catholic Church. The Catholics subsequently called their coreligionists living in the mountains to come to their aid, and a dead pig was found in the mosque of Smolitza. The priest was suddenly released, without the liberation of the brother, perhaps due to the fear of an Austro-Hungarian intervention in the region. However, in the course of the next few months, as revenge against the profanation of the mosque, the Catholic village of Ramotzi (east of Smolicë) as well as thirteen other Christian villages were burned down. During this period, the Catholic villagers were given until the month of Ramadan (September 1908) to convert to Islam or be killed. Then the rumour of the profanation of a mosque in Prizren spread and a boycott was launched against all Catholics.

At this point, Edith Durham gives the example of a large Catholic family in the village of Bretkotzi (Brekoc, southwest of Gjakovë) which was threatened and found protection with the Ottoman authorities. But when Şemsi Paşa, an officer in charge of regional problems, ordered the soldiers to withdraw, all the possessions of the family were destroyed. At the time Edith Durham wrote about these problems in order to bring help to these people, because the English had only been informed about the suffering of the Orthodox people in Macedonia. She asserted that the local Christians thought that the attitude of the Muslims was a consequence of the European intervention in Macedonia.

The eye of an Italian consul

In the archives in Rome I found several reports which mentioned the conflict, written by the Italian Consul Galanti, who was posted in Skopje at the beginning of the events.[14] According to these reports dating from November 1907, the priest, Luigi Palić from Gjakovë, had been illegally confined for two months in the village of Smolitza/Smolicë. In the consul's opinion, it was the first time that the Muslims took out their anger on a priest. To take revenge on the Muslims, the Catholics of the region desecrated the mosque of the village the day before the *bayram* (Muslim feast), by putting a dead pig inside it and smearing the walls with its blood. The Muslims wanted to take revenge, but the family that had him in custody prevented them from touching the priest. The Muslims declared a *besa* ("truce")[15] of three days, at the end of which they wanted to kill the priest and destroy the Catholic church of Gjakovë. According to the Italian consul, the Catholic population of the region had complained for two months about the incapacity of the Austro-Hungarian government to force a release of the priest. Furthermore, his Austro-Hungarian colleague had not properly received a delegation of Catholic clergymen and notables from Gjakovë, who wanted protection for the friar and the church in Gjakovë. Consequently, the delegation went to the Italian vice-consulate.

In a following report, Galanti informed his superiors that all this had serious consequences: some Muslim mountaineers had begun to burn down houses in a Catholic village and to kill some of its inhabitants. Thus he asked his superiors to intercede with the Ottoman authorities, because naturally the latter were basing their domination on "dissension between the elements", i.e. between Muslims and Christians and would not intervene, or would act only at the expense of the Christians. Ten days later, the consul asserted, it was necessary for him to respond to the requests of the Catholics to enhance Italy's prestige in the region. Indeed, the conflict had spread, with the burning of numerous houses in several Catholic villages by the Muslim mountaineers. However, the Muslims from Gjakovë had released the priest and some of their leaders (Sulejman Batusha, Bima Cur, Binak Shlaki) had taken part in the defence of the Catholics against the Muslim mountaineers.

The eye of an Ottoman officer

Also present in the region during the events, Süleyman Külçe, a member of the Young Turk movement, was an Ottoman officer of Albanian origin[16] posted in Mitrovica/Mitrovicë. In his book entitled *Albania in Ottoman History*, which he began to write just after the Young Turk revolution but which was not published until 1944, he dedicates several short chapters to the "pig head affairs in Albania".[17] His testimony is particularly interesting insofar as he was the personal secretary of Şemsi Paşa, who was in charge of the settlement of local conflicts in the region. Külçe's global view is marked by strong opposition to what he calls the "Austrian, Russian and Italian propagandas" against the interests of the Ottoman government in these Balkan regions. He also considers that the Sultan made a mistake in appointing an "uneducated" soldier like Şemsi Paşa to solve local problems, whereas the solution should have been initiatives in the fields of civil engineering and education, for example.[18]

Süleyman Külçe begins his account with the profanation of the mosque in Smolicë. In early September 1907, Şemsi Paşa received a telegram concerning the event which occurred in this village (half an hour distant from Gjakovë) just at the beginning of the *bayram*. Şemsi Paşa immediately asked the local *ulemas* to dampen the agitation among Muslims, by explaining that the dead body of the pig did not desecrate the mosque, and ordered that the guilty persons be found. During the following days, searches were conducted among the Catholics in order to find the perpetrators, and some people began to attack Catholics from Smolicë and other neighbouring villages. Although Süleyman Külçe does not precisely tell us who the arsonists were, he does indicate that the Catholics whose house was burned down were people known to be "quite wealthy" or "ferocious".

Later on, in January 1908, Şemsi Paşa received the order to come to Gjakovë with some troops. Upon his arrival, a priest presented him with a letter concerning homeless families and children killed in the womb of their mother, which was, according to Süleyman Külçe, only "noise" meant to attract the attention of the Great Powers. In response, the Pasha gathered the Muslim notables of the town and the region and declared that many of the Catholics who had been attacked were innocent. Such an attitude would not protect the Muslims; on the contrary it could give occasion to the enemies (*düşman*) to react. The notables (with the conspicuous absence of the Curri family and their partisans) signed a text promising not to continue such actions, also because a local religious leader (*alim*) had underlined the fact that some of the burned houses were *vakf* (i.e. pious foundations), meaning that such actions were also harming the Muslim community. Later, after the departure of Şemsi Paşa, troops were sent into that quarter of the town under the influence of the Curri family, in order to prevent the launching of reprisals against the Catholics.

While Şemsi Paşa was still in Gjakovë, a telegram from Prizren signalled that a new mosque profanation had occurred in that town. However, the commander thought that it was not true, which was effectively the case (no pig was found in the river where it had allegedly been thrown). Despite the efforts of the Ottoman authorities to stifle the false pig affair, Muslims from Luma and Kalis (two mountainous regions, today in Albania, along the border of Kosovo) arrived in Prizren and organised meetings in some mosques and *medrese* in order to mobilize the urban population against the Catholics: it was decided to stop commercial relations with them, and to cease leasing them houses.

At the end of February 1908, the Sultan, alarmed by a supposed connection between these events and the activity of Ismail Qemal bey Vlora in France,[19] ordered Şemsi Paşa to go to Prizren to placate the Muslims and protect the Christians. There were rumours reporting that the persons responsible for the tensions were monks from the Deçani Monastery and that there were Russian and Austrian political intrigues as well. However, Şemsi Paşa did not succeed in breaking the *besa* (pact) against the Catholics and stopping the boycott. The local leaders felt that their religion had been insulted and the movement spread beyond the town, partly due to a decision that, beginning from *Hidrellez* (St. George's Day, in early May), Muslims instead of Catholics would be hired to work on some *çiftliks* (agricultural estates). This provoked the conversion to Islam of some Catholic peasants who were not willing to loose their job. This also caused the intervention of the Great Powers, so that the *Rumeli* inspector was obliged to send an order defining the official and bureaucratic procedures for conversions in order to avoid involuntary conversions. Among the Catholic peasants, some actually converted to Islam, while others immigrated to the Skopje region. Şemsi Paşa received the leaders of the remaining Catholics.

Süleyman Külçe argues that the conflict was also difficult to solve because there was a divergence in the policy of the Sultan, who ordered that the Muslims not be touched and the policy of the Grand Vizier and the Inspector General, who wanted to act severely towards them. Some detachments had been sent, but the *vali*, supporting the policy of the Sultan, refused to use force. In Gjakovë, yet another type of problem erupted: the conflict between the Curri family and the other local chiefs. In the end, Şemsi Paşa was ordered to find a solution. In April he gathered all the Muslim and Catholic notables and succeeded in persuading all parties to sign an agreement saying that the peasants would no longer be persecuted, that commerce would be free, but that the people, as Ottomans, would bring their complaints to the government and not to the consuls. In fact, the question was not settled, and Şemsi Paşa had to return to Prizren in the last days of June, just before being called to Bitola/Monastir, where Young Turk insurgents killed him.[20]

The eye of an Austro-Hungarian vice-consul

The Austro-Hungarian representative in Prizren also had the opportunity to carefully observe the events. One of his duties was to closely follow the situation of the Catholic population, since the Double Monarchy was claiming to be the religious protectorate of the Catholic religion in the region. At the beginning of 1908, Vice-Consul Prochaska reported about the troubles that broke out between Catholics and Muslims in the region of Gjakovë: the discovery of a pig in a mosque, the boycott against Catholic shopkeepers, the expulsion of Catholic colonists and the settlement of the affair by the government. Then he indicated that another boycott had been launched in Prizren.[21]

During this period, several of his reports concerned the pressure exerted on Catholic villagers to convert to Islam. Of special interest is a report from mid-June 1908, where he again tackles the conversion problem. Here he gives important details concerning the nature of the conflict in Prizren, which apparently had not really been solved by Şemsi Paşa, despite the signature of the agreement, as indicated by Süleyman Külçe.[22] According to Prochaska, the situation was unchanged in the town at this time: the local Ottoman authorities were ignoring the new rules about lifting the boycott and they themselves avoided making purchases in Catholic shops; the "Serbs" were also obliged to observe the boycott. The movement against the Catholics was led by a commission formed by Muslim notables who were opposed to the *mutessarıf*, the local representative of the Ottoman authorities.

Vice-Consul Prochaska discusses the reasons for this movement against the Catholics, stressing that the reasons are complex. He sees the two mosque affairs as the origin of the conflict, but points out three other factors involved in the dynamic of the situation: the "intrigues" of some local notables and the interests of other Muslims, the exasperation of the Muslim population and the attitude of Şemsi Paşa.

Indeed, according to the Austro-Hungarian representative, some notables tried to take advantage of the conflict. One of the main leaders, Rassim Aga, was willing to accept from the authorities the payment of a debt contracted with the state and to become a *kaymakam*. Ramadan Zaskok was aspiring to be a gendarmerie commandant, while some leaders of the Luma regions were asking for money from the Catholics and the Austro-Hungarian consulate to stop the movement. Furthermore, the Muslim shopkeepers, who had begun to benefit from the boycott, had no interest in its termination. At another point, Prochaska also stresses the general annoyance of the Muslim population. According to him, it was a consequence of the strengthening of the Catholics in the public sphere, which had begun a few years before, under the leadership of Mgr. Trokši, the Bishop of Skopje. The latter had ordered the bells to ring often (up to 38 times during feast days) and loudly, to such a point that they were drowning out the call to prayer. In addition, the bishop's speeches would also have caused tensions among the Muslims. As for Şemsi Paşa, the vice-consul is of the opinion that his attitude did not contribute to the settlement of the conflict, because he came with his troops, but did nothing to stop the movement and, in this way, compromised the authority of the government.

Facts and their interpretations, actors and their identifications

Let us now return to an analysis of these four testimonies, while paying attention to what their authors did or did not say and whom they did or did not mention. Of course we have to take into account that these witnesses were also actors; they were far from neutral in the affair and its context.

A denominational conflict which brings the threat of an Austro-Hungarian intervention

Beyond the main image of a conflict bringing together Muslims with Catholics (who are not defended enough, according to English opinion), Edith Durham briefly mentions two categories of actors that were involved in the events: the "Catholic mountaineers," who would have been called upon by their coreligionists to perpetrate the profanation; "Austria-Hungary," whose representative did not succeed in making the Ottoman authorities act in favour of the Catholic priest and whose intervention in the region was feared. If Edith Durham here tries to clear the Catholic villagers at the expense of their coreligionists from the mountains (supposed to be responsible for the bad behaviours)[23] and to accuse Austria-Hungary, this gives a slight indication of the significance of internal social diversity and foreign influence that will be highlighted in further testimonies.

In the paragraphs following the description of the events, Edith Durham underlines the incompatibility between the Serbian claims on the region and the Albanian nature of the town of Gjakovë, due to its founding by "the Albanians" after the fall of the Serbian Empire in the Middle Ages. However there is no explicit "ethno-national" consideration in her presentation of the conflict between Catholics and Muslims.

A conflict to be used to enhance prestige in the region

The reports of the Italian consul from November 1907 also describe a conflict between "the Muslims" and "the Catholics" and additionally present a diversity of actors on the Muslim side, something that Edith Durham does not mention. Furthermore, they reveal a balance of power between Austria-Hungary and Italy and introduce the Ottoman authorities as a significant actor in the conflict.

The Italian consul underlines that during the affair, at least at a certain point, there was a divergence in the attitudes of the "Muslim mountaineers", of the "Muslims from Gjakovë" and especially of some of their leaders. Here there may be the same idea of absolving the main actors, of projecting the bad on the "wild mountaineers". However, this allows the consul to give a "racial", i.e. national dimension to his interpretation, which is otherwise mainly expressed in terms of religion. Indeed, in the same report he analyses the change of position of these local leaders as an absence of "fanaticism" and as an understanding of the community of race (in this case the Albanian race) with the Catholics.[24] In addition, the consul places the responsibility for the reinforcement of religious identification onto the Ottoman government, and considers that its partiality toward the Muslims makes it scornful of the Christian Albanians.

On the other hand, his analysis of the conflict's evolution is closely linked with the Italian-Austrian rivalry that arose particularly in the domain of the protection of the Catholic population: being able to protect this population would have been a source of prestige in the region. However, the Italian representative does not mention the possible consequence of this protection, namely reinforcing the religious identification of the local population.

A conflict difficult to solve by challenged Ottoman authorities

The testimony of Süleyman Külçe is, of course, quite different and more precise than that of the Italian consul, even if he forgets the kidnapping of the priest at the beginning of his account. First, in his version we find more details concerning the religious aspects of the conflict. Şemsi Paşa tries to de-confessionalise the affair of the mosque profanation, but during the negotiations with local notables, *ulemas* are present and religious arguments are used. It is in the name of the "insult to religion" that the boycott against Catholic peasants is launched. Subsequently, some of the latter decide to convert to Islam in order to keep their jobs. But Süleyman Külçe's account reveals other dimensions. It gives us a clear indication of the impact of social diversity among the Catholics. During the campaign of attacks against the Catholic villagers, the assailants choose their targets among the "richer" and the more "ferocious" families. In this last case, he probably refers to families that are used to stand up to intimidation more than others. However, this was not revenge indifferently launched against "Catholics". It means that social and economic elements were also part of the denominational conflict.

The young officer is, above all, more informative about the plurality of actors on the side of the "Muslims" and the "Ottoman authorities" and their impact on the affair. As far as the "Muslims" are concerned, his description shows us the role and the division of the "notables." Similar to the Italian consul, he mentions dissent in Gjakovë (with the peculiar position of the Curri family, which does not accept the invitation to negotiate with Şemsi Paşa). However, contrary to the diplomat, Külçe considers this split to be an obstacle in the way of solving the conflict and not as a good thing. He also cites, besides the town's notables, the "Muslims from Luma and Kalis" who played, according to him, an important role in the mobilisation against Catholics in Prizren. Here again we have evidence of the "negative" role of actors coming from the mountains.

Because of his position as Şemsi Paşa's secretary, Süleyman Külçe is also particularly sensitive to the problem raised by the dissent among the various representatives of Ottoman authority. While Edith Durham and the Italian consul see only the "Ottoman authorities" or the "Ottoman government", he stresses this point. In particular, he thinks that Şemsi Paşa could not apply the policy proposed by the Grand Vizir and the Inspector General, because of the position of the *vali*, who was more respectful of the Sultan's policy of non-intervention against the Muslims.

Similar to Edith Durham and the Italian consul, Süleyman Külçe also gives the conflict non-local, i.e. international dimensions, but not with the same significance. In his view, the shadow of the Great Powers hangs over the region: Şemsi Paşa asks the Muslims not to give the "enemies" a pretext for intervention and rumour has it that Austria-Hungary and Russia, through the intermediary of the monks of the Deçani Monastery, are responsible for the conflict (apparently, for him, Italy represented a lesser danger for the region). In the final agreement, Şemsi Paşa tries to cut the existing bond between Christians and the Great Powers, in making them promise to complain to the Ottoman government and not to the representatives of these Powers.

What is particularly interesting is that Süleyman Külçe also refers to an Ottoman dimension, i.e. to Ottoman domestic affairs. He introduces the question of Ottoman political management. The fact that he underlines the incapacity of the Ottoman authorities to solve such problems, notably because of their conflicting policies, is of course understandable in view of his Young Turk convictions. Furthermore, he suggests that in the Sultan's mind this local affair might have been linked with the activity of the regime's opponents in Europe, especially because of Ismail Qemal bey Vlora[25]. Thus, he introduces a political and possibly "ethno-national" factor, since Vlora used

"Albanianism" in political opposition to the Hamidian regime. This suggests that, at a certain point, the reasons for the Ottoman government's interest in solving the conflict were not only regional.

Settling a conflict in order to maintain prestige

Vice-Consul Prochaska is the one observer who gives us the most precise image of the situation in Prizren. Like the others, he also depicts the conflict as a denominational opposition, but for him the conflict is in a way "unnatural", since Muslims and Catholics have a "common clan origin, the same habits and customs" and can be distinguished one from the other only by religion. He thus supposes that only conflicts between different "races" are "natural". Despite this "ethno-national" eye, he is the only one of our four witnesses to explain the tension between Muslims and Catholics beyond that particular conflict. As we have seen, he does not refer to the impact of the reform attempts existing in the region since 1903, but he does refer to the growing place of Catholics in the public space, with particular reference to the problem of the bells and the discourses of Mgr. Trokši. However, the bishop was on bad terms with Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, and it is easy for the vice-consul to make him responsible for the tensions: a way to dismiss Austria-Hungary itself, which, as a protective power, was nevertheless involved in this new state of affairs.[26]

Besides the religious dimension, the Austro-Hungarian consul's account is particularly interesting with regard to the "Muslim side". It tells us about a "commission" formed by some notables of Prizren who were leading the boycott against the Catholics. Furthermore, he underlines the fact that different leaders (from the town and the surroundings, especially from Luma) had personal interests in the affair, or took advantage of it, by using the occasion to ask for different things from the Ottoman local authorities or even from the Austro-Hungarian consulate. Prochaska does not mention directly, as does Süleyman Külçe, the dissent between the different elements of Ottoman authority. Nevertheless, he agrees with him when he explains that the government's authority was undermined when Şemsi Paşa arrived with troops, but did not use them. Lastly, an international dimension is present in his report, since he suggests to his superiors that, for Austria-Hungary, the settlement of the question is important and for that reason recommends asking the Ottoman government to send a special civil servant (the *vali* for example). He implies that without a settlement, the notables might comply with the request of the Muslim population who want to protest against the Church and the Christian schools, and to send a delegation to the Italian vice-consulate. It is clear that here we again see signs of the rivalry between Italy and the Double Monarchy.

The dynamics of confessionalisation: active and dissymmetrical relational configurations

With the preceding analysis in mind, we can now try to answer the following question: how, through this conflict and its representations, can we understand the dynamics of "confessionalisation"? It is clearly a complex phenomenon, which combines (with real and imaginary dimensions and at different levels) religious, social and political, as well as individual and collective dynamics. Let us first examine these levels, followed by the relational configurations that appear in the process during this period of conflict.

Confessionalisation and its dimensions, from the local to the international level

As we have seen in the presentation of this sectarian conflict, all the observers allude more or less to non-religious factors and other categories of actors beyond the categories of "Muslims" and "Christians". Their testimonies also lead us to see the conflict at different levels. There is first the local dimension. The conflict is, above all, a local conflict that takes place in the regions of Gjakovë and Prizren (Prizren is approximately 40 kilometres from Gjakovë), and local dynamics are at work. The connection between the events in Gjakovë and those in Prizren is even tenuous; the actors are not the same. Even if the rumour of the mosque profanation has an effect in Prizren because of the impact of the preceding events in the region of Gjakovë, we can speak of a conflict in the region of Gjakovë and another one in the region of Prizren. In fact, the framework of a local conflict is mainly restricted to one town and its surroundings (here, a town, the villages around it and the related mountains: the Malsia e Gjakovës [Gjakovë's mountain] for Gjakovë and the Luma region for Prizren). This corresponds to the framework of local economic exchanges and of the local balance of power.[27]

Beyond the echoes between Gjakovë and Prizren, the conflict has a regional dimension as well. In particular, the events are dealt with by the Ottoman authorities in the context of the "Three *Vilayets*" (the three Macedonian *vilayets* placed under the supervision of the Inspector General, because of the "Macedonian Question"), and also within the framework of the general situation in the north of the Kosovo *vilayet*. The intervention of Şemsi Paşa can be located at this level. However, this regional dimension is closely linked with two other levels – the imperial and the international ones, owing to the growing Young Turk opposition produced by the particular situation in these "Three *Vilayets*", in which the Great Powers play an important role.

Besides these various dimensions, the process of confessionalisation also has different temporalities, as shown in the Ottoman reforms and in the specific conflicts, i. e. the conflicts which broke out in Gjakovë and Prizren in 1907–08.

Confessionalisation and the temporality of the Ottoman reforms

Let us now try to analyse the main relational dynamics which enter into the process of confessionalisation. These dynamics do not all share the same temporality. Confessionalisation, as mentioned in the introduction, was a phenomenon that, beyond the events of 1907–08, was developing since the last decades of the nineteenth century in this region, as well as in other parts of "European Turkey". The evolution of religious practices was responsible for this, thanks to an increasingly active clergy and, to a certain extent, to the use of printed material. The Tanzimat reforms enabled non-Muslim clerics to be more active than in the past. As far as Catholics were concerned, Franciscan and Jesuit missionaries undertook various activities in the region: churches were built, bells began to ring ever more loudly, schools for Catholic children were opened and congregations were founded. The Orthodox Christians enjoyed the fruit of the competition between the Constantinople Patriarchate, the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Serbian Orthodox Church. In particular, a Serbian Orthodox seminary (*Bogoslovija*) was founded in Prizren in 1871, which became the heart of a religious, cultural and educational network in the region. A quarter of a century later, Serbian bishops were installed in Prizren (1896), as well as in Skopje (1897) and later in Veles (1910).[28] As for the Muslims, different initiatives were launched in the fields of religion and education, to a large extent as a reaction against these Christian activities.[29] This process, however, has not been sufficiently studied, especially as far as Kosovo is concerned. It is a region where numerous conversions to Islam occurred in the last years of Ottoman rule, especially among Catholics.[30] But it is also a region where the networks of diverse Sufi brotherhoods strongly developed at that time,[31] where Qurans were distributed, and schools were founded in which Islamic religion and morality was an important part of the curriculum. It was also a region where *ulemas*, especially Albanian-speaking *ulemas*, were sent by Istanbul in order to preach among the Muslims.[32]

In this temporality we can see different levels (individual, local, regional, imperial and international), since none of these "churches" were homogeneous entities, as I have already stressed, and because initiatives might come from different types of actors. Factors other than religious ones could be part of the process as well. In particular, political factors were significant. For instance, Catholic activities developed under the protection of Austria-Hungary, the main protective power of the Catholic religion in the region, but France and Italy tried to compete in this domain. Political motives were not absent in this competition, as the consuls' reports show us. The Orthodox seminary in Prizren was, in the same way, under the direct jurisdiction of the Serbian government.[33] The strengthening of Islam was also to some extent a consequence of a policy put into effect by the Ottoman authorities at various levels. Besides the intervention of political powers into the religious field, confessionalisation was also a result of reforms implemented in the Ottoman provinces, under the more or less direct pressure of the Great Powers. Here one must mention the representation of each denominational group in local assemblies (*meclis*), as well as the share given to non-Muslim subjects in the gendarmerie and among the judges of the new courts (reforms which were newly introduced in this part of the Kosovo *vilayet*, as we have seen above).

However, it would be a mistake to see this strengthening of religious identification and religious borders as a pure top-down process, imposed by clergymen, missionaries, consuls and Ottoman administrators. The re-negotiation of local alterities proceeded according to multiple dynamics coming from above, but also coming from below and along various temporalities. Confessionalisation was also taking shape through the deeds and sayings of the local population. For example, the collective dimension of religious identification began to materialise through the profanation of religious symbols and through boycotts. In Prizren, a boycott of the Christian shops had already taken place in 1904, on the occasion of the arrival of bells for the Catholic Church.[34] Two years later, a boycott was launched against the Catholic peasants in the region of Gjakovë.[35] But it is easier to see these multiple dynamics when considering another temporality, that of the conflict.

Confessionalisation and the temporality of the conflict of 1907–08

Let us return to the affairs of Gjakovë and Prizren. The conflict begins when a Muslim, helped by a certain number of his coreligionists, kidnaps a priest with the aim of obtaining the liberation of his brother.[36] This individual move has nothing to do with religion, but the choice of the priest, which is new (according to the Italian consul), prompts a reaction that will give the conflict a denominational nature. Why have the prisoner's brother and his friends chosen a clergyman? The aim was certainly not to produce a sectarian conflict per se, but to have bargaining chips, i.e. to make the Ottoman authorities react and release the prisoner. Indeed, they knew that Christian religious matters were sensitive for the government, in particular concerning its relations with the Great Powers. According to the Austro-Hungarian consular reports (from the end of 1907) and to the local *kaymakam*, which both reflected local public opinion, the kidnappers were inspired by the secular priest of Gjakovë, Don Tommaso Glasnović, who suggested that they kidnap a foreigner in order to effect the release.[37] Whether this rumour concerning the responsibility of another priest was true or not, the fact that it spread reveals the competition between the regular and the secular clergy in the region and its possible influence on the conflict. Their choice is thus understandable in the general context, at the crossroad of local and international factors.

This act nevertheless provoked a reaction from some local Christians. Here it is difficult to really know who decided to profane the mosque of Smolicë and who eventually called the Catholic mountaineers to do this, if this was really the case. Indeed, according to the General Consul August Kral in Shkodër, it was not the case: the spiritual initiator would have been the priest of the Nikaj, a Catholic clan of the mountains, who delivered impassioned sermons relating to the captivity of the Franciscan and who declared that no Catholic was brave enough to avenge him. The consequence would have been that four men of the clan decided to be the avengers.[38] Whatever the case might be, the response chosen was an attack against a symbol of the religion of the "other" who had dared to lay a finger on a priest, another religious symbol. The moment is also particularly significant in view of the fact that the profanation took place just at the beginning of a Muslim feast. Therefore, the conflict takes on a sectarian aspect. The action quickly provoked a complex set of reactions on the part of "Muslims", as well as from the "representatives of the Great Powers" and the "Ottoman government".

Religion and confessional identification are significant factors throughout the conflict: they are mobilisation factors, identification factors, intervention factors, claim factors, solidarity factors, exclusion factors, or interpretation factors. On the "Muslim side", as well as on the "Catholic side", there is a communitarian sensibility; mobilisations take place in the name of the "offended religion", possibly against the "other". Some claims are expressed to the Great Powers and to the Ottoman authorities in the name of the religious community. The testimony of the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul shows us that the evolution at the level of the reform process certainly facilitated such mobilisations and claims.

Nevertheless, the testimonies have already indicated that there are also other factors and all "Muslims" and all "Catholics" do not act with one mind. There are also non-religious individual or small group interests that provoke or nourish the conflict and thus the confessionalisation process. These interests may be economic; Muslims attacking the houses of the "wealthier" Catholic peasants, some notables or chiefs seeking to benefit from the conflict to obtain some gains, Muslim shopkeepers deferring the end of the boycott for their own profit and some Muslims wanting to replace the Catholic peasants expelled from their jobs. Furthermore, when the pressure becomes too strong, some Catholics are led to convert, i.e. to join the other community, in order to keep a job. More generally, the conflict develops within the framework of the local balance of power and the complex power relations between the local chiefs themselves. In this way, the conflict between the Curri family and other chiefs in Gjakovë merges with the denominational conflict. Furthermore, the call of mountaineers to perpetrate wrongdoings or the influence of chiefs from surrounding areas also illustrate that the conflict developed along the line of the local balance of power. In addition, the power relations between local notables and Ottoman representatives also intermingle. In Prizren, the commission that leads the boycott movement is clearly acting in opposition to the *mutessarıf*. That does not prevent some notables, who are members of the commission, from playing their own cards during the conflict. The competition within the local Catholic clergy and between some members of the clergy and the consular agents also enters into the conflict and contributes to its development.

The representatives of the Great Powers, mainly the Italian and Austro-Hungarian consular agents in this case, are both actors and observers. They act in the region using an ambiguous analysis and intervention guideline: they are the defenders of the Christian population, but they also function in the regional context according to the existence of "nationalities". This appears clearly in their reports, and we can see the same ambiguity in Edith Durham's book as well. The result is a certain inadequacy, at the least making it necessary to re-evaluate their action from time to time. For example, before the beginning of the conflict, the Austro-Hungarian consular agent in Prizren informed his superiors that the influence and the prestige of the Double Monarchy were threatened in the region, because Catholics, despite the Austro-Hungarian religious protectorate, were suffering. As a consequence, the "Albanians" – Catholic, but also Muslim – were turning towards

Italy. For him, therefore, the money given for the Church and the schools was not bearing the expected fruits.[39] Indeed, the situation of competition allowed the different segments of the population to play on diverse possibilities of protection.[40]

Within the temporality of the conflict, the foreign representatives were obliged to react to appeals and requests, while being considered by the Christian and Muslim population and also by the Ottoman authorities, mainly as the defenders of the "Christian side." In a way, they were initially persuaded to interpret the conflict as a religious one, because the local actors mobilised according to religious affiliations. So here we see an aspect of the bottom-up side of the process. Of course, the Italian consul and his Austro-Hungarian colleague are particularly sensitive to the fate of the Catholics vis-à-vis the Muslims they consider as favoured by the authorities. Furthermore, the representatives of Austria-Hungary act according to the religious protectorate, for instance in interceding with the Ottoman government in the abduction of the priest, or the conversions of the Catholic peasants. And for both Powers – Italy and the Double Monarchy – a successful defence of the Catholics is seen as potentially increasing their prestige. But they have to act with caution, because their aim is not exclusively confessional, and they cannot let their regional influence rely only on the Catholics, and also because they are in competition with each other. That is why the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul tries to more fully understand the dynamics of the conflict and to identify the actors and the motives. As already mentioned, he, like the Italian representative, does not take into account in his analysis the consequence of his own government's policy in the confessionalisation process.

The Ottoman authorities, for their part, are operating in the region under the pressure of the Great Powers and, at that very time, under the pressure of a growing opposition among the Muslim population. They also have their own share in the confessionalisation process, as we have seen with respect to the temporality of the reforms. Furthermore, during the conflict it becomes evident that the Ottoman authorities do not exactly have the same attitude vis-à-vis the Muslims and the Christians, both in reality and in the mind of others. The Ottoman government seems to want a negotiated solution, rather than to use force, especially against the Muslims. Besides, confessionalisation goes hand in hand with Islamicisation or with the defence of Islam and the Ottoman Empire against the Great Powers. Following the intervention of the Great Powers after a wave of conversions to Islam, the Inspector General is urged to order the establishment of an official conversion procedure by means of a ceremony before the local administrative assembly (*idare meclisi*).[41]

This kind of measure had already been taken in other parts of the Empire, always with the aim of showing that these conversions were voluntary.[42]

However, we have seen that during the conflict there was not one consistent Ottoman policy, but rather conflicting policies vis-à-vis the Muslims and the problem of Christian-Muslim relations. Beyond the regional peace, the balance of power between the different representatives of Ottoman authority, as well as between the Ottoman authorities and the Great Powers, was undoubtedly at stake. Christian-Muslim relations were also a key problem for the Young Turk movement, which had developed in Macedonia as a consequence of the Macedonian crisis. The testimony of Süleyman Külçe is an illustration of this phenomenon. It is also striking to note that Şemsi Paşa was later accused by the famous Young Turk leader Niyazi Bey, of having mobilised Albanian volunteers against the Young Turks by announcing that Christians were massacring Muslims and that the volunteers have to move against these Christians (and not against the Young Turks).[43] Indeed, it is quite possible that he used this stratagem, linked to religious oppositions, to mobilise volunteers against the Young Turk insurgents. However, Şemsi Paşa's son denied in a book that his father did such a thing, since he would have always tried to defend the Christians against the injustices committed by Muslims.[44] It is interesting to note that this explanation uses the same kind of argument concerning the issue of Muslim/Christians relations: the image of Şemsi Paşa is linked with the management of the relations between Christians and Muslims at that time. With respect to the temporality of the conflict, it means that these complex relations (within the Ottoman administrative and military units and between these units and the Great Powers as well) are also components of the confessionalisation process.

Confessionalisation and religion as a real and imaginary integrative force in late-Ottoman Southeast Europe

At the time of nationalisms, religion as such, or a more imaginary religious identification, appears to have been an important factor of social integration in this region of the Balkan Peninsula. In any case, an inescapable fading of religious identification in favour of a new national identification is not obvious. The development of national identities (Serbian, Albanian, Turkish, etc.) is also present in the region at that time. As far as Albanian national identity is concerned, we know that it began to develop mainly in Gjakovë around 1907, with the foundation of an Albanian Committee, which included Bajram Curri, among others.[45] However the testimonies we used in this study, beyond the few remarks on the common "race" of the Muslims and the Catholics, are not precise enough to tell us if this development had an influence on the conflict and, in particular, what was the attitude of the people involved in the committee vis-à-vis the Catholics. However that may be, the phenomenon of confessionalisation was noticeable at that time, its development occurring according to various temporalities. The process was the result of a complex interaction of acts and discourses with both religious and non-religious motivations. Under these conditions it was not necessarily incompatible with nationalism or with "Europeanization", two other complex processes. Religious identifications, as national identifications, had an increasingly supra-local dimension, since foreign and non-local actors were involved in local religious matters. The violent attack of religious symbols (be it a priest or a mosque) purposely added a supra-local dimension to the conflict.

If confessionalisation was obvious at that time, it was not necessarily a linear and irreversible process. The framework was that of the *millets*, as institutionalised during the second part of the nineteenth century,[46] but we have seen that this framework is not sufficient to describe the dynamics of confessionalisation. There was a multiplicity and a fluidity of individual and collective identifications directly linked to the local configurations, and particularly to the question of power and authority on different levels (local, regional, imperial, international). The perspective of the *histoire croisée* and the comparison of different sources, taking into consideration the subjectivity of certain actors, lead us to a better understanding of this phenomenon.

5

VIOLENT SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION: A NATION-BUILDING STRATEGY IN LATE-OTTOMAN HERZEGOVINA

Hannes Grandits

The later days of the Ottoman period saw the repeated eruption of power struggles in the eastern part of Herzegovina bordering the mountainous areas of Montenegro. The principal forces involved in the conflict were mainly those of the Herzegovinian Muslim notables and "autonomous" Montenegrin militias. The latter usually organised themselves around the bishop of Cetinje. Both sides also involved the population of Eastern Herzegovina by repeated attempts at mobilisation and the frequent provision of weapons. From the perspective of the Herzegovinian notables, everything was about crushing bandits, *uskoks* or *hajduks* as they called them, who crossed the borders into Herzegovina to plunder and to undermine the existing order. The Montenegrins argued that they were only acting against unjust and violent Muslim *çiftlik-sahibis* and Ottoman tax collectors, whom they accused of a systematic and often unreasonable exploitation of an already poverty-stricken mountainous population.

During the Tanzimat period, the "reformed" Ottoman central authorities began to again apply stricter controls over local Herzegovinian power relations (following the armed intervention, 1850–51, in the Bosnian *vilayet*);[1] at this point they also "inherited" this regional conflict. In the beginning, they intervened offensively and started a rigorous campaign of disarmament of the population. This campaign did not meet with success, particularly in the Eastern Herzegovinian border areas in the direction of Montenegro. On the contrary, this area eventually became the starting point for the so-called Vukalović revolts, which repeatedly plunged this eastern border region into chaos. This development was obviously also furthered by the strategic interests of some of the foreign Great Powers (primarily Russia and the neighbouring Habsburg Empire) and in particular by the Montenegrin policy, which had begun to strive, with Russian support, for more sovereignty from the Ottoman state.

A solution was negotiated at the beginning of the 1860s, after several Ottoman military campaigns against Montenegro. This conflict resolution established a special regime in the border areas, despite the forthright strong tendency of the Tanzimat reform project towards the centralisation and "standardisation" of power relations. The population benefited from some tax reductions and, in particular, received relatively far-reaching rights for autonomous self-administration. In addition, men from these predominantly Orthodox rural communities were hired to become part of the salaried Ottoman border troops. The devastating defeat of Montenegro in the last Ottoman military campaign in 1862 had restrained Montenegro's expansionist activities for many years. The combination of these factors contributed to the return of a relatively peaceful situation throughout the whole region, including the border areas described above.

It was a time when a wave of house construction took place in most villages. This was very much a consequence of the strengthened settlement rights of the rural *çiftçi*-families, enacted with the so-called Safer Decree of 1859, a reform of the regional land-holding legislation. After the proclamation of the *hatt-ı hümayun* Edict of 1856, Mostar, the largest town of the region, saw the construction of a new and very large Orthodox cathedral and also of a Catholic church. At the same time, a "reformed" bureaucracy, sent from Istanbul, was given the responsibility for implementing a fundamental modernisation of the regional and local administrative procedures and of generally overseeing public order. Nevertheless, this was also a period when Ottoman state finances were increasingly caught in a vicious circle of foreign indebtedness and began to stumble towards a desperate situation.[2]

After the relatively quiet time of the 1860s, a new crisis came to a head in the eastern parts of the Herzegovinian *sancak* in the early 1870s. Judgements about the severity of the crisis varied according to the point of view of the observer. But it is clear that rural poverty again became widespread, due to succeeding years of bad harvests, and not much was done to alleviate the situation. In addition, the initiatives of the regional administration to continue with tax collections "as usual", following general orders from the central authorities that set the "correct" levy of taxes in the face of the growing financial turbulence, also gave cause for complaints. Grievances against the Ottoman authorities again became more numerous in several Herzegovinian regions, especially after the crop failures of 1873 and 1874.[3]

In this article we will take a closer look at a local conflict which developed in the context outlined above and out of complaints from rural Orthodox communities near the Eastern Herzegovinian town of Nevesinje. Unexpectedly, the Ottoman authorities totally lost control of the situation in this area within a short period of time. During the summer of 1875, the whole affair escalated into an extremely violent conflict, sweeping along large parts of the region into a situation of anarchy. This conflict, known in historiography as the "Herzegovinian rebellion" (*Hercegovački ustanak*), marked the beginning of a period of war that also brought the end of direct Ottoman rule on this region. Wars were also waged in several other regions of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Ottoman rule in the European parts of the Empire generally came to the brink of total disintegration, in particular after Russia entered the conflict in April 1877.

But this article does not deal with the eventually far-reaching implications for Ottoman or Great Powers' policies of these initially small and local insurrections. It is rather meant to be an analysis of how and according to which dynamics of power and loyalties this local conflict actually did escalate. This will be done in three parts. First, we will look at the actors who were crucially important in the escalation of the conflict. The second part analyses the processes of mobilisation and homogenisation of the local populations by means of the strategic use of violence. Thirdly, we will examine three exemplary Herzegovinian rural localities (one Orthodox, one Catholic and one Muslim) in order to see which consequences the erupting conflict eventually had for the social life of the population in the region.

The actors in the early escalation of the revolt of 1875

In early summer of 1875, several village elders from an area of near the small town of Nevesinje in Eastern Herzegovina had, for some weeks, refused to pay obedience to the local authorities. They started to boycott the levy of taxes to the State, as well as the dues to their *çiftlik-sahibis*. After a series of negotiations on the local level following their demand for mediation, a very prominent arbitration commission came to Nevesinje. It was led by the Herzegovinian *mutesarrıf*, Mustafa-paşa, and the highest military officer of the *sancak*, Selim-paşa.[4]

In order to gain insight into the organization and constraints within the discontented population of the Orthodox villages of the Nevesinje area, it is helpful to examine those people who attended the meetings convened by the above-mentioned special commission from the end of May to the beginning of June 1875.[5] The "Commission of the Pashas", the name used by the population to refer to this special commission, called upon all local leaders to come to the town of Nevesinje for an "open talk". The meeting would concern the complaints that some village leaders had formulated in a joint letter sent to the Sultan a few months earlier. Most of the invited men came. They were the elected headmen of the villages, the so-called *knezes* (officially: *muhtars*); some among them also held the title of *koca-başaı*, since they were also members of councils (*meclis*) that were consulted in local administrative matters (the so-called *vilayet* reform of 1864–5 had increased the involvement of representatives of the population in a series of administrative and judicial processes). Orthodox priests from the villages also came to the meeting in Nevesinje.[6]

The commission, led by Mustafa-paşa and Selim-paşa, was instructed by the Bosnian vizier to carry out the strict order of the Sublime Porte, which demanded that all necessary means should be used to find a peaceful solution to the existing problems. In view of the potential consequences that a violent escalation in this sensitive Herzegovinian border area could generate, the Ottomans did not want to take any risks. The Ottoman authorities also feared the deeper involvement of consular representatives of the Great Powers in this local "problem".

The village leaders were surprised at the positive and very constructive attitude of Mustafa-paşa and Selim-paşa, who patiently listened to their grievances. These grievances of the village elders mainly referred to the two previous years – that is 1873 and 1874. Crop failures had greatly affected life in this karstic mountain area. Emotional complaints were presented, that despite the deep misery, the authorities had made hardly any concessions with regard to tax deductions or the payment of existing tax debts.[7] The Orthodox priests protested against the expatriation "to Mesopotamia" of two of their church leaders and of a Serbian teacher.[8] Moreover, the village elders presented the names of several persons whom they accused of unjustified assaults or of fraudulent manipulations. These were most notably the names of some *zaptije* ("gendarmes"), some tax farmers and of some local *çiftlik-sahibis*.[9]

The special commission not only promised to remedy the situation; they went even further and started to talk about the possibility that a special administrative order, similar to one that had been imposed after the Vukalović revolts in the border areas further to the East, could also be put into effect here in the Nevesinje region. In those border areas, men from the villages became paid members of the Ottoman border defence and the village headmen could draw on a salary.[10]

In his accounts, Risto Proroković, who grew up in Nevesinje and whose father kept a shop in town at that time, described how tempting this offer had been for the assembled village leaders and that their mood had begun to change. Serious objections were raised against the earlier resolution which had included open confrontation if necessary:

> Such promises left a deep impression on the village headmen and they began to seriously reconsider whether they should really stay with their earlier decision and start a rebellion. They risked a disruption of their livelihood. Shouldn't they rather – also with regard to their own material advantage – aim for a peaceful solution and show signs of regret? Many of them, who had in no way been included in all the earlier plans, and did not know anything about them, were immediately satisfied with the assurances of the pashas: of course only to the degree that they believed them.[11]

As can be deduced from these lines, the majority of the village-headmen were becoming increasingly interested in a normalisation of the circumstances. This was furthered by the fact that this season's harvest promised to be a good one. If a rebellion were to take place, the risk was high that they and their families, as well as their fields and homesteads, would suffer. Some *knezes* and *koca-başıs* already began to boast about what they had accomplished for the population through their firm demands.[12] However, there were still two groups among the Orthodox Nevesinje villagers that remained reserved and sceptical about the apparent normalisation. Both had been absent from the previously-described assembly.

The authorities felt that one group actually constituted the real core of the rioters. These were several village leaders who had a following of some young men. Many of them came from the village and vicinity of Zovi-do. In the autumn of 1874 they had come into conflict with the gendarmerie and openly provoked opposition.[13] Eventually these men – about 40 in number – fled across the border to Montenegro,[14] where they were very cordially received.[15]

Even though they had received support for a revolt against the Ottoman authorities, the Montenegrin *Knjaz* made very clear to them that the time was not ripe for any systematic rebellion now and that they ought to stay calm for the foreseeable future. As a result of the initiatives of Montenegrin officials and the intervention of several consuls of the Great Powers residing in Mostar and Dubrovnik, most of the refugees described above could again return to their villages in early spring of 1875.[16]

Some of the returnees had been rewarded with presents, and were wearing Montenegrin dresses and bearing new weapons. They had high hopes for a potential future rule by *Knjaz* Nikola from Montenegro, and back home they initially praised him in almost messianic terms to other villagers.[17] But even these people could not refuse to seriously consider the implications of the offer made by the "Commission of the Pashas". They also entered into negotiations, during which they seemed to increasingly abandon their originally very adversary stance towards the authorities.[18] But the special commission demanded that they fulfil one condition: they should cease any support of the *uskoks/hajduks*, a group that had become a powerful factor over the last months in the area surrounding Nevesinje. Let us now turn to the *hajduks*, who had a particular interest in the escalation of a rebellion.

For some months, bands of *uskoks* and *hajduks* had again been active in the eastern parts of Herzegovina. This alarmed the local authorities and brought increasing troubles to the local tradesmen. The peace agreement of 1862, in which the Montenegrin prince had to accept the stipulation making him responsible for preventing any kind of *uskok* activities coming from Montenegrin territory, as well as the incorporating of the local border population into the protection of the border, had resulted in a pronounced downturn of banditry in Herzegovina.[19]

In the winter of 1874–75, while the above-described conflict started to emerge, groups of *hajduks* again began crossing the borders into Herzegovinian territory.[20] After occasional raids, they would withdraw into the higher mountain areas or return to Montenegro. By using the threat of violence, they forced the local population to support them with food. Sometimes such threats were not even needed, since some *hajduk* leaders enjoyed the aura of being "fighters for justice".

But Pero Tunguz, a man who had recently escaped from prison in Mostar and soon thereafter began to serve as the leader of a *hajduk* group in the mountains near Nevesinje, did not enjoy a good reputation among the local population. He was regarded as a common criminal. But Pero Tunguz contacted the rebels of Zovi-do, i.e. those men who had fled to Montenegro and had only returned in early spring. The *četa* of Tunguz consisted of about 30 men. These men were in part outlaws living in the region, but more than the half of them were Montenegrins.[21]

In summary, it is obvious that the group of local leaders within the "protest movement" of the Orthodox villagers of the area surrounding Nevesinje was not homogenous, and that it reacted to the attempts at conflict resolution with different interests in mind. It also becomes clear that the local dynamics of power were also influenced from the "outside". This influence came particularly from Montenegro. Both the group of refugees returning from Montenegro to their villages with a new "political awareness", as well as bands of *hajduks* that had acted illegally, used the area as a place of refuge in times of trouble.

Let us now turn to the second part of the analysis, where we will try to understand in which ways the obviously abating interest in confrontation was again emotionally inflamed.

Homogenisation through violence and "international" instrumentalisation of local conflict

The lessening tension between the Orthodox villagers and the Ottoman authorities was above all, and most outrageously, considered by the *hajduks* as a threat. They originally expected that a large-scale escalation of the conflict would make it much easier to undertake extended raids. They expected, with some justification, that an overthrow of the existing order might even help them to again occupy a legal position within society. On the other hand, a normalisation of conditions would certainly make it much more dangerous to continue to operate in Herzegovina.

The developments in Nevesinje also led to heated public and private discussions in Mostar, the central town of Herzegovina. A small conspiratorial number of nationalistically inclined young men of the town noted with dissatisfaction the non-violent solution of the problems reached in the Nevesinje villages. This small group consisted mainly of a few still very young Serbian "nationalists", who were mainly still attending school and to some extent also had a rather dubious background. Hardly any of the well-off and reputable Orthodox families or the Orthodox metropolitan, the *Phanariot Prokopije*, had anything to do with them.[22] Nevertheless, in the context of a conspiracy, they would come to exercise some influence on further events.

They falsified three "official" letters, in which they pretended to write in the name of the Orthodox town elders, the Orthodox metropolitan of Mostar, and the Russian consul of Mostar. An envoy from their group made his way to the Nevesinje villages and in the presence of the so-called "rebellious *knezes*", the "returnees" from Montenegro, he handed the letters over to the *hajduk* leader, Pero Tunguz. The messages of all three letters were quite similar. In principle, they called upon the *hajduks* and rebels to “kill as many Turks as needed” in Nevesinje and in the nearby villages. This provoked acts of revenge from the side of the authorities and these retaliations would again cause frustration within the Orthodox population. This would consequently insert a new dynamic into the already concluded intention to avoid a confrontation with the authorities.[23]

Although apparently the authenticity of the faked letters was not questioned, the majority of the village *knezes* still remained rather reserved – but not the *hajduk* chief, Pero Tunguz. He entered into an aggressive dispute with one of the village *knezes*, whom he accused of being a coward. Towards the end of the increasingly emotional meeting, he threatened the *knez* with whom he had quarrelled, saying that he would, “within the following day, kill a Turk” in the near vicinity of his village – which he proceeded to do.[24] Not much later, Tunguz’s *hajduk četa* brutally raided a trade caravan on its way from Mostar to Nevesinje. In this cruel attack, the *hajduks* killed five members of the caravan, all of them Muslims. The attackers fled with the stolen goods and withdrew to their hiding place in the mountains. The brutality of this raid changed the opinion of the Ottoman dignitaries engaged in the settlement of the conflict[25] and from now on they became increasingly pessimistic that pacification could be achieved by diplomatic means. Even the mediators who had been sent to Nevesinje with strict instructions to reach a peaceful solution began to recommend a rapid armed intervention to restore order. The following message, sent by telegraph to the vizier in Sarajevo immediately after the brutal attack on the caravan, illustrates this very vividly:

> Yesterday evening we again arrived in Nevesinje. Today, actually at the same moment when we were about to send someone body to the insurgents to inform them of our arrival and our mission [to continue the negotiations], a group of insurgents attacked a trader’s caravan. The armed robbery took place on a hill that is less than half an hour from here. They have killed five Muslims and have taken away 50 loads of coffee, sugar, and rice, as well as the horses. They have brought their booty to a village called Odrišina.
>
> The revolt of these people has taken on a new aspect. It looks as if they really have the intention to trigger a rebellion. The time of negotiation seems to be over. Going to them or sending an envoy does not make sense anymore. What is your order?[26]

The first consequence resulting from the events described here, was the transfer of many more *zaptije* troops to Nevesinje. Armed Muslim "self-protection" groups were also organised locally; the latter not infrequently consisted of men with rather shady biographies.[27]

The second consequence was that not only the Orthodox village headmen of the "rebellious" faction, but also the leaders of some other villages feared that in the search for the wrongdoers, the authorities would also settle their scores with them and attack them. As a measure of self-protection, they began to organise armed guards and to construct barricades. Inevitable, these guards were soon involved in conflicts with *zaptije* units.[28]

The following four short quotations illustrate how the situation developed. They are a series of reports from the special negotiators in Nevesinje and also from other Herzegovinian local authorities. These reports were telegraphically sent to Sarajevo and from there to the Sublime Porte. All four quotes make very clear that the situation was becoming increasingly polarised due to an escalating level of violence:

> Now the insurgents move through the villages in the mountains between Nevesinje up to Sarajevo. They harass the local villagers and force the loyal population to join the rebellion.[29]
>
> Today they [the insurgents] have taken away the sheep of the people in several villages, made the streets impassable, and terrified the Muslim as well as the Christian populations. They have also forcibly carried off with them some Christians. Those who were not willing to voluntarily join them were threatened with the worst consequences. They strongly recommended to these people that they should move away, or they could soon expect that their houses would be burned down.[30]
>
> Nevesinje, Stolac and Trebinje, and the population in the vicinity of Mostar have already repeatedly written and demanded that weapons and ammunition should immediately be given to the Muslim population, in order to enable them to defend their lives and their property.[31]
>
> The arrival of the Montenegrins was instantly associated with the burning down of the Muslim houses in the village of Lukavac. They have also taken the sheep and cattle. The village Biograd was the next. The involvement of them [the Montenegrins] has, of course, markedly changed the character of the rebellion.[32]

These reports show how the Ottoman authorities were informed about the consequences of the increasing escalation of the conflict, which was further complicated by the involvement of the Montenegrin "irregulars". In reaction, large Ottoman military contingents were deployed to "pacify" the region. However, in fact, now the Ottoman military leaders and officers at the scene more frequently made the decision on how to proceed. They "implemented" their own views about how the rebellion should be most effectively put down.

The Sublime Porte in Istanbul – now even more concerned about the potential danger of the political "chain reactions" of this conflict in the Herzegovinian borderland – repeatedly instructed the local authorities to subdue the heated and escalating situation. New initiatives for negotiations were started many times,[33] but they were often directly undermined by the activities of *başıbozuk* bands that frequently operated outside the control of the military and the authorities.[34]

The rebels also developed something like a process of "military professionalisation". Very soon after the previously-described events, "professional" national agents of the governments of Serbia and Montenegro began intensive "activity" in the region around Nevesinje. Within less than two weeks after the above-described raid on the trading caravan near Nevesinje, for instance, Mićo Ljubibratić, a Herzegovinian émigré who had lived in Belgrade since the early 1860s and worked there for the Serbian government, had come to the Nevesinje region with a small group of confidants, as he later wrote in his memoirs, "out of his own motivation".[35] As early as July 1875, he tried to give the rebellion a "basic structure", that is he (together with his followers) worked out plans as to how to organise the chain of command most efficiently, how many combatants every village should assemble, etc. On his own initiative, he also organised an assembly of village *knezes* and other men, who had already been involved in the early phase of the escalation of the revolt, by bringing together local leaders from the neighbouring Eastern Herzegovinian districts of Nevesinje, Gacko, Rudine and Piva.[36]

An incident occurring soon after this assembly makes obvious that a serious struggle about the further development of the rebellion had broken out. In particular, *Knjaz* Nikola from Montenegro greatly feared that the developments in Herzegovina could slip out of control. Initially, he in no way welcomed the Nevesinje escalation, because it did not come "at the right time" for Montenegro.[37] He was also concerned about possible repercussions from the fact that Montenegrin "volunteers" were involved in the neighbouring insurrection in increasing numbers, without having received permission for such an action.[38]

A first attempt by *Knjaz* Nikola to take charge of the developments in Herzegovina took the form of sending out one of his military leaders, Peko Pavlović, together with a group of armed men, with the task to "neutralise" Mićo Ljubibratić. Pavlović and his men carried out this duty to the greatest satisfaction of Prince Nikola. Ljubibratić and his followers were beaten up so badly that they had to leave Herzegovina for Dubrovnik to seek medical treatment.[39] It was only several weeks later, after he had reached an agreement in principle with the Montenegrin prince, that Ljubibratić was again able to engage in the Eastern Herzegovinian rebellion. He again became quite active as the organiser and commander of a squadron of some hundreds of foreign "volunteers" who carried out "joint operations" with some local militias. Ljubibratić's unit operated mainly from their headquarter in the Eastern Herzegovinian Duži monastery (which lies not far from the border with Dubrovnik). The foreign volunteers came from different parts of Europe, and usually entered the Herzegovinian battlegrounds via Dubrovnik and other Dalmatian towns. The majority were probably young nationalists from Serbia and fighters from Garibaldi's army in Italy.[40]

But the foreign units of volunteers did not consist solely of nationalist "idealists". There were more than a few among them who had quite doubtful personal records. The following testimony of the German war correspondent A. Kutschbach, who spent some time with the Ljubibratić legion in Herzegovina, illustrates this quite vividly. About the circumstances in the "camp of the Herzegovinian rebels" he wrote the following:

> After the meal, I accompanied Hubmayer [he was one of the leading foreign nationalist activists] on his walk through the camp. A more multi-coloured picture as this insurgent camp one can hardly imagine. Wild, dangerous looking figures were all around. In their faces one could see very obviously the suffering that they had to endure. Many foreign irregulars were there as well, like some depraved Czechs, who by their loud singing drew attention to themselves, Russians, and Italians – a motley mixture of European soldiers of fortune, whom the natives always observed with a – probably justified – portion of distrust…
> I spent the night, as under such circumstances it probably goes without saying, in the open field. … The discomfort even intensified, when I was thinking about the characters of the people among whom I was lying. But as to the honour of the Herzegovinian insurgents – I have to confess that I never felt danger from their side. It is true that various things were stolen from me, … but they never approached me with a

> threatening demand. From the beginning, I had nothing to fear with regard to this from the native insurgents, but all the more from the foreign ones, among whom there were a good many whose past did not differ too much from that of a common street robber. For instance, with an impertinent laugh, such a person – he pretended to be a soap-boiler from Komorn – told me, that he had wandered on foot into the insurgent camp directly from [the prison] Stein [in Upper Austria], where he had served a five-year prison sentence.[41]

Knjaz Nikola tried to actively win control of the early revolt movement by following several strategies. The most important was probably that he made every effort to establish close contact with local Eastern Herzegovinian insurgent leaders. He increasingly succeeded in this effort. How this was realised might be illustrated by the example of Don Ivan Musić. Musić was a 27-year-old Catholic priest in the Eastern Herzegovinian village of Ravno, who immediately began to organise armed *četas* for a radical change of the existing order, after he had learned about the violent escalation near Nevesinje.[42] In this way he consciously tried to stir up slumbering revolutionary sentiments in the population. Within a few days he mobilised a crowd of people among the Catholic population of his parish, which soon took part in some night raids.[43] Shortly thereafter, Musić was invited to come to the Orthodox monastery Zavala, where an assembly of village leaders took place in late July 1875, initiated by Montenegrins.

Several delegates of *Knjaz* Nikola were sent to this assembly and promised to send weapons and ammunition. The attending village leaders were reawarded with Montenegrin military honours and ranks and also received valuable Montenegrin uniforms as gifts. Don Musić was treated with particular deference. In addition to a luxurious uniform, he was given a sabre and a revolver and was also decorated with a Montenegrin military order. At the end of the assembly, the local leaders swore an oath to "put an end to the Turkish rule" and cheered for Prince Nikola.[44]

The case of Don Musić was an exception within the Catholic leadership. Musić disregarded the general "Catholic position" that was mainly supported by the Herzegovinian clergy, which meant, in particular, by the Franciscans. The Catholic priests, that is those in Eastern Herzegovina who came under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Dubrovnik (i.e. who resided outside the Ottoman territory) and the much more numerous Franciscans who served in Western Herzegovina, were quite supportive of Ottoman rule at the beginning of the here-analysed rebellion.[45] Not incidentally, this also resulted from the fact that Austrian policy, which had a strong influence on the Catholic Church in Herzegovina, firmly recommended this attitude.[46] But this was also connected with the fear of the Catholic Church that it could become integrated into an "Orthodox" Montenegrin or Serbian state if the Ottoman order was to break down. And the official position of the church viewed such a scenario very negatively. At first Musić took a more "revolutionary" position, which might be explained by his biographical background.[47] Nevertheless, Musić's position became increasingly more "independent" as the uprising progressed. In its late phase he even tried to align himself with the Catholic scheme of loyalty to the Ottoman state, while also being very pro-Austrian.[48]

The expansion of the depicted insurrection into other areas of Herzegovina and into parts of Bosnia immediately resulted in a massive refugee movement. Tens of thousands of people fled from the Herzegovinian and Bosnian areas of war. They became displaced persons within the region, and also fled across the border in great numbers to Austrian Dalmatia and partly also to Montenegro. Austrian sources tell us in much detail about the misery and distress the swarms of refugees suffered in overcrowded Dalmatian towns. To some degree, these people were also a factor in Austria's strategic policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Their political instrumentalisation by different



Fig. 6: Distribution of aid to refugees from Herzegovina in the city of Dubrovnik. Source: *The Illustrated London News*, Vol. LXVIII, 22 January 1876, London, p. 84.

private committees, which were founded in Dalmatia to organise support for Herzegovinian and Bosnian war refugees, became very obvious. Some of these committees worked not only to give humanitarian support to the refugees, but also had a quite unambiguous "nationalistic" agenda. These groups also played a crucial role in the supply of arms and ammunition for the Herzegovinian insurgents, which was crucially important for the whole rebellion.[49]

While the influence of officially "neutral" Austro-Hungarian policy in the developing neighbouring war remained mainly indirect, despite recurring military threats of "intervention", Montenegro's and Serbia's involvement was more than direct. In June 1876, the leadership of both (at that time still principalities under Ottoman rule) also officially declared war against the Ottoman Empire. After this official proclamation, the Montenegrin military became even more massively involved in the Herzegovinian theatre of war.

In time, movements of rebellion also broke out in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, most fiercely in the "Bulgarian provinces". Russia also officially declared war against the Ottoman Empire in 1877. Eventually a big supra-regional war with many conflicts and front lines developed in less than two years after the start of the "Herzegovinian rebellion". In Herzegovina this war lasted – although with fluctuating intensities – well into the first half of 1878.

The time of the uprising in three exemplary local contexts

The previous two parts of the paper have illustrated which dynamics could be generated by violent incidents, even though a consensual solution had already been near at hand. They also made evident that small cells of radicals could assume crucial influence by the strategic use of violence during a still critical situation. The authorities, on the one hand, were increasingly certain that harsh and concerted armed action against those responsible for the acts of violence needed to be applied as soon as possible in reaction to renewed violent attacks against the existing order. On the other hand, the village *knezes* and the population in general also feared falling victim to expected acts of prosecution. In such a situation, the more radical groups and the *hajduks* began to organise "self-defence" groups, and that meant large-scale forced mobilization in some local contexts. A kind of revolutionary mood also blossomed in parts of the region, which further undermined public order. Additional troops, as well as non-local "specialist" for uprisings, hastily began to take over command of the escalating conflict. Violent individuals and groups that were primarily interested in looting also began to enter the conflict, and this soon led to a first wave of plundering.



Fig. 7: Herzegovinian insurgents after a victorious combat. This picture gives an impression of how brutal this guerrilla war was waged. In the foreground an insurgent is cutting off the scalp of a fallen Ottoman soldier as a trophy, in the back a wounded but living soldier is shot dead. The armament and also parts of the clothing of the fallen soldiers are collected. Source: *Über Land und Meer. Allgemeine Illustrirte Zeitung*, 36.Bd.18.J9, No 28, Stuttgart, 1876, p. 560.

Increasingly larger areas became infected by a guerrilla war that would continue for almost three years. Between 1875 and 1878, the Ottoman authorities lost control of many parts of the Herzegovinian region temporarily or for longer periods of time. The Herzegovinian Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim populations would experience these violent and war-torn years, depending on the locality, in quite differing ways. It would exceed the scope of this article to attempt to reconstruct these experiences in detail. But to obtain at least a notion of how social life in Herzegovina was shaken by this period of massive violence, we will more closely examine the situation in three exemplary localities – i.e. the Orthodox Zavođe, the Catholic Brotnjo and the predominantly Muslim Ošanjići.

The Eastern Herzegovinian Orthodox Zavođe villages

The Eastern Herzegovinian villages Vrbno, Budoši and Dubočani, at that time also known as Zavođe villages, were already directly affected by the uprising very soon after the previously-described events. These villages of the wider Rudine region had in the past been repeatedly drawn into hostilities with the authorities during the time of the Vukalović revolts of the 1850s. In August 1875 they were again compelled to take sides, when a blockade of the nearby town of Trebinje was being prepared. This was an



Fig. 8: War in Herzegovina, Ottoman soldiers bringing away prisoners. Many of the arrested local men were detained in prisons and camps under harsh terms for long periods. Not few were executed or came to death there. Source: *The Illustrated London News*, vol. LXVII, 18 September 1875, London, p. 273.

important event in the early stages of the revolt, and it was organised and commanded by the previously-mentioned Mićo Ljubibratić.[50] All roads and major pathways were closed down by the insurgents. Since the Zavođe villages Budoši and Vrbno were located close to the road connecting Trebinje with the neighbouring town of Bileća (one of the most important supply channels for Trebinje), the mobilisation of the population of the Zavođe villages for the attempted blockade was judged to be essential by Ljubibratić and the insurgents. Quite a few men from the Zavođe villages volunteered or were forced to participate.[51] The main task for the group from the Zavođe villages was to contain the Ottoman military personnel stationed in the Muslim village of Jasen, which was next to Budoši and was also situated directly on the main Trebinje-Bileća road. During the period of the blockade, Jasen was attacked by insurgent groups and was partly burned down.[52]

Although initially the insurgents seemed to be quite powerful, the blockade ended in defeat for them. After the encircled garrison at Trebinje had received a military reinforcement of almost a thousand men, who had been transferred to Trebinje via the small Ottoman harbour of Klek on the Herzegovinian strip of the Adriatic coast, these joint Ottoman forces (accompanied by local militia) stormed the main base of the insurgents in the Orthodox monastery Duži, west of Trebinje. Most of the insurgent fighters fled either across the border to Austrian territory, retreated to hardly accessible higher mountain areas, or simply went back to their villages. The international volunteers also withdrew to Austrian territories.[53] The result was the collapse of the first blockade of Trebinje.

These developments soon had grave consequences for the Zavođe villages. After the end of the blockade, Ottoman troops started a series of arrests. The wave of imprisonments was not confined solely to the area around the town of Trebinje, but was also carried out on a large scale in other parts of Eastern Herzegovina. Hundreds of men, held responsible for being involved in insurrection activities or blamed for civil disobedience, were detained and escorted in chains through the towns and put into internment camps and dungeons.

Furthermore, reprisals took place as well; on 17 October 1875, the Zavođe villages suffered heavily from one such attack of retaliation. On this day, a punitive expedition made its way from Trebinje towards Bileća and plundered and burned down several hamlets settled by an Orthodox population. Budoši, Vrbno and Dubočani were among those villages that were heavily affected.[54]

The population from the Zavođe villages became refugees, like others fleeing the region.[55] Many men from the villages now permanently joined the insurgent troops. During the following two years, rebel units launched attacks, and for short periods repeatedly also assumed control of the villages.[56] In September 1877, the Montenegrin army captured the *kasaba* of Bileća and at that point the nearby Zavođe villages came under its rule.[57]

The British journalist A. Evans was in the area at that time, and he also reported about the Montenegrin capture of Bileća in his “Illyrian letters”. He observed how the regular Ottoman army was able to negotiate a free retreat, after it became obvious that it had lost the fight. But the population of Bileća had to endure harsh punitive measures. The following quotation gives some insight into the dynamics and consequences of this dramatic event:

> It was allowed to the garrison of the four hundred and twenty regular soldiers and the six officers to retreat with full armament. … The inhabitants of Bileća faced a different treatment. The Bileća Turks had to expect an uncompromising Montenegrin revenge, since they

> once had used the Montenegrin defeat at Krstac to block the retreat of the dispersed Montenegrin units. Yes, in those days they had no pity with the Montenegrins and also cut them off of any food supplies. Now, on order of the Montenegrin prince, a harsh punishment was carried out. All Turkish houses of Bileća were burned down to the ground. The fortress and the storehouses suffered the same fate. … The destruction of the private property though was accompanied by some compassion, since the Muslim population of Bileća was at least allowed to bring away their movable property.[58]

At the end of the war, a considerable number of men from Vrbno, Budoši and Dubočani were serving in the so-called "Zavođanski bataljon", which had been more or less incorporated into the Montenegrin army.[59] The years of war brought severe suffering to most of the families of the Zavođe villages: men died or were wounded in the fighting, and many women, children and old people became refugees and had to survive deprivations and precarious conditions; most houses in the village were burned down or plundered.[60]

At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 it was decided that the Zavođe should not become part of Montenegro.[61] More radical social changes also failed to materialise. Although some *çiftlik-sahibis* sold part of their landed property to village families, immediately after the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a significant number of families were still obliged to pay tributes to local *agas* and *beys* for the cultivation of the agricultural land in the village. Furthermore, the Austro-Hungarian occupation implemented much stricter border controls with Montenegro. Families were no longer allowed to migrate with their sheep and goats to their traditional mountain pastures when these pastures were now on the Montenegrin side, due to the changes in the borders. They had to seek new (summer) pasture areas; some village families were able to buy mountain pastures from emigrating *beys* from Foča.[62]

The Western Herzegovinian Catholic Brotnjo villages

The years of the uprising were not nearly as difficult for the people in the villages of the Western Herzegovinian Brotnjo area, as they were for the Eastern Herzegovinian Zavođe. In the tax-year 1873–4, the increase of the tax tithe calculation and a newly-introduced state control of the tobacco trade had caused quite a stir in the villages.[63] Especially the latter raised emotions, since many families were involved in tobacco cultivation in Brotnjo. Complaints about all these "unfair treatments" were conveyed by Franciscan-led Herzegovinian delegations and were also heard by Austrian Emperor

Franz Joseph, who spent weeks in a politically meticulously planned tour through his Dalmatian province in the spring of 1875.[64]

During the summer of 1875, when the revolt began in Nevesinje, the Brotnjo area remained fairly quiet, like almost all parts of Western Herzegovina, i.e. the territory west of the Neretva River. The Franciscans in the parishes observed the appeals of their church leaders to persuade the population to keep calm.[65] As later research has shown, committees for the support of Herzegovinian refugees in Dalmatia (which frequently also directly supported the uprising in this neighbouring Ottoman province) had at the same time also started "political" initiatives to encourage the village leaders in Brotnjo and the western part of Herzegovina to join the revolt. In particular, they had a vigorous exchange of letters with Herzegovinian Franciscans during this time.[66] It also seems that in some localities, during a brief flare-up of a social-revolutionary mood that had been stirred up by rumours about allegedly "imminent" far-reaching changes in social and agrarian relations, some men from the western part of Herzegovina sporadically also joined insurgents on the other side of the Neretva, soon after the beginning of the Nevesinje escalation.[67] But in the long run, no significant movement and no important leaders emerged on the right side of the Neretva; the social-revolutionary moment would remain only an item of speculation.[68]

Peter (Bajo) Božić was one of the very few better-known activists who came from the Brotnjo area discussed above. He was born in the Brotnjo village Blizanci, and at the beginning of the 1870s he received a scholarship from the Ottoman government to study in Istanbul. He suspended his studies in Istanbul after a short time, but did not return to his Herzegovinian home region. He went instead to Belgrade, where for some period he made a living by giving private lessons to pupils. When he heard about the uprising in Herzegovina, he left Belgrade and joined the legionnaire troops of Mićo Ljubibratić and for some time fought side by side with his former school colleague, the above-mentioned Don Ivan Musić.[69]

Except for a few local incidents, there was only one occasion when the insurgence movement seriously threatened to spread to the Herzegovinian regions west of the Neretva river and in this way to also affect the Brotnjo villages. This was in the spring of 1876, when a fighting unit of several hundred guerrillas, commanded by Mićo Ljubibratić, moved from Ljubuški across the Neretva and marched to the North, near the Ottoman-Habsburg border. They tried to mobilise the local population during their move towards Vrgorac and were also involved in skirmishes with Ottoman troops.[70] When the insurgents pitched camp near the border, the Austrian army unexpectedly intervened. They arrested Ljubibratić and other leaders of the foreign legionaries.[71] Ljubibratić was transferred to the Austrian town of Linz for internment and was later relocated to Graz.[72] Petar Božić, mentioned above, was another fighter who was also interned.[73] Those insurgents who were not arrested by the Austrians hastily fled the area.

Thus, since the Brotnjo villages were not directly affected by warfare, they also did not suffer from destruction. The social hierarchy and economic property relations also remained relatively stable throughout this war-torn period.[74] But the beginning of the occupation by Austro-Hungarian troops created a turbulent situation in the summer of 1878, when local Muslims began an armed resistance against the entering Austro-Hungarian troops. One group entrenched themselves in a *kula* in Služanj near Ograđenik, but after some small skirmishes, they were forced to cease their resistance. Some months earlier, a plundering incident had taken place in some Brotnjo villages. Muslim refugees, who had been brought there by the Ottoman authorities after they were forced to flee from their hometown of Nikšić, were blamed for the plundering. But, seen as a whole, all these actions had only very limited consequences and remained more or less local affairs.[75]

The mainly Muslim Ošanjići near Stolac

Our third example, the mainly Muslim village of Ošanjići near Stolac, was more seriously affected by violence and the war operations during the years of the rebellion. Before the uprising in January 1875, the assassination of Mustafa-aga Behmen, a *çiftlik-sahibi* with many possessions on the Ošanjićbrdo, had already resulted in a tense atmosphere. Mustafa-aga was killed during a visit to one of his *çiftliks* at the mountain Hrgud, not far from Ošanjići.[76] After this deed, several men fled across the border to Montenegro, in order to avoid investigations by the authorities. In the summer of 1875, when the riots began to escalate in Nevesinje, groups of insurgents also began to operate in the territory of the Stolac *kadılık*. They began to provoke violent incidents, and as early as 19 July 1875, the Herzegovinian *mutesarrıf*, Mustafa-paşa, reported the following activities of rebels in the Stolac area to the vizier in Sarajevo:

> In the account drawn up by the commander of the border troops in Stolac and the *kaymakam* of that place, it was reported to me that the rebels have split into two groups: one is in Drinovac, a place approximately one hour away from the *kasaba*, and the other is on the Hrgud

> mountain above the town. They have unrolled two flags and are currently preparing assaults on the road to Mostar.[77]

This report points out that insurrections in the area near Stolac were principally organised by two groups. One group was under the command of the previously-discussed Catholic priest, Don Ivan Musić. He would stay in control of an area including several villages south of Stolac for almost the entire whole period of the uprising.[78] The other group operated from the Hrgud mountain. It was led by Jovan Džombeta, another charismatic local rebel leader during the Herzegovinian uprising. Two years before the uprising, he was suspected of being responsible for the above-mentioned killing of Mustafa-aga Behmen.[79]

Although insurgent units repeatedly advanced to areas very close to Stolac and repeatedly cut off road connections, Stolac was saved from the same fate suffered by the nearby towns of Nevesinje and Ljubinje. Nevesinje was stormed by a guerrilla group and the insurgents troops were only forced to retreat after fierce house-to-house fighting.[80] Similar battles took place in Ljubinje.[81]

Throughout the war years, Stolac was protected by a particularly strong garrison. It was also relatively easy to re-supply the area because of the vicinity of the small Ottoman port at Klek, from which new troops were repeatedly sent to Stolac. But the local population also had to significantly participate in maintaining the strength of the garrison, which could be a heavy burden in these times of crisis. Local families in the town, as well as families from nearby villages, were compelled to offer provisions for the soldiers. The village of Ošanjići, discussed above, was affected as well, since soldiers were lodged in Ošanjići and the requisition of food was frequent.[82]

Much more "affected", however, were those Orthodox and Catholic villages in the area that were "identified" by local Muslim militia or *başıbozuks* as rebel places and that had begun to organise for "self-protection" and in support of the Ottoman troops. Sometimes even villages that were not at all involved in any rebellious activities were targets of retaliatory raids. A report to his superiors by the Austrian consulate representative, Vrčević, who had remained in war-torn Eastern Herzegovina after the situation had escalated in the summer and autumn of 1875, described such an incident that took place in the vicinity of Stolac:

> Volunteers from Stolac and Ljubinje, about 200 in number, that have accompanied the army of Şefket-paşa, raided without his knowledge

> the village Timar and killed five unarmed *raya* (subjects), among them Jovica Tomović, Lazo Kokošar, and Savo Kolak. After that they drove away 86 bullocks, 840 sheep and goats, and almost 100 mules.[83]

Although the Ottoman authorities and military units were strictly instructed to do everything to prevent such occurrences, they nevertheless happened. Obviously they also complicated any initiatives undertaken by the authorities (including promises of aid and guarantees for amnesty) to persuade the population to return to a state of law and order.[84] After such incidents of plundering became known, people of course became more sceptical about the good will of the authorities.[85]

But pressure on the war-weary population also came from the "other side". Insurgent or Montenegrin troops repeatedly carried out punitive expeditions against those villages that had decided to again obey the Ottoman authorities or that had resisted getting involved in the fighting. At the end of October 1875, for instance, almost 2,000 Montenegrin fighters moved into a number of Orthodox and Catholic villages in the Popovopolje, an area that stretches south of Stolac towards Trebinje and "punished" all those who had put down their weapons or refused to support the insurrection.[86]

A very tense situation arose for the last time in Stolac and its surrounding area during the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian army in the summer of 1878. Stolac had become one of the most determined Herzegovinian places of resistance against the invasion of the Austro-Hungarian troops. Many resistance operations originated in the area of Ošanjići, where strong forces from Stolac were positioned for an assault.[87] But this resistance was quite rapidly suppressed.

After the casualties suffered in previous years, the families of Ošanjići again had to suffer, including damage to their property. Men were mobilised into volunteer units and families fled their homes in these times of danger. Many Muslim families lived in unsafe conditions in Stolac; some Orthodox men also fled to the mountains. Immediately after the occupation, several Muslim families emigrated permanently to areas that had remained under Ottoman rule. Among them were some families that were *çiftliks*-owners and that were forced to sell their property, usually to other families in the village or surrounding areas.[88] But despite all of the dramatic events referred to here, the general social and economic relations in Ošanjići, as in the other two exemplary local cases previously examined, still did not undergo "fundamental" changes.

Conclusions

Various conclusions could be drawn from this detailed look into the dynamics of violence in the early stage of the big Herzegovinian rebellion from 1875 to 1878. With regard to the mobilisation of the population, one can emphasize the following: Even after the process of insurrection had started in the villages around Nevesinje, pronounced socio-economic and strategic antagonisms were still evident, both between the local leaders, as well as within the population. By leaving aside such antagonisms in the interpretation, an image of social homogeneity is projected that can rarely be reconciled with the perspectives of the social actors involved. It was simply not true that a whole rural society or confessional group purposely decided to collectively go to war against the existing order, as was and still often is – explicitly or implicitly – taken for granted in the dominant historical master narratives dealing with the issues discussed here. However, it became clear that certain groups were able to initiate a spiral of violence, which finally also set into motion the dynamics of social homogenisation.

The strategic use of violence was effective in activating processes of social homogenisation. This even happened in a situation where popular support for the initial political aims of the early period of unrest was already fading (not surprising, since a large proportion of the population was uninformed about those political plans). Enforcing group solidarity by means of violence was very significant for the rebellion, since it took place in a multi-confessional milieu.

In the history of this Ottoman border region of Herzegovina, the armies of the neighbouring powers that defined themselves as “Christian” had repeatedly confronted those on the Ottoman side, which had traditionally defended the existing Islamic order. During the escalation leading up to the insurgence of 1875, as described above, violent actors again made every effort to enforce such confessional polarisation by using strategic violence against the “other” confession. At the same time, they attempted to label inter-confessional amity as a sign of disloyalty to one’s “own” group. Hence, in such a setting of imminent violence, confessional loyalty was declared (and sanctioned) as being of absolutely primary importance vis-à-vis other forms of loyalty. One consequence of the violent confrontations was an increase in confessional hatred. But it can hardly be seen as the initial cause of the war.

The violent escalation of the situation in Herzegovina essentially began in rural areas. The largely multi-confessional town populations were of rather insignificant importance in the initial polarisation of the conflict, although in later phases of the conflict they did become war targets, when several of the small Eastern Herzegovinian urban communities became victims of blockades, or were even conquered. When a conflict seemed to be imminent, it was the political position of the village leaders in rural areas, living in an atmosphere of deep insecurity and fear, which often largely determined the further course of events. Both the agitators of the insurgence and the Ottoman authorities endeavoured to win over the village *knezes* and *muhtars* of the individual localities. The latter were important members of the local leadership, particularly in such situations of crisis; the same holds true for the confessional leaders. They could also become influential actors, who were able to either calm down their followers or promote tendencies toward revolutionary or rebellious actions. That was illustrated by the analysis of the involvement of the Catholic clergy and the Franciscans.

Furthermore, the process of internal mobilisation of the rural population for the rebellion also needs to be seen as being closely related to very powerful kinship relations that greatly affected the everyday interactions in the region. This factor also played a role in the process of the escalation of the uprisings discussed here, especially when local leaders appealed to solidarity and demanded that the community should be "unified" in action in the face of obvious dangers.

In the very early stages of the unrest, non-local "national militants" already became actively involved in the emerging conflict. These were, on the one hand, individual "national activists" who descended from families of the region, had become politically active during earlier local conflicts, or were politicised on a more national level during their education abroad. On the other hand, the groups of so-called "foreign" volunteers and legionnaires, which became active soon after the full escalation of the conflict, were by far more numerous. They were an important part of the insurgence movement between 1875 and 1878 and, at least in some areas, even "kept alive" the insurgence during some critical periods.

There is no doubt that as a result of the years of war, the Herzegovinian population again became strongly polarised according to confession. The violence and conflict introduced deep mistrust into the local relations between the confessional groups. Radical leaders on all sides were repeatedly able to mobilise followers to participate in acts of violence and revenge. Persons from the same confessional group also frequently became targets, especially when they openly advocated against violent action in certain situations. At later times, the conflict was largely remembered by all sides through antagonistic "symbolic recollections".

The most common categorisations applied to the Herzegovinian rebellion explain the mass-mobilisations as resulting from a social revolution and/or of a national awakening within the population. In light of the analysis presented in this paper, the question arises whether such explanations do indeed hit strike at the core of the matter. We have seen that the crucial decision makers of the early unrest were village leaders who were among the more prosperous members of the village communities. In addition, national positions were not usually relevant in the context of daily life in rural Herzegovina, where the escalation of the rebellion first began. Public discourse about "national issues" was only rudimentarily established in the 1850s, 1860s, or 1870s, even among the Herzegovinian urban elite. Across the borders from the Herzegovinian and Bosnian provinces, however, fervent interest in national projections about the further Serbian, Croat, or Illyrian developments was increasingly evident in many places, such as in the intellectual and elite circles of the neighbouring Habsburg monarchy, among the "new elite" in the autonomous principality of Serbia and also at the "court" in Cetinje in autonomous Montenegro. In Herzegovina – if they were visible at all –, only the first signs of such developments seem to have been perceptible in public life.

Especially during the times of conflict, the activists returning from exile tried to promote the "nationalisation" of the multi-confessional Herzegovinan society, while still having differing opinions about where the borders of the national groups should be drawn. There was some limited movement in this direction as a consequence of the military conflicts, but an actual "nationalisation" of rural and urban social life would not occur until long after the events recounted here.

6

IN THE SERVICE OF THE SULTAN, IN THE SERVICE OF THE REVOLUTION: LOCAL BULGARIAN NOTABLES IN THE 1870s

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The establishment of the present-day Bulgarian state in the former Ottoman provinces resulted from a foreign military intervention – the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–78. It was also preceded by a national movement, known as the Bulgarian National Revival which roughly coincides with the Tanzimat period and was to a large extent influenced by the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. There was also a movement for political independence, which was only active during the 1860s and 1870s, although there were different conspiracies and revolts before that time. Studies of the Bulgarian movement for political independence usually concentrate on the internal logic of the movement; they pay attention to foreign influences and to the impact of earlier national uprisings and "revolutions" in the region – those of Serbians and Greeks, but they often neglect the Ottoman context (the late Tanzimat period) in which the movement developed. Considering the Ottoman context will help us understand some of the paradoxes that one finds in the existing studies of the so-called Bulgarian national liberation movement. One element is that many of the revolutionary committee members also occupied different posts in the local Ottoman administration. They were not necessarily officials, but rather members of various administrative councils and mixed courts established during the Tanzimat period. Nowadays, studies rarely focus on this phenomenon, because such information does not suit the image of the revolutionary who rejects any compromise with the Ottoman authorities and leads a vigorous battle against them. I will present several cases, which were hardly unique, in order to illustrate the problem, before continuing with an analysis.

A series of coincidences

Let us begin with one of the most popular cases – the trial of Vassil Levsky (1837–73), the leader of the Bulgarian revolutionary organization, captured after the robbery of a large sum of money from an Ottoman postal carriage, known as the Arabakonak robbery. The commission that investigated Levsky and the other captives held sessions at the end of 1872 and the beginning of 1873 in Sofia, the centre of the *sancak* where the robbery was committed. From the protocols of the commission one can see that four of its members were Bulgarians.[1] The most popular of them was Hadzhi Ivancho Penchovich, a wealthy Bulgarian from Rustchuk (today Rousse), appointed to various high-ranking Ottoman posts, who at that time was a member of the State Council (*Şura-i Devlet*). Nowadays, a radically negative assessment of the "collaborationism" of Hadzhi Ivancho Penchovich predominates and his name has become a byword for collaboration with the Ottoman authorities. His involvement in the raising of Levsky's monument in Sofia after the Liberation has been negatively criticized by many.[2] However, some earlier publications described Penchovich rather positively as an active figure of the Bulgarian community in Rustchuk and of the political movement for an independent Bulgarian church.[3] Dr. Hristo Stambolsky's memoirs even mention that Levsky met Penchovich and stayed in his house on the island of Heybeli during his visit to Istanbul and that he received a significant sum of money for the revolutionary organization from Penchovich as well as from other wealthy Bulgarians.[4]

Another member of the commission was Hadzhi Mano Stoyanov, an influential Bulgarian tradesman from Sofia, who at the time was a member of the commercial court (*Mahkeme-i Ticaret*)[5] and was later elected as a member of the regional mixed court (*Meclis-i Temyiz-i Hukuk ve Cinayet*) in the town.[6] However, he has been remembered as a supporter of various patriotic initiatives and according to some sources, he also joined the revolutionary committee (or at least financially supported it)[7] contributing to a perception of him as a "Bulgarian patriot" was the fact that he was arrested in November 1877.[8]

A third member of the commission was Pesho Todorov, known as Zheliavetza, who at that time and in the years following was a member of the administrative council of the *sancak* (*Meclis-i Idare-i Liva*).[9] During the trial it became clear that his son Todor Peshev had joined the revolutionary committee and that Dimităr Obshti, the instigator and main perpetrator of the Arabakonak robbery (and a partner of Levsky), had visited him in Zheliava.[10]

The fourth member of the commission was listed only as Mito, but from other sources one could conclude that this was Mito Kaimakchi.[11] He was the same Mito who, on several earlier and later occasions, could be found as a member of the regional mixed court in Sofia.[12] There is information that he also joined the revolutionary committee.[13]

According to some sources, before Penchovich joined the commission, another member was Dimităr Traykovich, an influential representative of the Bulgarian community in the town.[14] In the 1860s and 1870s he was elected a member of the administrative council of the Sofia *sancak,*[15] although he was also involved in the revolutionary committee founded by Levsky in Sofia. Unlike many others, his involvement with the committee is firmly established.[16] In any case, he was not a member of the investigative commission during the interrogations of Levsky himself.

Several months later in the town of Haskovo, Atanas Uzunov was captured – the man who had taken over the leadership of the revolutionary organization in this region after Levsky's execution. Among those convicted during this trial was also Kosta (Koshta, Koshti) Chorbadzhi (Kosta Todev, also called Simitchiev), who was one of the revolutionary committee's members in Haskovo. During the previous year, he had been a member of both the administrative council and the *vilayet*'s general assembly (*Meclis-i Umumi*).[17] According to some memoirs, he served as one of the interrogators[18] during the beginning of the trial, but after he was shown to be involved in the case, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in Diyarbekir (today usually spelled Diyarbakır).

After the uprising in April 1876 and during the court trial of the captured rebels, one can find similar paradoxical examples. In his *Notes on Bulgarian Uprisings*, Zahary Stoyanov recounts that many notables from the town of Troyan were brought to the prison in the town of Lovech. One of them, Tzocho Spassov, had previously been a member of a commission that had investigated Zahary himself while he was imprisoned in Troyan. According to Stoyanov, this group included people who had collaborated with Levsky at earlier times. It is noteworthy that Stoyanov, who was usually critical of the notables (*chorbadzhiite*), did not mention that he suspected them. Moreover, he himself tried to establish contact with them, especially with Tzocho Spassov who had interrogated him a bit earlier.[19]

Another interesting example is that of Tzanko Dyustabanov – a member of the district court (*Meclis-i De'avi*) in the town of Gabrovo. Shortly before the uprising he was won for the cause by Yakim Tzankov, a cashier of the agricultural fund (*Memleket Sandıkları*) in Gabrovo and chair of the revolutionary committee in the town. The latter became a leader of the military group (the *cheta*, Turkish *çete*) gathered in that region during the uprising. Yurdan Theodorov, a member of the commission that put Tzanko Dyustabanov on trial, was elected a member of the Tărnovo regional court with the decisive support of Dyustabanov.[20] Tzanko himself was a son of Hristo Dyustabanov – a notable from Gabrovo, a participant in the preparation of the Tărnovo uprising in 1856, but also "*chorbadjiya* [i. e. mayor] of the village" at that time.[21]

There are also other similar examples, some of which will be discussed in the text. For some of these people one could question whether their heroism has been attributed retrospectively. Due to the scarcity of documents concerning the members of the revolutionary committees, statements in later memoirs cannot always be verified. The information on the membership of the mixed councils also requires additional validation of documents, since the yearbooks of the provinces (the *salnames* of the *vilayets*) do not always allow for the identification of the members and do not always enumerate all of them. However, there are some proven examples, and the coincidences are impressive, given the small number of both committee participants and representatives of mixed councils and courts. Moreover, we would not expect the same people to be included in both bodies.

More importantly, these paradoxes were far from seeming ambiguous to the contemporaries. I will try to illuminate the general factors involved in the occurrence of such coincidences. Firstly, I will present an overview of the debates in historiography. Secondly, I will look at the development of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement of the 1860s and 1870s in order to understand why and how it intersects with the fact of Bulgarians serving at Ottoman posts.

Historiography

Participation of local notables (usually referred to as *chorbadzhiya*, pl. *chorbadzhii*, from Turkish *çorbacı*) in the national revolution has been discussed many times and a significant body of material has been accumulated. However, there is still no satisfactory explanation of such paradoxes as the ones quoted previously. Let us see how this was done in individual cases and how the question was generally asked in historical studies.

When talking about individual cases, some authors mention these coincidences without seeming to be impressed by them, but also without trying to explain them. Thus, on the occasion of the investigation of the Arabakonak robbery, Petăr Dinekov mentions the coincidences only with a meaningless phrase: "There is no wonder that some of the investigators might have been committee members."[22] When discussing the same case, Georgy Pletniov thinks that the membership in such councils was "a good cover for their revolutionary and patriotic activities" and explains the coincidence with the fact that the revolutionary network was not uncovered.[23] However, this still does not explain why the Ottoman authorities turned their attention precisely to the conspiracy's participants and sympathizers and appointed them to the special commission in order to investigate those already captured, given the fact that the *sancak* of Sofia was populated by many thousands of Christian male adults, more than 1,500 of whom were living in the very town of Sofia.

In other publications, in references to the members of the mixed courts, the latter were also presented as "participants in the revolutionary movement" without analyzing that contradiction. Thus, in the references to *The Past* by Stoyan Zaimov (published in 1983) it is explained that Pesho Todorov Zheliavetza was a "public figure and follower of the revolutionary movement; a member of the *meclis* in Sofia where he defended the participants in the Botev *cheta* [1876]. The meetings of the revolutionary committee took place in his house". Concerning Mano Stoyanov, it was noted that "he used to support the revolutionary organization in the town".[24] Similarly, in the publication of Nikola Obretenov's memoirs (1988) it is mentioned that one of the members of the special court in 1876 in Rustchuk, Georgy Popov (Poppito), was a "participant in the revolutionary movement; a member of the *meclis* (administrative council) and of the special court in Rousse [Rustchuk] (1876)".[25] It is not clear how people reconciled membership in the Ottoman courts and councils on the one hand, and participation in Bulgarian revolutionary committees on the other. From the perspective of Bulgarian historiography, the two seem mutually exclusive.

Likewise, many publications presenting biographical data about the "leaders of the uprising" mention, without any additional explanations, that the same people were "mayors", "assisting mayors", etc.[26] The ease with which those publications, which were strongly influenced by nationalist ideology, offer such information is largely due to the understanding that a strong local autonomy existed and that municipal affairs were in the hands of Bulgarians.

From this perspective, the mayors and persons occupying similar posts do not look like representatives of the Ottoman authorities.

The general framework for discussing similar problems is set by the debates on the *chorbadzhiyas*. The term "*chorbadzhiya*" is quite unclear, but is often used when referring to local notables, namely wealthy and influential people. The latter group also includes people occupying local posts – mainly mayors (*muhtars*), but also members of mixed councils and courts, etc.[27]

The question of the notables' role in the national uprisings was already discussed by their contemporaries, whose opinions differed widely. In the early years of the communist regime, the ruling authorities imposed the theory of a purely "people's" (*narodna*) or even "peasant's" (*selska*) revolution, in which the notables and the more wealthy in general did not participate and were even thought of as traitors. This thesis was revised, beginning in the 1960s, and the most important step in this direction was the discussion which unfolded in 1976; many papers were published in the *Istoricheski pregled* ("Historical Review") journal during the year 1977.[28] Gradually, the opposite point of view gained power. Initially, some of the authors mentioned that not all notables were "traitors" and "instruments in the hands of the Turkish (sic) authorities." Some studies also offered a quantitative analysis. Some of them showed that among the rebels, there were many Bulgarians working at Ottoman posts.[29] Other studies, in a pointed attempt to rehabilitate the local notables, tried to show that many of them had taken part in revolutionary activities.[30] Georgy Pletnyov offers perhaps the most comprehensive reinterpretation of the participation of notables (*chorbadzhiite*) in the national revolution.[31] His study presents a detailed overview of their participation in the activities of the so-called National Revival, including revolutionary struggles. The book by Milena Stefanova, published a bit later, took the same approach.[32] These publications generally followed the similar idea of "rehabilitation" of the "rejected" and "forgotten" figures from the National Revival that can be found in Bulgarian historiography during the last decades.

The thesis that the *chorbadzhiyas* took part in the revolutionary movement (i.e. the network of committees of Levsky during the years 1869–72 and the uprising of April 1876) was based on the argument for the "nationwide character" (*obshtonarodniya harakter*) of the struggle for national liberation. Many authors, both contemporaries (Z. Stoyanov) and later scholars (the communist historiography of the Stalinist period), pointed out the non-involvement of many of the notables as an exception to the behaviour of the general public and emphasized the treacheries of some of the notables, their "apprehensions", "doubts" and "inconsistency." On the contrary, later "revisionist" studies correctly noticed that mass non-involvement, individual treacheries and many "apprehensions," "doubts" and "inconsistencies" existed among all other social strata. If only a small number of notables were involved in the revolutionary committees and uprisings, the percentage of "ordinary people" involved was equally small.[33]

This gradual "rehabilitation" led simply to the transfer of some people from one category into another. Historians from the last decades thought in clear cut categories of "revolutionaries," "moderates", and "traitors", and people were put into one or another category. Thus, Hadzhi Ivancho Penchovich was memorialized only as an instrument in the hands of the authorities and a traitor, whereas Hadzhi Mano Stoyanov and Dimităr Traykovich were remembered only as "revivalists" (*văzrozhdentzi*) and "sympathizers" or "activists of the revolutionary movement", and streets in Sofia were named after both of them. It was said that Levsky's suspicions that Dimităr Traykovich was an informer of the Ottoman administration (apparently due to Traykovich's participation in the investigative commission) were unfounded;[34] and the participation of Mano Stoyanov in the investigative commission, as far as I know, was nowhere denounced, even though the documents from the trial, where his name occurred numerous times, were published more than half a century ago. Similarly, Mito Kaymakchiata and Pesho Todorov Zheliavetza were mentioned as patriots and possible members of the revolutionary committee in Sofia. Only Ivancho Penchovich continued being cited as a Bulgarian participating in the trial against Levsky, not only in the popular mind but also in many "academic" publications.[35] There were also attempts to "rehabilitate" all Bulgarian participants in the commission that had investigated Levsky, including Ivancho Penchovich.[36]

This same separation into clearly defined categories also occurred when attempting to represent the behaviour of the notables. Instead of looking at the *chorbadzhiyas* as a homogeneous group, Dimităr Strashimirov talked about the replacement of the "old" type of *chorbadzhiyas* with a "new" generation of wealthy people who had become governmental officials but remained patriots. He gave as an example the revolutionary leaders in Gabrovo.[37] Others, on the contrary, stigmatized the notables, when speaking about the 1860s and 1870s, but mentioned that in the remote past they had played mainly positive roles. Without much clarification, Nikolay Genchev represented those who played a leading part in the national revolution as "bourgeoisie", whereas those who collaborated with the authorities were presented as *chorbadzhiyas*.[38] When viewed analytically, these interpretations do not change anything, since they fail to see how one and the same person could participate in a revolutionary committee as well as in the local Ottoman administration.

Contemporary analysis is based on the understanding that there was an incompatibility between involvement both in the national revolution and in the Ottoman political structures. This notion was reinforced by the influence of the political struggles during the twentieth century. Communist ideology and its respective historiography introduced a rigid understanding of what a pure political biography means – an individual is either with the foreign authorities or with the revolutionary movement. Such a "black-and-white" model was also adopted by the critics of Communist rule, as could be seen from the lustration laws. This approach, to a great extent, is an anachronism; while building the revolutionary network in the 1870s, the members of the local councils and courts were not automatically rejected as possible members of the revolutionary committees.

There are also various other examples of people who served the Ottoman state and their own communities at the same time. This is considered normal for religious and intellectual figures (*tzărkovni i prosvetni deytzi*) (at various times named "the Olds" and "the Moderates") and is fully compliant with the ideological climate of the Tanzimat era. At that time, the occupation of posts in the local Ottoman administration was considered as a service to the "fatherland". On the other hand, the fact that Muslims (Arabs, Albanians) occupied posts in the Ottoman administration and in the army usually was not considered as compromising their loyalty to the national cause. Here we see the phenomenon in its most radical form – local leaders of the Orthodox (in this case Bulgarian) population who are involved simultaneously in the local administration and in revolutionary activities.

In conclusion, it could be said that all quoted publications provide abundant but not always fully trustworthy material for the "patriotic" and even "revolutionary" activities of the notables under discussion. What interests us here, though, is not their "rehabilitation" – as a social category or individually – but the fact that the organization of the revolutionary network and uprising inevitably included attempts to involve the local notables.

Local notables and the revolutionary committees

The Bulgarian revolutionary movement had been developing throughout the 1860s, while relying on the radical nationalistic elements among emigrants, initially those living mainly in Serbia and then more and more those living in Romania. Young nationalists, committed and ready for self-sacrifice, as well as people with less intense convictions and motifs, were organized in small guerrilla groups (the so called *cheta/çete*). These groups had to cross into Ottoman/Bulgarian territory in order to encourage people to fight and to attract the attention of the Great powers and the European community.

These actions entailed many difficulties. Initially, attempts were made during the 1860s and 1870s to attract the commanders (*voyvodas*) of bands of brigands (*hajduts*) in order to compensate for the lack of leaders experienced in fighting. Although they agreed to lead some campaigns, in other cases the old *voyvodas* refused to participate in the struggles; ultimately, the attempts to attract them failed in most cases. The connection between the *hajduts* and the struggles for national liberation as presented by contemporary historiography is in complete contrast with the revolutionaries' own disappointment with the same *voyvodas*.[39] There were many criminals among the leaders and participants – a problem that was often mentioned in earlier studies, but avoided, with few exceptions, in Bulgarian historiography.[40]

A significant problem for the organizers themselves was the relatively small number of fighters they were able to recruit. Many of the plans to send military groups (*chetas*) remained only on paper, but here I will limit myself only to the most important military campaigns which did take place. Two times, in 1862 and 1867 respectively, fighting units were trained in Belgrade (in historiography they are known respectively as the First and Second Bulgarian *Leghia* in Belgrade); however, they did not leave the city. In 1867, two small *chetas* crossed the border successively, each consisting of several scores of people and led by Panayot Hitov and Filip Totyu; they merged after several fights and left the Ottoman/Bulgarian territory. In 1868, another group of radical emigrants, the so-called "Bulgarian Society", planned to send several similar *chetas*, but due to the small number of recruited volunteers, they all merged into one group amounting to a total of 127 people. Under the leadership of Stefan Karadzha and Hadzhi Dimităr they crossed the Danube River in July 1868 and after several battles they were crushed.[41] These attempts not only failed, but their leaders were also disillusioned, mainly due to the lack of support from the Bulgarian population in the empire. The *chetas* were joined by very few volunteers and in most cases were given up to the authorities by Bulgarians.

Toward the end of the 1860s, Vassil Levsky developed and implemented a new tactic. It aimed at attracting people from inside the empire to aid in the preparations for the uprising. Levsky himself participated in several of the above-mentioned attempts in the 1860s and was convinced from first-hand experience that the actions of radical but marginalized elements were not enough for a successful struggle. His tactics included gathering the

Bulgarian population in revolutionary committees and getting them to act together, in order to organize a large scale uprising. The same organizational tactic was also used later by the Bulgarian revolutionaries during the attempted uprising in September 1875 (the uprising of Eski Zağra/Stara Zagora) and the uprising in April 1876. Hardly a success in itself, the mobilization achieved by them is still impressive compared to the failure of the *chetas* organized from the outside. This applies also to the *chetas* that crossed the river Danube immediately after the uprising in the spring of 1876. For the largest, the *cheta* led by Hristo Botev, it is known that it consisted of, or even exceeded 200 people, according to some assessments, but only a few people from the local population joined it. These consecutive attempts only proved the advantages of the committees' tactics.

The committees were supposed to organize the uprising in the respective villages and they recruited a limited number of members, usually up to 10 people. This was also done for the purpose of keeping the organizations secret.[42] It was more important to find people who were sufficiently influential in order to organize and lead the others. This made the initiators of the revolutionary committees turn not only to the young Bulgarian nationalists who were the most likely to join the cause, but also to the local notables who had the necessary financial resources and personal influence in the village. Due to the logic of the patriarchal society, the involvement of people from certain settlements or communities first required gaining the support of their leaders. Indicative in this regard is the example of monasteries involved in the preparation of the uprising – as a rule, it meant support provided by their abbots.[43] Only where the abbot had joined the struggle was there greater participation on the part of the monks and the whole monastery– as seen in the monasteries of Dryanovo and Batoshevo in 1876.

Consequently, the founders of the revolutionary network turned to the local notables, employing a tactic that was in sharp contrast with the negative stereotype about the *chorbadzhiyas* that was dominant in the emigrant press. Some of the above-mentioned studies emphasized Levsky's more pragmatic attitude toward the *chorbadzhiyas*.[44] Other publications also mentioned that local notables had been attracted to the revolutionary committees, though this was not revealed in great detail.[45] Levsky's tactics for attracting local notables was even more clearly visible in the activities of his wilful colleague, Dimităr Obshti. After his capture, the disclosures of the composition of the committees suggest that he had systematically attempted to attract *chorbadzhiyas* to join the committees.[46]

Many of the other revolutionaries had no such plans, but the organizational tactics of the leaders of the 1876 uprising inevitably led to attracting local notables. Zahary Stoyanov, who himself was usually extremely distrustful to the *chorbadzhiyas* and the educated (*uchenite glavi*), testifies to this point: "According to the above-mentioned rules, the secret society had to comprise: the priest and the teacher (if there are any) and the most prominent people for whom it has been proven that they are honest and influential in this area, up to ten persons maximum. Each of these members will have to have the duty to convince and recruit supportive or ordinary members..."[47]

It is very important to consider the speed with which the revolutionary network was built and uprisings prepared. The first author who systematically studied the preparation and implementation of the uprisings, Dimităr Strashimirov, considered this to require as much as ten years, a period which he later called "the committees' decade" (*komitetskoto desetiletie*).[48] However, later authors generally emphasized the earlier prehistory of these events. Bulgarian historiography of today presents the work of Levsky and the uprising in April 1876 as a logical conclusion, the final stage of a multi-centuries struggle for liberation that had started at a grassroots level and gradually gained momentum.[49] In reality, very limited time was available for attempts to build a revolutionary network. Levsky, together with two or three associates, built these network committees during about three years. The initiators of the uprising in 1876 drew on what had been built by Levsky, but from the time they entered the country until the beginning of the uprising, they had only a few months at their disposal.

In order to quickly build the network of committees and to prepare an uprising, the revolutionaries relied on the existing social structures. It has already been mentioned that the organizers of the *chetas* from the 1860s turned to leaders of semi-bandit groups, though the latter did not have any special relation to the national cause. Gradually, some of them were integrated into the national movement and they could be seen to participate in purely national political actions.[50] The organizers of the internal uprisings of 1875 and 1876 also hoped to establish contact with such *voyvodas*.[51]

However, the leaders of the revolutionary organization had to rely on completely different mediators to rouse the population – on the people of influence in every village. Actually, the local notables were also the driving power during earlier uprisings.[52] To create a national revolution required a different motivation in principle, it fell within another framework, but locally its organizers arrived at the same practice – to rouse the local notables in revolt.

Most analyses have concentrated on the question of the *chorbadzhiyas*' motivation to participate and emphasised their patriotic feelings.[53] Here, I have tried to bring into focus the alternative question – why did the organizers of the revolutionary committees attract the *chorbadzhiyas*? An important reason undoubtedly was the money possessed by the *chorbadzhiyas*, a necessity for the preparation of any uprising. But the *chorbadzhiyas* were also people with influence over others. The local notables, together with priests and, to some extent teachers, had a strong informal influence over the villagers that needed to be utilised.[54]

Local notables as members of mixed councils and courts

Let us look at the problem from another perspective – the participation of non-Muslims, including Bulgarians, in the mixed administrative councils and courts. Many contemporaries claimed that these were simply persons who uncritically accepted everything put before them by the authorities; one of the pejorative designations for them was *evetchii* (from Turkish *evet* – "yes"). In many cases, those statements are also reinforced by recent Bulgarian historiography.

This is an incorrect interpretation, not because the Tanzimat rulers wanted to promote democratic practices, but because they had limited capabilities to impose their will at the local level. The establishment of a centralized administration was accomplished not only by eliminating the most disobedient local notables, but also by integrating some of the other notables into the centralized hierarchy. Enforcing centralized control was achieved from the top down, which meant that local notables played a larger role at the more local level. At the level of the administrative units, these notables became members of the mixed administrative councils and courts. In the villages and quarters (*mahalles*) they alone acted as mayors (*muhtars*) and members of the councils of the elders.

Although there were many ambiguities in the process of their election, it could be said with confidence that the members of the councils and courts were not just "instruments of a foreign power," "detached" from the rest of the population, but representatives of the local elites acceptable to the authorities.[55] The council members were influential people in their own right. The Ottoman authorities had reservations about the local notables, as they were precisely the people breaking their power monopoly; but they were also the people which made governance possible.

The reform measures at that time were designed to limit the abuses of the notables and put local affairs under the control of a wider circle of the population.[56] The fact that the authorities tried to counter act arbitrary actions of the local notables was acknowledged by its opposition. Zahary Stoyanov even wrote, "The Turkish government, despite its total demoralization, has always been on the side of the people against the tyranny of different *zabits*, *ayans*, *chorbadzhiyas*, and even subordinated princes."[57] This policy could also be interpreted as a regular preventive strike against wealthy people who were also potential local leaders.[58] Contemporaries were unanimous in their judgement that after the uprising, the notables were suspected as leaders and initiators of the rebellion and thus became victims of persecution.[59]

We should also pay attention to the negative stereotypes regarding the *chorbadzhiyas* as instruments of power – unlike many other interpretations, this is not a conclusion reached at a later time. Feelings against the *chorbadzhiyas* among the radical elements during the 1860s and 1870s could be followed on the pages of the printed press from that time, as well as in many private letters written by the revolutionaries. The local notables were integrated into the administrative hierarchy of the empire and acted as part of it, although locally they enjoyed a significant level of freedom. It is with good reason that the contemporaries see the *chorbadzhiyas* as representatives of Ottoman power.

We should not be surprised that after 1877–8, when the new Bulgarian administration was established, we again see the names of the same people. In many cases the Russian powers of occupation once again used the notables of the region. Their preference was due not only to the conservatism of the Russian autocratic regime, but also to the understanding that this was the only way to regulate and rule the country. In some other cases, the local notables managed to advance on their own.[60] So for example, in Sofia we see that most of the people mentioned in relation to the trial of 1872–3 once again reappear in the local administration. During the war, Marin Drinov prepared a list of notables from Sofia and its surrounding area that included Pesho Todorov and Hadzhi Mano.[61] Beginning in September 1878, Dimităr Traykovich, as well as the son of Hadzhi Mano Stoyanov, became members of the governor's court.[62] Hadzhi Mano Stoyanov also became a member of the town council beginning in 1879.[63] The son of Pesho Todorov Zheliavetza, the above-mentioned Todor Peshev, became chair of the Sofia court council (1878), and later chair of the town council (1879).[64] For about a month in June–July 1879, Pesho Todorov himself and Hadzhi Mano Stoyanov were members of the auditing committee of the Bulgarian National Bank.[65]

The role of the clergy was also of key importance. There was much discussion, and opinions varied from claiming that the clergy boycotted the national revolution, to clichés about the clergy's "participation on a mass scale".[66] What is important in this case is that there was the same overlapping between participation in the structures established by the Ottoman authorities and in the revolutionary network. In the Ottoman political model, the population of the empire was regarded as composed of religious communities, and their religious leaders in many cases represented the community. This not only did not disappear during the age of reforms, but in some respect was reinforced and codified. Thus the muftis and religious leaders of non-Muslim communities, by default, were members of the administrative councils of the *sancaks* and the *kazas*, and the imams and priests were members of the councils of the elders in the villages (*İhtiyar Meclisi*).[67] On the other hand, the very appointment of high-ranking religious leaders was controlled by the State.

But the revolutionaries also relied on the clergy – we mentioned that priests were among the first potential participants in the local revolutionary committees. In many cases the establishment of relations between individual villages was facilitated by the mediation of religious figures. Yurdan Theodorov – a member of the special court that pursued the rebels in Tărnovo – gives us an interesting example of how he mediated in favour of reprieving the priest Georgy from the village of Zheltesh in the area of Gabrovo. At that time, the ordinary participants had already been granted amnesty, unlike the instigators and initiators. At first glance, the priest seemed to be doomed, as it was disclosed that he had been the prime instigator for the rebels in the village. However, Theodorov managed to present priest Georgy as an ordinary tool in the hands of the rebels, claiming that "he was forced by the rebels to rouse the people to uprising, as he was a priest and people listened to him."[68] Except for the question of coercion, which in this case was invented by the defence, the argument corresponds to reality – in order to raise a rebellion in a village, it was very important to ensure the mediation of the village priest. It was in this context that the saying "tie up the priest to keep the village calm" was born. Both the Ottoman authorities and the revolutionaries tried using the religious network for their own purposes.

Another group to consider, in addition to the established local notables and religious leaders, is that of the Young and Educated. It has been described in detail that they were among the active participants in the revolutionary struggles. But they were also an object of interest to the Ottoman authorities and they had easy access to some state positions. The fact that their skills were recognized by the authorities was usually cited as evidence for their exceptional personal qualities. Perhaps this can best be seen in the large administrative centre of Rustchuk. Contemporary sources recounted that the governor of the Danube *vilayet* invited Angel Kănchev, one of Vassil Levsy's associates, to become governor of the large exemplary estate farm (*Numune Çiftlik*) near Rustchuk.[69] Somewhat later in 1874, it seems that almost all members of the revolutionary committee in the town occupied various posts, mainly in the railroad companies.[70] While notables and clergy were in the mixed councils, young educated people occupied official posts, including some in the Ottoman administration itself. This process had just started, but many young educated people were also participants in the revolutionary committees and in the uprising itself.

Innkeepers were a special and, at first glance, a less important category that also deserves attention. During the Tanzimat era, these people were of key importance both for the authorities trying to establish firm control over the movement of people and for the organizers of the revolutionary committees who were constantly on the move, but rarely had regular permits (the so-called *mürur tezkeresi*). Zahary Stoyanov noted, "According to the police rules of the time, it could be said that an owner of an inn was also a police agent. A lot depended on him; he had a chance to capture all purposelessly wandering persons, especially in winter. Every morning he went to the *konak* to sign the *tezkeres* of the travellers of whom he was in charge."[71] However, Zahary Stoyanov himself enlisted many innkeepers as leading figures in the local revolutionary committees: Nayden Drinov (Panagyurishte), Nikolay Raynov (Stara Zagora), Geno Atanassov and Koycho Georgiev (Tărnovo-Sejmen, nowadays Simeonovgrad).[72] Also, many innkeepers were revealed as having been involved in the Arabakonak robbery – we should especially mention Hristo Tzonev Latinetza, in whose inn Levsky was captured. Hristo had been one of the members of the revolutionary committee in Lovech from the time of its establishment. The following innkeepers were also captured and convicted after the Arabakonak robbery: Marin pop Lukanov from Lovech, Tzviatko Vălchev from Pravetz, Docho Mrăvkov from Pleven, Stancho Hadzhi Ivanov from Teteven, Gergo Stoykov from Izvor, Chorbadzhi Tone Ivanov from Zhelyava, Gavriil Genchev from Orhaniye.[73] Most of them were wealthy and among the most influential local notables. Moreover, the previously-mentioned Mano Stoyanov and Dimităr Traykovich were also innkeepers and Levsky stayed in both their inns. Finally, it should be noted that mayors involved in the revolutionary committees supplied the necessary permits to those who had to travel.[74]

The local dimension of the problem

Having considered the number and the participation of different social groups, let us now turn to the localities involved. It soon becomes evident that only certain settlements established committees and rose in revolt. It is indicative that by the end of twentieth century, the very name "The April Uprising" was rarely used and in historiography it was established mostly by the work *The April Uprising* of Dimităr Strashimirov published in 1907.[75] In the decades immediately after the uprising, different authors referred to it with the names of the villages, towns, or regions were it had occurred: thus they refer to the "Panagyurishte Uprising" or "Sredna Gora Uprising", as well as the "Thracian Uprising/the Uprising in Thracia", the "Koprivshtitza Uprising", the "Klisura Uprising" and the "Bratzigovo Uprising", among others. Strashimirov himself drew the conclusion that this was not a common uprising but rather "separate revolts happening not even at the same time." However, "the April Uprising" is not just a common name for all of them. With the establishment of this new name, the logic of thinking was completely reversed and the local dimension of the uprising disappeared. In the contemporary publications on the "April Uprising", such a "nationwide version" of the uprising is projected onto the stories about the local uprisings in each settlement.

But even though it had been planned as an all-Bulgarian uprising and received widespread international attention (in which the question of the victims and perpetrators was generalized – Bulgarians, Christians vs. Turks, Muslims, the Ottoman Empire), the uprising itself happened in particular settlements and everywhere followed its own logic. Where the local notables opposed it, there was no uprising: that happened in the autumn of 1875 in Stara Zagora.[76] In such cases the rebels either gave up the planned uprising because it was obviously doomed to fail, or left the village with a small *cheta*.

On the other hand, there were uprisings in those places where the local notables, including those who occupied posts in the Ottoman administration, had joined the movement. Such was the case in Panagyurishte (Otlukköy), the centre of the so-called Fourth Revolutionary District. Zahary Stoyanov writes openly about this coincidence: "The above-mentioned two *vekils* in the village, Shtărbanov and Geshenov, who represented the Sultan's power in the *voynuk*'s Panagyurishte, as I said, were not only accomplices in the uprising's preparations, but were also among the first members of the committee, members of the commission."[77] The situation was similar in the villages which revolted on a massive scale around Panagyurishte. In the village of Petrich we find that Mito Stoyanov – "a village mayor at the time", was a member of the revolutionary committee.[78] Even in Koprivshtitsa (Avret Alan) where the uprising broke out against the will of the majority of the local notables, "three of the *azas* – advisers in the *konak* [i.e. members of different elective councils] – were members of the [revolutionary] committee: Brayko Enev, Ilia Mangărăt, and N. Vălev."[79]

The situation was similar among the villages in the region of Tărnovo that joined the uprising: several local *chorbadzhiyas* in Gorna Oriahovitza were members of the revolutionary committee in the town; the mayors of Batoshevo and Novo Selo also supported the revolt.[80] On the contrary, in most other cases when the local notables were against the uprising, it was nipped in the bud.

The developments in Batak showed very clearly that the driving forces were again the local notables, (who, incidentally, were often also related through kinship) although they did not necessarily have the same opinion regarding the uprising. The leader of the rebels, Petăr Gorev Hadzhi Kavlakov (who later changed his name to Petăr Goranov), was a son of one of the former mayors of the village. Petăr Goranov himself was an influential person and at some point he was appointed a member of the court in Pazardzhik, but refused this post.[81] Furthermore, he was a son-in-law of Angel Kavlaka, the mayor of the village at that time and the most prominent figure among those opposing the revolt. Surprisingly at first glance, the latter was also among those invited to found the revolutionary committee. The sons of the former mayor (Trendafil Kerelov) of the village were appointed leaders of some rebelling military units. Trendafil Kerelov himself was one of those who would go on to lead the negotiations for the capitulation of Batak. An unstable balance was established between the advocates of the two positions, and at the beginning the voice of the rebellion supporters was seemingly stronger. At the moment when the position of the more prudent and conservative notables ultimately won out, the leader of the uprising, Petăr Goranov, left the village.

In a sense, the agreement or the refusal of the notables was decisive. We can only talk about influential revolutionary committees where the local notables were involved; uprisings took place in only those villages where the notables also participated. In other words, the village fought only until the notables decided to surrender.

The involvement of local notables could be also demonstrated by analyzing the age of the participants in the local revolutionary committees. The relatively young age of the "apostles" of 1876 was in contrast to the higher average age of the members of the local committees (and of the participants in the uprising itself), as the latter were about ten years older.[82] It was most important for the young men who supported the revolution to involve the settled local notables.

To translate the national project of the uprising's leaders to the level of the villages was of crucial importance. The leaders of the uprisings were unable to operate without taking into account personal connections and loyalties. There was one incident in which Zahary Stoyanov had to wait for a long time for the return of Father Cyril, the abbot of the Kalugerovo monastery St. Nicholas. He later wrote, "...without a recommendation by local people I could not move anywhere. It is an astonishing fact that without the participation of the population, the apostles are worth nothing."[83] This recommendation should have come from influential persons of the area and these are most often the priests, but they can also be the tradesmen and teachers.

The discrepancies between the generalizations about the "national revolution" and the stories of the villages about what happened are indicative. For example, Zahary Stoyanov observes, "The committee was equally cautious towards the *chorbadzhiyas*, the prominent tradesmen and those with diplomas as towards the Turks, because these people had a good means of living, consequently they were little interested in Bulgaria's destiny". Immediately afterwards, in a footnote, he adds that Levsky "paid visits to some wealthy people, mostly in Plovdiv", but without any results.[84] At other places in his book, Stoyanov, talking about the *chorbadzhiyas* in general, concludes that they were opponents of the revolutionary movement, concerned only with their own interest and therefore on the side of the authorities. This contradicts the information that many local notables were enlisted by him as leaders of the rebellion in different villages.

It should be emphasized once again that this question could not be clarified with long lists of *chorbadzhiyas*, priests, teachers and innkeepers, poor or rich. It requires looking at the full lists of members of the different committees, at all the participants in particular events.[85] This will show that the formation of both national and imperial networks actually depends on the engagement of existing social structures.

In some cases, the revolutionaries purposely addressed people occupying posts in the Ottoman administration. Thus, during the interrogation of Dimităr Obshti it was understood that when Todor Peshev was involved in the committee, he insisted on keeping this secret from his father (Pesho Todorov Zheliavetza), because the latter was a member of the "council". Dimităr Obshti's response to such caution was, "Don't be afraid, because we have our people in all governmental councils."[86] The village of Golyam Izvor is an example of the direct involvement of notables occupying official posts. There was a strong revolutionary committee there and it became the centre of the revolutionary district, which included three other nearby towns (Orhaniye, Etrepol/Etropole, Teteven) and a dozen villages.[87] We learn from the investigation protocols of the Arabakonak robbery that the committee members initially attempted to poison the mayor (*muhtar*) of the village Dimităr (Krachunov), and when that failed, they forced him to become involved in their organization.[88] The events in Panagyurishte also were a result of the tactics employed by the leaders of the uprising. The previous representatives of the Bulgarian community, Petko Bradestilov and Velko Ilchov, resigned in order to enable persons related to the rebels to occupy these positions. Shtărbanov and Geshenov (who were elected to these posts at a later time) were also chosen to be members of the revolutionary committee, which thus was expanded from ten to twelve members.[89]

Still, it must be emphasized that in most cases, recruiting members for the revolutionary committees from among those involved in the local Ottoman administration was not a result of intentional efforts. In the instructions for recruiting committee functionaries, it was said that the mission should not be disclosed to those who had "narrow contacts with the Turks."[90] It was repeatedly mentioned that the revolutionaries turned to the *chorbadzhiyas* in order to raise funds, and this was often done by means of threatening letters.[91] However, the revolutionaries did not limit themselves to taking money from the *chorbadzhiyas*, but they also involved them in the committees. The logic of recruiting influential people often led both the revolutionaries and the authorities to one and the same person. There was a parallel between the attempts of both the Ottoman authorities and the Bulgarian revolutionaries to use the existing social hierarchies for their own purposes.

Conclusions

Despite all "revisions," the Bulgarian national historiography considers the development of the revolutionary movement and modernization of the Ottoman State as two separate processes. At first glance, there should not be anything in common between the Bulgarians appointed to the Ottoman administration and the "committee members" – these people served radically different causes. There is hardly any doubt that these were two different causes, but often the same people served them. Each attempt at forming a broader network necessarily relied on the existing structures. The Ottoman authorities relied on influential local people, and even when attempting to develop a centralized administration, they tried to involve them in the system of governance. The leaders of the national revolution were even more in need of such tactics, due to the limited time at their disposal. For them there was not any other possibility except attracting the local notables and influential people into the revolutionary organization and encouraging them to revolt. We see in the example of Levsky (and later his followers) that they turned to the same people whom the Ottoman authorities had appointed to the mixed administrative councils and courts. And in many cases these were not only people from one and the same "social milieu", but literally the same individuals. They were members of the local councils, while simultaneously participating in the preparations for the uprising.

PART III

REFRAINED LOYALTIES

7

EL DOVÉR EL MAS SÀNTO. THE MOBILIZATION OF THE OTTOMAN JEWISH POPULATION DURING THE BALKAN WARS (1912–13)* **

Eyal Ginio

Moshe Ginio's was not an exceptional case. He was one of many non-Muslims and Muslims who had probably never held weapons before and were now compelled by law to serve their motherland and the Sultan in battle. The Jewish soldiers who served in the Ottoman army during the Balkan Wars (October 1912–July 1913) left behind few written testimonies. In 1932, Arieh Samsonov published the memoirs of Yitshak H. (Halperin), a farmer from the colony of Zichron Ya'akov near Haifa, who had volunteered to serve in the Ottoman army in April 1912. His ambition to serve in the military orchestra quickly faded as he received his assignment to serve in the Ottoman infantry. His memoirs, as recounted by the author, mainly relate the hardships endured by the conscripts during military training, the Ottoman difficulty in moving soldiers from the Arab provinces to the Balkan front, the harsh conditions during the war and the fall in battle, before his eyes, of his childhood friend, Ya'akov (Schwartz).[1]

Another contemporary testimony arrives from Ottoman Edirne: the saga of the Bulgarian siege over the city (October 1912–March 1913) stands at the centre of a detailed diary, written by Angela Guéron, a mistress from the local Alliance school for girls. Her diary was kept for decades in the archives of the Alliance Israelite in Paris. Discovered and partially published by

Avigdor Levy in Hebrew and English,[2] it was recently edited by Rifat Bali and published in its original French (befitting a teacher in the Alliance), by the Isis Press in Istanbul.[3] This diary presents a rare account of the suffering of the civil population inside the besieged city of Edirne. Ms. Guéron spent all five months of the blockade in her natal city of Edirne and therefore was able to report the daily events that shook her own life as well as the lives of her co-citizens. These two accounts, one based on the memories of a young Zionist from Palestine and the other compiled by a female teacher from an Alliance school that generally opposed Zionism, are two rare examples that recount the war experience as endured by Jews living in the Ottoman realm. They depict the Balkan Wars from two different perspectives, reflecting two different discourses existing among the Ottoman Jewish communities – the Zionist one and the emancipation-oriented one championed by the Alliance schools.

Furthermore, the personal and collective experiences endured by Jewish soldiers in the ranks of the Ottoman army and by Jewish civilians during the Balkan Wars have received only modest attention in the study of the troubled last decade of the Ottoman Empire.[4] Most of the existing studies concentrate on Jewish recruits coming from the nascent Zionist settlements in Palestine and their contribution to the formation of Jewish military power and national identity.[5] In the context of the Ottoman Jews living outside of Palestine, however, the significance of Zionism as a national movement aiming to restore a Jewish political presence in Palestine was still marginal. The then-prevailing "Ottoman Zionism" usually meant cultural Hebraism – propagating Hebrew language and culture – rather than advocating a territorial-political agenda. As shown by Esther Benbassa, Aron Rodrigue and Michelle Campos, among others, it attracted mainly the Jewish uneducated masses, by offering them a new venue for "socialization, politicization, and leisure activities under the nationalist banner." The ability of Zionism to suggest modernity, while still highlighting Jewish identity and tradition, further increased its popularity.[6] Furthermore, one cannot speak about one homogenous Ottoman Jewish community: the quarter of a million Jews who lived in the Ottoman Empire prior to the Balkan Wars formed numerous communities, often with their own distinctive language and cultural traditions. About half of the Ottoman Jews lived in the traditional core areas of the Ottoman Empire – Western Anatolia and the Balkans. They were essentially Judeo-Spanish-speaking. In Southern Anatolia and the Arabic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, most of the Jews were Arabic-speaking. The Jews living in the Kurdish areas spoke mainly dialects of Aramaic. Jews coming from all parts of the Diaspora were present in Palestine. However, Judeo-Spanish speakers were still the dominant group there. The linguistic differentiation between the various Jewish communities living under Ottoman influence is only one indicator that emphasizes the diversity of the Jewish presence within the Ottoman lands.

Against this background, my intention in this chapter is to explore the implications of the Balkan Wars and the military mobilization on the collective identities of the Ladino-speaking Jewish communities ("the Sephardim", meaning in Hebrew "the Spanish") who lived in the centre of the Empire: Istanbul, the remaining parts of European Turkey and Western Anatolia. From a Jewish perspective, most of the Judeo-Spanish-speaking communities were living in this one cultural area. Their location near the Ottoman political and cultural centres meant they were more exposed than their brothers living elsewhere to the contemporary debates and developments that influenced Ottoman society as a whole. Furthermore, as some of their residential locations became battlefields and as others were even situated next to the front, the Judeo-Spanish communities were much more alarmed and suffered from the developments that accompanied the Balkan Wars: conscription, flight, desertion, imprisonment as POWs and bereavement. The dearth of studies concerning the Sephardi Jews is even more pronounced in the vast literature that was published during the last decade about the shaping of the modern Balkan states. Balkan historiographies often concentrate on statehoods and therefore fail to give the local Jews (as well as other minorities) their due places. As a community that shared many of the challenges faced by the general population, yet also possessing its own distinctive agenda, the Ottoman and Balkan Jewish communities represent a particular case: a stateless minority that used to live in a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious empire and was now endeavouring to negotiate its position in relation to the changes occurring inside the Ottoman Empire or in the framework of the Balkan nation-states inheriting the Empire. In this volume dedicated to the study of the "national turn" in the late Ottoman period, the present chapter examines the impact of the general mobilization for war on a minority that had to shape and reshape its identity vis-à-vis the different groups encompassing the surrounding society. Integration, in contrast to exclusion, is the key term that would dominate the Jews' relations with the majority Muslim population during the Balkan Wars and their aftermath.

To understand the Judeo-Spanish Jews' responses to the Balkan Wars, we should briefly mention two cultural and political developments that occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century and that reshaped the Ottoman Jewish communities. The first was the emergence of a new cultural trend among Ottoman urban Jews that encouraged their modernization by exposing them to Western civilization. The outcome was what could be termed a new hybrid culture that drew heavily on the French secular culture as taught to the "Levantine" Jews by French Jews, but appeared mostly in the vernacular of the Ottoman Jews, namely Judeo-Spanish. This new culture enticed the Jews to fully embrace progress and science so as to become modern and civilized, i.e., an integral part of the civilized world.

Secondly, in addition to the internal Jewish pressure to change old habits, there was the external trigger for transformation embodied in the ideology of Ottomanism. The political and cultural changes brought about by the Ottoman reforms gave birth to the idea of a transnational imperial identity known as Ottomanism. It offered equal citizenship, in return for loyalty, to the various ethnic and religious groups living in the Ottoman Empire who were all perceived as putative members of the nation. The combination of Europeanization and Ottomanism was viewed by most educated Ottoman Jews as the two complementary cultural and political components that would safely lead them to a better future in their homeland. They considered the obligatory military service as part and parcel of these two changes: serving in the national army was part of their obligation as citizens in their own country; it also demonstrated that the Ottoman Jews were indeed following in the footsteps of their more "enlightened" brothers in the West, who were already benefiting from emancipation and citizenship rights.

My main source for exploring the Jews' responses is clearly related to the cultural changes that occurred among the Sephardi Jews; it lies in the contemporary publications, primarily the newspapers that appeared in Judeo-Spanish. These were the leading cultural products that mirrored the cultural changes endured by Ottoman Jews under the guidance of the French philanthropy organization of the Alliance Israelite. Judeo-Spanish, brought by the Jewish exiles from the Iberian Peninsula at the end of the fifteenth century and later influenced by Hebrew and the local languages of the surrounding society in which the Jews lived, was still functioning as the main spoken language of the Sephardi Jews. Written in Hebrew letters in the Rashi script, this hitherto mainly oral language profited in the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century from a cultural renaissance reflected in the appearance of a secular print culture. Dozens of novels, some of them original, others adapted and abridged from foreign languages, popular history books, theatre plays and children's books were among the new publications. However, it was mostly the Judeo-Spanish periodicals, flourishing in Istanbul, Salonica, Izmir and other urban centres in which the Sephardim lived, that mirrored the new cultural directions.[7]

This cultural transformation catered mostly to a new generation of Jews who were exposed to European, mostly French, literary modes and tastes through their education in the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) schools, which operated in many parts of the Ottoman Empire and other "Oriental" countries. In 1913, the Alliance included a network of 183 institutions attended by 47,300 pupils – both boys and girls – from Morocco to Iran.[8] According to a report compiled by the AIU, 30 per cent of Jewish boys living in Istanbul attended Alliance schools[9]; their influence on the community was therefore considerable. The Alliance schools were the main exponents and propagators of the Jews' emancipation in the Ottoman lands. Their primary mission was to elevate the status of the Ottoman Jews and to transform them into valuable citizens. By imitating their French co-religionists, they argued, the local Jews could hope to achieve full emancipation and social integration. In the French precedent this process had meant that the French Jews would adopt the secular civilization of the surrounding society, without relinquishing their own religious beliefs. However, the Alliance's vision for the Ottoman Jews suggested a different path to achieve this same goal: it was believed that by acquiring French culture – particularly the French language – the "Oriental" Jews would become modern and active citizens who, through their acquired professional skills and by forsaking their "oriental" habits, could become useful citizens duly deserving the confidence and esteem of their non-Jewish co-citizens.[10] As the alumni of the Alliance constituted the more educated segment of local society, their voices predominate in the Jewish writings on the Balkan Wars.

In the following section, I outline the various Ottoman Jewish responses to the new challenge posed by the mobilization, while using contemporary Judeo-Spanish sources that were published in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. In the process I hope to explicate the Ottoman Jews' understanding of the concept of Ottomanism and their particular position inside this "imagined" community of Ottomans. Using printed documentation that was published during wartime has its own flaws: self- and external censorship surely influenced the way in which different authors dared to fully reveal their thoughts and must have shaped their writings. Furthermore, focusing on the written word gives priority to those few who had access to publication options. Today we are very much influenced by those authors' understanding of the events that they witnessed, but to what extent were they representative of their contemporaries? Were they able to truly shape the perceptions of their readers? We cannot provide a full answer to these questions. However, we can argue that their own testimonies and reflections provide us with insights into various challenges, activities, debates, fears and sorrows that affected the Jewish communities where these authors lived and to whose members they addressed their writings.

The Balkan Wars put the Ottoman Jews' military service to the test for the first time. Recent studies that deal with the impact of military service on societies in which compulsory conscription is practiced, highlight its importance in shaping communal identities and in developing a sense of national belonging. Generally speaking, military service or a war experience does not invent identities, but it can nevertheless sharpen and reinforce existing identities. Obviously, concepts and representations of collective identity are not wholly products of wartime – the debate over the meaning of Ottoman patriotism has dominated the public arena for half a century – yet it was during the Balkan Wars that they became fundamental and therefore received much emphasis and clearer definition. As I have shown elsewhere,[11] the Balkan Wars were a watershed in the way that the Turkish-speaking Ottoman elite perceived the boundaries of the Ottoman nation. These conflicts presented a major innovation and change in the relationship between the Ottoman state and its different groups of citizens. The attempt to mobilize non-Muslims as part of the Ottoman nation was later given as one of the reasons behind the Ottoman defeat. Accordingly, retrieving the Jews' response to the general mobilization clearly illustrates their own understanding of Ottoman identity. Therefore, while the Balkan Wars lasted for a relatively short period, they constitute a useful laboratory through which one can explore the notions of collective identity, since these perceptions of identity were all clearly exposed and manifested during the years of the wars.

The Ottoman Jews and Ottomanism

Ahmad Feroz claims that among the religious minorities, only the Jewish community identified totally with Ottomanism and with the regime of the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP or "Young Turks" as these officers were better known in the West), which prevailed in Ottoman politics after 1908. Unlike the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, Feroz claims, the Jews perceived the disintegration of the Ottoman state as a major threat that could ruin their economic and political interests.[12] The survival of the Ottoman Empire with its territorial integrity was therefore the Jews' "best protection against Christian anti-Semitism."[13] The CUP endorsement of modernization and achieving progress through science was likewise understood as a goal shared by the Ottoman Jews, at least among those who studied at the Alliance schools.

But what was the Jews' understanding of the term Ottomanism? A few decades prior to the Balkan Wars, there had already been debates in the Jewish press about the Jews' role and future contribution to their State. They were well aware that as citizens they had to demonstrate their allegiance. Paying taxes in cash or kind, providing the State with some particular services or products in return for an exemption of taxes and keeping order – in the past, the State's only requirements from its subjects – were no longer sufficient. Since the late nineteenth century, most Jews (or at least those who practiced journalism and their audiences) believed that the Jews' role in the changing Ottoman state was to serve as what we would dub today "middlemen minority."[14] Their contributions to the national economy in general and to the development of commerce in particular were presented and heralded as a major benefit for the Ottoman cause. In addition, knowledge of European languages and cultures was proclaimed as the Jews' own mission to represent and to spread European civilization in the East. The Armenian and Greek bourgeoisies of the larger urban centres were in competition with the Jews in the same commercial arena and consequently, mutual accusations were often raised regarding alleged disloyalty to the Ottoman state. Nevertheless, it seems that the Ottoman establishment tacitly accepted this role of "mercantile minorities" for the non-Muslims, including the Jews. Sevfet Bey (Geylingil), the author of numerous geography textbooks during the Young Turk regime and the early Republican period, published in 1328 (1911–12) a textbook for pupils studying in the *rüşdiye* (primary) schools. The book was intended to acquaint the pupils with the various segments of the Ottoman community. As this book was designated to mould the perceptions of future Ottomans, we can assume that the author's ideas tallied with the prevailing contemporary discourse. Acknowledging the "inherent" differences between the various groups inhabiting the Ottoman lands, Sevfet Bey opted to present their distinguished and innate "qualities" and their particular contributions to the common motherland. For example, he claimed that the Jews numbered about half a million people,[15] that they were dispersed throughout all corners of the Ottoman State, and they were renowned for their commercial talents and abilities.[16]

The revolution of 1908 ushered in a discourse that highlighted the diversity of Ottoman society, while emphasizing the cause that unified all Ottomans under the umbrella of the all-inclusive Ottomanism. This notion, known contemporarily as *ittihad-ı anâsır,* replaced the previous Hamidian notion of harmony between dynasty, state and faith (i.e., Islam) that prevailed until the Young Turk revolution. Yet, it should be remembered that the exact character of Ottoman nationalism was debatable, quite vague and flexible. Therefore, it was open to diversified, sometimes contrary interpretations. While the constitution of 1876, reemployed in 1908, explicitly confirmed the equality of all citizens in an Ottoman state, the status of Islam and, accordingly, the position of the religious minorities were not clearly defined in the Ottoman popular mind. The Ottoman authorities interpreted Ottomanism differently according to the diverse audiences they wanted to address and convince with their messages.

An illustrative example of the new all-inclusive discourse, formally adopted by the CUP, can be found in a booklet that the committee distributed in 1326 (1909–10) as a gift to its friends and supporters. The booklet bore the title of *Hayyealelfelâh* ("Hasten to What is Profitable" – a part of the Muslim invitation to worship). The idea behind the distribution of this gift was to offer an abridged guide presenting the new ideas and world view formulated after the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The anonymous author defined the aim of this booklet as follows: "We wrote this booklet so that everyone could grasp the meaning of issues such as nation, homeland, and constitution."[17] The author chose to flavour his arguments with quotations from Muslim sources that might provide his ideas with the needed legitimacy; nevertheless the essence of this booklet was quite revolutionary. The author presented the vision in the form of succinct questions and answers written in a simple language that was probably intended for a broad and diversified audience. Among the main issues discussed were the identity and boundaries of the Ottoman nation. While such questions were still heatedly debated and contested in various Ottoman circles, the booklet offered a clear image that championed an all-inclusive discourse, acknowledging the diversity of Ottoman populations and their contributions to the motherland, but also highlighting the common cause that buttressed the perception of an Ottoman nation. The booklet underlined the fraternal union in which the linguistic and religious individuality of each people would be respected, while Ottoman Turkish would serve as the intermediary language known to all segments of the Ottoman collective, enabling them to reach mutual understanding.

For example, the virtual question master asked, "What is the Ottoman nation?" The reply was that "the Ottoman nation is a collective that evolved from the coming together in one place of [different] people like the Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Jews…who all possess different religions and ethnicities."[18] Only the shared homeland (*vatan*) could safeguard the interests and ambitions of the different segments that form the nation. In its absence, cautions the author, one lacks esteem, like a Gypsy. In the subsequent questions and answers, the booklet's author endeavoured to refute counter-claims that challenged the validity of the Ottomanist idea, due to the multiplicity of religions, languages and customs among the Ottomans.

Most of the Judeo-Spanish press endorsed this vision of Ottomanism. The calls for Ottoman patriotism, prevailing in the Jewish press with the onset of the Balkan Wars, corresponded well with this vision of Ottomanism, in which the Jews had an equal share. Ottomanism in its pre-Balkan Wars period offered the Jews, as it did other minorities, the possibility to be part of the larger Ottoman community. Their future seemed to be secured in a secular and consistorial Ottoman state. The Balkan Wars put this allegiance to the test.

The Jews, Military Service, and the Balkan Wars

On 17 December 1910, Merkado Yosef Kovo (1870–1940), a Jewish historian who served as a lecturer at the local Institut Pratique de Commerce, spoke to the Maccabi club of Salonica. The subject was the "Jews as Soldiers through the Centuries" (*Los Ğiđyos kómo Soldáđos a traverso los Syéklos*). His lecture suggested a steady continuity in Jewish military gallantry, stretching back from the Biblical military heroes and the Maccabees to various Jewish military leaders who displayed their bravery and military capacity in the Diaspora. One of his examples was the Jewish female military leader, al-Kahina, the "African Jeanne d'Arc," who gallantly fought the Arab invaders at the head of her Berber troops at the end of the seventeenth century.[19] Another was the Jewish poet Samaw'al ibn 'Adiya, who became an emblem for loyalty. Living in sixth-century pre-Islamic Arabia, he was known for his uncompromising faithfulness.[20] The participation of the Jews in the defence of Prague during the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) against Sweden, and the military contribution of Jews to the Polish revolt against the Russians were provided as more modern examples. Kovo used these examples to prove his point: military service was not unknown to Jews. Furthermore, by citing ample evidence of a Jewish soldering tradition and referring to praise and acknowledgment of Jews' military performance by renowned non-Jews, Kovo hoped to refute any allegations about Jewish innate cowardice and evasion.[21]

This kind of popular lecture on Jewish and general history was one of the significant modes of acculturation among the Balkan Jews in the late

Ottoman period and the interwar decades. Given in Judeo-Spanish and later often published in the format of affordable brochures, these lectures aimed to reach a wide audience and to teach the Jewish masses in their own language about their history and the culture of their states, in order to facilitate their integration. In the face of critical political changes, history was meant to provide the Jewish community with inspiring clues to self-identification and possible verification for its hopes and aspirations.

Kovo's decision to inaugurate his series of lectures on history with a discussion of the military heritage of the Jews was not accidental. In the age of nationalism, the obligation, or rather the privilege, to serve in the national army and to demonstrate one's loyalty by being willing to sacrifice one's life for the sake of protecting the nation and its interests, became one of the most glorified missions. The formal and informal educational system invested much of its efforts in instilling this sense of duty in the children's – the future soldiers' – hearts. The nation displayed its gratitude to those who fell in the battlefield by exalting its citizens' sacrifices with various forms of commemoration. Obligatory military service placed the minorities in a new relationship vis-à-vis the majority. In some cases, conscription opened new venues for integration, as it could offer social and political mobility, as well as access to the State. Arthur Marwick demonstrates that one of the characteristics of total wars is the participation of hitherto-underprivileged groups in the community. Taking part in the war effort can enhance these groups' legitimacy and position in the general society. The urgent demand for labour places underprivileged groups in a bargaining position.[22] The minorities who demonstrated their devotion to the shared national cause could expect to benefit from full citizenship rights on an egalitarian basis in return for their sacrifices.

Since Jews were first conscripted into a European army in 1788, enlistment was perceived as a fundamental element of their emancipation. With the major exception of Russia, conscription was heralded as a landmark in the Jews' road to legal equality.[23] The presence of American Jews in both the regiments of the Union and Confederate armies during the Civil War could serve as an example. Ira Katznelson claims that their participation as citizens-soldiers "proved a substantive marker of political incorporation, even as it was accompanied on both sides by discriminatory barriers and harassment in the ranks."[24]

The Ottoman state was no exception; military service became one of the indicators that articulated belonging to the "imagined" Ottoman nation. For the Ottoman Jews, conscription was a major innovation that was brought about by the CUP. Although non-Muslims were eligible for recruitment as early as 1856, military service remained a theoretical option for these groups until October 1909 (with the exception of individual professionals whose skills the army needed, such as engineers and physicians, for example). Only then, under the new regime of the CUP, was compulsory conscription, irrespective of religion, enforced for the first time. The implementation of the conscription law caused a considerable increase in Jewish emigration from the Ottoman Empire to France, the United States and Latin America, thus providing us with an indication of the reluctance of many Jews (and other non-Muslims) to join the army's ranks.[25] The new network of railways – however poor and ineffective – enabled the State to move recruits from the different corners of the Ottoman realms, while the Ottoman army assumed, at least theoretically, the character of a conscription army. Nevertheless, Erick Jan Zürcher, relying on Western reports, argues that this legislation remained only symbolic; even as late as early 1915, when mobilization was at its peak, merely four per cent of the total population actually joined the army (as compared with ten per cent in France); The percentage of recruits during the Balkan Wars was probably much smaller.[26] The number of non-Muslims serving in the Ottoman army is still unclear. Even if the numbers of non-Muslim recruits remained low, an important boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims was breached.

In addition, the army played a major role in popularizing the idea of Ottomanism. The Ottoman army presented its own symbols around which the Jews, as well as other Ottomans, were encouraged to display their patriotism. The Ottoman navy – the contemporary mark of military capacity and technological ability – was one of the main symbols used for mobilizing the civil population. The Committee for National Assistance for the Ottoman Navy, established in 1909 to encourage Ottoman citizens to support this force, also appealed to non-Muslims; among the twenty-eight founding members was Yitzhak Efendi, the representative of the Chief Rabbinate.[27] Its general appeal to all Ottomans was exemplified by a flyer distributed to the inhabitants of the Bakırköy neighbourhood by the local branch of the Committee. The flyer was published in Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Judeo-Spanish. While the message appeared in four different languages (and scripts), reflecting the multi-ethnic character of the neighbourhood, its content was identical: general mobilization to assist the imperial navy.[28] A Judeo-Spanish translation of the committee's regulations was likewise published.[29]

Military service obliged the Jewish recruits to tackle different problems, such as keeping the dietary regulations that are incumbent on Jews, or observing the Jewish laws that govern everyday life. Our sources tell us nothing about such daily challenges. However, the yearbook of the Ottoman navy provides us with some insights into the Ottoman effort to integrate religious minorities in the military service by enabling them to keep some of their religious obligations. The yearbook enumerates the different dates of rest given to Ottoman soldiers; among them it specifically lists the Jewish festivals and holy days on which Jewish soldiers will receive a holiday. These include Saturday as the weekly day of rest and Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year, one day), Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement, one day), Sukkot (Festival of Booths, two days), Pesach (Passover, four days) and Shavuot (Pentecost, one day), all of them official holidays earmarked only for the Jewish soldiers.[30]

For the Ottomans, the service of the non-Muslims in the national army was perceived as a crucial indicator of their loyalty. How did the Jews respond to this challenge?

The Balkan Wars and mobilization: the perceptions of the Jewish community

The memoirs written by Raphael Yosef Florentin delineate the history of the Jewish community of Kavala from 1912 until the end of World War I in 1918. According to his testimony, Jews in this Macedonian port city still assumed, as late as the first days of combat, that the war was a far-flung event that would hardly affect their lives.[31] They soon discovered how wrong they were. As the first all-European conflict of the twentieth century, the Balkan Wars ushered in an age of modern warfare, encompassing mass armies, machines and entire civilian populations. Many of the experiences that would later be identified with World War I were already present during the Balkan Wars: the general mobilization of civilians for the war effort and the use of nationalist ideologies to link them to the national cause, trench warfare, the relatively modest use of airplanes, the decisive role played by diseases, atrocities against civilians, the problem of refugees, etc.[32]

The Balkan Wars also indicated a major change in the relationship between Balkan Jews and their different states. The war circumstances brought about unprecedented pressures to assimilate into the general population. With the outbreak of hostilities, long-established boundaries and dichotomies within Ottoman society were relatively fractured: soldiers versus civilians, Muslims versus non-Muslims, men versus women. At this crucial point they were all expected to be present – in body or soul – at the various fronts. For the first time in Ottoman history, all able-bodied men – regardless of religious beliefs – were subject to mobilization. The non-combatant population had to take part in the war effort by contributing money and work. This call for arms put the Jewish population of the Ottoman state in an unprecedented position vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities and Ottoman society: they had to prove their active loyalty and to demonstrate their devotion to their motherland. They were required to adopt and to use the new language of Ottoman nationalism. While the numbers of Jewish soldiers who were enlisted in the various armies of the Balkan states are known, similar statistics are not available regarding the Jews in the Ottoman army.[33]

The Ottoman state, for its part, mobilized its citizens by using slogans touting all-inclusive Ottoman nationalism. It used various types of propaganda to instil a sentiment of effusive Ottoman patriotism among soldiers and civilians. The thriving local press was the most efficient mode of transmitting news and propaganda to the whole empire. The Jews' responses to the war challenge appeared in their own languages – in Judeo-Spanish and also, much more marginally, in Hebrew and French. Like their Muslim neighbours, the Ottoman Jews shaped their own patriotic culture during the Balkan Wars, which mirrored the discourse that appeared in the "general" patriotic culture of the time. The cultural products produced by Ottoman Jews included various forms of writing – diaries, prose, memoirs, news articles and almanacs of charitable organizations. Needless to say, the image that appears in these works was controlled by the authorities' censorship, as well as offering an image that the Jews hoped to shape for themselves in the eyes of their neighbours. Nevertheless, it still provides us with information about the prevailing discourse of the Jewish commentators and the Jews' contributions to the war efforts.

Serving the homeland in the name of shared destiny

Following the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Jewish contemporary writing in Judeo-Spanish highlighted the shared destiny of Jews and Muslims. It endeavoured to describe the Jews as part of the Ottoman collective: *kómo tođos los ijos del paéz, los Ğiđyos*… ("as all the children of this country, the Jews…") was a recurring statement heralded in *El Tyémpo* ("The Times," published continuously between 1872–1930), the most popular contemporary Jewish newspaper of Istanbul, which represented Alliance alumnae and supported Ottomanism and Westernization.[34] For the Ottoman Jews, four hundred years of docile cohabitation with other Ottomans was sufficient proof of their loyalty and belonging. The editorials were imbued with patriotic proclamations.[35] Interestingly, the Jewish authors emphasised vulnerability and victimization as major themes for the Ottomans' and Jews' common destiny. While current Christian enmity was mainly directed against a Muslim state, the Jewish press connected the contemporary Muslim suffering to the Jewish agonies during the Middle Ages in Europe and the time of the Crusades, by referring to the Crusaders' hostility and murderous campaigns against the Jews. They described the Ottoman state as fighting a defensive war in the name of noble patriotic and national causes, of which the Jews were an integral part. By contrast, the Balkan coalition was painted as motivated by religious fanaticism. The Crusades were mentioned as a precedent for and an example of Christian religious bigotry and atrocity inflicted upon both Muslims and Jews.[36] *El Tyémpo* labelled the motivation of the belligerent Balkan coalition as *Una kruzada móđerna* ("a modern crusade").[37] Their call to arms was perceived as *La yamáda al fanatísmo reližyóso éča por los estáđos balkanikos* ("a call for religious fanaticism proclaimed by the Balkan states").[38]

This "shared destiny" was meant to strengthen the connection between the Jewish minority and Muslim society in times of severe crisis. Generally speaking, the Jews, unlike their Christian co-patriots, did not face rebukes about treachery. Yet, they had to tackle prevailing prejudices that pointed to them as cowards and dodgers. The Jewish press carefully monitored the general press and diligently reported any such accusations published in the Turkish or foreign press and endeavoured to refute them by elevating the deeds of individual Jewish soldiers.[39] One example was the heroic death of a Jewish soldier named Israel during the siege of Edirne. *El Tyémpo* described the military funeral, which reached its climax with the draping of the Ottoman flag over the coffin.[40] Particular praise was given to the few Jewish marines who served on the victorious light cruiser, Hamidiye, the only Ottoman "success story" of the Balkan Wars.[41] At some stage, the community even considered the erection of a monument that would commemorate the Jewish soldiers who fell in battle.[42] Contemporary popular Turkish military songs were adopted into Judeo-Spanish, probably indicating their popularity among Jews.[43]

The Jewish press gave equal coverage to civilian mobilization. Descriptions of assorted initiatives were abundant. *El Tyémpo* elaborated about Jewish financial contributions to the Red Crescent, an enterprise that was spearheaded by the incumbent Chief Rabbi, Haim Nahum.[44] The Red Crescent was the most obvious institution through which Jews could channel their patriotic enthusiasm and services, and show their attachment to the State in times of severe crisis. The Jews' contributions to the Red Crescent are shown clearly in the Annual of the Ottoman Red Crescent for the years

1329–31 (1913–15).[45] The Jewish hospital, Or Ha-Haim, made available a ward of 12 to 14 beds in favour of the army and offered its services to the army.[46] Young Jews and students who were not conscripted volunteered to assist in the hospital and called for the establishment of a Civil Guard in the city.[47] Following the founding of the "Committee for National Defence" in February 1913 that aimed to mobilize the public for the war effort, some prominent Jews joined its ranks. The Committee nominated Jewish representatives to pass between the Jewish neighbourhoods of the capital and to lecture before their inhabitants about the necessity to contribute to the patriotic effort.[48] The Turkish-language daily *İkdam* published a report about one gathering, sponsored by the local branch of the Committee for National Defence, which had taken place in the Mizrahi synagogue in Istanbul's Hasköy neighbourhood. The meeting, at which the guest of honour was the governor of the Beyoğlu quarter, was meant to celebrate Jewish-Muslim friendship as manifested in the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Jews' attachment to the shared motherland and their readiness to make sacrifices to safeguard its future.[49]

Jewish leaders went to great lengths to demonstrate to the general public the Jewish contribution to the war effort. The Chief Rabbi of Edirne, Bidjerano, made public another deed of bravery in an interview given to the local correspondent of the London Jewish Chronicle. To prove the Jews' participation in the fight against the Bulgarians, the Chief Rabbi evoked the heroic martyrdom of a Jewish soldier trying to defend his Turkish officer. According to his account, the Jewish soldier hurried to rescue a defenceless captive Turkish officer who had been assaulted by the Bulgarians. In return, the Bulgarians cruelly beat the Jewish soldier and then executed him. The Bulgarians further retaliated by arresting prominent members of the community, plundering several Jewish homes and attacking a Jewish girl. The Jewish soldier's act of bravery demonstrated, the Rabbi further claimed, the loyalty of the Jews to the Ottoman Empire. He noted that their devotion was based upon four hundred years of fraternal coexistence and security unknown to Jews in other parts of the world, adding: "We are attached body and soul to the Ottoman soil."[50] The Rabbi did not mention the Jewish soldier's name in the interview. However, this episode appeared in the report submitted by the Carnegie Endowment. Relying on a Turkish officer as an eye-witness, the name of the Turkish officer was given as Captain Ismail-Youzbachi (Yüzbaşı); the name of his Jewish defender was given as Salomon Behmi.[51]

Since its inception in the nineteenth century in various European countries, general and compulsory mobilization to military service was one of the main arenas in which the emancipation of Jews was tested, displayed, or challenged – depending on the speaker's convictions and interests. The self-sacrifice of the Jewish soldier to defend his Turkish compatriot is similar to the myth of the Chief Rabbi Lyon Abraham Bloch (1859–1914), who was killed at the Vosges front during World War I, while blessing a dying soldier with a cross found nearby. According to the official accounts, taking the Rabbi for a priest, the dying Catholic soldier implored Bloch to perform this sacred duty. This myth was further promoted during the 1920s and especially the 1930s by Jewish circles and others in France, to corroborate the sacred attachment of Jews to the French nation, and to refute any allegations about Jewish treachery or cowardice, occasionally raised against them during the interwar period.[52] In a similar manner, it seems that the Chief Rabbi of Edirne wished to use the story of the Jewish soldier to fend off accusations of cooperation with the Bulgarian occupying forces. Such allegations against the Jews' conduct, as well as against the other local non-Muslims, became widespread following Edirne's liberation by the Ottomans in July 1913, during the brief Second Balkan War.

Defying voices

Assorted voices setting forth the Jewish contribution to the war effort were abundant in the Jewish press. What about defiant voices? Can we retrieve voices that diverted from this patriotic stance and reveal instances of defiance and resistance to the mobilization? The Jewish press, like all local press, was subject to stiff censorship that suffocated and silenced any indication of opposition. However, the rapid growth of State control during the war, including the power to enforce compliance, did not imply the broad passive obedience of the Jewish community. Instances of resistance to mobilization, although painted in patriotic terms, could be culled even from the censored press.

The most illustrative example is the rumour regarding the possible recruitment of Jewish men between the ages of 29 and 40. The Jewish press, like the Armenian and Greek press – a similarity that the Jewish press was eager to point out – explicitly demonstrated its disapproval. It explained its negative attitude on the grounds of potential damage to the Ottoman economy that might result from such general conscription. It further argued that the mobilization of such untrained civilians, who had paid the *bedel* (a payment levied in lieu of military service) and thus never experienced military life, would harm the Ottoman cause, as large numbers of unprofessional soldiers would fill the army ranks.[53] The negotiation about the mobilization of this age group clearly shows that the Jews perceived themselves as strong enough to resist what they considered to be an unbearable conscription. The Jewish newspapers did not hesitate to criticize the authorities for the arrest of an elderly member of the community, Nissim Kalma, and for his subsequent death in police custody. He had been arrested for the alleged desertion of his son to Italy.[54] The Jewish press attempted to convince the general public that being a Jew did not contradict affiliation with the Ottoman nation. Nevertheless, a particular problem faced by the Jewish community could hinder this manifestation of exclusive identification with the Ottoman cause: the presence of Jewish soldiers among the enemies' ranks. The local Jewish press was not indifferent to their lot. The reports regarding Jewish prisoners of war disclose the existence of what might be described as a Jewish network of information and mutual assistance on both sides of the fighting line.

This was not a new phenomenon created by the war circumstances. Sarah Abrevaya Stein remarks that from the end of the nineteenth century, the Judeo-Spanish periodicals maintained constant contact with one another, sometimes engaging in fiery dialogues.[55] With Judeo-Spanish still the lingua franca shared by most Jewish communities in the Balkans and Western Anatolia, these papers exchanged news and, in this manner, kept their readers updated regarding the living conditions of Jews in the enemy countries. Special concern was given to locating and then assisting and informing about Jewish POWs. The Jewish press of Istanbul reported about the existence of Jewish POWs in Ottoman hands and attempted to assist them by establishing a connection with their families, by providing them with food and clothes and by interceding on their behalf with the Ottoman authorities.[56] Similarly, *El Tyémpo* quoted an anonymous source, dubbed a "friend from Plovdiv," about the whereabouts of Ottoman Jewish prisoners of war who were held by the Bulgarian army. Thanks to this Bulgarian source, the Jewish newspapers could publish the names of the captives and their detention camps and report about the assistance accorded to them by the local Jewish community. Later, the sources of information were identified as the Ladino press of Bulgaria.[57] Similar information arrived through the Jewish press and its agents in Serbia and Greece.[58]

Interestingly, also reported in the local Jewish press was the gallantry of Jewish soldiers serving in the enemy armies. The Jewish press itself was puzzled by its own interest in the heroism of Jews fighting for the enemy cause. Some reporters interpreted this as testimony of the Jewish devotion to their different states. Others understood it as confirmation of Jewish solidarity that existed alongside their Ottoman patriotism.[59]

The dream of maintaining an all-inclusive Ottoman identity was much easier to achieve overseas, among the colonies of Ottoman merchants. While Ottoman ambassadors mainly attempted to recruit the Muslims abroad to the war effort in the name of Islamic solidarity, the few official Jewish representatives of the Ottoman state to foreign states coordinated the recruitment of Ottoman émigrés abroad in the name of the shared Ottoman identity. One illustrative example mentioned in the Istanbul Jewish press was the initiative of Nissim Arditi Bey, the Ottoman General Consul in Antwerp, Belgium. He organized a special prayer at a local synagogue to mark the victory of the Ottoman army. He also set up a special committee, including Ottoman Jewish, Christian and Muslim people living in Antwerp, to collect contributions for the Red Crescent.[60] Similar initiatives were made in different places around the globe, like in distant Salisbury of what was then Rhodesia, where Ottoman Jewish immigrants from Rhodes and Muslim Indians opened joint subscriptions in favour of the Ottoman war effort.[61] Indeed, coordinating and managing philanthropy was one of the main examples of communal work during the Balkan Wars.

Jewish philanthropy during the Balkan Wars

In her study about welfare policy in pre-modern European societies, Katherine Lynch demonstrates the close connection between charity for the relief of the poor and the construction of communities. By deciding who among the poor are deserving of their charity and by excluding others, the members of the community marked the boundaries of their communities: "People created and maintained bonds of community in large part by entitling those who were or became members to those benefits. Providing relief to the poor thus proved essential to the formation of communities themselves."[62]

These observations are pertinent to our present discussion. E. Benbassa and A. Rodrigue claim that even after the 1908 revolution, "the only truly legitimate political area for Ottoman Jews remained their community."[63] This conclusion is in keeping with Jewish philanthropy seen during the Balkan Wars. The Chief Rabbi of the Ottoman Empire, Haim Nahum, did his best to integrate Jewish philanthropy into the general mobilization for the war effort. In his well-organized visits to hospitals, he invited reporters from the general press to write about his donations to injured soldiers – including non-Jews – hospitalized in Jewish hospitals. As stated above, at one point he even envisioned the construction of a public monument to commemorate the sacrifice of Jewish soldiers during the Balkan Wars.[64] Also as noted, the contribution of non-Muslims, including Jews, to the Red Crescent is a clear example of this sharing in the philanthropic activity during the war. Yet, while it is true that prominent Jews also took part in Ottoman charitable organizations that aimed to ease the suffering of the war victims, their charity was dispensed very much according to communal boundaries. The Jews were not unique in their choice to channel most of their charity work into their own community. The Muslim and Christian communities did the same. This phenomenon may indicate that charity in the late Ottoman period was still very much operated and based on the traditional religious infrastructure; it may also indicate the prevailing communal affinities. Whereas not only Muslim refugees arrived in the capital, the support of non-Muslim refugees was exclusively undertaken by their respective religious organizations. Benevolent local Jewish committees were founded in Istanbul to assist Jewish refugees who fled to the capital from the Balkans, mainly from Edirne and its surrounding region.

It is noticeable that while slogans of Ottoman patriotism were often disseminated, most Jewish philanthropy was distributed to Jewish victims of war. The wars presented Ottoman Jewry with several major crises. Jews had to endure all the common problems of a mobilized society at war, i.e. the conscription of men led to impoverishment of families who remained without breadwinners, the care of injured soldiers and the need of assistance to bereft families.[65] Furthermore, following the Ottoman army's retreat, Jews, together with Muslims, were often singled out as targets for vengeance attacks. Consequently, Jewish civilians fled hastily, together with the retreating Ottoman army. The Jewish community of Istanbul had to handle this influx of refugees that arrived in the capital from throughout the occupied territories, but mainly from nearby Thrace.[66]

The Jewish community of Istanbul promptly organized itself to alleviate the sufferings of Jewish victims and to prevent the outburst and proliferation of fatal diseases among them. It had at its disposal the still-functioning and experienced committee of assistance for the Jewish victims of the recent earthquake in Çorlu (August 1912). The community set up branches in neighbourhoods where Jews lived. The task of assisting those in distress was given primarily to women, mainly those of the "leisured class," such as the wives and daughters of Jewish public figures. This was their designated role on the home front. Jewish women, like other Ottoman women, were encouraged, for the first time, to take an active part in the war effort. To be sure, their contribution was channelled to specific domains away from the fighting: bringing relief to the destitute and the war victims – refugees, wounded soldiers, or families of conscripts – and demonstrating in the streets their longing for peace. They were supposed to use their innate feminine and maternal skills to assist those in need. Nevertheless, an outcome of their patriotic efforts was that they created nascent women's movements and took part in public missions away from their homes.[67] One example of such an association was the "komité dela čika čánta del soldáđo" that collected small packages with much-coveted small treats for the soldiers at the front.[68]

We learn about the activities of charitable committees through reports published by the press and through the committees' own publications. The publication of booklets depicting Jewish suffering was meant to rouse the readers to donate money and provisions to the Jewish war victims. As was the case in Muslim communities, religious festivals were seen as an opportunity to raise such contributions. Thus, for example, Eliya Elgazi published the "Refugees' *Haggadah*" (*Haggadah delos Muhağires*) in Istanbul, just before Passover of 1913. In his version we can see an example for connecting the Jewish past and the Ottoman present, in order to emphasize the shared destiny of Jews and Muslims. The author of this *haggadah*, himself a refugee from Selyvria (Selivri), shaped his description of the recent events after the story of the Passover *haggadah*, read during the service for Passover night. In Elgazi's version the Ottomans in general, and the Jews in particular, took the place of the ancient Israelites, while the Balkan states represented the ancient Egyptians. In this manner, the author linked the Balkan states with the principal adversaries of the Jews from the past. The potential buyers were asked to pay for the booklet any amount they saw fit, based on their good will. All revenues were designated to assist the refugees. Particular praise in this text was given to besieged Edirne and to its defender, Şükrü-paşa .[69] The traditional *haggadah* has functioned for Jews as a central communal expression of a narrative that gives meaning to Jewish existence and a hope for salvation in the face of severe dangers and threats. Adapting it to contemporary political circumstances and ordeals by substituting the heroes, places and events appearing in the traditional *haggadah* with contemporary occurrences was a known literary device, enabling authors to place current events in the central narrative of Jewish history.[70] In a similar manner, the authors of a Balkan War *haggadah* were able to tell the story of these wars, and to situate them in the larger narrative of Jewish history.

Those involved in the traditional positions of leadership – that is, the spiritual leadership of the community and the neighbourhood organizations that evolved around the synagogues – were the organizers and directors of the assistance. In this manner, the Jewish mobilization to ease the suffering of the war's victims was to a large extent reminiscent of the Muslim benevolent activity towards “their” own suffering members. The need to assist those in need became one of the major triggers for the creation of charitable organizations that shaped the Jewish public space during the Balkan Wars. Philanthropic Jewish associations from abroad joined forces to found a unified organization designated to assist the Jewish victims of the Balkan Wars. Reflecting the growing importance of Western European Jewish philanthropy in the Ottoman lands, they provided, for example, assistance to the Jewish community in Edirne (estimated by them to number around 15,000 people) and to the 792 Jews from Edirne who found refuge in Istanbul.[71]

While it is clear that the Jewish discourse of the First Balkan War dovetailed with the discourse that appeared in the Turkish press, it is important to note that Jewish assistance to Jewish war victims was channelled though distinctive charitable organizations, totally separated from those established by Muslims.

This inability to form genuine charitable organizations that would cater to all Ottomans probably kept the communal boundaries intact.

The non-Muslims and the Ottoman culture of defeat

Following the liberation of Edirne by the Ottoman Army in July 1913, during the brief Second Balkan War, Rabbi Bidjerano, the Chief Rabbi of Edirne, tried to promote a discourse that underlined the shared suffering among the city’s different religious groups and the common vision of Ottomanism that was not tarnished by the Bulgarian occupation. The Chief Rabbi extolled the good relations between the local Jews and the Ottoman authorities – relations that had spanned four hundred years. His main wish or aspiration was a return to the convictions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities – chief among them being Ottomanism. To achieve this end, the Chief Rabbi joined forces with other leading communal leaders. On 28 July 1913, *El Tyémpo* published a joint communication, endorsed by Polikarios, the Metropolitan of the Greek community, Ahmet Nuri, the Mufti, Haim Bechor (Bidjerano), the Chief Rabbi and the representative of the Armenian community. The communication was addressed to the Ottoman Grand Vizir. It appeared in *El Tyémpo* in a Ladino translation. In the communication the spiritual leaders denounced the atrocities (*atrosíđađes*) performed by Bulgarian soldiers and authorities against the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the city during the Bulgarian occupation. The text emphasized the delegates’ conviction that the Ottoman authorities, who had eagerly protected them all during a period that spanned six hundred years, would initiate the proper steps to ensure them, as was done in the past, a peaceful existence “by taking their lives and property under the authorities’ noble protection.” The delegates concluded their communication by assuring the grand vizier of their “attachment to the Ottoman motherland.”[72] Similar declarations were published in the *Ottoman Gazette* by local leaders from neighbouring towns, such as Dimoteka (nowadays Didimotichon, in Greece) and Sofulu.[73] Any external claim supporting the Jews’ loyalty to the Ottoman motherland during the Bulgarian occupation was hastily published in the Jewish press. Thus, for example, *El Tyémpo* informed its readers that the French author Pierre Loti, “*el illústre akadémiko amígo delos turkos*”, confirmed in a conversation with the local Chief Rabbi his certitude of the Jews’ loyalty to the Ottomans in Edirne, and his rejection of accusations indicating the Jews’ collaboration with the Bulgarians.[74]

To understand the need of non-Muslims to display their loyalty towards the Ottoman state, we have to look at the Ottoman culture of defeat (to use Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s term)[75] that had already prevailed during the First Balkan War and its aftermath. The unprecedented military failure during the Balkan Wars, the ensuing loss of vast territories in the Balkans and the reports of atrocities inflicted on Muslim civilians and POWs, instigated a new discourse regarding the non-Muslim populations that appeared in the press, in memoir literature and in various other types of publications during the troubled year that separated the Balkan Wars from World War I.[76] These plentiful products of the culture of defeat represented among the Ottomans a complete crushing of self-confidence and a deep disillusionment of long-held convictions, but also evoked hopes for salvation, change, revenge and national renewal.

The Balkan Wars marked a turning point in the relations between the Ottoman political elite and the non-Muslim citizens. Following the development of a new discourse of a Muslim Ottoman identity, the non-Muslims were now excluded from the national community. This exclusion was perceived by many Ottomans who belonged to the political and cultural elites as a legitimate response to the non-Muslims’ alleged betrayal during the Balkan Wars. The new discourse portrayed the non-Muslims as disloyal to the national cause; the response was the non-Muslims’ exclusion from the major symbol of the national pride and sacrifice – the army.

One illustrative example of this new discourse can be found in a book by Selânikli Fatma İclal, a leading female author from Salonica, who took refuge in Istanbul during the First Balkan War. In March 1329 (1913) she published *Felaketten İbret* (“A Warning Out of a Disaster”). Like many contemporary publications, the author attempted to explain the military disaster and to suggest some remedies. In her introduction she included an open letter addressed to the journalists Celâl Nuri (İleri) and Ahmed Cevad (Emre), emphasizing the futility of Ottomanism. Referring to a recurring image in pre-Balkan Wars' writing, she declared that those who are looking at the Ottoman state might assume that they are watching an exhibition of one man with many different characters. However, she maintained that this Ottoman body is actually formed from many different Muslim people and equally diversified Christian elements. And, she continued, there are also the Jews. However, she lamented that one cannot find among these various elements one general sense of patriotism or national love that could unite them all. On the contrary, each segment of the population has its own language, vision and religion. She compared Ottoman society with a harmony played by a broken *saz* (a musical string instrument) in which no order can be found. Her only conclusion was that the Turkish nation ought to be rebuilt from scratch; a vital role in this process should be bestowed on women in their capacity as mothers and educators.[77]

The contentions about the non-Muslims' treachery were not limited merely to defamatory publications. The brief period of peace, between the end of the Second Balkan War (August 1913) and the outbreak of World War I, saw the first discriminatory activities aimed against non-Muslims. The boycott of shops owned by non-Muslims, mostly Greeks, initially marked the first step reflecting the new interpretation of Ottomanism, from which non-Muslims, including the Jews, were gradually excluded.

Conclusions

The Balkan Wars brought about the first explicit crisis of communal and national identities among the Ottoman Jews. For the first time, their country demanded from them, as citizens, active participation in a national mission. Subject to military service as recently as 1909, the Jews, like their fellow citizens, were required to join the army ranks. The response of the Ottoman Jews to this call, as articulated in *El Tyémpo* and other publications that appeared in Istanbul, was depicted as enthusiastic, befitting true patriots. The different Jewish authors portrayed this mobilization as reflecting the continuity that characterized the good relations between Jews and Muslims who were living together in the Ottoman realms. Jewish authors also participated in the discourse shaped by Muslim authors about the war's causes and aims. In their publications, they fully adhered to the official reading of the conflict and echoed the claim that the Ottomans were waging a defensive war against barbarism. They also condemned the Christian bigotry aimed against Jews and Muslims alike, which had its own long tradition going back to the Crusaders. For these authors, the Jewish recruitment to the Ottoman war effort was not an innovation coerced by legislation; rather, it was the outcome of a long devotion and gratitude of the Jews towards their homeland.

While their discourse underlined continuity and tradition, we can argue that its evolution indicates the peculiar situation which the Jews, like other non-Muslims, had to tackle during the Balkan wars. The ensuing defeat made the situation of the non-Muslims even more precarious. The patriotic discourse, fully adopted by the Jewish press, reflects this growing sense of volatility and insecurity. The recurring slogans evoking patriotism and communal commitment to the national cause certainly reveal true sentiments (the mobilization of Sephardi Jews living in the fast-growing "Ottoman Diaspora" can support such a claim), but they also allude to a growing fear of being accused of cowardice, evasion and even treason. This concern also explains the attempt of some authors to distinguish the Jews from the Ottoman Christians.

Another feature of Jewish mobilization during the Balkan wars was its management by the traditional leaders of the community, using the community's charitable infrastructure: hospitals, schools and synagogues were transformed into shelters absorbing wounded soldiers, refugees and families of enlisted soldiers. If war can sometimes trigger change, in the case of the Jewish community the crisis in the Balkans strengthened the traditional leadership. Probably because of its official status, recognized and maintained by the State, and because it could boast of a proven capacity (as shown during previous crises) of organizing communal charity, the traditional leadership presented the community vis-à-vis the authorities and directed the organization of aid. Nevertheless, some social changes were also evident: the public role played by women can serve as one important example.

How did the Jews' response to this call (i.e. to participate in the national mission) fare? For the Ottoman authorities, the Jews were considered as one small segment of the religious minorities. Their behaviour, or rather their alleged behaviour, was judged in accordance with what was seen as the general attitude of these minorities. At the beginning of the war, in October 1912, the character of the Ottoman nation was heralded as encompassing all segments of the population, including the non-Muslim minorities, and all were summoned to contribute their share to safeguard the future of the common homeland. The Ottoman press highlighted the contribution of individual non-Muslims who demonstrated their attachment to the Ottoman cause, by excelling on the battlefield, or by donating money to Ottoman organizations assisting the army and the war victims.

But in the literature published immediately following the war, the conduct of the non-Muslims was regarded as one of the reasons for the Ottoman defeat. The decisive debacle on the various fronts, already evident in November 1912, brought about estrangement from the secular Ottoman vision. Instead, the Ottoman elite chose to adopt a different form of Ottomanism, in which the role of Islam was accentuated. The non-Muslims were very much excluded from this process. The deterioration of the non-Muslims' position in Ottoman society places the Balkan Wars as the main watershed in the relations between the Ottoman Empire and its non-Muslim minorities.

8

CATHOLIC ALBANIAN WARRIORS FOR THE SULTAN IN LATE-OTTOMAN KOSOVO: THE FANDI AS A SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL GROUP AND THEIR IDENTITY PATTERNS*

Eva Anne Frantz

The Fandi were Albanian-speaking Catholics and constituted a *bayrak*[1] within the Catholic Mirdites confederation of clans (Alb. *fis*). The Fandi have been considered as one of the most important and famous groups in the area of present-day Northern Albania as far back as the nineteenth century.[2] The mountainous region of Mirdita was subdivided into five *bayraks*; apart from Fandi these were Oroshi, Kushneni, Spaçi and Dibri. In the West, the region of Mirdita was limited by the plain of the Zadrima between Shkodra and Lezha, in the North by the highlands of the Dukagjin, in the South by the mountains of the Mati-region and in the East by the region of Dibra. Everyday life in these mountainous regions was centred around the clan, a patrilineal group of people united by supposed common kinship and descent, whose marriages were based on the order of exogamy.[3] In addition to their core settlement area, smaller numbers of Mirdites also lived in the western region of modern-day Kosovo in the area of Peja (Serb. Peć, Turk. İpek), Gjakova (Serb. Đakovica, Turk. Yakova)[4] and Prizren, where they were all called Fandi regardless of the *bayrak* from which they originated.

The following discussion involves the Mirdites/Fandi[5] in late-Ottoman Kosovo[6] who emigrated from the original Mirdita region.

The analysis mainly focuses on questions of collective identity and aims at shedding light on a period of time which constitutes a phase of transformation in Balkan history. The late-Ottoman period in Kosovo was also the time when the "national idea" emerged in Southeast Europe, although without having much effect. It is argued that the Fandi formed a distinct socio-professional group in the western regions of Kosovo, whose way of living in certain respects differed from their clan members in Mirdita as well as from other Catholics living in Kosovo. This distinct group cohesion was central for the identity construction of the Fandi. It reveals the factions within the Albanian-speaking population groups in general but also within the Albanian-speaking Catholic population groups. It also demonstrates that while an ethno-national Albanian identity covering the whole Albanian-speaking population hardly existed in late-Ottoman Kosovo, collective identities were primarily formed from layers of religious, socio-professional/socio-economic and regional elements, as well as extended kinship and patriarchal structures.[7]

Following the theories of Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, identity in this context is understood as a "process, in which […] value systems and perceptions are constructed and balanced."[8] The case of the Fandi demonstrates that identity is not stable, but fluent, being composed of different layers that interact with each other; identity is furthermore negotiated by political, social and cultural developments in the region. The Fandi constitute a meaningful example of possessing an identity based on social status and privileges, which was distinct from that of other Albanian-speaking Muslim and Catholic population groups. Though religion was one of the most decisive factors in identity formation during this time, by analyzing the case of the Fandi it is possible to show that not only religion, but also social status and socio-professional aspects were essential in determining collective identity. An affiliation with Islam was usually found among those of a higher social status, but here the situation was different. Despite their Catholic religion, the Fandi, similar to the Mirdites, enjoyed privileges which were broader than those of other Albanian Catholic population groups living in the mountainous regions.

The following discussion will focus on the years between 1870 and 1890, a period of intensifying national movements in the Balkans, as well as a period of reforms within the Ottoman Empire. By analyzing the reactions of the population in Kosovo, specifically the Fandi, to the attempted introduction of reforms, conclusions can be drawn concerning the existing identity patterns. The case of the Fandi also illustrates the difficulties of the Ottoman government in implementing the reforms, not only in the mountainous regions, but also in the villages and smaller towns in the lowlands. The late-Ottoman period of reforms marked the beginning of a change in the dynamics of social integration to which the majority of the population responded with resistance and often violence.[9] Such a reaction of violence can also be observed among the Fandi in late-Ottoman Kosovo.

The analysis of the Fandi in Kosovo is based on Austro-Hungarian consular reports from Prizren and Skopje (Turk. Üsküb, Alb. Shkup), which were, of course, written by outsiders. We lack sources from the Fandi themselves, as the bulk of the population was illiterate; only on rare occasions do the consuls refer to oral meetings and deputations of the Fandi, which might shed light on the Fandi's point of view. The difficulty of drawing conclusions about identities becomes evident and suggests a careful handling of the consular accounts. The sources furthermore provide only a limited insight into the social structures and dynamics within the Fandi population and thus in the following will be dealt with only marginally. An introduction of the Fandi and their immigration to Western Kosovo will be followed by an analysis of their identity construction as being primarily based on their social position and socio-professional status. The Ottoman reform attempts and the reactions of the Fandi are subsequently described, leading to the study of their identities and loyalties. Finally the forms of violence within the Albanian-speaking population group, between Fandi and Muslim Albanians, will be addressed.

The origins of the Fandi and their immigration to Western Kosovo

Though the Mirdite immigrants to the regions of Gjakova, Peja and Prizren came not only from Fandi but from all five *bayraks* of the clan, the name Fandi was in general use for all Mirdites living in Kosovo. The reason for this could be that the first immigrants from the Mirdita region were members of the *bayrak* of Fandi, and their name was subsequently given to all immigrants from the Mirdite area[10]. As mentioned previously, the Fandi constituted a *bayrak* and a sub-group within the North Albanian confederation of clans, the Mirdites.[11] Not only is the time of their emigration uncertain, but the origin of the Fandi of Kosovo also raises several questions. The leading and presently accepted explanation is their already-mentioned association with the Mirdites, specifically with the *bayrak* of Fandi, from which they emigrated to Kosovo.[12] Considering that the Fandi who immigrated to Kosovo were not exclusively members of that *bayrak* but also often belonged to other *bayraks* of the Mirdite region, it is appropriate to add some remarks about the origins of the Mirdites, as they also touch the region of Gjakova. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa,[13] for instance, records that the Mirdites originally did not live in the area as it is known today, but settled in the region of Gjakova.[14] According to him, they were allocated land by a *firman* of the Sultan in the years 1436–7 in the area between the rivers Fani i Vogël ("Little Fani") and Fani i Madh ("Big Fani"), since this region was empty after Skanderbeg had fled the territory.[15] It also should be kept in mind that until the early seventeenth century, the region of what is today Mirdita was called Dukagjin[16] (and belonged to the *sancak* of the same name),[17] which also comprised the possessions of the Dukagjin family extending to Western and Central Kosovo.[18] Furthermore, there is also a theory, raised by several scholars, about a connection between Bogumils and Fandi.[19]

No final and uniform position has been reached regarding the question of the exact date of the Fandi's arrival in Kosovo. Most scholars have maintained that the immigration took place in the first half of the nineteenth century. The French Consul Hyacinthe Hecquard seems to have been one of the first to put forward this opinion by reporting that in 1840, 300 families of the *bayrak* of Fandi emigrated and settled in the mountains around Djakova.[20] Later scholars have followed this perspective.[21]

Still, the migration of the Fandi may have occurred as early as the seventeenth or eighteenth century. Peter Bartl points out the continuous emigration of Albanian Catholics from modern-day Northern Albania into Kosovo since the 1630s.[22] The numbers for the Catholics seem to be have been fluctuating and declining over the following years,[23] but in 1791–2,[24] as well as in 1853,[25] further immigration waves become apparent, which possibly correspond to the immigration of 1840 mentioned above. No Catholics are recorded in the city of Peja until 1703.[26] Compared to the region of Gjakova, these numbers are smaller, but they still indicate a possible immigration around 1840. In the city of Prizren Catholics are mentioned in 1610.[27] As the Catholic immigrants are not further specified regarding their place of origin, it is not possible to say exactly if Fandi or Mirdites in general and in what numbers they were part of these Catholic immigrants who came to Kosovo from the entire area of what is today the northern and central part of Albania. If we follow the ecclesiastical reports of the missionaries of the Propaganda Fide,[28] several general conclusions can nevertheless be reached: the emigration of Catholics from Albania constituted a complex process and took place in different phases and waves; a first migration already took place in 1637, followed by others between the years 1791 and 1853. The



Fig. 9: Gathering at the fountain in İpek (serb. Peć, alb. Peja), 1912. Source: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. Bildarchiv Austria. No. 65.819 – B.

fluctuation in the number of Catholics can be attributed to migration movements to and from Kosovo, but to a great extent probably also to Islamization processes.[29] It is possible and even likely that members of the Mirdite confederation and also members of the *bayrak* Fandi immigrated to Kosovo as early as the seventeenth century.

The reasons for emigration from today's Albania in general were manifold: difficult living conditions due to the population increase and overpopulation, as well as land and pasture shortages,[30] famine[31] and escape from vendetta,[32] but also forced migration by the Ottomans who wanted to repopulate the areas devastated by wars.[33] As in the general case of Catholic migration to Kosovo, which happened gradually, it is very likely that the immigration of the Fandi likewise did not take place at one specific point in time, but occurred in several waves.[34] The numbers of Fandi living in Kosovo recorded in the literature varies from 300 Fandi families that immigrated in 1840[35] to 1,000 Mirdite families.[36] According to Hecquard, about 4,000 individuals lived in the region of Gjakovo in the 1850s.[37] In an ecclestical statistic of 1874, there is a listing of 464 houses in the districts of Gjakova, Peja and Prizren.[38] If we calculate approximately 10 persons per house, the numbers mentioned more or less agree with each other. Besides members of the Mirdites, other Catholics were also living in Western Kosovo. Here one must mention the members of the Catholic clan of Nikaj and

Merturi – predominantly living in the mountainous areas west of Gjakova – as well as Christians in the Has region, which today is split between Albania and Kosovo. The statistics do not distinguish between the Catholic Albanian populations within different groups, which makes it difficult to refer to the actual number of people in these groups; it seems, however, as if a majority of the Catholics belonged to the Mirdites.[39]

The social position of the Fandi: socio-economic and socio-professional structures

In the 1870s, the Fandi of Kosovo were mainly peasants, tillers and tenants working on large properties belonging to Muslims, to whom they were obliged to pay a certain share of the crop, as was described by the Austro-Hungarian Consul Lippich:

> The Fandi, immigrated Mirdites, are among the most diligent and calm members of the rural population in the afore-mentioned two districts [Gjakova and Peja, E. F.], and they are almost without exception tenants of Muslim landowners to whom they have to pay rent in the amount of 30-50 % of the crop. They form a population of about 460 families or 3,220 individuals, not including the *flottante* that have no fixed abode and migrate to and from the Mirdite regions and their local housing. They pay the sum of 281,000 piasters (25,545 guldens) to the government as land and mutton tax as well as tithe; besides the rent, each family pays an additional average amount of 612 piasters as governmental tax, though until now they were exempted from the military exemption tax. Being Mirdites, they had to serve in the military during times of war and in times of peace they had to be part of the security forces in order to fight insurgents and criminals of all sorts in their neighbourhoods, and every year they suffered losses of dead and wounded persons [...].[40]

This description of the Fandi indicates that some of them were following a transhumant and semi-nomadic way of life, probably pursuing stock farming. In a few cases the Fandi themselves also seem to have been land owners, as is mentioned for the district of Gjakova.[41] Usually, though, they probably lived in rather poor conditions.[42] In their role as tenants of Muslim estates, their living conditions differed from those of their clan of origin in Mirdita. In return for their military service as irregular troops for the Ottomans, the Mirdites in general, unlike other Catholics, enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy and largely benefited from a tax exemption, as they did not have to pay the poll tax (*cizye*). During military campaigns, they received regular meals and a fixed pay of 60 akce per month, while other mountain clans were only given bread and cheese.[43] In European consular reports, as well as in Ottoman documents of the 1840s and 1850s, the Mirdites were described as highly loyal, reliable and brave, and were regarded as the best irregular troops in military campaigns.[44]

The Fandi of Kosovo also paid fewer taxes and were armed. In addition to their military service in times of war, they also played a vital role within the Ottoman local police and gendarmerie system in Western Kosovo: in times of peace they formed a special entity to maintain public order in the region of Gjakova, Peja and Prizren, as the above-quoted consular report shows.[45] The Fandi were often the commanders of the local *zaptieh*[46] units; this was mainly the case in the cities where the Ottoman state monopoly could at least be partly implemented. In contrast to the lowlands of Kosovo, a state monopoly was non-existent in Mirdita.[47] Although the Ottomans probably aimed at developing a gendarmerie system in Mirdita into which the local population would be integrated, this could not be achieved (mostly due to the impassable mountainous terrain) and only military service was required.[48] Several sources point out the importance of the Fandi in supporting local security, by being part of the gendarmerie when confining disorder and violence in the region against brigands and insurgents.[49] As a consequence of their military and security-political function, the Fandi were allowed to bear arms, a right usually forbidden to other Catholics – with the exception of Albanian Catholic clan members living in the mountainous regions, who retained the practice of carrying weapons. In all probability, only a small percentage of the Fandi population was incorporated into the local police system, while most of them were occupied with their work as peasants and tenants.[50] Furthermore, it seems that their initial function of also providing special units for the local police around the beginning of the 1880s was abolished in the course of the reforms, as this was no longer mentioned in 1882 when the duties of the Fandi were specified.[51] To the question, however, when and in what context this function was abrogated, the sources unfortunately do not provide an answer.

Although the Fandi were Catholics, there is some slight evidence about an Islamization of the Fandi, which, of course, must be seen in the context of a general conversion of Christians to Islam.[52] As a possible consequence of enforcing the collection of a new tax, an impending conversion of the Fandi to Islam is reported.[53] Likewise, in 1876 a consular report contains information about possible conflicts between Catholic and Muslim Fandi in the context of a raid on the Catholic village Zym.[54] A similar reference to Muslim Fandi follows in an account of 1878, referring to the murder of Mehmed Ali Paşa,[55] where a *zaptieh-yüzbaşı*[56] Bairam Aga, obviously a Muslim, is mentioned as chief of the Fandi.[57]

Returning to the above-quoted consular description of the Fandi, the consistently positive and almost adoring perception of the Fandi becomes evident: they are referred to as "diligent," "calm" and self-sacrificing. In order to adequately judge the description of the consuls, we should also consider their point of view. The consuls, as representatives of Austria-Hungary, were primarily interested in the adequate representation and protection of Catholics within the framework of the *Kultusprotektorat.*[58] The accounts of the consuls thus tend to centre on Catholic issues, often portraying the Catholics in a favourable light, which should be remembered when reading the consular accounts.

Ottoman reform attempts and the resistance of the Fandi

The Tanzimat reforms, which aimed at modernising and westernizing, that is centralizing and unifying the different (often only indirectly controlled) regions of the Ottoman Empire,[59] were partly instituted in the 1840s in Kosovo, but were only consistently enforced in the 1860s.[60] The provincial government pursued the implementation of a unified fiscal system and thus also intended to regularly tax the Fandi in Kosovo[61]. Since the late 1860s, the Ottoman authorities had tried to enforce the military exemption tax (*bedel-i askeriyye/bedelia*)[62] upon the Fandi, but they were unsuccessful even as late as 1883. The case of the Fandi clearly shows how difficult it was for the Ottomans to implement the reforms. The Ottoman policy of letting the local authorities summon and imprison the chiefs of the Fandi – as happened, for example, in 1870 in Gjakova, after the Fandi had resisted paying the *bedelia* – also proved to be futile.[63]

In cases of resisting Ottoman measures, such as the payment of new taxes, the Fandi turned to the local Catholic priests and the Catholic archbishop[64] as well as the Austro-Hungarian consul for help. The reports of the Austro-Hungarian consuls describe the Fandi as "loyally devoted" to the Austro-Hungarian government, since the government had protected them "hitherto always against unjust attacks."[65] It is also mentioned that the Fandi were called "*Milet Austrialy*" (meaning "the people of the Austrians") by the population in Gjakova, reflecting their sympathy for Austria-Hungary.[66] The Fandi counted on the support of the Austro-Hungarian government and in particular on the consul of Austria-Hungary, which becomes apparent in the following comment of a Fandi: "For what does the high government have a consulate in Prizren, if not for the protection of the Catholics?"[67] Although the "united, persistent resistance of the Fandi"[68] was surely also decisive in obstructing Ottoman demands, it probably was the interference and influence of the Austro-Hungarian consul, as well as the Catholic archbishop and subsequently the advocacy of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry at the Sublime Porte, which hindered the implementation of the taxes.[69]

The analysis of the Fandi ability to resist adopting the fiscal reforms not only illustrates the limited success of the Ottoman reform policy, but also provides insight into the identities and self-conceptions of the Fandi. In 1875 the chiefs of the Fandi were again interned in order to force them to pay the tax. They were soon released, but would only have two months time to consider whether to comply with the orders of the authorities or be regarded as "renitents". The Fandi tenaciously resisted the requests of the Ottoman government and, as the consul noted, seemed determined to try everything, to the extent of sending a deputation to plead their cause before the Porte and even the Sultan:

> […] in order to keep away the payment of the military exemption tax that the Albanians still regard as the old poll tax, and which is also called *charausch*. In the popular mind this tax is connected to the demeaning attributes of the unarmed and powerless class of the serf and the animal herd. In the unrestrained imagination of the mountain Albanians, this situation is akin to a state of dishonour. The question has a political aspect insofar as the Catholic mountain clans of Skutari and Prisren are tied to the Porte primarily by that bond that best suits their warlike temper, the military service, which was heretofore conceded to them by the proper appreciation of their national character, and were it to be taken from them at this time, it would just be another step in their outright alienation, and would probably lead to still more severe quandaries for the Porte. One can be certain that this would see the decrease of their old obligations, and would cause them to defect from the bonds of fealty to the Porte.[70]

The central elements of the Fandi's identities can be filtered out of the consul's report. As "Albanians," they detested the *bedelia*, which they equated with the old poll tax and which was traditionally applied to the population groups deprived of any rights. They rejected the new tax, since they felt that they belonged to a distinct group occupying a higher social status, compared to other Christians in the lowlands. Bearing arms and rendering military service was a further expression of their special status. In order to support the Fandi, the Austro-Hungarian consuls presented a similar argument. Due to the special functions and duties of the Fandi in the security arrangements in the region, they understandably and legitimately had the right to refuse the new tax and should therefore be exempt from paying it.[71] They furthermore claimed that if ordered to pay the tax, the Fandi would be forced to emigrate, due to threatening conflicts with their "Muslim national comrades".[72] According to the consuls, the Fandi themselves raised the question of emigration:

> Instead of delivering the arms to the Muslims, what the Fandi regard as the greatest ignominy,[73] they had decided rather to emigrate, namely to Serbia, from where the same, as the Catholic priest and the Fandi assure me, have been offered very good conditions for settlement.[74]

Besides oral deputations of the Fandi, to which the consuls refer in their accounts, the same argument is made in one of the rare written petitions of the Fandi to the Catholic archbishop. The Fandi leaders, Nicol Prenka, Prenk Lesci, Bek Kurti, Nrez Radi and Neziri Marco Zefi,[75] claim to have been "always free and poor" and "as irregular troops paid always with their blood." Due to their poverty they would be unable to pay the new tax and would have to emigrate, or be forced to convert to Islam.[76] In another account, the consul refers to a conversation with the Fandi in which the latter expressed their will to return to Mirdita, emigrate to Bosnia, or be imprisoned, rather than pay the *bedelia*.[77] But they do not refer to the aspect of conflict as mentioned by the consul, only touching upon notions of honour and privilege, as well as the bearing of arms and rendering military service, in connection with not paying the poll tax. The Austro-Hungarian consuls use the term "privilege" several times in their reports. While paying fewer taxes and being armed certainly was a marker of social status and can be interpreted as a privilege, the military campaigns were often hard and involved losses – as shown in the above-quoted argument of the Fandi chief – and therefore were not always necessarily felt to be a privilege.[78] Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind that the majority of the Fandi experienced rather poor and difficult living conditions, a fact which was also underlined in the Fandi's argument, and that only some of them actually enjoyed these rights, whereas the majority lived the life of simple peasants.

Taking into account these rather moderate living conditions of the Fandi, the economic implications of the tax should not be disregarded: in fact, according to one consular account, the *bedelia* demanded by the Ottoman authorities comprised about 30 piaster for each male inhabitant from his birth until his death and was also applied to the deceased.[79] The tax additionally included 48,000 piaster per year, which came to about 700 piaster on average for each family. The Fandi were requested either to pay the tax or to emigrate, but even when emigrating, they were required to pay the tax for the last two years, which, according to the consul, prohibited them from leaving, since they were unable to pay the amount all at once.[80]

Identities and loyalties

As stated previously, the identity of the Fandi was largely based on their social status, founded on "privileges" regardless of religion, but related to an agreement concerning the rendering of security services by armed groups. Similar to oral traditions among the Mirdita, the Fandi argued that their privileges were guaranteed and certified "by Sultan Murad I. after the Battle of Kosovopolje"[81] for their brave participation in the battle. These privileges include the understanding that they were "exempted from the regular military service respectively from the payment of the *bedelia* and that only obliges them to go to the field in the event of war as soon as the Sultan calls them to arms."[82] This "privilege", i.e. military service as irregular troops, combined with tax exemption, constituted a central part of their identity; this is shown by their argument that they would "rather be imprisoned or killed, than to abandon their old privilege."[83] The payment of the tax was so unimaginable and "ignominious" for them that they even preferred emigrating. They also declared that they would be "willing, like the Muslims, to serve in the regular army and supply inductees, if their religion would be respected."[84] This clearly indicates the relevance of religion for the identity formation of the Fandi population. Despite their predominantly Muslim Albanian surroundings and apart from the usual Islamization processes, they were inclined to keep their Catholic religion.[85] Still, the factor of religion should not be overemphasized. Although it seems as if their socio-economic and socio-professional status and the preservation of privileges was a pronounced factor, the Fandi clearly delimited themselves from other Catholics.[86]

Another component of identity construction was centred on the feeling of belonging to the homeland of Mirdita and the *bayrak* of Fandi.[87] The self-identification of the Fandi and outsider agreement with the same description suggest that the abstract image of the *bayrak* of Fandi as the origin of the Mirdite community was quite strong in Kosovo, even after some generations had passed. Here both regional as well as tribal elements could have played a role in identity construction. Aside from identification with the *bayrak* of Fandi, we also find references to Mirdita in general.[88] Furthermore, we can assume that there were also village identities. The names of villages are mentioned in several accounts,[89] but regrettably no further information was found in the sources regarding identities at the village level. The connection to Mirdita is nicely illustrated by the following account of the Austro-Hungarian Consul Schmucker in 1883:

> […] but those latter have not forgotten and abandoned their belonging together with the mother country, but rather possess a brisk, inherent, well-cultivated national feeling which therefore it is difficult to obliterate, a national feeling, which they proudly seek to demonstrate and from which, besides other good and bad national characteristics, they can be immediately identified as Mirdites. Each Fandi (I keep this name as it is generally and exclusively used for the hither-migrated Mirdites) can exactly name which of the 5 banners (*bayraks*) of Mirdita (Oroshi, Dibri, Kushneni, Fandi, Spatshi) he belongs to; he is perfectly familiar with the compositions and customs of the mother country, despite the fact that the religious community secludes itself from the other Catholics of the country and essentially differs from the same in bravery and bellicose attitude. Whenever the Porte waged a war against the neighbouring states, it called upon the Fandi to take up arms, and in contrast to the rest of the Catholic population, the latter always obeyed this call and proved themselves as loyal and courageous subjects of the Sultan. Therefore they also were and are proud of their privileges and seek to defend them to the utmost.[90]

In this account, as in many others, the Fandi, like the Mirdites of today's Albania, are described as exceptionally brave warriors. Furthermore, they were regarded as deeply loyal to the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire. One can assume that the Fandi did not understand the reforms as central legislation implemented by the Sultan, but rather as a "horrible act" of the local government, which endangered their economic survival. This must be kept in mind when considering the deputations sent by the Fandi to Constantinople in order to ask for help from the Sultan.[91] This also becomes clear when the Fandi on one occasion "declared to the *mutessarıf* that until recently they always willingly followed this call and would also go to the field in the future for the defence of the Sultan and the empire; but they would not resign for any price from their ancient, honourable privilege, which had been bought through the blood of their ancestors."[92] Here again the central meaning of the privileges becomes clear. It seems that the Fandi, in comparison with the Mirdites of today's Albania, were generally more loyal than the latter, at least after 1862.[93] The pronounced feeling of loyalty to the Sultan becomes even more obvious during the violent fight between Muslim Albanians and Mehmed Ali Paşa. The latter, as the Ottoman representative on the Ottoman-Montenegrin delimitation commission following the Congress of Berlin in the autumn of 1878, was instructed to communicate the orders of the treaty to the local population. In this conflict the Fandi functioned as protective troops of the Ottoman government in defending Mehmed Ali Paşa and his supporters as representatives of the Sultan.[94] It was also noted that the Fandi remained loyal to the government and had many losses:[95]

> The Fandi always remained loyal to the Porte: as *başıbozuk* they always led the way before everyone else, as defenders of Mehmed Ali they have finally risked their life for a state dignitary and delegate of H. M. the Sultan, and they thus have all rights to an energetic protection by the Porte-government.[96]

It is thus nicely illustrated that loyalty to the Sultan did not only apply to Muslims, but also to parts of the Christian population. While loyalty to the Sultan probably also persisted for some time among the Fandi (similar to other Muslims in Kosovo), their attitude toward the central government in Istanbul became more antagonistic in the course of the disintegration of the original privileges, as well as during the coming to power of the Young Turks. During the upheavals of 1912, for instance, the Fandi did not back the Young Turks, but supported the fight against the government.[97]

As has been mentioned, the Fandi population itself was not homogeneous. We find the majority of the Fandi living as peasants and tenants of Muslim land owners, serving as irregular Ottoman troops in times of war, while a minority of the Fandi probably enjoyed a better reputation as members of the local police forces. Furthermore, there were specific hierarchies within Fandi society, as we can distinguish chiefs as well as so-called secondary chiefs[98]. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide further information about the social dynamics between these groups. It is interesting that in a

Fandi petition, where they speak of themselves as "all the Catholic Fandi from the parish of Gjakova", the chiefs and secondary chiefs of Oroshi, Kaçinari, Kçira, Fandi, Kushneni and Spaçi are listed.[99] As all these locations are in the Mirdite area, it probably hints at the influence of the Mirdite chiefs in the region of Western Kosovo. Due to a lack of sources, it is not possible to clarify this matter.

The lack of ethnic identity and communication within the Albanian-speaking population also becomes evident from the fact that the Fandi were not invited to take part in the formation of the League of Prizren because of "the tension between them and the Muhammedans of Gjakova", as noted by the Austro-Hungarian consul.[100] The Fandi were only included in March 1880, when new intensive meetings of the League were already underway.[101] This is an indication of the initially limited and local Muslim character of the League as well as the frictions within the Albanian-speaking population groups.

Violence within the Albanian-speaking population groups

The case of the Fandi illustrates the heterogeneous and multilayered nature of the Albanian-speaking population groups in late-Ottoman Kosovo. These divisions also become evident when looking at the previously-mentioned high level of violence within the Albanian-speaking groups. Whereas we tend to think of violence in Kosovo today largely in terms of ethnic conflict or even "ancient ethnic hatreds", the various forms of violence the consuls described in their reports in late-Ottoman Kosovo appear to have occurred primarily along religious and socio-economic fault lines, reflecting pre-national identity patterns. In addition to the usual violence prompted by shortages of pastureland or robbery for private gain, the sources often report on religiously motivated violence between Muslims and Christians, with a high level of violence not only between Albanian Muslims and Serbian Christians, but also between Albanian Muslims and Albanian Catholics.

However, the Catholic Fandi-Muslim antagonism was probably less motivated by religious matters than by social elements that, of course, were ultimately connected to religion. The Ottoman social order, based on the *millet*-system, was fully elaborated in the course of the nineteenth century and enabled the Christian communities to regulate administrative, fiscal and religious matters.[102] Furthermore, the Muslims in late-Ottoman Kosovo held an unchallenged dominant, legally defined position in society until the time of the Tanzimat reforms. They usually paid fewer taxes, but had to provide military service, which generally had a high reputation and was connected to notions of honour. They were favoured in legal affairs and were mostly allowed to carry weapons, in contrast to Christians. Although the reforms of the Tanzimat were initiated after 1839 and increasingly after 1856, the reforms often could not be implemented due to the intense resistance of the Muslim population. The Muslims felt that their favoured position was threatened by the reforms that aimed at equating the different religious and confessional groups. In Kosovo, for example, the reforms could only be carried out after the 1860s and even then only partially,[103] due to the strong resistance of the population, as well as the difficulties in Ottoman centre-periphery communication. The Muslims' perception of their higher status, combined with a religious-moral notion of Islam and a feeling of superiority with respect to the neighbouring Christian environment, probably continued after the Tanzimat reforms. The feelings of superiority must certainly have been more widespread among the Muslim elite, since the daily life of peasants, both Muslim and Christian, characterized by difficult economic and social conditions, would have been relatively unaffected by the fact that Muslims enjoyed a structurally favoured position.

The period of time involved in this analysis of late-Ottoman Kosovo must be understood as a period of transformation where, however, the social structures of the pre-Tanzimat era still prevailed. In Kosovo, which became a highly-contested border region[104] of the Ottoman Empire after 1878, Muslim population groups reacted with increasing violence towards Christians in general, regardless of ethnic categories, since the Muslims believed that only they had the right to a favoured status. As for the Fandi, it was probably their privileged, and in the eyes of the Muslims, illegitimate position which explained why they "also attracted the hatred of surrounding Muslim-Albanian clans,"[105] as the Austro-Hungarian consul reported in 1875. On another occasion the consul noted that on the subject of violence between Fandi and Muslims, generally no side alone was to blame.[106] "Religious fanaticism" was equally strong on both sides. According to the consul, violence was stimulated because "the Muslims" often were left unpunished, while among the Fandi the "Mirdite custom of the blood revenge" was in effect.[107] It was further noted that in comparison with other local Albanians, the "Mirdites" would shoot "simply the first best, who stood in any connection with the murderer, i.e. a neighbour, a village companion, a fellow citizen, or just a fellow believer of the actual culprit." The consul further mentioned the "irreconcilability" of the Fandi concerning "some cases (abduction etc.), where in other clans a fine has to be paid," as well as continuous theft of cattle, which leads to "frequent conflicts with the Muslims." At the same time, it was also stated that "the Muslims" would "use every occasion" to act violently against the Fandi. Here, as in other cases, the consuls tended to speak of "the Muslims" in general, as a homogeneous group. Only in rare cases do the consuls differentiate, speaking of the "Muslim inhabitants of the mountains and the villages" as quoted above, which still seems rather vague. It can be assumed that the consuls themselves were often not capable of seeing these differences, or possibly the differences were not important for them. In all likelihood, the economically motivated conflicts occurred between Fandi and Muslim peasants, while socially motivated violence encompassed peasants as well as Ottoman officials and Muslim landholders. It is interesting to note in the consular account that one consequence of the often excessive reactions and revenge of the Fandi was that the Muslims also mistreated the "defenceless and peaceful Catholics of non-Fandi parentage." The consul regrets that the clergy is also powerless against the "even for Albania particularly barbaric habits of the Fandi [...], as without excesses of the latter it would probably be rather possible to effectuate a lasting conciliation between the local Albanians of Islamic and Catholic faith."[108] The Fandi in this context are described as violent, which stands in contrast to other descriptions of the Fandi quoted at the beginning of this article, where they are said to be "calm" and "diligent." These positive characteristics are likely to have been filtered through the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian consuls, and they should also be seen in the context of the consuls' endeavour to achieve a tax exemption for the Fandi, as described above.

The years after 1876 saw a general increase of violent Muslim assaults against Christians in Kosovo, which also affected the Fandi. After the previously-mentioned Fandi support of Mehmed Ali Paşa and his subsequent murder, the Muslims of Gjakova accused the Fandi of treason for defending Mehmed Ali and wanted to take revenge.[109] Together with the "strongest" mountain clans, they threatened the Fandi with disarmament and expulsion.[110] As a consequence of the conflict involving Mehmed Ali Paşa and his murder, in which around 300 people also lost their lives, the violence against the Fandi increased. In the autumn of 1878, the Austro-Hungarian consul reported of clashes between Muslim Albanians from Gjakova and Fandi. Muslim Albanians had challenged the Fandi by illegally chopping wood in a forest guarded by Fandi. A conflict ensued during which a Fandi was killed. This resulted in the Fandi's taking revenge, which again involved atrocities by the Muslims, as related in the following report:

> The Muslims of Djakova often attempted to provoke quarrels with the Fandi. Thus, on the 17th of October for example, several armed Muslims of Djakova appeared in a nearby forest guarded by two Fandi (brothers) and went about chopping wood and carrying it away, a case which until then had never occurred before. When the Fandi objected that as servants of the forest's owner (a Muslim) they could not permit the felling and removal of the wood and that they had to protect the property that was entrusted to their care, one of the wood thieves casually shot at one of the Fandi, while several of them got ready to attack the other. In this situation, the brother of the deadly wounded Fandi, in a state of the utmost excitement and in justified self-defence, shot down the murderer of his brother. When this news was immediately brought to Djakova by one of the Muslims, more than 1,000 Muslims gathered together, seized the two miserable Fandi, using arms of all sorts, such as scythes and wood axes, brought them to Djakova, where the Fandi, instead of being brought before the government representative, as they demanded, were remorselessly massacred by the angry mob without further procedure. The patience of the Fandi was strongly tested by this incident; still they kept their calm, considerate attitude in the interest of the whole clan.[111]

While it is possible that the attack by the Muslims resulted from the previously-mentioned privileged socio-economic and socio-professional position of the Fandi (unusual for other Christians),[112] the cause of the conflict was probably a purely economic one – the need for wood. The economic motive must not be neglected or underestimated, especially bearing in mind the poor living conditions in the region. Nevertheless, the killing of Mehmed Ali Paşa had just recently occurred, and the anger of the Muslims against the Fandi probably intensified what was originally an economic conflict, and gave it a special anti-Fandi connotation. The consuls again describe the Fandi as "calm" and "considerate," as they had done on previous occasions. While these categorizations may correspond to the realities of the given situation, it has to be remembered that the consuls were still arguing in favour of the Fandi's exclusion from the new *bedelia* tax, which might explain their positive description of the Fandi. Further violent conflicts were reported in the years up to 1880, when the Fandi were expelled from their villages near Gjakova,[113] the villages were looted, and Fandi murdered.[114]

Of course, the relations between Albanian-speaking Muslims and Fandi were not always antagonistic. In particular, it seems that relations were quite good between Fandi and certain Albanian Muslim clans living in the mountainous regions west of Gjakova (especially with the Gashi), in contrast to the Muslim Albanians living in the lowlands and in the villages and towns. These Albanian Muslim clans living west of Gjakova supported the Fandi in the conflict between Muslim Albanians and Fandi or during governmental attempts at disarmament and expulsion.[115] The primary reason for this was the fact that in their function as landlords of the Fandi they had a vital interest in protecting them. However, the alliance with the Gashi was not completely solid, since it was reported in 1879 that the Gashi, together with other Albanian mountaineers, forced 16 Fandi families to leave their village, Skivjan.[116] Another report describes how the priest of Peja, Padre Roberto Gabos da Cles, representing the Catholics of Peja, together with "a great number" of Muslims, appealed for the intervention of the Austro-Hungarian consulate, because the inhabitants of the "forever quarrelsome Mohammedan village" of Isniq intended to rob the Catholic Fandi living between the villages of Gjurakovc and Klina near Peja, which, as the consul noted, was a Catholic enclave amidst a Muslim population. He also noted that the Fandi had numerous good relations with the more influential inhabitants, so that many Muslims promised their support.[117] The reason for the hostility between the Fandi and the inhabitants of Isniq (which had already continued for several months) was related to the controversy about a parcel of land that a "Turk" from Isniq had bought. The Fandi and their "Turkish allies" protested against this acquisition on the basis of an Albanian customary law, which stated that the neighbour of a property had the right to purchase it before anyone else.[118] In 1890, however, there is a report of the friendship and renewed alliance of a bigger part of the Gashi clan with the Fandi near Gjakova. They stood in opposition to the clans of Krasniqi and Berisha, who in turn were allied with the notables of Gjakova against the Fandi. The reason for the formation of these two factions confronting each other in a hostile way was that a Fandi from the village of Doblivar near Gjakova had murdered a Bosnian immigrant named Gör Beg, residing in Gjakova. The consul further reported:

> The murdered man, who had lived in Djakova with his previously murdered father since the occupation of Bosnia, had served as a wonder-doctor and had gained considerable prestige among the rural population of the district. Consequently, the chiefs of the Krašnič and Beriša clans decided to revenge the murdered man by destroying the Catholic village Doblivar, and when the negotiations, regarding the

> cessation of this blood-feud initiated by the aforementioned village, with the chiefs failed, due to exaggerated monetary claims of these chiefs, the latter partly carried out their threat by allowing the attack with a big force on Sunday, yesterday, on the house of the by-now-absconded murderer in Doblivar and setting it on fire. On this occasion the aggressors completely robbed another three neighbouring houses. Today the two missionary priests, Don Tommaso and Don Pascuale domiciled in Djakova, sent a local Catholic representative to me with the message that the rage against the Catholics reaches alarming dimensions, and that the mentioned clans are preparing to destroy all Catholic villages near Djakova and that the gravest danger is imminent [...]. [The same enjoy the protection] of the chiefs of the Gaši, Mehmed Aga and Sulejman Aga, who are well disposed towards them [...]. There is also no doubt that these chiefs will use all their influence for the protection of the Catholics, also because most of the houses of the villages in danger are their properties, whereas they are only leased by the Catholics.[119]

Obviously, one reason for the alliance of the Gashi with the Fandi was the fact that the Gashi, as the landlords of the Fandi, had a vital interest in protecting them and their houses. After the house of the culprit had been burned, the conflict threatened to spread to all the Fandi in the region, because the chiefs of the Krasniqi and Berisha decided to attack the surrounding villages and burn the houses of Catholics. However, the houses of Muslim landlords were to be spared, while the possessions of the Catholic tenants were to be plundered.[120]

Conclusions

The aim of this article was to show that the Catholic Albanian-speaking Fandi constituted a distinct socio-professional group in late-Ottoman Kosovo, a region still not influenced by the emerging national idea that had already taken hold in other parts of the Balkan Peninsula at that time. The case of the Fandi illustrates the existence of a diversity of multilayered identity options in late-Ottoman Kosovo before the ethnisizing and nationalizing of the population groups in the region, which dominate our conception of Kosovo today. While today ethno-national categories prevail, we nevertheless also find a diversity of multilayered identity options. However, an overall ethno-national Albanian identity covering the larger parts of the Albanian-speaking population (as well as other ethnic groups) did not yet exist in Kosovo during the late-Ottoman period. It also becomes obvious that it is reductive to limit the history of Kosovo to an “ancient ethnic hatred and conflict” between “the Albanians” and “the Serbs,” since these categories prove to be anachronistic, at least for the late-Ottoman period in Kosovo. The case of the Fandi shows that there were also many violent clashes within the Albanian-speaking population itself, between Catholic and Muslim Albanians. Whereas economic reasons were often the cause of these violent conflicts, clashes between Muslims and Catholics also resulted from the differences in social status and the primarily Muslim idea that only they should be allowed to possess prerogatives in connection with the Ottoman reform attempts to equalize the different religious groups. It is evident that while religion was certainly important for the Fandi in identity formation, identity options should not be reduced only to religious aspects. Besides religion, the case of the Fandi shows the importance of social status and socio-professional elements. Furthermore, loyalty towards the Ottoman state, and in particular to the Sultan, can be observed. Other identity factors were centred on tribal as well as regional elements around the village, including social hierarchies, which illustrates the highly complex identity options. Not touched in this analysis is the broader question of the contacts within the Catholic population of Kosovo, between Fandi and others, as well as the relations between Fandi and Serbian-speaking Orthodox population groups. It is noteworthy, though, that the sources remain silent on this topic, while, for example, violent conflicts between Muslims and Orthodox population groups are frequently reported. It can certainly be concluded that violent encounters did not occur between these groups, as we can be sure that the Austro-Hungarian consuls would have written about them. The example of the Fandi also shows how difficult it often was for the Ottomans to implement reforms. With the continuous enforcement of the late Tanzimat reforms, as well as the reforms of the post-Tanzimat period, and ultimateley, the cessation of the privileged and functional status of the Fandi, their identity also began to fade and to be transformed. However, they have not disappeared completely. Even today, descendants of the Fandi, who still identify themselves as “Fân”, can be found near Gjakova and Peja.

PART IV

ELITE PROJECTS, DIVERGENT REALITIES

9

MISSION, POWER AND VIOLENCE: SERBIA'S NATIONAL TURN

Nataša Mišković

> I woke up early, but I did not want to go downtown. The first thing that I thought about was that today is St. Vitus Day. In my thoughts I was more in Kosovo than in my room. It made me sad. I could do almost nothing. Around twilight I wrote a letter to my mother and then I remembered how at dusk I used to drive lambs with her from meadow to water.[1]

These lines were written around 1850 by a young Serb during his studies at a Western European university. Feeling desperately homesick, he kept a diary where he could give way to his yearnings. But he missed more than his mother. In his fantasies he was transported back to the fourteenth century, and took part in the famous battle of Kosovo on St. Vitus Day, 28 June 1389. According to the myth of St. Vitus, initiated by the Serbian Orthodox Church, God allowed the Christians to suffer a mortal defeat against the Ottomans in order to gain an eternal victory in heaven. The believers were told to wait for their dead king's resurrection to take revenge upon the Muslim invaders.[2] Four hundred years later, when Petar Karađorđe assumed the leadership of the insurrection against the Sultan in 1804, many firmly believed that the Messiah had arisen, and the Day of the Last Judgement had arrived. Thus, the Serbian struggle for independence was linked to the idea of revenge for Kosovo, and had a strong religious undercurrent.[3]

After the two uprisings of 1804 and 1815, the Sultan subsequently tried to re-establish his authority in the Belgrade *paşalık*. In order to do so, he granted and gradually extended the Christians' autonomy rights. This act marked the beginning of Belgrade's secession from the Ottoman *millet*-system. The small principality became an attractive destination for Christians from the surrounding *vilayets* and from the Habsburg Empire. The Habsburg Serbs, in particular, seized the opportunity to escape the constant conflict with Vienna regarding their autonomy rights. However, in Serbia they gained influence as a result of their education and knowledge of the European lifestyle, slowly altering the local population's understanding of identity. The Christian population had previously been organised as one *millet*, thus forming a social group by denomination; but now the Muslims were gradually losing their significance as the dominant community, and the ethnic aspect gained importance. Facing a Serbian Orthodox majority, Orthodox Vlachs and Greeks, Catholic Hungarians and Germans faced increasing social pressure, which left them the choice of remaining inconspicuous, leaving, or declaring themselves as Serbs.

Apart from the religious cult, which was carefully cultivated by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the subsequently-developed national myth equalled that of other contemporary European countries in both content and operational procedures. The slogan "Revenge for Kosovo" continued to be the Serbian elite's most powerful instrument to mobilise the population.[4] The student of 1850, cited above, imagined that he was fighting for freedom, while in his memory his mother and his country combined to form one motherland. He might have been a fanatic, but he was not a fool. His name was Jevrem Grujić (1826–95), and he was a member of the first generation of Ottoman-born Serbs educated in the West. He later became a leader of the Liberal Party, Minister of Justice in 1860 and 1876 to 1878, and Minister of Interior in 1875.

The Serbian turn to nationalism and the process of disintegration of Ottoman society can be divided into three chronological phases. The first phase is distinguished by "rebellion and autonomy" and lasted from around 1800 until 1839. It comprises Serbia's transition from an Ottoman *paşalık* into an autonomous princedom. The new elite, which had come together in the course of the uprisings, still tried to emulate the Ottoman lifestyle in order to be accepted as equals among the Muslims. During the second phase, from 1840 to 1868, labelled "separation and reckoning", the process of separation from the Ottoman Empire was in full swing. The Serbian leaders destroyed the old socio-economic order, forcibly introducing a modern central administration, imposing a policy of Serbianisation on the whole society and finally taking over the Ottoman garrisons in 1867. The third phase extends from the Russo-Turkish War until World War I and may be characterized with the slogan “independence and expansion”. During this period, the Serbian elite eliminated many features reminiscent of Ottoman times, while the Dual Monarchy’s policies of colonization served to accelerate the process.

This essay focuses on the third phase, discussing the Serbianisation process in its various aspects and relating it to the internal political divisions, external economic colonisation and a widening social gap.[5] The national myth is explored as it facilitates the acceptance of unstable power structures; the use of violence is analyzed as a means to enforce power in an authoritarian political system. Initially, Serbia’s capital, Belgrade, will be seen through the eyes of a British traveller, being indicative of the enormous changes experienced by the former Ottoman stronghold, located on the confluence of the rivers Danube and Sava. The Serbianisation process is then examined from demographic, economic and cultural points of view. An account of the political and economic constraints the country faced after independence is followed by a discussion of the Serbian intelligentsia’s notion “to be useful”. The record of the scandalous assassination of the royal couple in 1903 enables us to see the splits within the elite, whereas the appalling housing conditions of Belgrade’s underprivileged population demonstrates the widening gap between the elite and the general population.

The building of a capital

When the English traveller, Edith Durham, came to Belgrade in 1902, she was surprised by the town’s elegance and modernity:

> Belgrade (Beograd= “The White City”) is most beautifully situated. For a capital to be so placed that the enemy can shell it comfortably from its own doorstep is of course ridiculous, but for sheer beauty of outlook Belgrade is not easy to surpass. […] Belgrade is a new town, a quite new town, and no longer deserves the name of ‘The White City’, its general effect from a distance being dark; but the name is an old one, and ‘white’ is a favourite Serbian adjective. It is a bright, clean town; the houses, seldom more than two storeys high, look solidly built; there are plenty of good shops, and the streets are wide and cheerful. It looks so prosperous and the inhabitants so very much up to date, its soldiers are so trim, its officers so gorgeous, and the new Government offices are so imposing, that one is surprised to find that the country, owing to mismanagement, is financially in an almost desperate condition.[6]

"Belgrade is a new town, a quite new town". Indeed, Belgrade had been rebuilt after the departure of the Ottomans. It is also true that the city was situated right at the country's border and could have been easily shelled by the Habsburg army. (This did not happen until World War I.) In June 1862, however, Belgrade had been shelled from its own fortress. The incident was a turning point in the Serbian princedom's struggle for independence. After a fatal row between Christian servants and Muslim soldiers, the Ottoman garrison had been provoked into bombing Belgrade from the fort. International protests quickly followed and the remaining Muslims of Serbia, roughly 23,000 persons, were ordered to relocate from the princedom to the Sultan's territories. In 1867, the last Ottoman governor and his soldiers left the country forever and eleven years later, it was awarded independence by the European Powers.

In the course of the transfer of power, Muslim real estate was handed over to the Christian administration. In the case of the capital, this meant that almost the entire old town came into possession of the city authorities. Their intention was to eliminate all reminders of the capital's past as an Ottoman stronghold and to create a modern royal seat, worthy of the victorious Serbian prince.[7] In the words of the Minister of Construction, presumably Milivoje Petrović-Blaznavac:

> Will it not hurt our pride, if our residency continues to retain the aspect barbarism has given her? Can the livelier traffic, soon to be expected, cope with the present narrow, winding, interrupted, and steep alleys?[8]

Not all the government's ambitious plans were realised, but the old Muslim quarters and all but one mosque were razed, the bazaar stripped of its former function and the vast, dirty market square turned into a representative park called King's Square (today Studentski trg). The new, broad, Austro-Hungarian-style main street, ulica Kneza Mihaila, today still leads from the new Kalemegdan Park to Terazije Square. There, rich Belgradians, beginning with the prince's family, began building representative palaces, whereas better-off civil servants or high-ranking officers preferred to buy property in the former Muslim town, where they erected slightly more modest one- or two-storey family homes.

The new elite took over the old town and the Europeanized city centre looked modern, cheerful and well off, inducing the British tourist to her favourable account. But Ms. Durham seemingly did not visit the town's outskirts. Belgrade had undergone significant demographic growth since the departure of the Muslims; between 1866 and 1905, the number of residents tripled from 24,768 to 80,747. The town had all the signs of an immigrant city, with a share of more than sixty per cent male inhabitants. In 1900, only a third of the Belgradians had been born there, another third came from Serbia or from the Ottoman territories and a final third were immigrants from the Habsburg Empire.[9] The migrant workers, fleeing underemployment and hunger in the countryside, rented a place to sleep in the new residential areas outside the old town, in the cheap multi-storey apartment houses on the slopes of Savamala quarter, or they erected an illegal shack somewhere. Belgrade was the only Serbian town to experience such an urban aggregation. The smaller towns tried to copy the capital's new lifestyle, but basically retained their provincial character. The countryside, home to 86 per cent of Serbia's total population in 1900, remained deeply rural and untouched by European-style industrialisation.[10]

Serbianisation

After 1867, the Christians of Serbia were more or less on their own. The Muslims, with few exceptions, had left: in 1900, roughly 1,000 Turks lived in the country, predominantly in the district of Podrina at the Bosnian border, and all of 140 Muslims lived in Belgrade. Many Jewish families had also decided to settle elsewhere. Making up about ten per cent of the Belgrade



Fig. 10: Monument of Prince Mihailo Obrenović erected in front of the National Theatre at the place of the former Stambul-gate in Belgrade, photography by Ivan Gromanov from 1884. Source: Muzej grada Beograda, Ur 6068 .

population in 1850, living conditions had been deteriorating for them since the 1840s. Since 1846, Jews had been prohibited by law to live, work and possess property outside the old town of Belgrade, and in 1850, Serbia closed the borders for Jewish immigrants coming from the Ottoman Empire. During the riots of June 1862, the Jews of Belgrade escaped along with most of the other residents, but in contrast to the latter, many of them did not return.[11]

On the other hand, simply being a Christian no longer meant automatic acceptance in Serbian society. Until the 1860s, foreigners and their professional services had been welcomed and many among them had been offered admission to the country's elite. Barthélemy-Sylvestre Cunibert from Piedmont had been Prince Miloš's personal physician and political advisor. The Czech lawyer František Zach stayed in Serbia long after he had finished serving as an agent of the Polish government-in-exile: he changed the spelling of his name to Franjo Zah, was elected director of the newly-founded artillery school and later became the prince's first adjutant and head of the General Staff. The French officer Hippolyte Mondain even became the first Serbian Minister of War.

From the 1870s onwards, strangers with an education or money to invest still easily made a living in Serbia, but the pressure to assimilate increased. The demand for foreign specialists diminished gradually, as the first generation of Serbian academics educated abroad were ready to take on responsibility for state administrative offices. These were people like Jevrem Grujić, cited in the initial reference, imbued with the national mission to revenge Kosovo and to lead all Serbs to freedom. The notoriously unstable successive governments attempted to create a homogenous Serbian nation; this also meant that people had to meet certain requirements, in order to become full members of Serbian society. To acquire real estate, for instance, prospective buyers now had to be citizens. To become naturalised, they had to adopt the Serbian Orthodox denomination and to "Serbianise" their names. Prussian officer Paul Sturm (1848-1922), for instance, changed his name to Pavle Jurišić-Šturm in 1876. He subsequently had a brilliant career as a general and the king's first adjutant. The wealthy entrepreneur Georg Weifert, whose grandfather had been a Swabian settler from Vršac/Werschetz in Vojvodina, restricted himself to a change of spelling when he became a Serbian subject in 1873, in order to build his well-known brewery. As Đorđe Vajfert, he celebrated the patron saint's festival of *Slava* and built Orthodox churches consecrated to St. George and to St. Anne. On the other hand, a Serbian surname helped people to conceal a Vlach (Tsintsar), Greek, or other origin.

Prime Ministers Vladan Đorđević and Nikola Pašić were of Tsintsar origin, as were the playwright Branislav Nušić and the conspirator Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis, whereas the grandfather of the wealthy jeweller, Popović, had been a Greek priest from Saloniki.

The "Serbianisation" of names can also be observed in the denominations of trades and crafts. When the Christians began to settle in towns and establish their own guilds, they adapted the Ottoman *esnaf* system and learned the traditional oriental crafts. In 1850, they worked as *terzije* and *abadžije* ("tailors"), *ćurčije* ("peltmongers"), *simidžije*, *furundžije* and *pekari* ("bakers") or *kujundžije* ("goldsmiths"). However, by 1900 there was no longer a peltmongers' guild, the baker was simply called *hlebar*, the *kujundžija* had become a *zlatar* and the *terzije* and *abadžije* faced steep competition from the European-style *krojači* and *šnajderi*. Ottoman words of Arabic or Persian origin were complemented by German terms and finally, if not consistently, replaced by Serbo-Croatian expressions. Thus, the *šloseri* and *tišleri* of 1850 became *bravari* and *stolari* in 1900.[12]

It was a process of crowding out: old names and crafts survived if there were people who continued to use them; there is still a *zlatar-kujundžija* to be found in today's Belgrade, working both in the oriental-style silver craft along with being a modern goldsmith. The same holds true for place names and for food. The place names from Ottoman times remained in use wherever they were not replaced by new ones. The old market place of Belgrade was rechristened Kraljev trg (today Studentski trg), the newly built streets of the old town received the names of the heroes from the battles for freedom, but nobody bothered to rename the quarters of Dorćol, Kalemegdan, or Tašmajdan.

The traditional food of Serbia, as prepared at home or in inns, was simply complemented by the recipes of Austro-Hungarian cooks in the service of the local elites, thus becoming an integral part of Serbian cooking. The names of common local dishes usually remained unchanged, such as *burek* (Turkish: *börek*; "cheese or meat cake usually eaten for breakfast"), *baklava* ("puff pastry sweet"), or *čevapćići* (Turkish: *kebap*; "grilled sausages made of minced meat").

The consciousness that something belonged to the Ottoman heritage was gradually lost or supplanted, depending on the case. After 1900, hardly any Serb remembered that the word *makaze* ("scissors") was of Arab origin and he hid his preference for traditional Turkish-style coffee by calling it *naša kafa*, our coffee. Previous integration into the Christian lifestyle seemed to be the sine qua non for remnants of Muslim culture to survive Serbian independence: soon after the Muslims' departure, there were no public *hammams* ("Turkish baths") left in Belgrade, the *čibuk* ("Turkish pipe") was replaced by the more popular cigarettes and the *fes* ("red felt cap") died out, together with the older generation of Serbs.[13]

Political struggles and economic colonisation

Around 1900, the Serbian state presented itself as a young and successful nation with a beautiful capital. The political and socio-economic problems only partly revealed themselves to the outsider; these problems were largely consequences of the "liberation war" of 1876 to 1878.

In 1876, Prince Milan Obrenović declared war against Turkey. He did this under public pressure and following unofficial Russian encouragement, but against his own better judgement. Among others, his own Russia-born wife Natalija, whom he had married the previous year, was in favour of the war. Industrialist and sponsor Đorđe Vajfert remembered:

> When the preparations for war began in 1875, the women started to cooperate as well. This was initiated by Queen Natalija, who deserves our gratitude. Twice a week, she invited the Belgradian ladies and girls to the court, and together with them plucked lint from linen thread for bandages (…).[14]

The Serbian army's attempt to support the Bosnian rebels under the guidance of a Russian general ended in disaster. Prince Milan's personal friend and advisor, Čedomilj Mijatović, wrote in 1906:

> In truth the war was not popular with the Serbian peasantry. I have seen thousands of militia pass the barracks of Kralyevo (where I had installed my offices and stores as Intendant of the Ibar corps), all looking earnest and gloomy. I hardly ever heard anyone sing a patriotic song, or cheer. The individual bravery of the Turks and the greatness of the Turkish Empire caused the majority of the militia to feel that we had no chance against the Sultan. The gloom was spreading to the intelligent class too, because we all expected that, immediately after our declaration of war, the Christians in general, and the Serbs more particularly, would enthusiastically rise in a general insurrection against Turkey in Old Servia [Kosovo] and in Macedonia. But to our great astonishment, and utter disgust, not a man rose in those provinces![15]

After the defeat of the Serbian army, Russia withdrew its support in favour of the less unruly Bulgarians. The Great Powers mediated a peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which was designed to create a Greater Bulgaria instead of a Greater Serbia, as had been expected by Serbian politicians. The peace conference of Berlin in the summer of 1878 revised this decision, thereby risking the humiliation of Russia. Serbia was finally awarded independence, but had to pay a high price for it. Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sandžak region fell to the Dual Monarchy, even though their possession had been one of the primary causes of the war. Under a special agreement with the Habsburg Empire, Serbia was assigned a small territory to the South, including the towns of Niš, Vranje and Pirot, under condition that within three years, Serbia would finance and construct the railway section of the Orient Express running through its territory and that it enter "at once into negotiations for a commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary".[16]

The consequences for the country's economy were far-reaching. Until the turn of the century, ninety per cent of Serbian exports went to the Dual Monarchy, which dominated its small southern neighbour economically and politically during that period. Moreover, Serbia was obliged to spend thirty per cent of the annual budget on the amortisation of the foreign debts accumulated in order to finance the construction of the Orient Express.[17] Additionally, the government signed a secret treaty with Vienna in 1881, which secured the country's claim on the Ottoman territories to the South, but forbade any Serbian agitation in Bosnia in return.[18]

After years of bellicose propaganda and the bitter defeat of 1876, the atmosphere in Belgrade was one of depression. Many people did not trust the Austrians, nor did they understand why the Russian "brothers" had withdrawn their support. In 1882, Prince Milan's proclamation as King of Serbia was modestly celebrated. Many people were dissatisfied with him because of his obvious subjugation to the Habsburg emperor and because he oppressed the winners of the 1880 and 1883 elections, the Radical Party. The Radicals, inspired by the Russian Narodniki movement, advocated Slavic brotherhood and traditional peasant values, such as village autonomy.[19] They actively searched for supporters among the uneducated population, and had considerable influence on public opinion and trends. Even King Milan shaped his authoritarian rule with the insignia of Serbian rural life, although he usually preferred to leave this duty to his wife. Queen Natalija, known for her love of Russia, enjoyed more popularity among the population. She liked to pose for official photographs in peasant costumes and was appreciated for initiating and supporting patriotic charitable works, as cited above. The royal couple quarrelled in public about the political alignment of the kingdom; in 1888 Milan divorced the queen in a public scandal, which led to his downfall.[20]

***Biti koristan* and the invention of tradition**

Queen Natalija's example – plucking lint for the wounded, founding charitable institutions – was in accord with the educated elite's notion that it was essential for a "good" Serb to be useful, *biti koristan*.[21] At that time, when eighty to ninety percent of the Serbian population were still poor and illiterate, assistance to less privileged Serbs formed a leitmotif of the national mission. Vojislav Bakić (1847-1910), professor of pedagogy at the Belgrade High School, wrote in his book *Srpsko rodoljublje i otačastvoljublje* ("Serbian Patriotism and Love of the Fatherland"), published in 1910:

> Educated men [*ljudi*] must, through their patriotic deeds, set a good example to their people. They are obliged to do this, because they are the ones who have profited most from the people and from the state; thanks to them, they have reached a higher degree of intellectual culture, allowing them to occupy a higher rank in society.[22]

To serve the country was still believed to be a duty among educated Serbs sixty years after Jevrem Grujić's statement of 1850, cited above. The elite now consisted of state employees, officers, some professionals and a few successful businessmen, who generally lived in Belgrade, had a house of their own and were well travelled.[23] Many of them came from a modest family background. Similar to the generations before them, they considered a state-financed education at a foreign university to be a privilege with an obligation: the fatherland had chosen them to go abroad and learn, primarily enabling them to participate in the country's improvement and to be an example for others. After returning from their studies abroad, they keenly felt the backwardness of their country and were ashamed of the rural population's poverty and ignorance. Living in the capital, they often lost empathy for the villagers' problems, and yet they felt rootless at the same time. Believing in the notion that the fatherland was like a big family, they wanted to follow the king as their head of family, and made St. Vitus their family saint. In this arrangement, the church gained much influence, complementing the king in the celebration of the Kosovo cult.[24]

The politicians were mainly divided into two factions. The Western-oriented Liberals and Progressives tended to regard the adoption of the European way of life as the appropriate means to rid the country of the common past with the Ottoman Empire, and they wanted to reconstruct bonds with a glorious medieval history through reintegration with Europe. The National-Conservatives and the Radicals tried to detect and reanimate "proper" Serbian tradition, unaffected by the Ottoman heritage.

Academics working at Belgrade High School (upgraded to the rank of University in 1905) and historically interested politicians, such as Stojan Novaković, focussed their research on the Serbian past, including history, law, language and ethnography. Language reformer and ethnographer Vuk Karadžić's writings from the 1820s provided an excellent foundation for further analysis. Their aim was to invent a tradition, based on new findings and inspired by ideas from Europe, ranging from the French Revolution to the Russian Narodniki. The new ideology was constructed around the *zadruga*, Karadžić's description of rural family life.[25] It became the symbol of Serbian virtue and patriotism, representing self-conscious, industrious brothers and sons, following their most deserving member as a leader, while the women reared the children and looked after the household in the same organised way. Karadžić's intention had been to justify the State, or Prince Miloš Obrenović's reign, as mirroring the family order. Vojislav Bakić, the author of *Srpsko rodoljublje i otačastvoljublje* cited above, compared family and state directly:

> A well-managed family of bigger size is equivalent to a community or a state. There exist freedom and equality; but there is also voluntary submission under the parental authority, which is necessary for unanimous and successful work. Each family member's rights are guaranteed, and all members are treated justly. Therefore, each member is ready to sacrifice himself in order to defend his family's honour, to maintain the common property, as well as look after all the other family interests.[26]

Bakić stressed freedom and equality even more than brotherhood. He advocated the education of girls to prepare them for their patriotic mission. In 1910, the idea of general female education was relatively new. Peasant girls had no access to education and in towns, only fifty per cent of the girls went to school. Educated or even university-trained women were rare and they had to overcome many obstacles to be allowed access to professional fields. Still, some women of the elite, as for example Tomanija Obrenović or the rich widow Draginja Petrović, gained considerable political influence through the networks they maintained. The members of the Women's Society of

Belgrade, founded in 1875, successfully organized and conducted girls' schools for domestic economics throughout the country. They were determined "to be useful" for the country's sake and found a niche the State left entirely to their care.[27]

Bakić emphasised the traditional notion of family honour in his appeal. According to him, a good Serb carried in his heart an altar to his family and never allowed it to be dishonoured. In his plea, family and national mission blended in the same way as in Jevrem Grujić's diary. His anxiety to shield a child from external influence might be attributed to Rousseau's impact, the latter having been the topic of Bakić's dissertation thesis at the University of Leipzig:

> A man who was raised in a good family keeps the fondest memories about it throughout his life. He keeps it sacred, is proud of it in society, and does not allow anybody to offend it. He loves his dear home and its surroundings, he loves his region and his native country, of which he keeps the strongest and most agreeable memories; and this love he confers on his greater fatherland as well. (…) In a Serbian family, a child learns to feel and think in the Serbian way, to speak and work in the Serbian way. It entertains itself in a Serbian way and lives within the Serbian tradition. Deep inside, from birth to manhood, it develops a national feeling, and its Serbian character fortifies it.[28]

Like many of his contemporaries, Bakić believed it was possible to filter a nation's "good" properties in order to use them for certain ends, as, for example, in the national mission. However, his tendency to isolationism is surprising. Repulsion and suspicion of the unknown, fear of the future and nostalgia all reflected the *Zeitgeist*, but not everyone agreed with such characterisations. Bakić's condemnation of dissolute, unpatriotic Serbs suggests that there were students feeling perfectly at ease far from home, that there were educated Serbs who did not care to be "useful" and that not all mothers sent their sons to war with pride. The Serbian reality differed from the elite's ideal of a patriotic society striving to revenge Kosovo.

The national myth and the political splits within the kingdom

Despite all efforts to create a national identity and tradition strong enough to absorb every single inhabitant, Serbian society continued to be split between families originating from Ottoman lands or emigrating from Austria-

Hungary; between supporters of the Liberals, Conservatives, or Radicals; between the partisans of the Obrenović and the Karađorđević dynasties; and, increasingly, between the elites and the general population.

Facing ever more complex problems, inner conflicts, the lost war, Habsburg domination and the worsening economic situation, the political elite clung to the uniting national ideology as to a safe anchor. The belief in a Serbian brotherhood and the mission to free the brothers and sisters still living under the Muslim yoke, remained the most powerful argument to mobilise the population. As in the time of the Serbian uprisings, the Kosovo myths and the ecclesiastic cult of St. Vitus continued to be a means of communication understood by everyone. The tragic example of the inept King Aleksandar Obrenović demonstrates this in an exemplary way.

After the birth of Prince Aleksandar in 1876, two years before independence and during the war with the Ottoman Empire, the officers drank to his health, declaring a new Tsar Dušan had been born on the battlefield to reunite the Serbs.[29] As King of Serbia, he refused to become engaged to a princess from a minor European court and instead married his widowed mistress, Draga, against the opposition of all his friends and supporters. He promoted his unsuitable wife as *Kraljica Srpkinja*, as Queen of Serbian descent. Unpopular with the army, the couple sought closeness to the church. Draga celebrated forgotten Serbian customs and appeared in pseudo-medieval attire, stressing an imaginary bond with Carica Milica, King Lazar's wife.[30]

Aleksandar's and Draga's show of patriotism was of little use, however. Conspiracies had started from the time of their engagement in 1900. The European powers were appalled by the King's scheming and wanted to replace him. The army officers were hurt in their pride by the unworthy choice of their King. To get rid of him was a matter of patriotism to them: was there not a saying that the worthiest should be the head of the family and that an incompetent leader may be replaced? The regicide succeeded, after several failures, on 29 May 1903 (Orthodox calendar). The perpetrators were Serbian officers; however, the people behind the scene were connected with Peter Karađorđević and the Great Powers.[31] Čedomilj Mijatović wrote in 1906, three years after the assassination:

> Queen Draga, in the last interview which Mr. [Pera] Todorovich had with her, not many days before her assassination, told the King's friend that for some time both she and the King had received information that a conspiracy against them was being prepared, and that many officers, especially young ones, had joined it. Some of these communications

> were made by anonymous letters, others confidentially in a personal interview. Some of the informers asserted that the conspiracy had been organised and was directed from abroad, others that it had started spontaneously with a certain group of officers. The Queen had the impression that the conspiracy was organised by someone outside Servia, who seemed to be an experienced conspirator. It had been cleverly suggested to the young officers drawn into the conspiracy that they would act as patriots and heroes, if they were to deliver the country of such an unworthy King and Queen.[32]

The brutal way in which the murder was conducted came as a shock to the country and marked a rupture in Serbian history.[33] The country's image in Europe reached a new low. After the Obrenović dynasty was extinguished, the Karađorđević family came back to the throne. Contrary to the situation in the neighbouring Balkan kingdoms, no foreign prince would have been acceptable to the Serbian public. Russia regained control over the new Serbian government under the leadership of Nikola Pašić's Radical Party.

The Radicals quickly entered into a tariff war with Austria-Hungary, proudly rejecting Habsburg domination and protecting domestic production. Their economic policy was initially a success. Serbian citizens started to produce goods that had previously been imported and invested their money, instead of keeping it under their pillows. In 1898, only 28 industrial sites with a total of 1,702 workers had existed throughout Serbia, increasing to 94 factories by 1905. In the following five years, the number of industrial sites rose to a remarkable 465, among them 229 mills, nine breweries and 55 mines.[34] Isolationist tendencies also increased. The government took up a loan for armaments and was on the verge of a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, after the empire's annexation of Bosnia in 1908, had not Russia denied its support. A new tariff agreement with Vienna was concluded in 1911, but in the following year Serbia participated in the Balkan Wars.[35]

The social gap

The economic "mini spurt" from 1904 to 1911 encouraged hope and optimism among the Serbs, but it also stimulated speculation.[36] Implementing the new protectionist policy, the government offered no accompanying measures to alleviate the consequences of uncontrolled capitalism. Well-intended education programmes never gained momentum. On the other hand, deteriorating conditions in the countryside fostered migratory labour.

Growing numbers of impoverished, unskilled rural workers poured into the towns, especially Belgrade.

The shantytowns mushrooming at the outskirts of the city centre soon provoked an investigation by the municipality of Belgrade. Starting in 1906, a commission under the guidance of statistician Dragiša Đurić conducted a survey of the housing shortage.[37] The results reflected problems generated by a steep population growth from 25,000 persons in 1866 to 100,000 in 1914. Two thirds of Belgrade's inhabitants lived in overcrowded lodgings, ten per cent of whom had to share their room with five or more cohabitants. More than half of the residents changed their lodgings at least once a year. Belgrade rents were among the highest in Europe, the price increase between 1906 and 1912 amounting to thirty to fifty per cent. Sanitary conditions were poor to catastrophic. Only about 200 luxury apartments featured a bathroom. Around 1900, Belgrade accounted for one of the highest tuberculosis rates in the world.[38] Đurić was deeply concerned:

> Flats with more than 5 persons in one room are mostly the flats of the lowest proletariat. Such flats offer the darkest pictures of city life. It is not worth mentioning that in such places there is no order or cleanliness, and the air is spoilt and stale. Hundreds of families live in such flats, hundreds of families are not even able to procure anything more than the basics needed for survival. In the tiny room, men and women, boys and girls, live packed together, ten or twelve members of families and strangers. Of course, such an atmosphere eradicates any familial and moral feeling and destroys the basis of any economic and physical progress. Just in passing we will mention that there is a close causal link between the life in such flats and the three biggest enemies of public health – tuberculosis, alcoholism, and venereal diseases.[39]

Đurić called upon the authorities to assume responsibility for this situation:

> The municipal authorities are the main culprits that so many houses and lodgings are not fit to live in, that building land is expensive, that rents are high, and that the whole city has expanded in such an irregular way. Without any plan or programme, they did not propose an elaborate building policy, but left it to wild speculators to do what they wanted. The latter, profiting from growing immigration and rising demand, raised the prices of building sites to incredible levels and built on them without any control. Their only goal being profit, speculators were not in the least interested in quality or hygiene in their

> real estate, nor did they care for the economic difficulties, into which they precipitated mainly the poorer classes of the population.[40]

Đurić dared to name the problems, but he did not dare to list the names of the answerable profiteers. In fact, everybody knew the speculators to be among the richest families in town. The brothers Dimitrije and Đorđe P. Đorđević had a monopoly on trade in building materials for many years and also notoriously dealt with mortgaged houses at a time when most Serbians still avoided banks.[41] In many ways, the Belgrade elite felt quite proud that the capital's growth and problems were comparable to those of other European cities, interpreting them as a sign of progress. In 1914, Svetislav Predić, for example, wrote in his brochure about the housing question:

> It goes without saying that Belgrade has not remained untouched by modern development. If one remembers that twenty and something years ago, Belgrade was a fortified village, and that today, its population reaches the number of 100,000, which is considered the size of a big city, one has to admit that it has developed quickly. Perhaps this growth was slower than many would have wished for, but still it represents much progress. Also in Belgrade, along with its entry into the ranks of big cities, problems arise one after the other, which nobody could ever have thought of ten years ago.[42]

Many among the educated elite, preoccupied with national affairs, had obviously lost touch with the problems of the common people. Struggling and muddling, the government had neglected the development of the countryside as soon as it had secured bureaucratic control over it in the 1840s. At that time, the so-called regime of the Constitutionalists (*ustavobranitelji*) had centralised the princedom's administration, sending government police into every corner of the country, and thus abolishing traditional village autonomy. This violent process resulted in the peasants' incapacitation.[43] Decades later, the elite was surprised and ashamed when the result of its neglect arrived in the capital. The peasants had been left to themselves, without any education and fairly untouched by progress in farming, health, or other benefits of the industrialised world. Most of them still farmed according to the old ways, and wanted nothing more than to secure the livelihood of their families: Their life centred on their *kuća*, their family, feeling more loyal to them than even to the King. If they left home, it was out of desperation, because they wanted to make survival easier for their loved ones.[44] Trade in the countryside was inhibited. The Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Village Shops from 1891 admitted only the sale of articles "of urgent need" (*od preke potrebe*). The selling of coffee, sugar, textiles, or books was prohibited. On the other hand, the government protected the town guilds from the competition of imported goods, by giving them exclusive licence to sell their products at the weekly district fairs.[45] In this way, it simultaneously shielded the peasants from foreign influence.

However, the government could not shield the peasants from the demographic transition that was fully underway around 1900 and which had a deep impact on living conditions in the countryside. At the turn of the century, almost 54 per cent of Serbia's total population was under twenty years old.[46] In order to produce enough food for local consumption, many peasants had started to grow crops instead of rearing cattle. Without any training or help from the authorities, with too little land, almost no money and inadequate methods, their efforts were doomed to fail. No medical help or basic knowledge of hygiene counteracted the fact that bad nourishment leads to bad health. According to various official reports, peasants ate from shared bowls, their food was unvaried and poor, they did not wash themselves, they never aired their rooms, they slept on the floor on some straw and they defecated anywhere.[47] The tuberculosis epidemic began in the countryside and reached Belgrade with the migrant workers who had been forced to leave their villages because of underemployment and hunger.[48]

In town, the rural migrants retained their usual way of life. The catastrophic housing conditions in the capital led to a rapid deterioration of public health on the whole, which was further aggravated by the miserable labour conditions in factories, crafts and trade.[49] Despite his criticism of the government's neglect and the mercenary speculators, Đurić, the author of the housing investigation, was no socialist. His analysis of the situation was ambivalent, explaining the miserable living conditions of the poorest as due to their low social rank, a view common among conservatives.[50] Thus, he regarded the style of home decor as a mirror of society:

> The desire for more comfort at home, the wish to arrange it according to the various needs of everyday life, is a proof of upgrading culture; on the contrary, the less care is displayed for the arrangement and comfort of (their) accommodation, the less cultivation is shown by an individual, a family, or a society. The way people live, the arrangements

> they make to decorate their home and to live in it, all this shows the degree of intellect, which a society has reached.
>
> It is enough to have a hasty look at the primitive dwellings of the rural population, where culture is in its first beginnings, and compare it to the lodgings, for instance, of those village people who have advanced a little in their culture […]. The first will set up their dwelling solely for the purpose of having temporary shelter from bad weather, whereas the more cultivated villager will build a house for permanent living; the primitive, uncultured man will share his shelter with his cattle […], the more cultured peasant will separate the animals from his daily abode and rear them at a distance from his house.[51]

In Serbian society, gaps were deepening both within the elite and between the elite and the people. The ruling classes had begun to despise the peasants in the 1840s, when their lack of cooperation had hampered the government's programme to centralise the administration and again in 1876, when they were despised for their military weakness. When they reached the capital as migrant workers after 1890, the educated condemned them for their ignorance, ill health and poverty. This process also finds expression in the development of Serbian law. In 1860, there was no question that all male citizens were entitled to the political right to vote and to be elected. In 1884, after a tax reform, these rights were limited to those who were rich enough to pay the taxes.[52]

Conclusions

Nineteenth-century Serbian history coincides with the history of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottomans, the Christians had been included within one administrative unit and therefore had a sense of community, which lasted through the first decades of Serbian autonomy. The small Christian elite remained more or less loyal to the Sultan and to the established social order. From the 1840s to the 1860s, the Muslims of Serbia were increasingly estranged and finally had to leave the country, whereas the Christian government secured control of the rural population, introduced a centralised bureaucracy and destroyed the old, autonomous village structures.

This article deals with the last phase, after 1867, when the last Ottomans had left Belgrade and the Christians remained as the dominant group. National concerns gained importance, particularly under the influence of Serbian immigrants from the Habsburg Empire and students educated abroad.

Muslims were excluded and Jews discriminated against. Still, the Serbian sense of community encompassed Habsburg and Ottoman Serbs and also included locals from ethnic minorities and foreigners willing to stand up for the Serbian cause. However, after independence in 1878, the credo prevailed that the Serbian "we" consisted of Serbian nationals only. Immigrants and old-established residents from various ethnic backgrounds faced pressure to serbianise their names and religious denominations. From the mid-1880s, political rights were reserved for nationals paying taxes.

The process of Serbianisation of identity was accompanied by a cultural and ideological Serbianisation. The small Serbian elite living in Belgrade built a new capital fit to represent the national spirit, eliminating many reminders of Ottoman times. Students, civil servants and officers, girls and ladies were looking for ways "to be useful", to serve the Serbian cause and to help their brothers and sisters still living in the Ottoman Empire to cast off Muslim rule.

The integration of Habsburg Serbs promoting Serbianisation had opened the country to Austria-Hungary's economic and cultural influence. The de facto Austrian colonisation of the 1880s and 1890s further enforced Serbia's orientation towards Christian Europe. But such Westernisation affected mainly the educated elite and the urban consumers. The government shielded the countryside, where the large majority of the population lived, from foreign influence, neglecting its economic and cultural development.

The unity of the Serbian nation was thus a chimera present only in the heads of the elite. The lethal rivalry between the leading families of Obrenović and Karađorđević, dating back to the very beginning of autonomy, was never resolved. The political elite never stopped quarrelling about the question of whether to follow Austria or Russia. The actual village population of 1900 did not comply with the national ideology's romantic notion of proud and independent heroes living self-sufficiently in a *zadruga* and it was the elite which had broken the villagers' pride by destroying their autonomy. The poor migrant workers and shanty dwellers at the outskirts of Belgrade's elegant city centre were held in contempt by the prosperous elite, who disregarded them as people of low standing and deprived them of their political rights because of their poverty.

In fact, the slogan "Revenge for Kosovo" stands out as the main continuity in nineteenth-century Serbian history, forming a bond within the nationally homogenising, but politically and socio-economically increasingly heterogonous society. It followed the tradition of folk tales and spoke a language familiar to everyone. Although the peasants primarily believed in the stories, remaining more loyal to their families than to the King and the Church, the politicians believed in a religious mission, which permitted them to stubbornly move forward without ever looking at the ruins around them. The country's integration into the circle of European nations failed mainly because of the competing interests of the Habsburg and Russian Empires and because of the Serbian elite's unfaltering claim for ascendancy among the Balkan peoples.

10

NATIONALISM AT (SYMBOLIC) WORK: SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION AND THE NATIONAL TURN IN MELNIK AND STANIMAKA*

Galia Valtchinova

Located in what is today Southern Bulgaria, Melnik (Greek: Melenikon), in the Blagoevgrad district, and Stanimaka/Assenovgrad (Gr. Stenimachos, Stanimaka), in the district of Plovdiv, have been for centuries prosperous centres and strongholds of Northern Hellenism. By present-day criteria, they are modest towns, especially Melnik which, with its less than 300 permanent inhabitants, is known to be the smallest Bulgarian commune that is proudly considered as an urban place. Their respective stories are seen as disproportionately important in the historiography of two Balkan states, Greece and Bulgaria. Even today their stories haunt the national imaginaries of Greeks and Bulgarians.

The above statements introduce the problem that is central to this paper. By giving two quite different images of the respective places, by pointing to the gap between two realities, they raise the question of causality. What is regarded as almost common knowledge should be considered as a distinctive experience in the passage to nationhood in the late-Ottoman Balkans and the accompanying disruption of the old "model" of social integration.

I have singled out the towns of Melnik and Stanimaka to illustrate how a certain model of a prosperous local economy and social integration in the Ottoman context was disrupted in the process of national emancipation experienced by the Christian Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Both towns are comparable in size, with a similar "ethnic" composition.[1] Since

1878 and until the Balkan Wars, they developed within different states: the Ottoman Empire for the former, Eastern Rumelia and (since 1885) Bulgaria for the latter. The difference at the level of the overarching State structure makes the comparison all the more exciting. Each of our "model" towns, whose profile was definitively shaped during Ottoman times, was enclosed, for the period under study, in the two political structures that frame our general topic, namely the late Ottoman Empire and a young nation-state resulting from its disintegration. By scrutinizing the diverging evolution of the two towns at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the religious mediations of nationalism specific to both places, I will show how the overarching political structures influenced the "work" of nationalism.

This paper has several tasks. The first one is to delineate the parameters of social integration in largely Christian-Orthodox (with small numbers of Muslims) Greek-dominated urban communities in the late-Ottoman Balkans. The second one is to identify the lines of break-up and the emerging social forces that were willing and trying to counter, or reverse, the ongoing (mostly) violent processes of social disruption. The last and perhaps most ambitious one is to analytically construct two cases, which are often cited as "proofs" for vast schemes of national(ist) historiographies, as "structural comparables" with model value for thematically-oriented historical-anthropological research. I insist on an ethno-/anthropological approach: it has provided me with an unusual entry[2] into a basically historical problem. The anthropological bias is also palpable in the attention given to representations and present-day reconstructions of each town's past glory. The very idea of scrutinizing the inner workings of nationalist projects and contested imaginations has an anthropological inspiration.

"Northern Hellenism" and social integration in the late Ottoman Empire

The functioning of a prosperous "Greek" Ottoman town

For more than a century, "Northern Hellenism" was used in Greek history-writing to embrace the numerous Greek (or Greek-dominated) communities located north of modern Greece, which marked the "frontlines" of Greek economic and cultural dominance. Despite the fact that territorial continuity, in the strictest sense, between "purely Greek" territorial communities was rarely attested, there was clearly a tendency to make Northern Hellenism coincide with a territory that was part of the Great Hellenic project, mostly with Ottoman Macedonia.[3] It is in this vein that both Meleniko/Melnik (Turkish

Menlik) and Stenimachos/ Stanimaka have been described as strongholds of Northern Hellenism, or Greek outposts in the midst of the "Slavic sea", whose tragic outcome was due to the victory of Bulgarian nationalism.

When adopting an Ottoman-centred point of view, however, it would be more appropriate to speak of "nesting" Hellenism. Here, the term coined in reference to "nesting orientalism"[4] covers several things: the process whereby a certain Greek identity takes root; its spreading throughout (and often beyond) the Ottoman Empire; and its inner working through social and cultural mechanisms peculiar to the Ottoman system. Predictably, one of these mechanisms is the *millet* structure of the mature Ottoman society, which crystallized in the course of the nineteenth century.[5] It associated the Greeks with the Christian Orthodox *Rum millet*; hence, the increasingly Greek identification of the religious institution that supported the early national forms of collective identity of various Christian Orthodox populations in their struggle to be recognized as separate *millets* through their own churches. The other element, identified as "the conquering Greek Orthodox merchant"[6], emphasizes the role of the most dynamic segment of Balkan Ottoman society in the creation of a "Greek" diaspora. The latter was associated not with "territory" but with economic prosperity and social success, with the prestige related to particular occupations, and with highly effective networking.[7] How a non-territorialized social body is connected to national territory and embedded into it, is a core issue of the broader question of how nationalist imaginaries work.[8]

This broader understanding of Northern Hellenism is more attuned to the fact that during Ottoman times, the norm of social integration in the two towns in question was integration into the "Greek" (*Romaiotikès*) religious-cultural collective body, defined by the vocabulary (by no means ethnic) of the Sultan's Empire. This, let us say, "normative" Greek-ness, is correlated to similar socio-economic profiles. Throughout the nineteenth century, Melnik and Stanimaka enjoyed a prosperous economy based on viticulture and wine trade. Their leading families of wealthy merchants relied on vast networks and had good connections throughout (and beyond) the Ottoman Empire and hence, a high capacity for the assimilation of non-Greeks. Both towns were characterized by high levels of Greek literacy, intense Christian religious life and a European way of life seen as inherently "Hellenic". It might be argued, however, that this "model" of urban and socio-economic Hellenism was an Ottoman product: if both towns were considered as Greek, at least since medieval times, it was the structural features



Fig. 11: Stanimaka in the year 1875, picture taken by the Russian photographer Ermakov. Source: The scan is provided by the Historical Museum Assenovgrad. The original is kept in the collection of old prints and photographs of the National Library Ivan Vazev in Plovdiv.

of the Ottoman system that strengthened Hellenism. Let us consider each of these characteristics in detail.

Economy

In popular representations, both Melnik and Stanimaka are associated with vine growing and the wine trade. Vine growing is considered to be "an age-old tradition" going back to antiquity, especially in the Melnik area.[9] Depictions of grape harvests and caravans of wine are constants in the oral tradition and folklore of both localities. Wine is also central to the image of economic prosperity of both places. The techniques of wine production, its storage and conservation were given attention in memoirs as well as in various scientific publications. Even the work of memorializing the past – a work encouraged by museums and exhibitions – is focused on allegedly deeply rooted traditions of vine growing, production and trade of wine. [10]

It is not easy, however, to establish a straightforward relationship between an old tradition of vine growing and a monoculture of grape production and wine trade as the main source of wealth for a local society. In the Ottoman Empire, making wine for domestic and local use was widely practiced throughout the Christian provinces, but not necessarily related to trade; what makes the real difference is an economy oriented to export. It should be kept in mind that market-oriented vine growing also requires advanced techniques of wine making that allow not only for industrial production of wine, but also for its preservation and safe transportation to distant markets. In other words, it required that the local economies were monocultures centred on vine growing. However, given the precedence of intensive cultures like cotton and tobacco in the Melnik area, as well as numerous crafts, shown by the existence of various *esnafs* in both towns,[11] it is questionable to what extent monoculture of vine-wine was actually achieved. The primary conditions for economic success include the combination of technical skills and structures of wine making and storage in place, on the one hand, and the effective use of networks for trade, on the other.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, both Melnik and Stanimaka were renowned for their wines; the elites of the towns made their profits on wine export throughout Habsburg's "Europe". The precedence of grape and wine in local economies dominated by Greeks was (and still is) taken for self-evident, the one explaining the other.[12] Yet this essentialist, a-historical position is countered by the realities of vine growing and wine production in nineteenth-century Europe. In a detailed study of life and migration in nineteenth-century Peloponnese, Al. Khitroeff has suggested that the crisis in Western European vine growing due to the *phylloxera* infestation, which was already occurring in France in the 1860s, had boosted viticulture in Southeast Europe. The high (and rising) prices of wine encouraged vine growing and resulted in the exclusive culture of vine in many regions of Greece. In turn, the revival of French and Iberian viticulture around 1900 led to a deep crisis in Greek viticulture. Following the logic of his analysis of Peloponnese,[13] it might be suggested that the boom of vine growing in our two towns occurred mainly from the 1850s and was pursued until the end of the nineteenth century. The *phylloxera* epidemic appeared in Melnik in the year 1900; 1904 was the last year of grape harvests before the epidemic reached Stanimaka. These prosperous economies were in near ruin by the year 1912. Given the centrality of vine-wine in the formation of "Greekness", one can imagine how pervasive this crash would be.

On the other hand, the association of "Hellenism" and the culture of vine-wine is not as straightforward as it is appears. Oral histories, collected in both towns between 1988 and 1990 and again in 1997, insist on a kind of "ethnic" division of labour, relative to the process of viticulture and wine production. They represent "Bulgarians" as working the soil and carrying out all physical work required for proper vine growing, from pruning to grape harvest (which is at odds with the image depicted by Bruhnes), while Greeks were mainly involved in marketing and trade. Big winery owners were also Greeks, a distinctive mark in a region were big land-owners were exclusively Turks. It was in the sphere of wine making that these different areas of expertise, usually thought of as belonging to ethnically separate cultures, could meet and cross-fertilize. The Bulgarians who made a name for themselves in the business were skilled in producing and storing wine. As a rule, they married Greek women from well-known local families and ended by becoming "Greeks".[16] It is in Stanimaka, in the group of "langeri" (*langeras*), that we find the best example of the interdependence between ethnicity and vine growing/wine making.

Society

From a sociological point of view, the cement of social relations in the Ottoman Empire was interpersonal relations and networks, as well as the use of a legitimating religious discourse.[18] Here, the urban Greek-dominated societies of the late nineteenth-century Ottoman Balkans are explained by a socio-anthropological and constructivist approach. The central point is that "Greek-ness" was socially and culturally produced and reproduced: even if the local Greek population had some "Byzantine background", it was the tax system, trade and financial laws and above all, the *millet* system that supported the emergence of Greeks as representing a particular occupational "niche" associated with higher social status, culture (language) and lifestyle.[19] This is the key for the social process denounced as *grecomania* by Bulgarian historiography and nationalist writings.[20] For most of the Ottoman period, *grecomania* should have been a natural state of things in the Orthodox communities. It only became the problem of Slav/Bulgarian nationalism with the change towards a historically modern order. It occurred exactly at the moment when the association between wealth, social standing and Greek identity (including legal identity) was made and started to be intentionally exploited, becoming a matter of a life strategy and important in the pursuit of upward mobility.

The normal way of the (re)production of a Greek Ottoman urban community in a multicultural environment can be summarized by the following observation (referring to the city of Plovdiv):

> Through professional contacts, shared commercial interests, inter-ethnic marriages, common worship etc., the early Bulgarian immigrants had become strongly linked to the Greek-speaking economic and social establishment […] to their official representatives with the Ottoman authorities, the Patriarchate's clergy. They adapted to their Greek-speaking environment smoothly, spoke Greek and adopted Greek lifestyles.[21]

The above description points to "a process whereby social groups of lower prestige, upon the acquisition of new wealth and other forms of opportunity, imitate and often successfully acquire what they conceive to be the behaviour of those with greater prestige", which is precisely the definition of "lagging emulation".[22] Based on the assumption that "the desire for prestige, or social status, or achievement is a basic motive in all cultures and societies that enter the conscious awareness of the participants in a society", the concept of lagging emulation leads toward the more general concept of social capital. The latter, developed by Pierre Bourdieu,[23] provides an excellent analytical tool for studying *grecomania* and understanding the logic by which the Orthodox Slav-speaking population was continually integrated into the Greek social establishment and eventually "made Greek".

The relationship between marriage and Hellenization is especially elegant and strong. In the nineteenth century, Plovdiv Bulgarians achieved upward social mobility by marrying Greek women, because of the difference in matrimonial systems for Bulgarians and Greeks.[24] While rural Bulgarians traditionally paid a bride-price, urban Greek wives brought with them substantial dowries, which helped entrepreneurship. The two systems assigned different values to women: "Bulgarian wives" were acquired as goods and were subsequently exploited as manpower, while "Greek wives" came with real estate, i.e. houses, which meant that the husband would live in the bride's house (uxorilocal marriage). Greek wives also provided networks that helped the couple to advance socially. Furthermore, Greek wives stayed at home, giving rise to the cultural stereotype of the *kokona*. Clearly, it were Greek wives who secured the economic standing and the social profile needed by the modern rising bourgeoisie.[25]

Seen from the Greek viewpoint, the difficulty of matching the growing number of culturally produced Greeks to the available matrimonial pool – and therefore to assure Greek endogamy – made such marriages a realistic option for many Greek families, even if they were looked down upon as hypogamic.[26] The "Greek wife" – the much-feared *kokona* of the Bulgarian

Revival period – was the factor of production (and cultural re-production) of Hellenism. By contrast, a "Bulgarian" wife in an urban setting was considered susceptible to "Greek" corruption in that she could easily adopt the Greek ways.[27] Therefore, even if marriage supposed "mixing blood", it was a cultural rather than a biological device for maintaining and producing Hellenism in Melnik and Stanimaka. Taken together, the cross-cutting of marriage patterns and cultural assimilation provide a logical explanation for the growth of the Greek population of both towns at the end of nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Ottoman model of social integration was disrupted by the ideas of an emerging nationalism. Marriage and family networks are thus the primary *loci* for the reproduction of Greek identity; islands of Hellenism in the Slavic sea were preserved through marriages perceived as hypogamic, but hardly "interethnic" in the modern sense of the word.

Religion

The logic of the *millet* system made the Orthodox Church the main factor of collective identification; in the same vein, churches occupied the most prominent public space. During the Ottoman period, churches and Christian shrines, broadly speaking, were the primary social arenas which were transformed by the changes of the twentieth century into places where social capital (in the sense of Bourdieu) was locally acquired, negotiated, redistributed and (since the 1860s) ethnically appropriated.

Indeed, in both places the church institution was well represented and extremely powerful: Melnik and Stanimaka were important sites of Orthodoxy in their respective areas,[28] mainly due to the big monastic foundations located in the proximity of both towns. The Rožen or Rosinon monastery (recorded since the early thirteenth century as a dependence of Iviron, in Mount Athos) was located next to Melnik and the Bačkovo/Petritzon monastery (founded in 1081 by the brothers Bakouriani, high Byzantine officers) was situated near Stanimaka.[29] Both monasteries were dedicated to the *Koimesis Theotokou* ("Assumption of the Virgin") and developed as local sacred centres following Athonite models, not least due to the miracle-working icons of Theotokos.[30] Despite occasional attacks and plundering, both monasteries remained active and wealthy during the entire Ottoman period. The case of the Bačkovo monastery suggests that from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, the place of origin of the main groups of pilgrims (Central Rhodopes, Eski Zağra [Stara Zagora] and Hasköy [Haskovo]) coincided with the area which provided the largest groups of rural immigrants to Stanimaka.[31]

Stanimaka, combined with the Bačkovo monastery, offers an example of how Christian visibility and influence could provoke a kind of religious response from dominant Islamic organizations. Around the mid-seventeenth century, an attempt was made to establish a Muslim counterpoint in the vicinity of the Stanimaka area; the village of Papazli was transformed into a *kasaba* with the name of Islamlı and was endowed with a large Muslim charity and center for a cult.[32] This religious foundation was short-lived and it seems to have vanished by the late eighteenth century, but the attempt is interpreted as a "political program aimed at promoting Islam in an area of combative Orthodoxy"[33].

The proximity of these great Orthodox foundations gave energy to the local religious life and fostered the development of an intense Orthodox piety, with the result that active monasteries were paired with an unusually high number of parish churches in both towns.[34] This vibrant religious life made for the influential position of the two Greek towns over quite large areas. At the end of the nineteenth century, both Melnik and Stanimaka were seen as small "Jerusalems", crystallizations of Orthodox piety in their respective regions. Retrospectively, this curious label is explained by reference to the well-structured and hierarchically organized "Greek" piety, as opposed to the diffuse religiosity of the Slav-speaking or Bulgarian villages.

With the exacerbation of the struggle for a Bulgarian national (autocephalous) church in the 1860s, religion came to the fore of the social scene. The creation of the Exarchate in February, 1870, placed both towns in zones dominated by the Exarchate, but perhaps the resistance of the Greek communities was so strong that the "front line" was revised to leave Stanimaka with the Bačkovo monastery outside the respective diocese.[35] The first breakthrough of the patriarchist "front" in Stanimaka occurred in 1894–95, but Melnik *mitropolija* remained a stronghold of the Patriarchate until 1912. As school was paired with church, the affirmation of the new ethnic collective forces included a struggle for the opening of Bulgarian schools and *čitalište*.[36] In this competition, ethno-national labels were used for apparently religious issues, while religious structures and institutions assumed political roles. In so far as the Ottoman administration used religious affiliation as the primary and overriding criterion of civic life, church-based associations were the background of every form of public and civic life.[37] Thus "religious" struggles, in which the symbolic work of nationalism was crystallized, were also an organic part of social change. The main line of social disruption in both towns was therefore not opposition between *millets* (or Muslims vs. Christians), but an "ethnic" one within the community of the *Rum milleti*, a disruption of the Ottoman *millet* category under the pressure of nationalizing processes.

The political stakes of this struggle became clear after the foundation of the Principality of Bulgaria. Since 1878, the issue of the Bulgarian *millet* in the regions remaining under Ottoman rule was associated with the new state. From this moment onward, the realities of Hellenism in Melnik and Stanimaka began to evolve along divergent lines. Melnik remained in the Ottoman Empire, while Stanimaka became part of the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia, "reunited" with the Bulgarian principality in 1885. However, Stanimaka kept its Ottoman profile of a Hellenizing town well after this date. This is what makes careful comparison of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth of special interest. I will focus on this period in the next part, while analyzing the separate development of each town.

Living on the edge: social cohesion and disintegration

The "Bulgarian" Stanimaka

Set at the foot of the Rhodopes Mountains, on the most important route cutting through the mountains and connecting the plain of Thrace and the Aegean coast, Stanimaka evolved for centuries under the shadow of the great regional centre, Greek-dominated Philippoupolis/Filibe. Since the Middle Ages, the area presented a mix of populations that resulted in a rich and complex local culture, whatever the dominating state institution. To the urban Greeks, Bulgarian farming population, Romanian-speaking (Vlah) cattle-breeders and Armenians active there prior to the fourteenth century, the Ottoman period added Jews, Roma and above all the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks).[38] Stanimaka suffered from the *kırcalis'* raids; the "time of Emin aga" (1790–1812) is, together with "the meeting" of 1906 (a euphemism for the anti-Greek movement), an important point on the town's symbolic chronology.[39] It was in the aftermath of the anarchy and partially as a result of it, that an increasing number of Bulgarian-speakers started to settle in the town, establishing themselves in new *mahalles*. Since the mid-eighteenth century, Bulgarian-speakers had been migrating from a large region of the Thracian plain and the sub-mountain areas; by 1870 they made up a significant part of the local Christian population. As a rule, the Orthodox newcomers were quickly integrated into the Greek-speaking economic, social and cultural (school) establishment; Greek acculturation was seen as a normal procedure.

The disruption of the status quo began in the mid-nineteenth century, as the split of the *Rum milleti* in nearby Plovdiv into a Greek and a Bulgarian community proved irreversible.[40] In Stanimaka, where all key economic positions (as well as social distinction) were with the Greeks, the initial claims of a Bulgarian collective identity were related to economic (taxation) issues. The first clash between "Greeks" and "Bulgarians", in the late 1850s, was due to the redistribution of tax allotments between two neighbouring parishes, namely the "St. George" parish (coinciding with the Greek *mahalle* of Ambelino) and the parish of "Annunciation" (better known as the "Fish *Theotokos*" church, a dependence of the Bačkovo monastery), coinciding with the predominantly Bulgarian Bahča *mahalle*. After adopting Bulgarian in the liturgy in two churches, a Bulgarian school (1873) and a *čitalište* (1886) opened; they were probably short-lived.[41] In the early 1890s, another conflict, opposing Greeks and Bulgarians, focused on the church of the "Annunciation". In 1894, some activists on the parish council proclaimed their support for the Bulgarian Exarchate and called in a new parish priest, an immigrant from Macedonia.[42] In response, Greeks organized a boycott of attendance at the "Annunciation" church. Normal religious life at the church resumed after the abbey of Bačkovo joined the Exarchate in 1895, but tensions remained high until 1906–07, when the church was finally given independence from the Bačkovo monastery.

The process of nationalization and nationalist conflicts heightened the social and political visibility of Bulgarian-speaking immigrants, especially those coming from Ottoman Macedonia. If the earlier waves of immigrants were dissolved in the Greek urban community,[43] this happened less frequently with later immigrant groups, especially those arriving after 1878. In the course of the 1880s (and especially after the Reunification of 1885), Macedonian immigrants who had settled at the margins of the Bulgarian state moved to the main Rumeliote city, Plovdiv, and other towns closest to the Ottoman border. Stanimaka also had its "Macedonian" community, which marked its heightened sensibility to the national struggles by founding a branch committee of IMRO (1896). Most of its activists came from Exarchist villages of the Serres-Strumica area. Local people also embraced the Macedonian cause, such as Pejo Šišmanov from the nearby village of Slavejno, who became the leader of the local IMRO branch. Šišmanov became famous as *vojvoda*, particularly in 1901–03 and during the Ilinden uprising. His militia (*četa*) operated in the region of Xanthi, reaching as far as the Serres area. After August 1903 he spent longer periods in the town, remaining a Macedonian activist until 1908.[44] This is the period when the

Macedonian groups, labeled "the *komitadžis*", used to provoke skirmishes with the local Greeks; they were among the main actors in the anti-Greek manifestations of July 1906. The leading *komitadži*, Šišmanov, settled into a more conventional life around 1910, when he married the daughter of one of the richest Stanimaka citizens. The couple subsequently endorsed the central role played by the church of the "Annunciation" in the symbolic mediation and pacification of the local society.

At the same time as Bulgarians and "Macedonian" immigrants struggled for public space in Stanimaka, local Hellenism was on the rise. Contrary to expectations that the Reunification (6 September 1885) would foster a new sense of Bulgarian identity, it was rather Greek identity which remained attractive for Bulgarians. Thus, many local inhabitants applied for and obtained Greek citizenship[45] and continued living in Stanimaka. In fact, the benefits that Greek citizenship offered to people living under formal Ottoman control – a kind of judicial immunity – may have tempted many non-Greeks as well.[46] After 1889, Greeks no longer formally occupied positions of leadership in the municipality, but their involvement in economic matters, their social skills and extensive networks assured that they remained influential in public affairs.[47] Twenty years after being "reunited" with Bulgaria, the town had more and better-endowed Greek churches and schools than Bulgarian ones. The ambiguity of national identification became especially clear in the question of participation in the army: local young men massively responded to patriotic calls from Greece, fighting in the Cretan War of 1897 and becoming part of the elite *Evzone* regiments.[48]

However, the primary cause for the process of disintegration of the town's community into "ethnic" communities was the quarrel revolving around the Bulgarian Church (the Exarchate). It was reflected in various organizational levels of public life, including the collective bodies for ruling community affairs, such as Orthodox church committees which were divided into a "Greek" and a "Bulgarian" section. Even gendered forms of sociability came to have national and political connotations: Greek women's cultural and charitable associations developed various ways of displaying Hellenism,[49] which marked as "Greek" even the rare Bulgarian groups.

In the 1890s – a few years before the *phylloxera* epidemic affected the area – Hellenism was most intensely "exported" to the vine growing villages around the town. The label of "little Hellas," as well as *langera*, was extended to the population of villages west and northwest (mostly Kuklen and Voden), as well as southeast of Stanimaka.[50] This pro-Greek activity was most visibly expressed in the religious life of communities. In 1900, for example, a new religious feast related to the cult of the Virgin, the Golden Apple, was inaugurated in Voden, "reinventing" its Greek origin.[51] This process surely had its roots in the Ottoman model of cultural and urban-centered Hellenism, but here it was also fuelled by the process of emulation, typical of the urbanizing peasant societies of "Little Hellas".

Thus two processes were developing in parallel: on the one hand, urbanization of Bulgarians "coming into" the town; on the other hand, the continuing spread of Hellenism "going out" to the countryside. They largely occurred at the same time, challenging the established hierarchies and cultural habits, which resulted in the high degree of animosity and passion aroused by the nationalist struggles in and around Stanimaka, a passion that permeated every form of social life. After 1885, the Bulgarian-Greek competition became all pervasive and left little room for the expression of other identities. One possibility for escape was sought in religion. Thus, a small community of Baptists appeared in the last decade of the nineteenth century,[52] rallying Bulgarian-speaking newcomers in search of a middle way.

The open defiance of the "Greeks" was especially pronounced during the Macedonian struggle between 1903 and 1908. In Bulgaria, this struggle culminated in the 1906 wave of anti-Greek pogroms, mainly in the towns along the Black Sea coast which were economically and culturally dominated by the Greeks. In Stanimaka, the events of 23–24 July once again took the form of a struggle for churches. Several parish churches, including "St. George", as well as some Greek schools were taken over by Bulgarians, most of whom were peasants from the surrounding villages.[53] In Ambelino the riots were only halted after a brief demonstration in front of the municipality and after several shops and stores had been looted. These events provoked the emigration of a large part of the local Greek and Hellenized families in the following months; by 1907, the number of Greek inhabitants of Stanimaka was reduced by half. Another wave of emigration came during the Balkan Wars (1912–13). Almost all local Greeks moved to their "homeland" under the terms of the Bulgarian-Greek population exchange agreement of 1923, a process that continued into the late 1920s.

The Ottoman Melnik

The community of Melnik is located close to another communication artery, the Strymon/Strouma valley. The *kaza* of Melnik presented a complex demographic profile in which, along with the numerically predominant Bulgarian peasants, we also find Vlachs and Aromanians/Tsintsars, with most of the latter two supporters of Hellenism (as were some Bulgarians), a sizeable Turkish and Pomak population in the villages and a stronghold of Yuruks could also be found in the region at Demir Hissar. The town of Melnik, whose core Greek population was supplemented by Greeks moving from the Plovdiv area in the early years of Ottoman rule, also accommodated a group of Tsintsars which had emigrating from Albania and Western Macedonia.[54] This added a rich and entrepreneurial population that was easily integrated into the leading families and networks of merchants. During the late nineteenth century there was a mention of an Armenian *mahalle* with its large church, which also suggests a sizeable Armenian presence.[55]

In fact, since the seventeenth century, Melnik was part of the highly active economic area of Thessaloniki-Serres, where cotton and tobacco were intensively cultivated and where farm products were regularly exchanged through a dense system of regional fairs.[56] *Esnaf* have been recorded in Melnik since early in the nineteenth century, for the first time in the exceptional document delineating the 1813 Rules of the Greek *koinonia* (see below), and the *esnaf* appear to have played a crucial role in the town's dynamism throughout the nineteenth century.[57] There is little evidence for the exportation of "Melnik wine" prior to the early nineteenth century.[58] It was trade from the South to the North that contributed to the early creation of effective networks of local merchants to whom the Melnik wine was exported. The *čiftlik* system, maintained until 1912, was well adapted to intensive vine growing and progressively passed from Turkish to Greek hands. But it was already around 1907 that the first signs of the crash of wineries due to *phylloxera* became evident.[59]

Melnik and the surrounding area experienced several waves of unrest, beginning in the 1770s, when Albanian warlords began roaming the region, up to the late 1830s. This period coincided with the creation of a sizeable diaspora of Melnik-born (mostly Vlach) merchants in Vienna and the Transylvanian towns of Braşov and Sibiu. There also arose a group of wealthy citizens able to defend their own interests.[60] In 1813, the Melnik Christian community composed a charter defining the structure and functioning of its *koinonia* (communal council), which made the town one of the first to have a modern Greek urban "constitution"[61]. In 1839, the community, unwilling to further endure the acts of extortion by the corrupt Musta Bey, launched an unprecedented "march" to Istanbul of a delegation asking for his removal.[62] The success of this campaign shows the strength of the Greek *koinonia* and also might suggest a relatively weak Turkish presence. Greek religious and cultural organizations flowered around 1900, in a town that was deeply affected by nationalist passions. It would seem, when considering the anti-Bulgarian militancy of the Greek women's association *Harmonia* (founded in 1909), that even women's civic organizations were involved in the political struggle.[63]

The Greeks of Melnik maintained economic and cultural supremacy in the area throughout the nineteenth century. This was difficult to tolerate for the sizeable number of Bulgarians (or Slav-speakers) living in the town. Launched in 1873, the Bulgarian School, first established in 1873 and filled with students coming from the villages, found it necessary to close several times.[64] The area around Melnik was predominantly populated by Bulgarians during the nineteenth century,[65] yet the influx of peasants into the town, recorded in the 1850s and 1860s, did not bring about the strengthening of the Bulgarian element there. The local Greek community effectively controlled assimilation into their community as late as the end of the nineteenth century. Cohabitation with the Turkish population of the town (180 households by 1891, one *rüşdiye*-school) seems to have been unproblematic, as shown by the inclusion of Muslim names as donors for the reconstruction of the Rožen monastery.[66] This delicate equilibrium was upset by the events of 1895, when, during an anti-Greek incursion into the town of a band led by Ivan Garvanov, from the Sofia-sponsored Supreme Macedonian Committee, 37 Turkish houses were burned down and 10 Turks were murdered.[67] From this moment and until 1912, Ottoman reprisals were frequent, mostly provoked by local intrigues and the vicissitudes of the Greek-Bulgarian struggle.[68] With the presence of Jane Sandanski and his group in the vicinity of Melnik and the Rožen monastery, Greek-Bulgarian antagonism reached its peak during the last decade of Ottoman rule.

The realities of social life and (dis)integration in Melnik, during the period of intense conflict before 1912, can hardly be reconstituted by simply superimposing the dominant Greek narrative over the Bulgarian one. Both narratives are still impregnated by nationalist feelings and the data from which they are constructed are barely comparable. To illustrate this still missing common ground, let me recount the treatment reserved for the most emblematic "Melnikiote Greek", the vine grower and wine merchant Manolis Kordopoulos, or Kordoupala (Kouropalates) (1870–1912).

M. Kordoupala is the only name that survived in the Bulgarian narrative of the entire Greek Melnikiote community; conversely, he is given a very modest place (if mentioned at all) in the Greek one. It is around this typical personage of "the wealthy Greek" – and "Bulgarians' friend" – that the present-day memory and mythology of Melnik is constructed.[69] The figure of Kordoupala presents all the features of the rich Greek skilled in personal and family networking – and at the same time an entrepreneur engaged in modernization, in an intense exchange with Europe. A big landowner (data about his *čiftlik* vary between 12 and 40 ha of vines, while the largest had up to 90 ha), he was the heart of a highly effective network of wine trade, reaching as far as France and Vienna. Despite his success as a merchant, his personal achievement was rather related to vine growing. He had studied in France and tried to introduce the latest innovations to the local viticulture. Unfortunately, the latter coincided with the raging of the *phylloxera* epidemic and his technical innovations were considered the real reason for the spread of this epidemic, which annihilated the source of local wealth within a few years. Blamed by the rich and the poor alike, Kordoupala was excommunicated by the local metropolite around 1910.[70] To make things worse, he was judged to live a "deviant" life (by Greek standards), since he associated with Bulgarian peasants and was known to live with his "Bulgarian servant" without the benefit of marriage. He was a personal friend of Jane Sandanski (who sometimes hid in his house) and used to consort with Bulgarian notables from the surrounding villages. He was the only "Melnikiote Greek" (*melnishki grăk*) among a group of Bulgarians, was accused of conspiracy and subsequently executed by order of the Ottoman administration at the beginning of the Balkan War (October 1912). This was carried out just a few days before Sandanski entered the town as a "liberator", followed shortly by the Greek army. His tragic death added a final touch to the legendary persona magnified by Bulgarian memory (and rather refuted by the Greek one).[71]

Putting aside the case of Manolis Kordoupala, the division between Bulgarians and Greeks seems to have persisted until the Balkan Wars, and Melnik had apparently kept a "Greek" face. In the first decade of 1900, Melnik's Hellenism had deeply marked the surrounding villages of vine growers, namely Mančov *čiftlik* (today Vinogradi), Hărsovo and Lozenitsa (listed by Kănčov as "Bulgarian"). Along with cultural influences, there was also evidence of political *grecomania*. However, the nature of this relationship was one that rather preserved the exclusionary and social barriers. Judging from oral histories, the male population of these villages worked in wineries and in various crafts related to wine making, while the local women were employed as servants in the town. This "division of work" and especially women's somewhat ambiguous role in the life of the town,[72] were important elements in the formation of the opposition, despite the shared Bulgarian heritage, between villages of vine-growers and the inhabitants of mountain villages (commonly called the mountaineers), a point that was emphasized in oral histories and published memoirs. Compared to the "Little Hellas" around Stanimaka, these villages seem to have had less of a symbiotic relationship with Melnik; what was lacking here was integration through marriage.[73] The presence of Sandanski and the most combative branch of the IMRO around Melnik did the rest, by giving a political label to any expression of "Greek-ness" and by emphasizing Greek identity inside the town. This must have impeded the transformation of a cultural into a political Hellenism in the surrounding rural area.

Melnik and the Rožen monastery (with the nearby villages) delimited a small area where Sandanski, the IMRO leader and commander of the Serres revolutionary district, took up residence between 1903 (in the aftermath of the Ilinden uprising) and 1908. From the Melnik area, Sandanski managed to establish a "State within a State" in Northeast Macedonia. Without discussing the topic of terror practiced by this famous IMRO leader, let me emphasize some details concerning the special aspects of government which he had established in the Melnik kaza. Applying the normal IMRO practice of levying taxes on the local population, the "Organization" (this term was still used to refer to Sandanski in Melnik as late as the 1990s) had established a system of regular taxation in the villages and their elite land owners. Sandaski controlled local tobacco production, as well as trade and industry in the districts of Serres, Drama and Xanthi. It seems that the same was true for the grape harvest and wine exportation, as far as Melnik wineries were still exporting reduced quantities, due to the *phylloxera* epidemic.[74] The harvest and transportation – and the entire chain of commercial exploitation – of both tobacco and grapes, were controlled by the "Organization". However, what was at the heart of Sandanski's "special regime" for the area was his way of handling the land issue. He fought for the abolition of both the *vakufs* (lands conceded to clerical institutions, both Muslim and Christian) and the *čiftliks*, maintaining that the land should be distributed among landless peasants. The terror increased, making clear that such an "economic platform" would create a generalized uncertainty about ownership, property and money – the pillars of a productive male-centred society. The local societies were further disrupted in that Sandanski established a kind of moral police that punished immoral behaviour by both men and women. At the beginning of his rule, he used a moral vocabulary when referring to his political enemies. He interfered in local marriage practices, prohibiting customary marriages because of the often unbearable weight of the traditional requirement of exhibiting wealth by the bride and her family.[75] On the other hand, he forced widows from villages under his rule to remarry, often pairing a widow with one of his own *četniks*. With the occurrence of such oppression and violence during the almost decade-long IMRO control of the area, one would have expected the total disruption of village life, with fear and insecurity also increasing in Greek Melnik. Ottoman pressure on the one side, the IMRO presence and violence on the other, made any mediation between "Bulgarians" and "Greeks" impossible. After the Turks' emigration from the town in 1912, the Greeks also left it en masse – and in ruins – in the summer of 1913.[76]

Nationalism, violence and the religious response

In the preceding section I have tried to demonstrate the extent to which the rise of nationalism disrupted the socio-political order that had previously encouraged the flourishing of small- and middle-sized Christian (*Rum*)-dominated Ottoman towns. The irony is that it was through "religion" that the national movements led to the disintegration of a system based on religion and that had achieved the integration of religiously-defined communities. In our two towns, nationalist ideas – both Greek and Bulgarian – mobilized and channeled the whole of public life. Influencing every form of civil association, they also triggered responses at a symbolic level that could be traced in the most sophisticated forms of religious and spiritual life of the Christian Orthodox populations. This question will be discussed in the following section.

Stanimaka: Struggling over Theotokos in a divided town

As indicated previously, Bulgarian-Greek competition in and around Stanimaka had infused everyday religious life and ritual behavior. By 1900, several new rituals and religious feasts had been established, which celebrated the Mother of God in such a manner as to attach her to a particular (Greek or Bulgarian) community. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the major feasts of *Theotokos* developed into processions of her miracle-working icons between special places in Stanimaka, the Bačkovo abbey and the Hellenizing villages. These religious events mobilized the Greek Orthodox population and established a straightforward relationship between "Greek piety" and the most visible and solemn forms of religious life.[77] Thus religion in every form and shape, beginning with the Church, the Orthodox cult and parish life, and ending with "folk customs", was a realm – perhaps the realm – in which Greek-Bulgarian national competition was played out. Analyzing them allows us to explore nationalism at work.

One of the Greek processions proceeded from Stanimaka to the church of *Theotokos* at the fortress of Tsar Assen, a highly symbolic place for the unstable identity of the Bulgarians. The procession was organized in 1899 after a man, who happened to be walking by the fortress, reported seeing a display of lights and hearing the sound of chants around the church. In ruins for centuries, this shrine now became the stage of a magnificent night-time Divine Liturgy held in the presence of the ghosts of Byzantine soldiers, noblemen and the Byzantine Emperor himself – or so it appeared to the passer-by.[78] A few years later, a similar "Bulgarian" procession was established. It was the earliest instance of the Greek-Bulgarian confrontation that materialized the past in "monuments", an excellent example of the "memory cast in stones" characteristic of a society whose everyday life was permeated by concerns with history and a nationalist reading of its past.[79]

The nationalist competition in the religious realm fostered a more sophisticated "divine intervention", consisting of a series of visions and revelations. This took place during the years following the 1906 anti-Greek movement [80] in and around the church of the "Annunciation". One night, in the wake of St. Michael's Day, a group of pious women working together in the churchyard to help the priest's wife, saw the lights of a procession "coming from King Assen's fortress," and distinctly heard angel's voices singing religious hymns. This Heavenly Liturgy, held by saints and angels around midnight at the Church of the "Annunciation", was perceived as "real" by two peasant women who had spent the night in the church "for their health". Shortly afterwards, the priest's wife was allegedly visited by *Theotokos/Bogorodica* in a dream, and given the order to organize a women's association to support a cult, which should bring peace to the town. The "Coming of the Light" (as the Heavenly Liturgy was called) and the Mother of God message jointly led to the foundation of a women's Orthodox association, "The Annunciation" (*Blagovestenie*).

The time and circumstances of the alleged divine interventions, the *loci*, chosen by Our Lady, and the gender of those said to have seen, heard or taken part in them, were conditioned in many ways by Bulgarian-Greek national rivalry. People who had "seen" and "heard" were considered to be witnesses of the apparition. It should be noted that a review of the accounts and early publications shows that almost all witnesses were women (or maidens) from various social milieus, "Greeks" and "Bulgarians" alike. The central location of the event was the priest's house next to the church from which "The Light" was seen. The parish priest, Father Bukhlev, had withdrawn from IMRO activism by this time, but his past should have permanently marked him. His wife, also of Macedonian background, was the driving force behind the collective visionary process. She was already an experienced visionary and she was the first to identify words, things and heavenly figures that were subsequently confirmed by others. The most authoritative group of "witnesses" was the group around the priest's wife. These were mainly young women, of Greek (or "Grecomaniac") families who had come to work and socialize together (*na belenka*), and who happened to see "The Light" from the priest's house (*čardak*). According to the two main "Greek" witnesses, the procession of angels was moving down the road "from King Assen's Castle," the sound of a military trumpet was heard before the mass began, and the name of the Bulgarian King Ferdinand (1887–1918) was heard during the Heavenly Liturgy.[81]

The "Coming of the Light" in "Annunciation" shows deep structural similarities to the midnight Heavenly Mass, seen a decade earlier in the church at King Assen's Castle. Recently a folklorist demonstrated that a folk legend based on an international legend, The Spirits' Mass, was behind both "events".[82] It was gradually transformed and adapted to fit the religious and cultural contexts in this divided Bulgarian town. The author traced back the local legends of the Heavenly Liturgy to a late nineteenth-century Greek translation of A. Daudet's *Lettres de mon Moulin*, one of which recasts this folk legend. In this town with a high literacy rate, but where literacy was also an element in the struggle of two cultures, the literary elaboration of a folk legend was more than an entertaining and funny reading. Circulated through the channels of Greek culture, it was redefined as having a high literary value in the ideological sense of the word and used to support real Greek claims. Thus an European and primarily Catholic folktale, into which the French writer had instilled a certain irony, was used literally in the night vision of the Heavenly Liturgy around King Assen's Castle. It served the purpose of fostering the feeling of Greek superiority over the Bulgarians at the very site the latter claimed as their own. In turn, the Heavenly Liturgy of the "Annunciation" church was an attempt to reassert the Bulgarian character of the church and the neighbourhood. In the Bulgarian-Greek controversy, King Assen's Castle was a bone of contention, similar to the "Annunciation" church; both embodied symbolic domination and had the symbolic capital to possibly stimulate the birth of a "nation-bound miracle".

Putting the two stories side by side shows the nationalist construction of an "event" to support first the local Hellenism, and subsequently claims for "Bulgarian-ness", by showing a "supernatural preference" for the Greeks (assimilated to the Byzantines) or the Bulgarians. From this perspective, every detail is significant. During the miracle of the "Annunciation", most of what the women "distinctly heard" were specific formulae, pronounced in Bulgarian, of an Orthodox Mass celebrating God and the King. Precisely these formulae and the language in which the Holy Mass was held were the burning issues in the struggle for the Bulgarian Church. Similarly, just where the heavenly procession originated, the Bačkovo monastery or King Assen's castle, would serve different purposes. The latter is a historical landmark – a sign of the past glory of the Bulgarian state; the former is a sacred landmark. Military trumpets have their place in the castle; it makes sense that the sound of angels' trumpets comes from a major Christian shrine, adding to the magnificence of the liturgy. The story of the Heavenly Mass emerged at a time when the tensions between the two major ethnic groups living in Stanimaka were reaching their climax. Within the divided Orthodox community, each of the opposing groups had a good sense of what the other was doing, talking about and believing, since Greek was the language of culture for Bulgarians until the early twentieth century. The miracles, visions and Our Lady's apparition in dreams were interpreted in a social language, as an order to create a women's Orthodox congregation,[83] that is, for women's public engagement.

The women's Orthodox association of the Assumption (*Blagovestenie*) was related, in one way or another, to the miracles that had happened in and near the church of the "Annunciation", and its further activities derived from *Theotokos*'s wishes as they were revealed in the dreams of the priest's wife. The founding members were model young women coming from old local families, some of whom were "Greeks", others "Bulgarians". As a rule, the image of the good Christian, as well as church practice, was associated with urbanism and "Greek origins", as were the pious forms of female sociability. In this case, however, the "Greek" model accommodated a unique alliance of "Bulgarian" and "Greek" pious women for the sake of survival,[84] since the association put into practice *Theotokos*' summons for "bringing peace" to the town.

The local stories attach particular importance to those who received *Sveta Bogorodica*'s messages. In fact, several founding members acted as channels for divine grace through their visions and dreams. The most important of them were Father Bukhlev's wife and Sultani Šišmanova, the daughter of one the wealthiest local families of wine-merchants, who became the leader of "Annunciation".[85] One can still hear allegations that, when asked for in marriage by Peyo Šišmanov, Sultani was hesitant to accept this alliance before *Bogorodica* appeared to her in a dream and told her to marry the *komitadži* in order to purify him from his bloody sins. This marriage enabled Peyo Šišmanov to become a wealthy and respected citizen and he subsequently invested his energy in pious actions, mainly building or renovating churches and chapels. Since 1925, the sessions of the association took place twice a week in a special hall (*saloni*) adjoining the church nave, built with a donation by Sultani's family and husband. The church thus became a kind of second home, a place for the most respected social activities of local women and pious men – activities oriented to the supra-human mediation of human failings. The marriage of the wealthy and highly-cultivated (perhaps "Greek") girl with the IMRO activist is indicative – and highly symbolic – as a strategy of pacification of a local society in strife. The centrality of divine intervention and of women's visionary skills suggests that, even when striving towards a new means of social integration – perhaps the only one possible in the framework of the young Bulgarian state[86] – such a pragmatic solution nevertheless needed a supernatural justification.

Sušica near Melnik: a living saint in a "terrorized" village

After a one-hour-walk up the eastern slope from Melnik, one arrives at the Bulgarian village named Dolna (Lower) Sušica.[87] The proximity of this mountainous village to both Melnik and the Rožen monastery made it a suitable place for Jane Sandanski to settle.[88] Controlling this village, located on the old road connecting Melnik to Nevrokop and Serres, a road previously used by wine-merchants, would have been an asset for the *komitadžis*. Putting aside the debate over Sandanski's "terror", one might reasonably concluded that the *komitadžis*' frequent descents and the IMRO's interference in local life in general, must had instilled fear and a feeling of hidden violence. This presence must have been especially traumatizing for women,[89] which is why one can speak of "terrorized villages".

The visionary Stoyna (1883–1935), coming from the small village of Haznatar (today Chrysochorapha) in the *kaza* of Serres, settled in the Bulgarian village of Sušica in the early part of the twentieth century.[90] Oral accounts about Stoyna's coming to the village are dated by the event "when the village escaped from the Turks' repression", which would date her flight to the village after the Ilinden uprising.[91] Blind Stoyna enjoyed a special relationship with saints, which included living in a small chapel dedicated to St. George near her parents' house. It was St. George himself who led the 20-years-old maiden to "his" church in the village of Sušica,[92] where she chose to live. Stoyna spent the rest of her life cloistered in the church, in a space inhabited by saints and the dead, dwelling in a small room the community built for her use in the women's section (on the upper level) of the church, living from communion and fruits.

Stoyna's coming to Sušica was interpreted by the local community as a gift from God. She was considered to be a living saint. The unprecedented fact is that an outsider, a woman – furthermore, an unmarried "maiden" without any support from kin – came from a devastated village to seek refuge and was accepted, allowed to dwell in the church, taken care of and supported by the collective effort of all the villagers. People of Sušica and other villages came to confess their sins, or to ask her for one of her "strong" prayers that were supposed to be channeled to heaven by St. George himself. She was led around the district to preach and also provided a sort of religious teaching to the peasants, especially to women from Sušica. She was the person to consult for personal as well as communal problems[93] and in time her advice came to be seen as the ultimate word to be heard and followed.

Stoyna had the gift of seeing and speaking with saints, thereby acquiring supernatural knowledge of things past and future. Her special relationship with St. George – a warrior saint with particular power to protect people – made her the local community's precious ally in their struggle to survive during hard times. Considering herself as St. George's "sister", Stoyna often urged him to act on behalf of the village. According to the popularly accepted story of her life, Stoyna and her "brother" had at various times saved "her village" from Turkish attacks (most probably coming from the nearby village of Katuntzi, where some Turks lived alongside the Muslim Roma), repulsed "treacherous" Vlachs, or preserved it from unidentified plunderers. Many stories tell of how, with St. George's help, she punished thieves, blasphemers and murderers; in some versions of the accounts relating such miracles, the latter are also called *komitadžis*. In spite of her own "in-between-ness" (between the living and the dead, between women and men), Stoyna was seen as a guarantee of the community's moral integrity. She was able to "see" and blame liars and thieves, acting as an indicator of "moral correctness" for many villages south of Melnik.[94]

"Holy" Stoyna lived until the mid-thirties, but most of the written records of miracles are dated to the last decade of the Ottoman period in the Melnik area. The few accounts that show her in the context of wars (especially during the Great War) portray her in visionary trances, or so-called near-death experiences. Stoyna was said to "visit the front" when in a trance, weeping over people who had lost their lives. Visions reported from this period have apocalyptic overtones, and global concerns and predictions about the end of the world replaced local concerns, characteristic of the previous period. It was in 1925, during the brief Bulgarian-Greek border incident, that Stoyna was again urged to "foresee" events feared by everybody, namely the "coming of the Greeks". Her prophetic pronouncements that her village would be spared and the attacked area should soon be recovered, came true. Once again, they confirmed her position as symbolic mediator of all sorts of collective anxiety related to national feelings. "Holy" Stoyna achieved popularity even among Muslims (who began to disappear from the local "ethnoscape" after 1912) and the rural Vlach population. However, contrary to what occurred in Stanimaka, her symbolic mediation and the messages of peace and morality could never bridge the Bulgarian-Greek divide.[95] The last publicly known case of Stoyna's clairvoyance was related to the Greek-Bulgarian border incident of 1925, when the population of nearby villages was about to leave. By predicting that the Greeks would stop short of the village and the situation would be restored to its original status, she was able to appease people's anxieties about belonging to a State or a territory, and about their own identity.[96]

Conclusions

In the beginning of the paper, I argued that as Greek towns, both Melnik and Stanimaka were representative of a model of urban and socio-economic Hellenism that was, in a sense, an Ottoman product. Strengthened by structural features of the Ottoman system, this Hellenism was a pivotal element of the model of social integration that had crystallized in the Eastern Balkan provinces. My guess was that the effect of developing nationalism and under the pressure of the growing ethno-national awareness of the various populations that made up the *Rum milleti*, this model was disrupted – and with it, the structural place of Hellenism for defining a social, religious and cultural identity. This process is perhaps best observed in the case of Bulgarians' emancipation from the *Rum milleti*.

The theory about a process of disintegration, that took the shape of a differentiation and an open conflict between "Bulgarians" and "Greeks", was tested in the examples of two local economies and societies, and in a more detailed way, in their local religion. Analyzing the first two helped to show some of the outer workings of nationalism, the third one unveiled its inner working. Centred on viticulture and wine making, as they were in the late Ottoman period, both examples show how occupation and work are interwoven with gender, kinship, social status and ethnicity. It became obvious that the model of social integration, which had been elaborated during Ottoman times, was put to the test by the centrifugal forces of early Balkan nationalism. As soon as social competition started to be translated into "ethnic" terms, Greek identity lost its self-evident and "natural" character and

Bulgarian nationalists started denigrating their neighbours' *grecomania*. The resulting conflicts and the Bulgarian-Greek divide should be understood less in terms of ethnicity than of negotiated identity. The vicious circle of "nation-bound" explanations of a socio-cultural phenomenon was disrupted by having recourse to the concept of social capital and seeking its relevance in the gendered concepts of successful marriage (usually hypergamic for men, often hypogamic for women). The struggle for the Bulgarian Church is viewed as being just a part, albeit an essential one, of the larger process of emancipation from the imposed "categorical imperative" of the *Rum milleti* and against using Greek-ness as social, cultural and symbolic capital.[97]

The examples of late-Ottoman Melnik and Stanimaka were structured as comparables[98] which, along with the pattern of similarity, allowed us to explore the lines of divergence induced by the passage from empire to nation-state. The comparison clearly shows the impact of economic forces on the process of ethnic strife and the disruption of local societies. By giving viniculture and wine a central place in the local economy, the Greek economic elites of Melnik and Stanimaka acted as if they were integrated into an Ottoman framework, even when they were embedded in a national economy (as was the case for Stanimaka in Bulgaria after 1885). However, once the main culture suffered, these local economies could no longer continue at the same level and also maintain their prestigious Greek characteristics. The periods between 1903 and 1904 and again between 1906 and 1907, look like a fault line not only for Bulgarian nationalist "assaults", but also for the economic decline. No doubt, the latter must have made the population with a Greek identity resent more acutely the effect of the former.

In both cases, we have observed many forms of violence aimed at disrupting a social order rooted in the Ottoman system and categories, a violence that pervaded every aspect of social life. In both cases this violence found a clear expression in religious life, as a contest over the church, over shrines, or supernatural entities, and it consequently provoked distinctively religious responses. These responses constituted what I termed the symbolic work of nationalism: competing claims were expressed in a religious language (saints' cults and processions, visions or apparitions) and were given a symbolic shape. As the example of Stanimaka shows, nationalist discourses articulated in a religious grammar were particularly effective. However, "religion" was not only an arena of social disruption; it also helped in mediating conflicts and reducing the fear of violence. The two towns also demonstrated how symbolism was used for dealing with both internally generated and with external violence.

The comparison of Melnik and Stanimaka clearly shows a difference in the effectiveness of symbolic mediation and religious response. In Stanimaka, despite the highly sophisticated forms of religious mobilization on both sides, symbolic mediation through the Virgin/*Theotokos* did finally succeed in taming nationalist passions and pacifying the local society. The "Bulgarianized" church of the "Annunciation" was the focus of the decades-long Bulgarian-Greek conflict, and it was also the place where a "middle ground" was first established. In Melnik, where Greek supremacy in economic, religious and cultural matters lasted almost until 1912, while the countryside remained at the mercy of nationalist fighters, the abyss could not be bridged. The lack of a middle ground is palpable in features such as the combative nationalism of Greek civic and cultural associations, which – contrary to what happened in Plovdiv and Stanimaka – were not emulated by Bulgarian associations. In addition, the town lacked "Bulgarian" Orthodox shrines, at the same time as they multiplied in the villages. The only religious mediation and response to violence that surfaced in the Melnik area was not for the purpose of "bridging differences" of the mixed town, but to assure supernatural protection of an ethnically homogenous village community.

The exploration of the symbolic strategies for promoting a national causa and the variety of symbolic responses to the latter emphasized the role of women in mediating processes that could not be easily handled in an open and public way. Women, who were caught between the everyday violence of a world dominated by men (albeit the "Greek" patriarchal order differed from the "Bulgarian" one) and the violence of armed men, seem to have occupied the structural position that made them successful mediators between complementary worlds and competing identities.

NOTES

Introduction

1 Nathalie Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais,* Paris, Karthala, 2007; Hannes Grandits, *Herrschaft und Loyalität in der spätosmanischen Gesellschaft. Das Beispiel der multikonfessionellen Herzegowina,* Wien, Böhlau, 2008; Robert Pichler, "Environment, economy and the problem of closeness versus openness of mountain communities. A comparison of northern and southern Albanian villages 1880–1930", in *The Balkan Mountain Space. Proceedings of the International Congress "The Balkan Mountain Space in Konitsa",* Athens, 2000, pp. 79–98.

2 Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for research", in *Review*, II/3, Winter, 1979, pp. 389–98; Immanuel Wallerstein and Reşat Kasaba, "Incorporation into the world-economy: change in the structure of the Ottoman Empire 1750–89", in *Economie et Sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman,* Paris, CNRS, 1983, pp. 335–54; Immanuel Wallerstein, Hale Decdeli and Reşat Kasaba, "The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy", in Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 88–97.

3 H. İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy.*

4 H. İslamoğlu-İnan and Çağlar Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman history" in H. İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy,* pp. 42–62.

5 Cp. Michael Palairet, *The Balkan economies c. 1800–1914. Evolution without development,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 58–84, 85–128; also see Ulf Brunnbauer, *Gebirgsgesellschaften auf dem Balkan. Wirtschaft und Familienstrukturen im Rhodopengebirge (19./20. Jahrhundert),* Wien, Böhlau, 2004; Marie-Janine Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens 1815–1914. Der aufhaltsame Fortschritt während der Industrialisierung,* München, Oldenburg, 1994.

6 Cp. here the exemplary judgements of Halil İnalcık, as in the following: Halil İnalcık, "Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman administration", in

Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History,* London, Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 27–52 or Halil İnalcık, "Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects", in H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy,* London, Collected Studies, 1978, XVI, pp. 3–33.

7 Holm Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens. 19.-21. Jahrhundert,* Wien, Böhlau, 2007; Marie-Janine Calic, *op. cit.*; Nataša Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards. Belgrad im 19. Jahrhundert,* Wien, Böhlau, 2008; Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918. A History,* Boulder, East European Monographs, 1983; Philipp Carabot (ed.), *Greek Society in the Making 1863–1913. Realities, Symbols and Visions,* Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997; Ioannis Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität 1870–1912. Staat und private Akteure vor dem Hintergrund der* "*Megali Idea*", München, Oldenburg, 2002.

8 Maurus Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung über die osmanische Reformpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert,* München, Oldenburg, 2005, p. 19ff. For "traditional" power relations, see Fikret Adanır, "Semi-autonomous provincial forces in the Balkans and Anatolia", in Suraiya Faroqui (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Turkey. vol. 3. The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 344–414 and Suraiya Faroqui, "Coping with the Central State, Coping with Local Power: Ottoman Regions and Notables from the Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century", in F. Adanır and S. Faroqui (eds.), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: a Discussion of Historiography,* Leiden, Brill, 2002, pp. 351–81. See also the challenging view of Michael Meeker, *A Nation of Empire. The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002; Marc Aymes, "Provincialiser l'empire. Chypre et la Méditerranée ottomane au XIX^{e} siècle", *Annales Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 62/6 (November-December 2007), pp. 1313–44.

9 For the course of the reform process in the Ottoman Empire in general, see, for example, Thomas Scheben, *Verwaltungsreformen der frühen Tanzimatzeit. Gesetze, Maßnahmen, Auswirkungen*, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 1991; Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–76*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963; Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. vol. 2. Reform, Revolution, and Republic. The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 55–171; Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State 1789–1908", in *International Journal for Mediterranean Studies*, 3 (1972), pp. 243–81.

10 See, in particular, Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte 1789–1922*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980;

C. V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom. A Social History*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989.

11 C. V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom. A Social History*, pp. 11, 40–85, 87–130. Cp. also Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, p. 218.

12 Carter V. Findley, "The Acid test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy", in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1982, pp. 339–68.

13 During the reform process, the bureaucratic bourgeoisies, similar to state services in general, consisted largely of Muslims. In the course of the nineteenth century, the economic, or rather, merchant bourgeoisies were increasingly dominated by Christians. The latter seemed to have much to do with the strategic advantage of Christian merchants having better trading relations within the rapid economic expansion of the Western industrial and trading system. Cp. here Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire. Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987. On the evolution of Ottoman elites, see also David Kushner, "The place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire during the age of reform (1839–1918)", in *Turcica*, XIX, Louvain, Peeters, 1987, pp. 51–74, and Olivier Bouquet, *Les Pachas du sultan. Essai sur les agents supérieurs de l'État ottoman (1839–1909)*, Louvain, Peeters, 2007.

14 Cp. here, for instance, the critical discussion about the alleged "temporal backwardness" of nationalism in the Balkans by Maria Todorova, "The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalisms", in *Slavic Review*, 64/1 (Spring 2005), pp. 140–64.

15 Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom. Islam, the state, and education in the late Ottoman Empire,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

16 Cp. for an analysis of this Maria Todorova: "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans", in Carl L. Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 69–73.

17 This can also be explained, to some degree, by a still-existing lack of a historiographic tradition dealing with this period that looks not only in an one-dimensional way at the "hard but successful national struggle", but that is interested in approaching the social realities of the diverse elites and populations in a more complex way.

18 For a more detailed depiction of this framework, see H. Grandits, *Herrschaft and Loyalität in der spätosmanischen Gesellschaft*, pp. 15–35.

19 For the divergent variants of *çiftlik*-economies, for instance, see Avdo Sućeska,"O nastanku čifluka u našim zemljama", in *Godišnjak društva istoričara Bosne i Her-*

cegovine. God. XVI (1965), pp. 37–57. For variants of pastoral economies in the Balkans, see Karl Kaser, *Hirten, Helden, Stammeshelden: Ursprünge und Gegenwart des balkanischen Patriarchats*, Wien, Böhlau, 1992, or K. Kaser, "Household and Family Contexts in the Balkans: Introduction", in *The History of the Family*, 1/4 (1996), pp. 375–86.

20 See, for instance, the chapter on the *esnaf* in Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City 1400–1900*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1983, p. 123ff. For an exemplary in-depth analysis see, Hamdija Kreševljaković, *Esnafi i obrti u Bosni i Hercegovini,* Sarajevo, 1961, or Nikola Vučo, *Raspadanje esnafa u Srbiji*, Belgrade, Prosveta, 1954.

21 For a basic introduction, see Michael Ursinus, "Millet", in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*. New Edition, vol. 7, Leiden, Brill, 1993, pp. 61–64. For a more thorough discussion see, Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The functioning of a plural society*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1982.

22 Georg Elwert, Stephan Feuchtwang and Dieter Neubert, "Dynamics of Violence – an Introduction", in G. Elwert, S. Feuchtwang and D. Neubert (eds.), *Processes of Escalation and De-Escalation in Violent Group Conflict,* Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2000, pp. 7–31.

23 For the use of traditional "tools" in the exertion of state power see, for instance, M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung.* For the complexity of claims of local elites and state representatives in fighting for a "progressive" order see, for instance, the two exemplary studies on the situation in late-Ottoman Salonica by Bülent Özdemir, *Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Reflections from Salonica, 1830–50,* Istanbul, ISIS, 2003 and Meropi Anastassiadou, *Salonique, 1830–1912: Une ville ottomane a l'age des réformes,* Leiden, Brill, 1997.

24 See M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung,* p. 76. On the impact of the environment on the political self-organisation in Mediterranean mountain areas see, from a comparative view, John Robert McNeill, *The Mountains of the Mediterranean World. An Environmental History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

25 See Kaser, *Hirten, Helden, Stammeshelden: Ursprünge und Gegenwart des balkanischen Patriarchats*, On conflict management and customary law in Montenegro, see Christopher Boehm, *Blood Revenge. The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and other Tribal Societies*, Kansas, University of Kansas Press, 1984. For another intriguing study on local self-organisation in the northern-Greek Pindos mountains, see John K. Campbell, *Honour, Family, and Patronage. A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964.

26 See Clayer's chapter in this volume.

27 On the Jewish history in Salonica, see Mark Mazower, *Salonica: City of Ghosts. Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430–1950*, London, Harper Perennial, 2005.

28 On this phenomenon, see George W. White, *Nationalism and Territory. Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe*, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

29 James L. Gelvin, "The Other Arab Nationalism. Syrian/Arab Populism in Its Historical and International Contexts", in Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (eds.) *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1997.

30 See Raymond Detrez and Pieter Plas (eds.), *Developing Cultural Identity in the Balkans. Convergence vs. Divergence*, Brussels, Pieter Lang, 2005.

31 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* London, Verso, 1991; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

32 See, for example, Joseph M. Whitmeyer, "Elites and popular nationalism", in *British Journal of Sociology*, 53/3 (September 2002), pp. 321–41; J. L. Gelvin, "The Other Arab Nationalism".

33 The distinction between elite and non-elite is not always very clear. Let us follow Whitmeyer and Sundhaussen, who define elite by their social status and social capital. See J. H. Whitmeyer, "Elites", p. 322 and Holm Sundhaussen,"Eliten, Bürgertum, politische Klasse? Anmerkungen zu den Oberschichten in den Balkanländer des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts", in Wolfgang Höpken and Holm Sundhaussen (eds.), *Eliten in Südosteuropa. Rolle, Kontinuitäten, Brüche in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, München, Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1998, pp. 5–30.

Chapter 1

1 I would like to express my sincere thanks to all my colleagues at Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin, who have given me invaluable comments and criticism on an earlier version of this article, especially to Dr. Dana Sajdi and Dr. Zafer Yenal. I also thank Lefteris Bratopoulos and Martina Naydenova for proofreading.

2 *Avrupalılaştıramadıklarımızdan mısınız?* (This is the longest possible compound construction in Turkish).

3 Political Archives of the Foreign Office, Berlin (PA-AA): General Consulate Salonica (GK Sal) 22 (Auskunftsgesuche), pp. 49–53.

4 Archives of the House, Court and State, Vienna (HHStA): Administrative Registratur (Adm. Reg.) F 15 – 68, Turkey - Heimroth (Consulate General, GK) to Otto (Embassy), Üsküp, 28 September 1910.

5 HHStA Embassy/Consulate Constantinople (BK Kpl) 107, GK to Embassy, Constantinople, 13 December 1913.

6 "Europe" is used here as an abbreviation for the economically and in some cases militarily successful states of Northern, Western and Central Europe. As will become clear from the following, I consider neither the obvious exclusions nor the clear-cut opposition of this entity with its others as natural given, but as a construction particular to a certain time which I must outline for the purpose of this analysis. Also, it cannot touch on the wide-spread practice in the nineteenth century of long-term residents of the Ottoman Empire attaining and maintaining European nationality on an individual or family basis, which has received much recent attention; see Oliver Schmitt, *Levantiner – Lebenswelten und Identitäten einer ethnokonfessionellen Gruppe im Osmanischen Reich im "langen 19. Jahrhundert*", Munich, Oldenbourg, 2005; and Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis, *Une société hors de soi: Identités et relations sociales à Smyrne aux XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles*, Leuven, Peeters, 2005.

7 The position I assume in this matter is in opposition to the one of Maria Todorova: "while orientalism is dealing with a difference between (imputed) types, balkanism treats the differences within one type [...] Balkanism evolved to a great extent independently from orientalism and, in certain aspects against or despite it." M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 21. This delineation, though appealingly simple in its juxtaposition, cannot be upheld if one considers the fact that elements of inclusion and exclusion of the Southeast from Europe often change rapidly or are even combined in the same statement; see Etienne Balibar, "An Europas Grenzen. Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit einer Gestaltwerdung", in *Lettre International* 20 (2000), pp. 20–22; John B. Allcock, "Constructing the Balkans," in J. B. Allcock and Antonia Young (eds.) *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons,* Bradford, University Press, 1991, pp. 170–91.

8 Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens: Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert*, Munich, C. H. Beck, 1998, p. 46–51, 271–75, 304–08.

9 Friedrich Heckmann, "Ethnos, Demos und Nation, oder: Woher stammt die Intoleranz des Nationalstaats gegenüber ethnischen Minderheiten?", in Gerhard Seewann (ed.), *Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1992, p. 23.

10 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, London, Vintage, 1994.

11 The European Casino, founded at the end of the eighteenth century in Smyrna as an elitist club for theater, music, dance, pool, newspaper reading and other activities considered to be cultured, restricted admission to those of European de-

scent and appearance. While European dress and etiquette became increasingly popular around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Casino continued to insist on descent. Assimilation to Western ways by Greeks or Armenians was considered a skin-deep affair – "What – admit a man, who only a few years ago wore a calpac and long robes…?" See O. Schmitt, *Levantiner*, pp. 422–24.

12 This was, for example, the basis for the extensive missionary activities in the region, which were framed as the brotherly help of the Western Churches for their Eastern brethren; see Malte Fuhrmann, *Traum vom deutschen Orient: Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich 1851–1918*, Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 2006, pp. 111–14.

13 This approach is most eloquently summarized by the orientalist Martin Hartmann: "My attitude towards all people, apart from those who reveal themselves to be vermin, is friendship and good will. I feel these emotions also for the Ottoman Turks, in fact to a very high degree. And because of that my words against them often sound harsh. I see them on paths that do not lead up but down, while I wish for them what one must wish for every ethnicity and every individual: progress towards the only decent goal, the development and useful employment of all forces, fulfillment in the limits of nationhood and the great community of cultured nations. […] I have proven that two heavy loads weigh this people down, so it cannot get up and merrily join in advising and doing with the hoard of nations in Southeastern Europe and West Asia who are rising in force and willingly following the call of the cultured nations: towards a [sic] union of all parts of the whole Western Eurasia, from the Atlantic Ocean to the mountain cordon of the Tienshan, towards the union that will bring to this tremendous economic zone the blessings of a magnanimous economic policy impregnating even the most remote corner of the individual parts, the union that will lead the freely inundating hosts of culture through the tight network of roads into regions that momentarily still turn their heads in disdain. Those two loads are the Sharia, the 'Holy Law', and *xenophilia* (*Fremdländerei*)"; Martin Hartmann, "Unpolitische Briefe aus der Türkei", in M. Hartmann, *Der islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen*, vol. 3, Leipzig, 1910, pp. V- VI.

14 Faruk Tabak, "Imperial Rivalry and Port-Cities: A World-Historical Approach", in Malte Fuhrmann and Vangelis Kechriotis (eds.), *The Late Ottoman Port Cities: Subjectivity, Urbanity, and Conflicting Orders* (publication in preparation).

15 Gregor Schöllgen, *Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht. Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871–1914*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1984.

16 Evangelical Central Archives Berlin (ezab): 5/1959, 164, Evangelical Supreme Church Council to Zschimmer, Berlin, 12 January 1878.

17 Raymond Detrez, "Colonialism in the Balkans. Historic realities and contemporary perceptions", in *Kakanien Revisited*, 16 August 2003, www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/theorie/Rdetrez1.pdf.

18 Some recent writings have overstated the Ottoman manoeuvring space. The Sublime State supposedly was not only free of outright foreign domination, but still retained as much power as other second tier members of the Concert of Powers, such as Russia and Austria-Hungary, cf. Donald Quataert, "Labor History and the Ottoman Empire, c. 1700–1922", in *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 60 (2001), p. 94. This view is too flattering and ahistorical, and derives the power of its argument only from these Empires' common failure to survive the World War, not from their interrelations prior to it. As we know, foreign gunboats did not wantonly parade in St. Petersburg or Trieste, and neither the taxes of Poland nor those of Tyrol were pledged to foreign creditors.

19 Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration*, New York, New York University Press, 1983, pp. 148–49.

20 The Asseo family for example, Salonica locals with Austrian passports, were beaten publicly in the bazaar and temporarily arrested by police. According to the consular records, their claims to capitulatory immunity only made the policemen more violent; HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-105, Räuber, Misshandlungen, div.

21 Meropi Anastassiadou, *Salonique, 1830–1912: Une ville ottomane á l'âge des Réformes,* Leiden, Brill, 1997, pp. 395–98.

22 M. Fuhrmann, *Traum vom deutschen Orient*, pp. 369–71.

23 Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", in *Slavic Review* 54 (1995), pp. 917–31; M. Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics", in *Slavic Review* 51 (1992), pp. 1–15; Dietmar Müller, *Staatsbürger auf Widerruf: Juden und Muslime als Alteritätspartner im rumänischen und serbischen Nationscode. Ethnonationale Staatsbürgerschaftskonzeptionen, 1878–1941,* Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 2005.

24 School inspector Krempff, quoted in M. Fuhrmann, *Traum vom deutschen Orient*, pp. 118–20.

25 Hervé Georgelin, *La fin de Smyrne: Du cosmopolitisme aux nationalismes*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2005, pp. 55–98.

26 Fritz Klein, quoted in Mustafa Gencer, *Bildungspolitik, Modernisierung und kulturelle Interaktion: Deutsch-türkische Beziehungen (1908–18),* Münster, Lit, 2002, pp. 187–88.

27 O. Schmitt, *Levantiner* , p. 338. "Colonies" is used here in the contemporary usage, i.e. the community of one country's expatriates in a certain locality.

28 "Je pense que les diverses populations se livrent à un jeu plus ou moins conscient d'occupation de l'espace visuel, voire d'investissement des espaces publics à Smyrne. Il importe pour chaque groupe de montrer son existence et son excellence économique et culturelle à ses voisins ainsi qu'aux visiteurs, notamment occidentaux. Pour parvenir à cette fin, les divers groupes adoptent des codes similaires. Ainsi, alors que chaque entité désire se distinguer, elle adopte des modes d'exaltation de soi qui sont analogues à ceux des communautés voisines. Cette publicité s'inscrit tout autant dans la vie quotidienne, (que ce soit au niveau de la mise, que de l'affichage commercial, que de la langue parlée en public), que dans des temps particuliers à chaque groupe." Hervé Georgelin, "Smyrne à la fin de l'Empire Ottoman: Un cosmopolitisme si voyant", in *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 67 (2003), pp. 125–47; M. Fuhrmann, *Traum vom deutschen Orient*, pp. 270–382.

29 Meropi Anastassiadou, "Les Occidentaux de la place", in Gilles Veinstein (ed.), *Salonique, 1850–1918: La ville des juifs et le réveil des Balkans*, Paris, Éd. Autrement, 1992, pp. 143–52; Yaşar Aksoy, "İzmir'in Parisli Semti Alsancak", in *İzmir Kent Kültürü Dergisi,* 1 (April 2000), pp. 24–29.

30 Zdenka Stoklásková, "Wandernde Handwerksgesellen als priviligierte Gruppe; Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Handwerks in den böhmischen Ländern", in Klaus Roth (ed.), *Vom Wandergesellen zum 'Green Card'-Spezialisten: Interkulturelle Aspekte der Arbeitsmigration im östlichen Mitteleuropa*, Münster, Waxmann, 2003, pp. 29–44.

31 Ernst von der Nahmer, „Deutsche Kolonisationspläne und -erfolge in der Türkei vor 1870", in *Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung*, 40 (1996), 935; Secret State Archives, Berlin (GStA): III. HA II (MdA) 758, 61, M. Pezzer to MdA, Smyrna, 8 March 1845; Anne Dietrich, *Deutschsein in Istanbul: Nationalisierung und Orientierung in der deutschsprachigen Community von 1843–1956,* Opladen, Leske + Budrich*,* 1998, p. 81.

32 Michael Palairet, *The Balkan Economies c. 1800–1914: Evolution without Development*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 19–22; HHStA Adm. Reg. F 47-31, Circulare, MdA, Vienna, 19 March 1873.

33 HHStA GK Sal 108. Apparently, because of the relative proximity of Cattaro to the Ottoman core regions and its great distance from other Habsburg territories, it was partially integrated into the Balkan tradition of landlocked itinerant labor; see HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-105, Misshandlungen, Governor General Prizren, 28 November 1872; Đuro Nikov Subotić, Petition, Glavati, 21 November 1875. On the *gurbet/pečalba* tradition, see Robert Pichler, "Hirten, Söldner und Wanderarbeiter: Formen der mobilen Ökonomie in den Dörfern des albanischen Hochlandes", in R. Pichler, Karl Kaser and Stephanie Schwandner-

Sievers (eds.), *Die weite Welt und das Dorf: Albanische Emigration am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Vienna, Böhlau, 2002, pp. 133–61. The predominance of Austrians from the Adriatic littoral among the itinerant lower-class travellers and unregistered residents in the Ottoman Empire seems to have persisted at least into the 1890s; see HHStA BK Kpl 115, MdA to Calice, Vienna, 28 December 1895. Max Brunau, *Das Deutschtum in Mazedonien*, Stuttgart, Ausland u. Heimat Verl.-Aktienges., 1925, p. 18.

34 Anna Vourou, "Interview Thessaloniki 1985", in Christine Rillig (ed.), *1895–1985, 90 Jahre Evangelische Kirche dt. Sprache in Thessaloniki,* Thessaloniki, Ev. Gemeinde, 1985, pp. 60–63; PA-AA GK Sal 32 (Vormundschaft Sörgels Kinder); 49 (Briefe des Bahnmeisters Sörgel).

35 HHStA GK Sal 117 (Passprotokoll), 1906.

36 ezab 5/1959, 166, Zschimmer, Annual Report Smyrna, 1877.

37 The wife of Michael Kalmar in Hungary enquired about the heritage of her ancestors, Franz and Anna Braun, who were rumoured to have become court tailors to the Sultan. However, the Brauns had only worked as assistants to a lady's tailor and had died penniless; HHStA BK Konstantinopel 107, Rodick to Pallavcini, Constantinople, 15 November 1906.

38 Julius Fröbel, *Ein Lebenslauf. Aufzeichnungen, Erinnerungen und Bekenntnisse*, vol. 2, Stuttgart, Cotta, 1891, pp. 591–94; M. Brunau, *Deutschtum in Mazedonien*, p. 56.

39 Paul Lindenberg, *Auf deutschen Pfaden im Orient*, Berlin, F. Dümmler, 1902, pp. 171–72.

40 D. Quataert, "Labor History and the Ottoman Empire", p. 104.

41 PA-AA GK Sal 14. These lists were apparently abandoned in 1907.

42 M. Brunau, *Deutschtum in Mazedonien*, p. 58; PA-AA Sal 14 (Paß u. Polizei); ezab 5/1960, 93.

43 ezab 5/1960, 93; HHStA Adm. Reg. F 47-61, GK Smyrna to MdA, Smyrna, 17 October 1887.

44 Heinrich Schultheiß appealed for help to his consulate, which had sentenced him to a prison sentence, with the following words, "I must be ashamed when someone asks me what I am; a Gipsy is cleaner than a German"; PA-AA Sal 27 (Strafverfahren Weil/Schultheiß, 1-3).

45 PA-AA GK Sal 22 (Auskunftsgesuche), pp. 49–53.

46 Helmut König, *Zivilisation und Leidenschaften: Die Masse im bürgerlichen Zeitalter,* Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1992, pp. 97–113.

47 Rainer Nitsche (ed.), *Häuserkämpfe 1872/1920/1945/1982,* Berlin [West], Transit, 1981, pp. 48–50; H. König, *Zivilisation und Leidenschaften*, pp. 84–93.

48 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York, Vintage Books, 1979.

49 Christoph Herzog, "Migration and the State: On Ottoman Regulations Concerning Migrations since the Age of Mahmud II" and Florea Ioncioaia, "Foreigners in Town: Urban Immigration and Local Attitudes in the Romanian Principalities at mid-nineteenth Century (1830–59)", both in Ulrike Freitag, Malte Fuhrmann, Nora Lafi and Florian Riedler (eds.), *Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond* (publication in preparation).

50 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-105 (Mißhandlungen).

51 In 1898, the Jerusalem (Yerushalayim/al-Quds/Kudüs) consulates were asked to list their nation's vagrants so the governor could arrange their deportation. While the Austro-Hungarian consul was actually entertaining the thought of ridding himself of this clientele, mostly penniless Jews from Galicia as he pointed out, he had serious scruples about cooperating on this matter and refrained from it in the end; HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-105, fragment; see also BK Kpl 115 (Ansuchen d. türkischen Behörden wg. Listen der ö. u. Untherthanen 1909).

52 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-105 (Neues türkisches Vagabondage-Gesetz).

53 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-105 (Neues türkisches Vagabondage-Gesetz).

54 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 47-61 (Paßgesetz, 1912).

55 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution), 752-46 (S./P.), 4, Constantinople, 19 December 1896. Constantinople was, however, an exception, as sources pertaining to the city far outweigh all other recorded sites of Habsburg subjects practicing prostitution in the Ottoman Empire or its vicinity. When a direct rail link between Salonica and Austria-Hungary was established in 1888, several Greek newspaper commentators warned that the city would be inundated by European women of loose morals (Mark Mazower, *Salonica: City of Ghosts*, pp. 251–52; M. Anastassiadou, *Salonique, 1830–1912*, pp. 173–75), but the Habsburg consular records do not confirm this. However, in Salonica, where the European foreign community was comparatively small and the Jewish community large, Galician and Bukovinian pimps or prostitutes with a Jewish background sometimes managed to integrate inconspicuously into the Jewish community claiming to be refugees from Galicia or Russia and thus going unnoticed by the consulate, HHStA GK Sal 420 (Nachlaß Nathan Hermann Ball false Weismann), Israelite Community to Consulate General, Salonica, 19 March 1909).

56 See for example the list of deported prostitutes in HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution, 2), Vienna, 15/23 December 1913.

57 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution, div).

58 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution, 4), *Osmanische Post*, no date (before 28 December 1896).

59 HHStA BK Kpl 107, Guido Panfili (Consul) to Embassy Constantinople, 2 February 1911.

60 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution, div).

61 Nils Ringdal, *Love for Sale: A Global History of Prostitution*, New York, Grove, 2004, pp. 313–19; Harald Fischer-Tiné, "'White women degrading themselves to the lowest depths': European networks of prostitution and colonial anxieties in British India and Ceylon ca. 1880–1914", in *Indian Economic & Social History Review*, 40, 2 (2003), pp. 163–90; Sumanta Banerjee, *Dangerous Outcast: The Prostitute in Nineteenth Century Bengal*, Calcutta, Seagull, 1998, pp. 173–75; Rajnarayan Chandravakar, *Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, c. 1850–1950*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 195–96.

62 For a more detailed account of "white slave trade" immigration to Constantinople as seen through the documents of foreign Jewish aid organizations, see Rıfat N. Bali, *Devlet'in Yahudileri ve 'Öteki' Yahudi*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2004, pp. 323–68.

63 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution, 1), GK to Andrássy, Cairo, 27 November 1875.

64 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution, 1), Sax (Consul) to Andrássy, Adrianople, 5 December 1878.

65 H. Fischer-Tiné,"White women degrading themselves to the lowest depths", pp. 167–71.

66 Aron Halevi, 3 January 1890, quoted in R. N. Bali, *Devlet'in Yahudileri*, pp. 341–42.

67 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46 (Sicherheit/Prostitution, 4/Eindämmung), Armbruch to MdA, Constantinople, 28 March 1891; see also diverse other petitions in same subfolder.

68 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46, Krassay to Embassy, Constantinople, 25 September 1891; Krassay to Lemberg Police, Constantinople, 29 March 1890.

69 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52-46, Min. of Interior to Min. of the House, Vienna, 29 March 1896.

70 Hans-Christian Maner, "Zum Problem der Kolonisierung Galiziens: Aus den Debatten des Ministerrates und des Reichsrates in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts", in Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch and Moritz Csáky (eds.), *Habsburg postcolonial: Gedächtnis- Erinnerung- Identität,* Innsbruck, Studienverl., 2003, pp. 153–54.

71 H. C. Maner, "Zum Problem der Kolonisierung Galiziens", pp. 153–64.

72 Samuel Cohen quoted in R. N. Bali, *Devlet'in Yahudileri*, pp. 336–37.

73 Eugene Rogan (ed.), *Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002.

74 Meyda Yeğenoğlu, *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 39–67.

75 Mehmed Ali's order in 1834 to ban prostitution from Lower Egypt must be read in this light: "prostitutes bore the brunt of hostility that was directed not necessarily against themselves or their trade but at an explicitly European-accommodating policy of the Pasha." Khaled Fahmy, "Prostitution in Egypt in the nineteenth Century", in Eugene Rogan (ed.), *Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, pp. 80–81.

76 In the colonial setting and its explicit basis of hegemony on race, the Galician prostitutes even seemed to threaten the British Empire: "The prestige of the ruling race is affected by the degradation of its members, especially if they are females. It matters not that the Austrian, Poles and Russian Jewesses who are the victims of the trade are wholly alien to the British race. In the eyes of the general population, the distinction is not recognized. These women with their white skins come from the West, whence come the rulers of this country, and the whole European community has to bear the shame of their presence in the prostitutes *chakla*." Punjab Government, quoted in H. Fischer-Tiné, "White women degrading themselves to the lowest depths", pp. 183.

77 Karin J. Jušek, *Auf der Suche nach der Verlorenen: Die Prostitutionsdebatten im Wien der Jahrhundertwende*, Groningen, Univ., Diss. 1993. Unfortunately Jušek does not discuss the ethnicity or regional background of the prostitutes.

78 PA-AA GK Sal 32 (Vormundschaft Sörgels Kinder), 62, Ebeling to GK Sal, Smyrna, 6 August 1895.

79 M. Anastassiadou, *Salonique, 1830–1912*, pp. 174–75; M. Mazower, *Salonica: City of Ghosts*, pp. 251–52. I am very grateful to M. Anastassiadou, Paris/Strasbourg, for pointing out these interconnections.

80 Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives, Istanbul (BOA): İ.HUS. 89/1319.Ra.36, 22/Ra/1319 (9 July 1901). I would like to thank Nazan Maksudyan, Istanbul, for drawing my attention to this document.

81 Ernst Steinwald, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Gemeinde zu Smyrna 1759–1904,* Berlin, Vaterl. Verl.- u. Kunstanst., 1904, p. 86.

82 HHStA BK Kpl 107, 1, MdA to Pallavicini, Vienna, 4 November 1911.

83 HHStA BK Kpl 107, G. Panfili (Consul) to Embassy Constantinople, 2 February 1911.

84 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 52–46, 2, 15/23 December 1913.

85 According to information that had fallen into the hands of the German navy intelligence service, the Berlin pimp Ernst Gras, a.k.a. Hans, had travelled to

Constantinople to work in a garden bar as a cover for espionage for Russia. He had used Armenians, Greeks and prostitutes to create an intelligence network. Although neither the search of Gras' Berlin apartment, nor that of Cäti Gross, his alleged lover in the Hotel "Grande Bretagne" in Constantinople, nor the continued surveillance of her presumed other lover Konstantin Phokinos resulted in any evidence, the German and Ottoman side continued to believe that they constituted a spy network; German Federal Archives–Military Archive, Freiburg i. Br. (BA-MA) Reichsmarine (RM) 40/733, 21 ff., pp. 82–85.

86 Horst Haselsteiner, *Bosnien-Hercegovina: Orientkrise und südslavische Frage*, Vienna, Böhlau, 1996, p. 102.

87 Bojan Aleksov, "'Habsburg's ‚Colonial Experiment' in Bosnian and Hercegovina Revisited", in Ulf Brunnbauer, Andreas Helmedach and Stefan Troebst (eds.), *Schnittstellen: Festschrift für Holm Sundhaussen*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2007, pp. 201–16; Evelyn Kolm, *Die Ambitionen Österreich-Ungarns im Zeitalter des Hochimperialismus*, Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 2001, pp. 237–53.

88 Alexandre Toumarkine, *Les migrations des populations musulmanes balkaniques en Anatolie (1876–1913)*, Istanbul, Isis Press, 1995, pp. 67–77; Dilek Akyalçın-Kaya, "Immigration to the Ottoman Lands: The Case of Salonica in the Late nineteenth Century", in Ulrike Freitag, Malte Fuhrmann, Nora Lafi and Florian Riedler (eds.), *Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond* (publication in preparation).

89 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, *Ein Ausflug nach Macedonien: Besuch der deutschen Eisenbahn von Salonik nach Monastir*, Berlin, R. v. Decker, 1894, p. 109.

90 Izzet Pasha, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Marschalls Izzet Pascha: Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, Leipzig, Koehler, 1927, pp. 139–41.

91 Mehmet Emin İlhan,"İzmir'de Avusturya Boykotajı", in *Tarih ve Toplum,* 161 (May 1997), pp. 19–26, 275–82.

92 M. Mazower, *Salonica: City of Ghosts*, pp. 282–85.

93 H. Haselsteiner, *Bosnien-Hercegovina*, pp. 102–03.

94 A. Toumarkine, *Les migrations des populations musulmanes balkaniques*, p. 76.

95 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 15-68, Heimroth to Otto, Üsküp, 28 September 1910.

96 HHStA Adm. Reg. F 15-68 (Turkey), div., especially Pallavcini to Berchthold, Constantinople, 27 February 1912. The case discussed here is the divorce of a Bosnian-born dragoman, working at the Constantinople embassy, from his locally-born wife who had only become a "Bosnian" through marriage.

97 HHStA GK Sal 450 (Hörmann), Kral to MdA, Salonica, 10 June 1913.

Chapter 2

1 In this article we designate the Slavophone population of Macedonia as Bulgarian, because this was the term used at the time. Today, the descendants of these "Bulgarians" in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia obviously call themselves "Macedonians".

2 The information contained in the second map was reproduced in 1906 in two maps entitled "*Vilayet* de Monastir. Carte des écoles chrétiennes" and "*Vilayet* de Salonique. Carte des écoles chrétiennes" published by the Istituto geografico de Agostini in Rome. Reproductions in *Hartografontas ti Makedonia 1870–1930*, Thessaloniki, Musio Makedoniku Agona, 2004, pp. 52–53.

3 Dimka Radev (1810–75) was a militant for the Bulgarian cause in Bitola/Monastir in the 1860s. His son Petraki received a Greek education, as did his grandsons, even though competition among schools was quite fierce at that time in Bitola: both grandsons Aleksandăr (1864–1911) and Goce Radev (1873–?) studied in the city's Greek high school, followed by the University of Athens. This did not prevent the elder from becoming Minister for Justice and then Education in Bulgaria, and the younger from becoming Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4 This argument was particularly used to discredit the Albanian national movement, whose school network was significantly behind that of its competitors in the Balkans.

5 Georges Hassiotis, *L'instruction publique chez les Grecs depuis la prise de Constantinople jusqu'à nos jours,* Paris, Leroux, 1881; P.K. (Petko Karavelov), "Bălgarskoto učebno delo v tursko", in *Periodičesko Spisanie,* 23–24 (1888); V. Djordjević, *Srpska i grčka prosveta,* Beograd, Srpska Kraljevska akademija, 1896; Jovan Hadživasiljević, *Prosvetne i političke prilike u južnim srpskim oblastima u XIX veku*, Beograd, Zaduzbina Lenke Beljinice, 1928; S. Tovaru, *Problema şcoalei româneşti din Balcani,* Bucureşti, 1934; Aleksa Jovanović, "Srpske škole pod Turcima", in *Spomenica dvadesetgodišnjeg oslobodjenja Južne Srbije 1912–13*, Skopje, 1936, pp. 250–60; Stephanos Papadopoulos, "Ecoles et associations grecques dans la Macédoine du Nord durant le dernier siècle de la domination turque", in *Balkan Studies*, 3, 2 (1962), pp. 400–20; N. Genčev, "Pogled vărhu prosvetnoto dviženie v Makedonija prez XIX v. do 1878 g.", in *Plamăkăt na solunskijat svetilnik*, Sofia, 1970, pp. 15–45; Stephanos Papadopulos, *Ekpedevtiki ke kinoniki drastiriotita tu Ellinismu tis Makedonias kata ton televteo eona tis Turkokratias*, Thessaloniki, 1970; Jašar Redžepagić, *Razvoj prosvete i školstva albanske narodnosti na teritoriji današnje Jugoslavije do 1918,* Priština, Zajednica naučnih ustanova Kosova Metonije, 1968; V. Božilov, *Bălgarskata prosveta v Makedonija i Odrinska Trakija 1878–1913*, Sofia, 1982; Rista Kantardžiev,

Makedonskoto prerodbensko učilište, Skopje, 1985; Selank Vuri, *Ekpedevsi ke ethnikismos sta Valkania. I periptosi tis Vorioditikis Makedonias 1870–1904*, Athina, S. A. Somel, 1992; *Ottoman Islamic Education in the Balkans in the Nineteenth Century*, Islamic Studies, Islamabad, 36/2–3, 1997, pp. 439–64.

6 It is necessary to cross-check with various original sources when they are used. Unfortunately, this was not done by Ilija Galčev in his rather interesting work, *Bălgarskoto samosăznanie na naselenieto v Makedonija prez Văzraždaneto*, Sofia, 2005.

7 Even though he lived in the Hungarian Srem, at the end of the eighteenth century, Prota Matija Nenadović, *Memoari*, Beograd, 1980, p. 87. In the 1860s, this vision remained predominant among the uniates of Tikveš who sent their children to Bitola's Catholic school: "According to the country's prejudices, they saw themselves as either priests or teachers, it sufficed to be able to read and write Bulgarian, to read the psalm books and missals and, in particular, to know the Slavic liturgical chants". Arthur Droulez, *Histoire de la mission de Monastir (Bitolj) 1857–1930*, unpublished, Paris, Archives de la Congrégation de la Mission, p. 15.

8 It is particularly difficult to translate the social realities of the Ottoman Empire into English terms. We have used the term *community* to describe the various levels of social structures. There were denominational communities that benefited from a relative internal autonomy at the level of the Empire, the *millet*. At the local level, for example that of the city of Bitola, each *millet* was institutionalised in an elected body, officially recognised by the authorities, which was called *cemât*, *obština* or *kinotis*, a type of local community administration, which should not be confused with the city municipality (*belediye*), covering a number of communities even though it was de facto controlled by the Moslems. Nevertheless, the second half of the nineteenth century saw a crystallisation of national identifying references in Macedonia that were not immediately recorded by the Ottoman authorities, either at the imperial or at the local level. It is therefore possible to refer to a Bulgarian community in Bitola at the beginning of the 1860s, even though the city's Bulgarian *obština* only came into operation in 1869, that is, one year before the official recognition of the Bulgarian *millet*, Bulgarian Exarchate, 187); a Serbian *obština* was officially recognised in Bitola in 1890, but there was never a Serbian *millet* in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, local communities were often in conflict with their representative bodies.

9 This anomaly, which meant that those loyal to the *Rum milleti* used two different liturgical languages and two different alphabets (Greek and Cyrillic), complicated the polarisation of nationalisms in Macedonia right from the start.

10 Pantelis Tsallis, *To doxasmeno Monastiri*, Thessaloniki, 1932, p. 8.

11 Greek was taught in Jewish schools in the 1880s. See Constantinos Vavouskos, *Der Beitrag des Griechentums von Pelagonien zur Geschichte des neueren Griechen-*

landes, Thessaloniki, Institut f. Balkanstudien, 1963, p. 13; M. R. Kamhi, *Az vojvodata Skanderbeg*, Sofia, 2000, p. 21. The teaching of Greek was not part of the twentieth century programmes.

12 In Bitola, where the Jewish community was relatively poor, management and supervision of the *Talmud-Torah* was the responsibility of the AIU from 1903 to 1911.

13 "Progress" in its material form spread extremely slowly to inland towns such as Bitola. The first accordion reached the town in 1836; there were three pianos recorded in 1856; the town was connected to the telegraph in 1860 and to the railways in 1894; the first automobile arrived in 1907.

14 R. Jivkova, *Le vilayet de Manastir selon le Manastır vilayetine mahsus sâlname 1314 (1896)*, Masters Thesis, Paris, INALCO, 1996.

15 Nathalie Clayer, "Les cadis de l'après-Tanzimat: l'exemple des cadis d'Ergiri et Libohova", in *Turcica* (32), Leuven, Peeters, 2000, pp. 33–58.

16 See the scathing comments made by the young Lazar Jovčev, future Exarch of Bulgaria: "Certain [shopkeepers] of Balkapan and tailors, crazed with jealousy that here [in Istanbul] I am a public servant and an important man, would like to see me [in Kalofer] as their servant, teaching their children, so that they can all give me orders and barely enough money to keep me from starving to death." *Dnevnik*, Sofia, 1992, p. 54, entry of 28 June 1871. Todor Ikonomov makes similar comments: "Difficult and bitter is the life of a Bulgarian schoolteacher. It is unbearable for many teachers who have a conscience, a character and some human dignity. The simple labourer is better placed with his boss or his employers than a teacher in a Bulgarian *obština*, because the labourer has a given job outside of which no one has the right to give him orders, and no one can give him tasks that are not his own. That is not the case for school teachers today." Quoted by Angel Dimitrov, *Učilišteto,progresăt i nacionalnata revoljucija. Bălgarskoto učilište prez văzraždaneto*, Sofia, 1987, p. 239. The same author notes that in the 1860s teachers were better paid in Macedonia than in Bulgaria (p. 236).

17 These local intrigues were echoed at higher levels; as such they occupied a considerable part of the correspondence between David Arié, Bitola Principal and the AIU in Paris.

18 *Ako iskaš da napraviš otečestvoto si kumir na bălgarskija narod, kojto da e gotov da žertvuva vsičko za nego, trjabva da go prosvetiš*. ("If you want your homeland to be an idol for the Bulgarian people, for which they would sacrifice everything, then you must educate them.") Speech by Ivan Šišmanov during the inauguration of the University of Sofia, *Misăl*, I (1892), p. 235.

19 Milan Matov, *Naj komitata razkazva,* Sofia, 2002, pp. 14–15.

20 K. Bitoski, *Dejnosta na Pelagoniskata mitropolija 1878–1912,* Skopje, 1968, p. 91.

21 V. Božilov, *Bălgarskata prosveta v Makedonija,* p. 316.

22 AIU: IB, Yougoslavie, Monastir, 1907.

23 The Lazarite Catholic school provided free education from 1857 to 1869 (including boarding school 1864–68). To be competitive, Vasil Mančev had to finance his Bulgarian school himself, through French lessons given to the sons of Moslem notables (V. Mančev, *Spomeni*, Sofia, 1982, p. 80).

24 It is necessary to explore the social demands that led to this development. It was rare for women to work outside the home in the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, kindergartens were an undeniable success: in 1906, 934 children were recorded in the "Greek" kindergartens (N. Georgiadis, *Osa egrapsa sto Monastiri 1903–12*, Thessaloniki, 1984, pp. 14–15). The Macedonian historian Krste Bitoski sees this as a way of introducing literary Bulgarian or Greek to children of a very young age, which he considers as a desirable step toward denationalisation, *Dejnosta na Pelagoniskata mitropolija*, p. 125.

25 K. Bitoski, *Dejnosta na Pelagoniskata mitropolija,* p. 116. This is obviously due to the fact that candidate-priests were not Greek-speakers by birth. We should note that at the Greek Teachers' Training School of Thessalonika, twelve hours were nevertheless devoted to Greek each week at both levels (G. Vouri, "Quelques aspects des problèmes de la formation des instituteurs grecs dans la partie européenne ottomane au début du XX^{e} siècle", in *Etudes balkaniques*, XXVI, 3 [1990], pp. 83–90).

26 Simeon Radev, *Ranni spomeni*, Sofia, Strelec, 1967, p. 182; Ljubomir Miletič, *Kăm borbite v Jugozapadna Makedonija*, Sofia, 1926, pp. 5, 27; N. Georgiadis, *op.cit.*, p. 83; Vasil Čekalarov, *Dnevnik*, Sofia, 2001, p. 37.

27 Gustav L. Weigand, *Die Aromunen: ethnographisch - philosophisch - historische Untersuchungen über das Volk der sogenannten Makedo-Romanen oder Zinzaren,* T. I, Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1895, p. 6; AIU I.E., Yougoslavie, Monastir, Dossier D. Arié, 22 August and 30 December 1904; see also A. Koltsidas, *Istoria tu Monastiriu tis Pelagonias ke ton perihoron tu*, Thessaloniki, 2003, p. 378, note 555; K. Bitoski, *Dejnosta na Pelagoniskata mitropolija*, p. 91.

28 Skjabin, *Političeskija i ekonomičeskija svedenija o bitolʾskom vilaete*, Sofia, N. Paskalev, 1917, pp. 30–31.

29 According to the Bulgarian translation Albert Soniksen, *Izpovedta na edin makedonski četnik*, Sofia, 1983, p. 146 (1st ed. New York, 1909). The Bulgarian high school provided an education that was significantly more open to the world than its Greek rival. The young Georgios Modhis and his classmates were surprised to find portraits of the great Hellenes of Antiquity, as well as those of Luther, Shakespeare, Napoleon, Victor Hugo, and Tolstoy in a school text book "captured on the enemy", G. Modhis, *Anamnisis*, Thessaloniki, 2004, p. 64.

30 Heinrich Gelzer, *Vom heiligen Berge und aus Makedonien. Reisebilder aus den Athosklöstern und dem Insurrektionsgebiete*, Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1904, p. 141.

31 "At the end of the 1890s began the Macedonian movement that saw the participation of almost all of Bulgaria's teachers as committee members" in N. Aleksiev, *Našata učilištna politika (istoričesko izsledvane)*, Sofia, 1912, p. 144.

32 Bernard Lory, "Le meurtre du prêtre comme violence inaugurale (Bulgarie 1872, Macédoine 1900)", in *Balkanologie*, IX, 1–2 (December 2005), pp. 13–29.

33 For example, around 1900, Luka Džerov, inspector of Bulgarian schools, and Jovo Ćirković, inspector of Serbian schools, acted similarly in the poor and divided region of Kičevo. See Tomar Nikolov, *Spomeni iz moeto minalo*, Sofia, 1989, pp. 90, 231.

34 V. Mančev, *Spomeni,* p. 71; Kuzman Šapkarev, *Za văzraždaneto na bălgarštinata v Makedonija*, Sofia, 1984, p. 244.

35 HHStA, PA XXXVIII, 391, Monastir, 31 May 1902.

36 Teachers changed posts often and thereby circulated throughout Macedonia, which facilitated their revolutionary activities. It is therefore not surprising to find most of IMRO's key figures among the teachers of Bitola: Pere Tošev, Dame Gruev, Gjorče Petrov, Mihail Gerdžikov, etc.

37 S. Radev, *Ranni Spomeni,* p. 181.

38 Hristo Siljanov, *Pisma i izpovedi na edin četnik*, Sofia, 1984 (1st ed. 1927), pp. 24–26.

39 Pavel Šatev, *V Makedonija pod robstvo*, Sofia, 1968 (1st ed. 1934), p. 68.

40 *Ibid.,* p. 320

41 T. Nikolov, *Spomeni,* p. 107. The author adds, "Cvetkov and I could not watch this horrible spectacle and that is why we moved away". This was a reference to the same Cvetkov, professor of music, who was soon to lose his life.

42 This situation was fictionalised by Pinelopi Dhelta in a famous novel for the young, *Sta mistika tu valtu* (1937).

43 C. Vavouskos, *Der Beitrag des Griechentums.*

Chapter 3

1 See Charilaos G. Gkoutos, *Ο συνδικαλισμός στο ελληνικό κράτος 1834–1914,* Athens, 1988, for an overview of the history of the Greek labour movement in the nineteenth century.

2 This concerns socialist and anarchist groups around Platon Drakoulis, the editor of the first socialist newspaper of Greece (1885), which in the following years experienced many changes and divisions. Their great number has no relation to their generally marginal impact on the broader strata of Greek society, apart from local exceptions. For more details see Panagiotis Noutsos, *Η σοσιαλιστική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα 1875–1974*, vol. I, Athens, Gnosi, 1992, and Kostis Moskof, *Η*

εθνική και κοινωνική συνείδηση στην Ελλάδα 1830-1909. Ιδεολογία του μεταπρατικού χώρου, Thessaloniki, 1972, p. 185ff.

3 See Gunnar Hering, *Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland (1821–1936)*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1992.

4 On the ottoman guild-system see for example John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950. From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 24ff.; Spyros Asdrachas, *Ελληνική Οικονομική Ιστορία ΙΕ΄-ΙΘ΄ αιώνας*, Athens, Piraeus Group Cultural Foundation, I (2003), pp. 403–22, and Suraiya Faroqhi and Randi Deguilhem (eds.), *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East. Fashioning the Individual in the Mediterranean*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2005.

5 See Theodore H. Papadopoullos, *Studies and Documents relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination*, Brussels, New York, 1973; Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 vols., New York, Holmes & Meier, 1982; on the orthodox church communities Giorgos D. Kontogiorgis, *Κοινωνική δυναμική και πολιτική αυτοδιοίκηση. Οι ελληνικές κοινότητες της τουρκοκρατίας*, Athens, Arsenidi, 1982; Neoklis Sarris, *Οσμανική Πραγματικότητα. Συστημική παρά-θεση δομών και λειτουργιών,* II (1990), Athens, pp. 319–72.

6 For an overview see Spyros Asdrachas, *op. cit.*, pp. 461–81. One example is the cooperative of cloth producers and traders from Ampelakia in Thessaly in the eighteenth century; see Olga Katsiardi-Hering, *Τεχνίτες και τεχνικές βαφής νημάτων. Από τη Θεσσαλία στην Κεντρική Ευρώπη (18ος – αρχές 19ου αι.). Επίμετρο: Η Αμπελακιώτικη Συντροφιά (1805),* Athens, 2003. Another example is the association of merchants of Chios, the so-called "System of Chios", which maintained an even more far-reaching operational network. Favoured by the privileges the Porte had granted to the island, this organization was even able to develop a specific form of local self-government, which in the beginning of the nineteenth century was repeatedly praised as a prime example to be copied in other Orthodox regions of the Ottoman Empire, see Georgios I. Zolotas, *Ιστορία της Χίου*, vol. III, part 1 (*Τουρκοκρατία*), Athens, P. D. Sakellarion, 1926, pp. 359–72, here p. 364.

7 See George D. Frangos, *The Philike Etaireia, 1814-21: A Social and Historical Analysis*, PhD, Columbia University, 1971, with detailed information about the members in the attachment (pp. 298–539).

8 See George D. Frangos, "The Philiki Etaireia: A Premature National Coalition", in Richard Clogg (ed.), *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, London, Macmillan, 1973, pp. 87–103.

9 On freemasonry in Greece see Marinos Pollatos, *Διακόσια χρόνια του ελληνικού τεκτονισμού (1740–1940),* Athens, 1952, Alkis Angelou, "Η καθίδρυση του ελεύθερου τεκτονισμού στον Νέο Ελληνισμό", in *ΟΕρανιστής*, 15 (1978–79), pp. 182–252; Ilia Chatzipanagioti-Sangmeister, in *Ο τεκτονισμός στην ελληνική κοινωνία και γραμματεία του 18ου αιώνα,* Athens, 2007 (forthcoming). Apart from freemasonry, the *Philiki Etaireia* could also have been influenced by other secret societies of this period, e.g. the Italian Carbonari, whose roots went back to the Napoleonic wars.

10 See Barbara Jelavich, "The Philorthodox Conspiracy of 1839", in *Balkan Studies* 7/1 (1966), pp. 89–102; Angelos Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland. Ihr Wirken und ihre Funktion im Hinblick auf die Modernisierung und Säkularisierung der griechischen Gesellschaft,* Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 57–62.

11 Entry required an oath and the members were bound by the principles of secrecy. The hierarchy included three degrees, the "Simples", the "Greats" and the "Tremendous", see Ekdotikiki Athinon (ed.), *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους* (*IEE*), vol. XIII, Athens, 1977, pp. 77–79. The loans from the *Philiki Etaireia* are obvious, see also the report of the secretary of the embassy of Austria in Athens, Wallenburg to Metternich from 13 January 1840: "*c'est une copie peu modifiée de l'organisation de l'hétérie qui a insurgé la Grèce, il y a vingt ans, et qui mine encore aujourd'hui la Thessalie, l'Epire et la Macédoine d'un bout à l'autre".* (quoted from B. Jelavich, *The Philorthodox Conspiracy,* p. 97).

12 See Charles A. Frazee, *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821–52,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969. On the ideological dimensions of this controversy and about the most pronounced opponent of Greek autocephaly, Konstantinos Oikonomos, see Alexandros Papaderos, *Metakenosis. Griechenlands kulturelle Herausforderung durch die Aufklärung in der Sicht des Korais und des Oikonomos,* Meisenheim am Glan, Hain, 1970.

13 See Ioannis Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität. Staat und private Akteure vor dem Hintergrund der "Megali Idea",* Munich, Oldenbourg, 2002, p. 52ff. The first documented political use of this slogan by Ioannis Kolettis dates roughly to this period (1844).

14 The Philorthodox Society had close relations with the "Russian Party", the so called *Napaioi*, from which it also recruited many of its members, see G. Hering, *Die politischen Parteien,* pp. 195–216. Thus, its excessive persecution by the government, apart from being unpopular, could have triggered a diplomatic intervention from the side of Russia. In this context, one can also interpret the obvious efforts made by the Greek government in official statements, as an at-

tempt to present the conspiracy only as the work of a few individuals lacking broader support, see *IEE*, vol. 13, p. 79.

15 On his person see I. Kassianos, “Από την ιστορίαν του νεοελληνικού χριστιανικού κινήματος”, in *Ακτίνες,* 1943, pp. 154–61 (uncritical-apologetic).

16 Among them were Konstantinos Oikonomos (see note 153) and Ignatios Lampropoulos who later also became a leading figure in the religious movement.

17 This pseudo-collection of obscure prophecies of a fictitious mediaeval monk was one of the most popular texts of its genre. In fact it was written around 1750 by the erudite Phanariot Theoklitos Polyeidis and published some forty years later in Vienna, probably with the assistance of Rigas Pheraios, see Alexis Politis, *Η προσγραφόμενη στον Ρήγα πρώτη έκδοση του Αγαθάγγελου,* in *Ερανιστής* 7, 42 (1969), pp. 173–92 (including the text). See also John Nicolopoulos, “From Agathangelos to the Megale Idea”, in *Balkan Studies* 26, 1 (1985), pp. 41–56.

18 G. Hering, *Die politischen Parteien,* p. 256.

19 A. Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland,* p. 63.

20 A. Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland,* p. 201, calls him for this reason (with a touch of probably unintended humour) the founder of the “*wohl ersten auf rationaler Basis organisierten Erweckungsbewegung*”. On Makrakis see also Panagiotis Bratsiotis, “‘Die geistigen Strömungen und die religiösen Bewegungen in der Orthodoxen Kirche Griechenlands”, in P. Bratsiotis (ed.), *Die Orthodoxe Kirche in griechischer Sicht,* Stuttgart, Evangel. Verlagswerk, 1970, pp. 255–75 (uncritical-apologetic), Thanasis Kalafatis, “Θρησκευτικότητα και κοινωνική διαμαρτυρία. Οι οπαδοί του Α. Μακράκη”, in *Historica* 10, 18–19 (1993), pp. 113–42; Leon Brang, *Το μέλλον του Ελληνισμού στον ιδεολογικό κόσμο του Απόστολου Μακράκη,* Athens, Armos, 1997; Vasilios N. Makrides, “Secularization and the Greek Orthodox Church in the Reign of King George I”, in Philipp Carabott (ed.), *Greek Society in the Making, 1863–1913: Realities, Symbols and Visions,* Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997, pp. 179–96, here p. 188.

21 On the basis of visions he had in his youth, Makrakis believed himself to be a chosen instrument of divine providence (see L. Brang, *Το μέλλον του Ελληνισμού στον ιδεολογικό κόσμο του Απόστολου Μακράκη*, pp. 251–55). He developed an eschatological teaching that shows some affinity to the positivism of Auguste Comte and to which he adhered until his death in 1905. Although repeatedly sentenced to prison, he continued his activities as a journalist and agitator undiminished and was even nominated, though without success, several times as a candidate in parliamentary elections.

22 For example Ierotheos Mitropoulos, a disciple of Ignatios Lampropoulos and confidant of Makrakis. In Patras he founded the religious association “Agios Andreas” (“St. Andrew”) that published the newspaper *Stavros* (“Cross”), and be-

tween 1899 and 1901 he founded a school for destitute children and another one for future clerics. Mitropoulos had been sentenced in 1879, along with Makrakis, but was rehabilitated a few years later, after a declaration of remorse. In 1892 he became metropolitan of Patras at the instigation of Charilaos Trikoupis, who appreciated him very much. He was very active as a journalist until the end of his life (1903). For a biography see I. Kassianos, "Από την ιστορίαν του νεοελληνικού χριστιανικού κινήματος", in *Ακτίνες*, 1944, pp. 256–61 (uncritical-apologetic).

23 From 1889 to 1894, see Nikolaos Th. Bougatsos, "Anaplasis (Lemma)", in *Θρησκευτική και Ηθική Εγκυκλοπαιδεία* (*ThEE*), Athens, 1963, with detailed member lists, among them the diplomat and scholar Alexandros Rizos-Rangavis, the historian Pavlos Karolidis, the writers Alexandros Papadiamantis, Kostis Palamas a.o., not to mention university professors and high ranking clerics and theologians. However, it seems that the celebrities played more the role of figureheads than belonging to the inner circle of activists. Furthermore, the member lists contain no evidence of any noticeable repercussion of the association in the Greek communities of the Ottoman Empire. See also A. Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland*, p. 73, on the growing importance of urban members. He also presents the interesting information that, in contrast, the membership of Makrakis was still predominantly rural (unfortunately without further references to sources).

24 N. Th. Bougatsos, "Anaplasis".

25 A. Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland,* pp. 67, 198f.

26 On him see A. Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland*, pp. 199-202 with further references on (principally uncritical-apologetic) literature.

27 See P. Bratsiotis, "Die geistigen Strömungen", pp. 269–73, with a list of "*Zoi*-branches" founded until 1960, among them associations for parents, adolescents, students, scholars and destitute persons (a random sequence). See also A. Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland,* pp. 255–72.

28 A. Giannakopoulos, *Die Theologen-Bruderschaften in Griechenland*, pp. 273–78, who localizes strong influences from Anglo-Saxon and German Protestant movements.

29 See, however Vasilios N. Makrides, "Orthodoxy in the Service of Anticommunism: The Religious Organization Zoë during the Greek Civil War", in Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas (eds.), *The Greek Civil War. Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences,* London University, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp. 159–74.

30 The founding of the society and their programme were announced in the first issue of *Ερμής ο Λόγιος* ("The Erudite Hermes"), published in Vienna on 1 January 1811, pp. 5–9.

31 The organizer of this society, which possibly operated as the “legal arm” of the “Philiki Etaireia”, was Ioannis Kapodistrias; see Eleni E. Koukkou, *Ο Καποδίστριας και η παιδεία 1803-22. Α΄ Η Φιλόμουσος Εταιρεία της Βιέννης,* Athens, 1958. Some years later the society opened a branch in Athens.

32 This is documented in great detail by Kyriaki Mamoni in “Les associations pour la propagation de l’instruction grecque à Constantinople”, in *Balkan Studies*, 16 (1975), pp. 103–12; “Σωματειακή οργάνωση του Ελληνισμού στη Μικρά Ασία”, part 1, in *Δελτίον της Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρείας της Ελλάδος* (*ΔΙΕΕΕ*) vol. 26, 1983, pp. 63–114; part 2 in *ΔΙΕΕΕ* vol. 28, 1985, pp. 55–166; part 3 in *Δελτίο Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών* (*Δ.Κ.Μ.Σ.*), vol. 6, 1986–87, pp. 155–225; “‘Εισαγωγή στην ιστορία των συλλόγων’ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (1861–1922)”, in *Μνημοσύνη*, vol. XI, 1988–90, pp. 211–34; K. Mamani and Lida Istikopoulou, *Γυναικείοι σύλλογοι στην Κωνσταντινούπολη (1861–1922),* Athens, Estia, 2002.

33 On this association, see Charis Exertzoglou, *Εθνική ταυτότητα στην Κωνσταντινούπολη τον 19ο αι. Ο Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως 1861–1912,* Athens, 1996; George A. Vasiadis, *The Syllogos Movement of Constantinople and Ottoman Greek Education 1861–1923,* Athens, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 2007, with a view on the broader context.

34 See K. Mamoni, Εισαγωγή, p. 215.

35 K. Mamoni, Εισαγωγή, p. 226. This association consisted of high ranking Turkish-Ottoman officials, Armenians, Greeks (among them some later founding members of the Philological Association) and European orientalists. Its purpose was the “improvement” of the Ottoman language, the translation of literature into Ottoman and other languages of the Empire and the publication of modern teaching books. Membership required, apart from proved activities in scholarship and science, sufficient knowledge of Arabic, Persian, Ancient Greek, Latin and the modern European languages of science and literature. Theses lofty requirements may have turned out to be counterproductive with regard to membership figures and consequently may have affected the viability of the short-lived association.

36 See K. Mamoni, Εισαγωγή, pp. 217–20. The founding of these associations (the author, p. 222, mentions about 500 between 1861 and 1922) seems to have followed a pattern of concentric circles radiating from the capital to greater regional centres and finally to the smaller towns. For Macedonia see Athanasios A. Angelopoulos, “Pro-Educational and Charitable Associations in Macedonia during the Final Years of Turkish Rule, Society for Macedonian Studies”, in *Studies on Macedonia. Μακεδονική Βιβλιοθήκη*, vol. 85, 1996, pp. 9-37. See also Lydia Papadaki, “Τοσούτοι οξύφωνοι αλέκτορες αναφωνούντες ‘γρηγορείτε’: οι ελληνικοί πολιτιστικοί σύλλογοι τον 19ο αιώνα”, in *Historica* 14, 27 (1997),

pp. 303–22, who speaks of a “complex pyramidal system of within-communication” (p. 318) due to the fact that, on the one hand, these regional associations were not just branches of the Philological Association, but, on the other hand, depended more or less on the cooperation of the latter.

37 See Elli Skopetea, *Το ‘πρότυπο βασίλειο’ και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830–80),* Athens, Polytypo, 1988, pp. 155f., on the so-called *συλλογομανία* (“association mania”).

38 Among the founding members were Alexandros Soutsos, Nikolaos Mavrokordatos, Markos Dragoumis and Charilaos Trikoupis. Their programme included the dissemination of scientific knowledge of practical use, especially among the working classes, through the establishment of public libraries and free education. This utilitarian approach differs strikingly from the otherwise uncontested dominance of so called “classical” education, which sometimes was cultivated to the point of autism.

39 The word “antipode” by L. Papadaki, ‘Τοσούτοι οξύφωνοι αλέκτορες αναφωνούντες “γρηγορείτε”’ , p. 311; on the activities of the association see Angelos Papakostas (ed.), *Η δράσις του συλλόγου κατά την εκατονταετίαν 1869–1969*, Athens, SDEG, 1970.

40 In this year a new statute was passed that declared explicitly that the “general national restoration” would be the main objective of the association, K. Mamoni, Εισαγωγή, p. 217. On the prehistory of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the schism of 1872, see Paraskevas Matalas, *Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία. Από το “ελλαδικό” στο βουλγαρικό σχίσμα,* Rethymnon, 2002–03.

41 L. Papadaki, “Τοσούτοι οξύφωνοι αλέκτορες αναφωνούντες ‘γρηγορείτε’”, p. 309f., says that it was probably the only cultural association that in 1878 stopped its usual publication of annual activity reports, justifying this with the anticipated negative reactions from the “Panslavists” which could endanger its own activities. That justification does not sound very convincing because such an ostentatious display of secrecy must have appeared even more suspicious to potential or real adversaries. For this reason, one can suspect that there were internal motives and maybe it was hoped that the association and its activities would gain in significance in the eyes of the Greek public.

42 Evangelos Kofos, “Patriarch Joachim III. (1878–84) and the Irredentist Policy of the Greek State”, in *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 4, 1 (1986), pp. 107–20. Soon both organizations reached an understanding through partitioning their geographical zones of influence. Subsequently the “Association for the Dissemination of Greek Literature” concentrated its activities on Macedonia and Epirus, leaving Thrace, Constantinople and Asia Minor for the brotherhood “Love each other” (*ibid.*, p. 113).

43 Although there existed religious associations which were mostly organized along city district boundaries and can be traced back to the eighteenth century in Constantinople, these were almost exclusively committed to the brightening of church rooms, the acquisition of icons, relics, etc. They were officially banned, though without lasting results, by Patriarch Gregory VI. in 1837, see K. Mamoni, *Εισαγωγή,* p. 213.

44 K. Mamoni, *Εισαγωγή,* p. 229.

45 See Charis Exertzoglou, "Κοινωνική ιεραρχία, ιδεολογία και εθνική ταυτότητα: το νόημα της ίδρυσης της Φιλεκπαιδευτικής Αδελφότητας 'Αγαπάτε αλλήλους'", in *Historica*, 12, 22 (1995), pp. 85–118. However, Vassiadis (pp. 147–97, 231–33) interprets this in terms of a decline of the '*syllogos* movement,' pointing out the destructive consequences of the "internecine struggle that followed" the establishment of the patriarchal association.

46 The first theater associations were founded in Constantinople; see, for example, the "Ellinikos Dramatikos Syllogos Sophoklis" ("Greek Dramatic Association Sophokles") that was founded 1882 in Tatavla (K. Mamoni, *Εισαγωγή*, p. 225).

47 Musical and gymnastic associations were at first often founded together, the latter separating later. See, for instance, the association *Orpheus*, from which the purely gymnastic "Gymnasion" separated in 1893. Other examples are the "Panionios Gymnastikos Syllogos" ("Panionian Gymnastic Association") of 1890 and the "Panionios Podosfairikos Syllogos" ("Panionian Soccer Association") of 1895 that exists until today.

48 See Christina Koulouri, Αθλητισμός και όψεις της αστικής κοινονικότητας. Γυμναστικά και Αθλητικά σωματεία 1870–1922, Athens, KNE/EIE, 1997. One pre-war example is the "Podosfairikos Omilos Athinon" ("Athens Soccer Club") founded in 1908 and today known as "Panathinaikos", while the majority of soccer clubs (e.g. "Olympiakos"–1925, "A.E.K."–1924 and "P.A.O.K."–1926) were founded in the 1920s – significantly, the latter two were founded by refugees from Constantinople and Smyrna.

49 Cf. the well-known word of the American ambassador in Greece, Charles K. Tuckerman (*The Greeks of to-day*, New York, 1872), who characterized the "Megali Idea" as the dominant ideology of Greece (quoted from the Greek translation *Οι έλληνες της σήμερον,* Athens, 1877, G. D. Patnom & Sons, p. 98). See also Richard Clogg, "The Byzantine legacy in the modern Greek World: the Megali Idea", in Lowell Clucas (ed.), *The Byzantine Legacy in Eastern Europe,* London, East European Monographs, 1988, pp. 253–81, here p. 254.

50 See Thanos Anagnostopoulos-Palaiologos, "Ο Νεοκλής Καζάζης και οι Γάλλοι φιλέλληνες στην περίοδο του Μακεδονικού Αγώνα", in Institute for Balkan Studies (ed.), *Ο Μακεδονικός Αγώνας. Συμπόσιο 28–10/2–11 1984,* Thessaloniki, 1987,

pp. 259–71, and Giorgos Kokkinos, *Ο πολιτικός ανορθολογισμός στην Ελλάδα. Το έργο και η σκέψη του Νεοκλή Καζάζη (1849–1936),* Athens, Trochalia, 1996, pp. 21–28.

51 G. Kokkinos, *Ο πολιτικός ανορθολογισμός στην Ελλάδα*, p. 27 characterizes it as "something between pressure group and hybrid of a political party that is difficult to determine". In the period from 1898 to 1901 the share of middle- and low-rank officers in the executive committee seems striking. On this, see I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität*, p. 173, note 215.

52 In 1929 Kazazis founded the "Panellinios Organosis Koinonikis Amynis" ("Panhellenic Organization of Social Defence"). To make an impression with anti-communism in interwar Greece was, however, particularly difficult, because it was extensively cultivated by virtually all political groups of the so called "bourgeois" camp, especially by the Venizelist parties, including their name giver.

53 Vikelas was born in Greece in 1835 but spent most time of his life abroad (London and Paris) and thus belongs biographically more to the Greek diaspora of Western Europe. He played a major role in the organization of the first Olympic Games in Athens in 1896, where he settled permanently in the same year. Until his death (1908) he was, apart from his literary activities, strongly committed to the association, which included the prominent contemporary writer Georgios Drosinis in its ranks.

54 It has to be mentioned, however, that Vikelas seems to have been president of a "Macedonian Central Committee" founded in 1903. See Francis R. Bridge (ed.), *Austro-Hungarian Documents relating to the Macedonian Struggle, 1896–1912,* Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, p. 104 (No. 65/66), – this was different from the "Macedonian Committee"of Dimitrios Kalapothakis, also founded in 1903 (see below), but there is no evidence for any involvement of the "Association for the Dissemination of Useful Books".

55 See, for example, the founding of an "Ergatiki Scholi" ("Workers School") in 1909 by the association, which appears like the practical implementation of aims articulated by the "Society of Friends of the People" some forty years earlier (see above, note 38). Indeed there is continuity on a personal level, since Markos Dragoumis was a member of both societies.

56 The central passages of the lecture (presented during the crisis in Eastern Rumelia in 1885) bear a striking resemblance to the present frontiers of Greece. See I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität*, pp. 136–39.

57 See Spyros Asdrachas (ed.), *Μακρυγιάννη Απομνημονεύματα,* Athens, s.a., 1960, pp. 525–31. The association committed itself to the liberation of the "brethren under the tyranny of the Sultan" and to make "the Cross of Orthodoxy shine in splendour" (ibid., p. 526, note 1).

58 See Domna Vizvizi-Dontas, *Η Ελλάς και αι δυνάμεις κατά τον Κριμαϊκόν Πόλεμον,* Thessaloniki, 1973, p. 41.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 42f.

60 Characteristically, the slogan of the 1854 rebellions was not the enlargement of the Greek kingdom but the *Ελληνική Αυτοκρατορία* ("Greek Empire"), whose "resurrection" was strongly connected with latently chiliastic-apocalyptic beliefs. See I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität,* pp. 71–79. The underlying concept of identity was more of a religious than of an ethnic nature; see Maria Todorova, "Die Freiwilligen von der Balkanhalbinsel im Krimkrieg", in Christo Choliolčev (ed.), *Nationalrevolutionäre Bewegungen in Südosteuropa im 19. Jahrhundert,* Munich, Oldenburg, 1992, pp. 134–51.

61 On the Cretan Revolt see Nikolaos A. Tsirintanis, *Η πολιτική και διπλωματική ιστορία της εν Κρήτη εθνικής επαναστάσεως 1866–1869*, 3 vols., Athens, 1950–51 and Wolfgang Elz, *Die europäischen Großmächte und der Kretische Aufstand 1866–67*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1988. The "Central Committee" of Athens established itself as the umbrella organization for numerous smaller committees that had come into existence in most Greek towns. Quarrels about responsibilities occurred with the committee in Ermoupolis/Syros that insisted on its independence (N. A. Tsirintanis, *Η πολιτική και διπλωματική ιστορία της εν Κρήτη*, vol. I, pp. 307–14). In August 1866 the Central Committee tried to launch revolts in Epirus and Thessaly (*ibid.*, p. 533ff.), and in November of the same year it established contacts with the governments of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro (*ibid.*, vol. II, p. 47ff.). These activities had no consequences but illustrate the self-understanding of the protagonists.

62 On the idea of Balkan Federation and the above-mentioned associations see Varban N. Todorov, "The Society 'Oriental Federation' and its Activities during the 80s and 90s (sic) of the nineteenth Century", in *Balkan Studies*, 25, 2 (1984), pp. 529–37; Greek Politics in the 70s of the 19th century and the Idea of Balkan Federation, in *Études Balkaniques*, 3 (1993), pp. 91–112, and *Greek Federalism during the nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects),* New York, East European Monographs, 1995; and Loukianos Chasiotis, *"'Ανατολική Ομοσπονδία': δύο ελληνικές φεντεραλιστικές κινήσεις του 19ου αιώνα,"* Thessaloniki, 2001. Leonidas Voulgaris represents a type of "revolutionary by profession" rather characteristic for the nineteenth century. As a supporter of the Balkan Federation, he maintained a communication network all over Southeast Europe, see I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität*, pp. 115–18. The Oriental Federation had contacts with, among others, the president of the Bulgarian National Assembly Zakhari Stoyanov, the Serbian activists and politicians Dimitrije Katić, Nikola Pašić, Jovan Ristić and with the later prime minister of Rumania, Ion Brațianu

(L. Chasiotis, *‘Η Ανατολική Ομοσπονδία’*, pp. 53–57), while inside Greece it had no particular impact. Until its dissolution in 1890, it was reduced to an existence as a splinter group, similar to the socialist-utopian formations that appeared at the same time and with which it also maintained contacts.

63 See Evangelos Kofos (ed.), *Η επανάστασις της Μακεδονίας κατά το 1878*, Thessaloniki, 1996, p. 25. The association “Rigas” took also part in this fusion but without having any further impact.

64 This first declaration of war by Greece since its independence was on 21 January 1878 during a most unfavourable moment, quasi “post festum” shortly after the armistice between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. It was followed by an “invasion” of Thessaly by the Greek army for one week. Negative consequences of this actually very hazardous act were only avoided thanks to the international diplomatic situation, which resulted in a more general settlement that was later ratified at the Congress of Berlin, see *IEE*, vol. 13, pp. 330–33.

65 Prominent members were, among others, the historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, who in 1877 even became president of the “National Defence”, the legal scholar Pavlos Kalligas; the director of the National Bank of Greece Markos Renieris (he had also been a member of the “Central Committee for the Cretans”) and the lawyer and politician Stefanos Dragoumis, who presided over the “Macedonian Committee”.

66 G. Hering, *Die politischen Parteien,* pp. 396–415.

67 This tendency can already be observed in the committees founded during the Cretan Revolt. They also attracted social elites, though to a lesser degree, and as in the case of the “Brotherhood” and the “National Defence” the principles of secrecy scarcely played a role, e.g. communication between the different departments even took place, partly through daily newspapers (see N. A. Tsirintanis, *Η πολιτική και διπλωματική ιστορία της εν Κρήτη*, vol. III, p. 675ff.).

68 See Georgios Lyritzis, *Η Εθνική Εταιρεία και η δράσις αυτής,* Kozani, 1971, p. 8f., and I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität,* pp. 186–96. The founders were Lieutenant Nikolaos Th. Kalomenopoulos und thirteen other low-ranking officers, who felt themselves to be in historic continuity with the “Philiki Etaireia” and cultivated analogous rituals. It is however significant that in the founding declaration they explicitly distanced themselves from previous organizations which they called “patriotic in name only” and developed mechanisms of exclusion. This is the first evidence for the emergence of a specific *esprit de corps* that is founded on the perception of the officers as the “defenders” and “avant-garde” of the nation – a well-known ideological pattern that began to flourish during the twentieth century.

69 Its spectacular “appeal to the Greek race” was published on 31 October 1896, in all the major newspapers of Athens. See the commentary of the Austrian ambassador in his report from 19 November 1896: “Es bleibt immerhin eine seltsame Erscheinung, daß eine in mystischer Dunkelheit gehüllte Gesellschaft in ihrem so bombastisch angekündigten Programme sich ganz offen neben oder eigentlich über die Regierung stellt” (F.R. Bridge, *Austro-Hungarian Documents*, p. 53 (No 15).

70 This included, apart from representatives of the political and financial world, especially academics (e.g. the historian Spyridon Lampros, the folklorist Nikolaos Politis, the linguist Georgios Chatzidakis (each of them a “Nestor” of his subject with tremendous scientific authority even in the twentieth century), numerous poets and writers (e.g. Kostis Palamas, Gerogios Drosinis, Aristotelis Valaoritis) and prominent publicists; see G. Lyritzis, *Η Εθνική Εταιρεία και η δράσις αυτής,* p. 10. Beginning in December 1896 the National Society got into a heated competition with Kazazis “Hellenism”, which was also active in irredentism during this time (*IEE*, vol. XIV, p. 98). This resulted in counter-espionage and a fight for members, although some of them (e.g. Chatzidakis) belonged to both associations.

71 Apart from the great urban centres in the Ottoman Empire, this concerned especially the strong communities of Egypt (Alexandria, Cairo, Suez) and Rumania (Konstanza, Bucharest). On the other hand, in Central and Western Europe there is evidence only for Munich, see I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität*, p. 191, note 254.

72 See *IEE*, vol. XIV. pp. 125–57 for a detailed depiction. The strong influence of the National Society on the government is documented by archival sources published by the association shortly after the end of the war, ironically for the purpose of self justification; see “*Εκθεσις των πεπραγμένων της Εθνικής Εταιρείας*”, Athens, 1897, pp. 22–26 (scarcely concealed threats against the king and his dynasty) and pp. 53–55 (secret talk with prime minister Diligiannis on the eve of the war, where Spyridon Lampros, as spokesman of the association, declared that it could rally up to 20,000 armed men if necessary – which of course was greatly exaggerated).

73 Nevertheless, a part of the considerable amounts of money accumulated before the war were used to support invalid veterans, widows and orphans. The remaining sums were finally transferred in 1900 to a “Panhellenic Rifle Club”, which the association had previously founded.

74 See Dimitris Livanios, “Conquering the souls. Nationalism and Greek guerrilla warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904–08”, in *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 23 (1999), pp. 195–221.

75 The statutes are published in ΓΕΣ (General Staff of the Army) (ed.), *Ο Μακεδονικός Αγών και τα εις Θράκην Γεγονότα*, pp. 346–48 (Articles 5, 6 and 11). This is in striking contrast to the National Society, which in article 5 of its statutes still had explicitly excluded members of the government and of the royal family even from membership (I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität*, p. 194) and clarifies the shift in mentality .

76 I. Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität*, pp. 246–48. Its first chairman was the officer Pangiotis Danglis, who, during World War I, was a member of Venizelos Triandria's government in Thessaloniki. The participation of the Greek officer corps in the Macedonian Struggle was generally significant, and forms an important aspect of the prehistory of its first open intervention in Greek politics in 1909; see Vasilis Gounaris, "Από τη Μακεδονία στο Γουδί. Δραστηριότητες των Μακεδονομάχων Στρατιωτικών (1908-09)", in *ΔΙΕΕΕ*, vol. XXIX, 1986, pp. 175–256.

77 Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amerique*, 2 vols., Paris, C. Gosselin 1835–40) (English translation in http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/ch2_05.htm, vol. 2, section 2, chapter 5: "Of the use the Americans make of public associations in civil life").

78 They are treated here as a separate category not only for reasons of factual relevance but also because critical scholarship still pays little attention to them, in contrast to cultural associations and socialist splinter groups. This imbalance could have its reasons in ideologically motivated preferences, because the history of religious societies in Greece seems to collide with well-established, latently occidentalizing development models derived from modernizing theory. So e.g. the characterization of the religious fanaticism that manifested itself around the "Papoulakos" movement simply as "dumpfes anomisches Aufbegehren" (G. Hering, *Die politischen Parteien*, p. 257) may be justified to some degree, but seems insufficient for the purposes of historical analysis in view of the broad popularity enjoyed by this movement and the fact that it could draw on the obviously well-organized and for more than one decade successfully-operating Philorthodox Society. In this context, the attempt to separate their ideological profile in a quasi "chirurgical" manner from the canon of values of the "Russian Party" (*ibid.*, note 56) is also not very convincing.

79 A. de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie*, "associations ought, in democratic nations, to stand in lieu of those powerful individuals whom the equality of conditions has swept away." (regarding monarchies and aristocratic oligarchies).

80 For the Greek case see Paschalis Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," in Thanos Veremis and

Martin Blinkhorn (eds.), *Modern Greece: Nation & Nationality,* Athens, 1992, pp. 23–66.

81 So, for instance, the historian Pavlos Karolidis was a member of both "Anaplasis" and "Hellenism" (whose founder Neoklis Kazazis as late as 1909 became a member of the masonic lodge "Athena"), while the writer Kostis Palamas, also member of "Anaplasis", went to the National Society, which competed with "Hellenism". That such things obviously did not cause severe problems becomes clear by the example of the linguist Georgios Chatzidakis who was simultaneously a member of both national associations, while the writer Georgios Drosinis, after leaving the National Society, became a member of the "Association for the Dissemination of Useful Books".

Chapter 4

1 In particular, see the works of Kemal H. Karpat, *An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations,* Princeton, Center for International Studies, 1973, and "Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era", in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire,* New York-London, Homes & Meier Publishers, vol. I, 1982, pp. 141–69.

2 See Vincent Goossaert, "State and Religion in Modern China. Religious Policy and Scholarly Paradigms", 2005, http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00106187/fr/.

3 See N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais,* Paris, Karthala, 2007.

4 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Penser l'histoire croisée: entre empirie et réflexivité", in *Annales. Histoire, sciences Sociales*, 58, 1 (january-february 2003), pp. 7–36, here p. 17.

5 Similar events had occurred a bit earlier between 1897 and 1900 in the region of Shkodër, see N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, p. 543.

6 Each chief would mobilize a certain number of armed men in order to intimidate or to fight his adversaries in different kinds of conflicts.

7 N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, pp. 74–89.

8 *Ibid*, pp. 603–06.

9 On Edith Durham, see John Hodgson, "Edith Durham: Traveller and Publicist", in John B. Allcock and Antonia Young, *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons: Women traveling in the Balkans,* New York, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2000, pp. 9–31.

10 Edith Durham, *High Albania,* London, Edward Arnold, 1909, chapter I,"The land of the living past" (http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/durham/alba-

nia/albania-I.html). By “Austrian intrigue”, Edith Durham meant the active presence of Austro-Hungarian representatives in the region for imperialist purposes. She wrote: “The Austrian Consul-general even takes it on himself to spy on the actions of tourists, as though the land were already under Austrian jurisdiction”.

11 *Ibid*, chapter IX, “In the debatable Lands – Djakova – Devich” (http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/durham/albania/albania-IX.html).

12 She begins the account of her visit by writing that Gjakovë was once Christian, and relates a legend about the conversion of the Christians in neighboring villages: one Easter, an Italian priest celebrated mass too early in the town, so that the villagers were late; they asked him to repeat the mass; since he refused, they went to the mosque and converted.

13 In fact it happened in mid-September (see HHStA, Vienna PA XIV/30, XXVII).

14 ASMAE (Rome), Archivio Storico Diplomatico, Serie P. Politica (1891–1916), Albania, Pacco 667, Uskub, 9/11/1907, 20/11/1907 and 30/11/1907.

15 The term *besa* can have several meanings (word of honour, truce, pact, etc.). See Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, “Humiliation and reconciliation in Northern Albania: the logics of feuding in symbolic and diachronic perspectives”, in Georg Elwert, Stephan Feuchtwang and Dieter Neubert (eds.), *Dynamics of Violence: Processes of Escalation and Deescalation in Violent Group Conflicts* (Sociologus, supplement 1), Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1999, pp. 133–52.

16 He was from Kalkandelen/Tetovo (today in Macedonia), and his ancestors who, according to him, were “Albanians”, came to this town from the Luma region (see Süleyman Külçe, *Osmanlı tarihinde Arnavutluk,* Izmir, 1944, p. 77, note **).

17 *Ibid*, pp. 282–83 (in the region of Shkodër, in the 1890s), pp. 324–27 (around Gjakovë, in 1907–08) and pp. 328–32 (in Prizren, in 1908). The following account is related in the two last-mentioned chapters.

18 *Ibid*, pp. 338–40.

19 Ismail Qemal bey was an Ottoman high civil servant of Albanian origin, born in Vlora (in today’s Southern Albania). He had fled to Europe in 1900, because of his opposition to Sultan Abdulhamid. Later (in 1912), he was the man who proclaimed Albanian independence.

20 See Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–08,* Oxford, Oxford University, 2001, pp. 267–69.

21 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/403, Konsulat Prizren, 1908. Vice-Consul Prochaska also extensively reported on the kidnapping of the Franciscan P. Luigi Palić between September and December 1907 (see HHStA, PA XIV/30, XXVII).

22 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/403, Vicekonsul Prochaska, Prizren, 13 June 1908.

23 According to a report by the Austrian consul in Scutari/Shkodër, the Catholic mountaineers must, in fact, have been responsible for the profanation of the

mosque, since they would not have been called upon to do such an act by their coreligionists living on the plain (HHStA, PA XIV/30, XXVII, Scutari, Consul Kral, No 126, 18 December 1907).

24 ASMAE, Archivio Storico Diplomatico, Serie P. Politica (1891–1916), Albania, Pacco 667, Uskub, 30 November 1907. In the previous report (from 20 November 1907), the consul wrote about the "community of race and political interests" among the Muslim and Catholic Albanians.

25 On Ismail Qemal bey Vlora, his Young Turk activities and his use of Albanianism, see N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, pp. 384–385. In the same way, the Austro-Hungarian civil agent in Salonica reported that rumours were spread about the involvement of the pretender to the imaginary Albanian throne, Aladro, in the kidnapping and the Smolicë mosque affair. He was supposed to have inspired local priests to foment disturbances (HHStA, PA XIV/30, Liasse XXVII, Salonique, telegram, Rappaport, 22 November 1907).

26 See HHStA, PA XXXVIII/402, Konsulat Prizren, Notiz über den katholischen Erzbischof von Uesküb, Mgre. Pasquale Trokši, Association du Master Affaires Européennesà Sciences Po (AMAF), Paris, NS Turquie vol. XIII, Uskub, Rapport annexe à la dépêche du 18 août sur les menées autrichiennes en Albanie. Mgr Trokši had better relations with the Italian and French governments. According to the French report, the clergy of the region was divided as far as relations with the Austro-Hungarian Power were concerned. The "Church", of course, should not be seen as a monolithic entity either.

27 See my study on "Local factionalism and political mobilisation in the Albanian province in the late Ottoman Empire" (to be published), where I analyse how economic and social relations were based on a system of heterogeneous and temporary alliances, which implied mutual aid and an exchange of "services". The alliances used in daily life could also be mobilised when a situation of conflict appeared. For such an event the opposing parties would mobilise their "friends" or "partisans", with more or less success, according to circumstances, leading to a certain balance of power and later to a violent conflict or to negotiations.

28 Dušan Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles,* Beograd, Plato, 1992, p. 99.

29 See, for example, Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains,* London-New York, Tauris, 1998, p. 93 sqq. On the development of education as a response to missionary and Christian minorities' activities in the provinces, see Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial classroom: Islam, the State and education in the late Ottoman Empire,* London, Tauris, 2002.

30 N. Clayer, "Quelques réflexions sur le phénomène de conversion à l'islam à travers le cas des catholiques albanais observé par une mission jésuite à la fin de l'époque ottomane", in *Mésogeios*, 2 (1998), pp. 16–39.

31 On the late development of the *Kadiriyye*, the *Rifaiyy*e, and the *Bektachiyye* in Kosovo, see Alexandre Popovic, *Les derviches balkaniques hier et aujourd'hui,* Istanbul, Isis, 1994; "La *Qâdiriyya/Kadiriye* dans les Balkans. Une vue d'ensemble", in *Journal of the History of Sufism,* 1–2 (2000), pp. 167–212; and "A propos des Bektachis au Kosovo-Métohija", in *Kosovo*, *Les Annales de l'Autre Islam*, 7 (2000), pp. 91–98.

32 N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, pp. 540–41.

33 D. Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 99.

34 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/401, Konsulat Prizren, 1904–05, Gerent Viceconsul Halla, Prizren, 17 April 1904 (telegram copy from Istanbul, 14 April 1904).

35 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/402, Konsulat Prizren, 1906–07; see reports of the viceconsul Lejhanec from July 1906.

36 In fact, according to the more detailed Austro-Hungarian reports, there were two main kidnappers, Idris Jahja and Bajram Daklan, who had the same type of objective: to obtain the liberation of a parent (HHStA, PA XIV/30, XXVII, Vice-consul Prochaska, Prizren, No 110, 20 September 1907).

37 HHStA, PA XIV/30, XXVII, Prochaska, Prizren, No 119, 1 October 1907; Rappaport, Salonica, No 102, 30 October 1907; Prochaska, Prizren, No 145, 9 December 1907.

38 HHStA, PA XIV/30, XXVII, Scutari, Consul Kral, No 126, 18 December 1907.

39 HHStA, PA XXXVIII/402, Konsulat Prizren, 1906–07, Gerent Viceconsul Lejhanec, 16 January 1907.

40 See the study of Isa Blumi on the mountaineers of Northern Albania ("Contesting the edges of the Ottoman Empire: Rethinking ethnic and sectarian boundaries in the Malësore, 1878–1912", in *IJMES*, 35, 2 (May 2003), pp. 237–56), in which she speaks about the "possibilities of identity" in the context of a border region where different external powers are competing.

41 In a report from 21 May 1908, the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul writes that a priest told him about a collective conversion in a village of the surrounding area; consequently, he informed the *mutessarıf*, who sent the gendarmerie for an investigation. The gendarmerie noted that the conversion effectively took place through a collective ceremony of circumcision. Having doubts as to the voluntary nature of this conversion, the Austro-Hungarian representative put pressure on the *mutessarıf*. The latter then decided to organize an official ceremony in front of the local Assembly, in the presence of a priest. However, the converts did not want to speak to him and the priest refused to sign the act, in pretending that it was a forced conversion (HHStA, PA XXXVIII/403, Konsulat Prizren 1908, Vicekonsul Prochaska, Prizren, 21 May1908).

42 See S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, pp. 85–86.

43 Ş. Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, p. 268.

44 Müfid Şemsi, *Şemsi Paşa, Arnavudluk ve İttihad-Terraki. El hakku ya'lû vela yu'lâ aleyh,* Istanbul, Nehir, 1995, pp. 62–64.

45 See N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, p. 560.

46 In fact, the Catholic community was not organised as a *millet* (see Anna Hedwig Benna, "Studien zum Kultusprotektorat Österreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888–1918)", in *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs,* Wien, 7 (1954), pp. 13–46).

Chapter 5

1 The armed intervention of 1850–51 was one of the most significant caesuras of late Ottoman rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ottoman army, commanded by the famous Omer-paşa Latas, broke the resistance of a local elite of notables who had fought against the diminution of their power, and the local notables were able to mobilise a quite considerable part of the (mainly urban Muslim) population to armed resistance. Only after this armed intervention (and the expatriation of many leading notables to Anatolia) did the reforms of the Tanzimat begin to really be implemented. For a more detailed analysis of the changing power and loyalty relations in the region during exactly these decades see Hannes Grandits, *Macht und Herrschaft in der spätosmanischen Gesellschaft: Das Beispiel der multikonfessionellen Herzegowina,* Wien-Köln-Weimar, Böhlau, 2008.

2 Starting about in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sublime Porte became a good client at the European financial markets. To maintain its course of modernisation, it was ready or forced to take up increasingly higher loans. Since 1869 the nominal value of new loans exploded. On average, an amount valued at 18 million British Pounds per year was being borrowed in the early 1870s. That was six times more than only a few years earlier. In 1875–76, the Ottoman Empire declared itself as insolvent to its international lenders. For details see Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 60 ff.; Donald Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Em*pire, New York, Columbia University Press, 1929.

3 Cf. here for instance the comment in the official *vilayet*-gazette *Bosna*, Br. 431 (16./28.IX.1874) or Br. 458 (24.III./5 IV.1875).

4 Vuk Šolja, an orthodox *koca-başa* from Mostar, also accompanied the *mutessarıf* and the army commander. This was meant as a conciliatory signal to the people of the Nevesinje villages. See Risto Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874. i početak ustanka u Hecegovini 1875. god,* Beograd, Št. Sv. Nikolića, 1905, pp. 136–58; Hamid Hadžibegić, "Turski dokumenti o početku ustanka u Hercegovini i Bosni 1875 godine", in *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, 1, Sarajevo,

1950, p. 88. With reference to this early phase of negotiations, also see Salih Sidki Hadžihuseinović Muvekkit, *Tarih-i Bosna / Povijest Bosne*, vol. II, Sarajevo, El Kalem, 2000, p. 1172 resp. the official interpretations about the course of the conflict in the official gazette *Bosna,* Br. 474 (14/26.VII.1875).

5 In combination with other sources, this is particularly possible with the help of the work of Risto Proroković-Nevesinjac. Proroković witnessed the years of the uprising from his native town of Nevesinje. Later, in the 1880s and 1890s, he wrote a detailed study about the here-analysed events of spring and summer 1875 (by interviewing more than 50 men involved in the negotiations and the conflict escalation). See Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874,* pp. 141–48.

6 *Ibid*, p. 143.

7 *Ibid*, pp. 26–38, 143f as well as Vaso Čubrilović, *Bosanski ustanak 1875–78,* Beograd, SKA, 1930, p. 49. See here also the official statements in *Bosna*, Br. 431 (16/28.IX.1874) and Br. 458 (24.III/5.IV.1875).

8 These were the *arhimandrit* of the monastery Žitomislić, Serafim Perović, his brother Jovan Perović, who was a teacher in the Orthodox school in Mostar and Leontije Radulović from the monastery Duži. They were accused of conspiracy and "Slavic agitation" and sent into banishment – not to Mesopotamia but to the town Fezzan in the North-African desert. J. Koetschet, who on order of vizier Savfet-paşa commanded the police action against S. Perović, has written an interesting report on this "case". See Josef Koetschet, *Osman Pascha, der letzte grosse Wesir Bosniens und seine Nachfolger,* Sarajevo, D.A., Kajon, 1909, pp. 46–50.

9 In this part of Herzegovina the bulk of the agricultural land was owned by an urban landowning class. The contemporary Proroković remarked with regard to these common property relations in his Nevesinje home region: "The large mass was living on Turkish *spahiluks* (*çiftlik*s) as *kmets – čifčijas*. To the owners of the land – the *agas* and *beys* – they had to deliver the third part of the harvest." See Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874*, p. 38.

10 See here Branko Pavićević, *Crna Gora u ratu 1862. godine,* Beograd, 1963, pp. 468–70 resp. Savo Ljubibratić and Todor Kruševac, "Prilozi za proučavanje hercegovačkih ustanka 1857–78", in *Godišnjak istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine*, God. VI, Sarajevo, 1954, pp. 183-90.

11 Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874*, p. 144.

12 Danilo Tunguz-Perović, "Nevesinjska puška", in *Spomenica o hercegovačkom ustanku 1875,* Beograd, Odbor za podizanje Nevesinjskog spomenika, 1928, pp. 51–52.

13 This was linked to a previous incident. A village "delegation" had lodged a complaint at Knjaz Nikola in Cetinje that finally reached the Ottoman authorities.

See Hadžibegić, "Turski dokumenti", pp. 86–87 and Ibrahim Tepić, *Bosna i Hercegovina u ruskim izvorima 1856–78,* Sarajevo, V. Masleša, 1988, pp. 358–60.

14 But not only people from the Nevesinje area fled in this autumn-winter 1874–75 to Montenegro (and Dalmatia). The bad harvest and the extremely hard winter caused suffering among much of the population. This also furthered the conflict with local *çiftlik-sahibis*. In one such conflict in the Stolac area, the landowner Mujaga Behmen was killed. Immediately after this deed a larger group of 20 families fled. See Pascal Buconjić, *Povijest ustanka u Hercegovini i boj kod Stoca,* Mostar, Hrv. dio. Tisk, 1911, pp. 77–80. Also see Husejn Bračković, "Tarihce-i vukuat-i Hersek/Mala istorija dogadanja u Hercegovini", in *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, Br. 34., Sarajevo, 1985, p. 177.

15 This was despite the fact that an increasingly precarious refugee problem developed on Montenegrin territory in the winter of 1874–75. The contemporary Gavro Vuković even thought that the Grahovo border region and Cetinje looked like a "Herzegovinian camp". See G. Vuković, *Hercegovački i Vasojevićki ustanak 1875. i 1876, Memoari Gavra Vukovića*, Sarajevo, Bos. Pošta, 1925, p. 9.

16 According to Russian consular reports, 165 persons returned from Montenegro to Herzegovina in the spring of 1875, following an amnesty decree by the Sublime Porte. See I. Tepić, *Bosna i Hercegovina u ruskim izvorima*, pp. 364–65.

17 Gazi Husrevbegova biblioteka (GHB), Sarajevo, Rukopis Kadićeve Kronike Sv. 26, 240, p. 88.

18 For a detailed reconstruction of these negotiations see Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874*, pp. 146–50.

19 For more details, see Valtazar Bogišić, *Zbornik sadašnih pravnih običaja u Južnih Slavena. Gragja u odgovorima iz različitih krajeva slovenskog juga,* Zagreb, Jazu, 1874, pp. 606–16 or the original reports written in the 1860s and sent to V. Bogišić in Bogišić archiv (BA)/Cavtat XIX. Br. 10: Običaji hercegovački (Odgovori).

20 *Ibid*, p. 138. Cp. as well Haus-, Hof- und Staatarchiv (HHStA)/Wien, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatsarchive. Konsulat Trebinje Kt. 1, 1874/28.

21 Tunguz came from the village Slivlja near Nevesinje. In winter and spring 1874–75, he headed a small group of men with whom he carried out smaller raids. In spring 1875, his *četa* repeatedly also united with the one of Filip Kovačević, a Montenegrin *uskok* leader. Tunguz and Kovačević knew each other from earlier "business". Kovačević was involved in a spectacular murder in Nevesinje and was wanted by the authorities. See Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874*, pp. 136–40 and, in particular, Danilo Tunguz-Perović, *Odjek Nevesinjske puške 1875,* Sarajevo, Obod, 1923.

22 The situation in Mostar in this regard was similar to the one in Sarajevo, which was aptly portrayed by the British journalist A.G. Evans, who had walked through

Bosnia on foot at this time. Evans, an admirer of the uprising, complained in one of his "letters" about his British consul, who, in his eyes, would have no sympathy for the rebels. By writing about this, he also referred to the common view of the urban Christian merchant elite regarding the uprising: "The sources of information which our representative in Sarajevo has at his disposal are either those of the official Osmanli or those of that peculiar class of Christians (with whom all visitors of the Levant are well acquainted), who, having grown rich under the protection, and often in the service, of the ruling caste, are usually, for reasons of their own, more Turcophile than the Turks themselves". A. G. Evans, *Illyrian Letters*, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1878, p. 45.

23 Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874*, p. 151 f.

24 The *hajduks* of Pero Tunguz assaulted and killed the trader Ibrica Vukotić from Gacko, who traded in tobacco, wool and livestock. *Ibid.,* p. 155; and Tunguz-Perović, *Nevesinjska puška,* pp. 51–52.

25 See S.S.H.Muvekkit, *Tarih-i Bosna*, p. 1173 resp. *Bosna*, Br. 474 (14./26.VII.1875).

26 Dispatch from 24 June (6 July) 1875 to the Bosnian Vizier Derviş-paşa from Hajdar-beg Čengić and Petraki-efendi Petrović, who had just been sent from the Vizier Derviş-paşa to support the negotions in Nevesinje. See Hadžibegić, "Turski dokumenti", p. 94.

27 A troop of border soldiers were transferred from Gacko to Nevesinje. Two further battalions, which had been raised in other border areas, joined them on their march at Fojnica. All these troops were then united with the official military in Nevesinje. See *Bosna* Br. 474 (14./26.VII.1875) resp. S. S. H. Muvekkit, *Nevesinjska puška,* p. 1174. Also see HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatsarchive. Konsulat Trebinje Kt. 1, 1875/194, pp. 26, 37, 38, 44, 51. For additional groups that also operated at the local level (local volunteers, Albanian mercenaries, etc.), see in detail also Proroković-Nevesinjac, *Nevesinjska buna 1874*, pp. 162–72.

28 *Ibid*, pp. 166–72 resp. *Bosna*, Br. 474 (14./26.VII.1875).

29 Hadžibegić, "Turski dokumenti", p. 97 (report from Nevesinje from 28 June [10 July] 1875, from Hasan-paşa and Kostan-efendi).

30 *Ibid,* p. 99 (report from Nevesinje from 3 July [15 July] 1875, from Hasan-paşa and Kostan-efendi).

31 *Ibid*, p. 105 (dispatch of the *vilayet*-administration from 9 July [21 July] 1875, to the Sublime Porte).

32 *Ibid,* p. 111 (dispatch of the *vilayet*-administration from 22 July [3 August] 1875, to the Sublime Porte).

33 Even after the described raid on the caravan, the Sublime Porte gave orders to the authorities at the scene to still try to find a suitable solution and wait before

using violence. Hasan Edib-paşa and Kostan-efendi were sent to Nevesinje as additional special emissaries. See *Bosna,* Br. 474 (14./26.VII.1875). Concerning the strategies of the new emissaries, see also Hadžibegić, "Turski dokumenti", pp. 96–97 and again *Bosna,* Br. 474 (14./26.VII.1875). See the interesting assessments of the Austrian consulate in Mostar about the developments in the areas of the uprising in HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatsarchive. Konsulat Mostar Kt. 3, 1875/85. Furthermore, after the uprising had continued for a longer period of time, new initiatives were repeatedly undertaken to de-escalate the situation by making various concessions. See here, for instance, *Neretva*. God. 1, Br. 1 (2 March 1876) or Br. 37 (6 December 1876).

34 Already on 17 August 1875 the Austrian Vice-Consul Vrčević in Trebinje reported the following to his superiors: "Turks from Trebinje move out to the insurgent villages … yesterday many *raya* were killed or seriously injured, and the regular military has not intervened". HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatsarchive. Konsulat Trebinje Kt. 1, 1875/57.

35 S. Ljubibratić and T. Kruševac,"Prilozi za proučavanje hercegovačkih ustanka 1857–78. Iz arhiva vojvode Mića Ljubibratića", in *Godišnjak istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine*, God. VIII, pp. 306–16.

36 It is interesting that Ljubibratić tried to win over the local Christian village leaders, as well as the local Muslim notables and leaders. In this early phase he issued two protocols. The first was addressed to the "Serbs in Turkey", and the other to the "Serbian brothers of Mohammedan's faith". See here Ljubibratić and Kruševac, *Prilozi za proučavanje hercegovačkih ustanka*, pp. 306–16. See also Milo Vukčević, *Crna Gora i Hercegovina uoči rata 1874–76.* Cetinje, n.Y., pp. 115–16.

37 Just at that time, a mixed commission was working to demarcate a more accurate border of the Montenegrin territory. Due to the crisis in Nevesinje, the two Ottoman representatives, Hasan Edib-paşa and Kostan-efendi, were ordered to withdraw from this duty. Furthermore, a major road construction project that was financed mainly by the Great Powers and would establish a direct link between the Dalmatian coastal towns of Kotor and Cetinje, was being carried out. Prince Nikola was interested that both projects proceed successfully. Generally, he had to implement the policies of the Great Powers, whose representatives at that time were not at all interested in any 'uncoordinated' act of the Montenegrin leadership. Cp. to the border demarcation and the road construction: Muvekkit, *Tarih-i Bosna*; S. 1173 resp. Spiridon Gopčević, *Montenegro und die Montenegriner,* Leipzig, H. Fries, 1877, pp. 41, 134–35. Concerning this, see also the remarks of Prince Nikola to the physician in Ottoman service, J. Koetschet, that the latter described in Josef Koetschet, *Aus Bosniens letzter Türkenzeit: Hinterlassene Aufzeichnungen,* Wien-Leipzig, A. Hartleben Verlag, 2007, p. 14.

38 *Bosna,* Br. 480 (25.VIII./6.IX.1875).

39 See Ljubibratić and Kruševac, *Prilozi za proučavanje hercegovačkih ustanka*, pp. 316–17 resp Vuković, *Hercegovački i Vasojevićki ustanak*, p. 36.

40 For details about these volunteers, see the illustrative material that also gives insight into the work of the Dalmatian "committees" for the support of Herzegovinian refugees. These committees were crucial in transferring the volunteers to the Herzegovinian battle fields. See, for instance, Državni Arhir (DA)/Dubrovnik, Pisma i ostavština dra Pera Čingrija. Further, see the detailed diary notes of Kosta Grujić, one of the Serbian volunteers, in K. Grujić, *Dnevnik iz Hercegovačkog ustanka (od 6. augusta do 16. oktobra 1875),* Beograd, Vojni muzej, 1956. See also the analysis of Milorad Ekmečić,"Die serbische Politik in Bosnien und der Herzegowina und die Agrarrevolutionen 1848–78", in Ralph Melville and Hans-J. Schröder, *Der Berliner Kongreß von 1878,* Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1998, pp. 427–44; Jože Pirjevec, "Die italienischen demokratischen Strömungen und ihre Beziehungen zu den Balkanslawen in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jh.", in *ibid.,* pp. 309–13.

41 Albin Kutschbach, *Erlebnisse eines Kriegsberichterstatters in Montenegro und der Herzegowina während der Insurrektion im Jahre 1875,* Chemnitz, Commissionsverlag, 1880, pp. 77–78.

42 Ivan Music was born as son of a *çifçi*-family in Klobuk near Ljubuški in 1848. He was educated in the Franciscan monastery Široki brijeg, and was prepared for a future as a Franciscan monk. He fled in 1869, during an alleged conspiracy, but was soon caught by Ottoman *zaptije*. With the intervention of the French consul in Mostar, he and his comrade Peter Božić were set free, and even received a scholarship to study medicine in Istanbul. Musić did not stay long in Istanbul. He continued his religious studies in Esztergom in Hungary and became a Catholic priest. In 1873 he was appointed as the parish priest of Ravno in Eastern Hercegovina. Marko Vego, *Don Ivan Musić i Hrvati u Hercegovačkom ustanku,* Sarajevo, Drž. Štamparija, 1953, pp. 4–5.

43 Musić was also joined by a group of "rebellious" Catholics from Hrasno, who some months earlier had come into conflict with the authorities, because they refused to follow the *zaptije* to perform unpaid work on road construction near Jablanica and Konjic. After a quarrel, their leaders fled to Dalmatia. Now they had returned and joined the camp of Musić. See P. Buconjić, *Povijest ustanka u Hercegovini*, pp. 86-87.

44 Vego, *Don Ivan Musić i Hrvati u Hercegovačkom ustanku*, p. 25.

45 Even though, for the Catholic clerics and village *knezes* – "beset" by different emissaries – it was not easy to realign themselves during the escalating crisis. See M. Vego, "Pisma o Hercegovačkom ustanku 1875. godine", in *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja*. N.S. Sv. X. Istorija i etnografija, Sarajevo, 1955, No 13 and 8.

46 Austria's influence was based on the fact that the church organisation in Herzegovina was financially quite dependent on Austria. Since the late 1860s, the Herzegovinian Franciscans, just to mention one example, received, from Austrian funds, a subsidy of 2,500 forint yearly only for their schools. Julian Jelenić, *Kultura i bosanski Franjevci,* vol. II, Sarajevo, Kramarić & Raguž, 1915, pp. 150–51.

47 See here again the biographical notes on Music in footnote 310.

48 In the course of the conflict, Musić even developed a kind of coexistence with the Ottoman authorities, although his men continued to control "autonomous" areas in the vicinity of Stolac. During this time, even local *agas* approached Musić in cases of quarrels with their *çifçis*. Finally, Musić became a proponent of a particularly pronounced pro-Austrian position, although never severing his contacts to the insurgent leaders in the eastern Herzegovinian mountains. See Marko Vego, *Don Ivan Musić i Hrvati u hercegovačkom ustanku 1875–1878 godine,* Sarajevo, Drž. štamparija, 1953.

49 For the precarious situation of the refugees, see Ilija Kecmanović, "Položaj bosansko-hercegovačkih izbeglica na dalmatinskom tlu 1875–1878, prema savremenoj štampi i spisima iz Državnog arhiva u Zadru", in *Radovi. Naučno društvo SR BiH, XX,* Sarajevo, 1963, pp. 197–206. For the activities of the Dalmatian committees in support of the refugees, see Danilo Petrović, "Djelovanje Dubrovačkog odbora za pomaganje hercegovačkih ustanika 1875-78 godine", in *Godišnjak Istoriskog društva BiH.*, god. X., Sarajevo, 1959, pp. 221–45; Julije Grabovac, *Dalmacija u oslobodilačkom pokretu bosnansko-hercegovačke raje 1875–78,* Split, Književni krug, 1991.

50 In August 1875, the official *Bosna* reported the following: "The rebels have now moved to the vicinity of Trebinje. They are joined by further rebels, and the community of the insurgence is growing from day to day. They now give weapons and foment to rebellion even those, who until recently had shown all loyalty. In the surroundings of the *kassaba* [Trebinje] the rebels also began to plunder in the villages and to burn down *kulas*, houses and *barns* and to destroy the grain on the fields…". *Bosna,* Br. 478 (11./23.VIII.1875). See here Vojislav Korać, *Trebinje. Istorijski pregled II. Drugi dio,* Trebinje, Svjetlost, 1971, pp. 55–82.

51 At the well-known meeting of village leaders in Vranjska on 27 July 1875, there were also men from Zavođe among the *Rudine-knezes*. Ljubibratić and Kruševac, *Prilozi za proučavanje hercegovačkih ustanka*, p. 312 f.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 321. The village of Jasen went up in flames on 12 August 1875. See also HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschaften- und Konsulate. Konsulat Mostar, Reservat Akten. Kt. 3. Telegramm 13 August 1875. Along the road there were also a number of fortifications, so-called *karauls*. They also became targets of attacks

in the course of the uprising, and many were systematically destroyed, like many *kulas* of local *beys* and *agas*.

53 See Bračković, *Tarihce-i vukuat-i Hersek*, p. 179, Grujić, *Dnevnik iz Hercegovačkog ustanka*, pp. 69–74.

54 The Austrian Vice-consul, Vuk Vrčević, described this plundering in his dispatch from 22 October 1875. See HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschaften- und Konsulate. Konsulat Mostar Kt. 4, 1875–1889. For the further development, see in particular HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschaften- und Konsulate. Konsulat Trebinje Kt. 1, 1875/109.

55 They predominately fled to Montenegrin territory. More than 20,000 Herzegovinian refugees spent the winter of 1875–76 in the Montenegrin border territory. Despite all later "glorification", the suffering of the refugees must have been dreadful.

56 HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschaften- und Konsulate. Konsulat Mostar Kt. 4, 1875, pp. 149–66; Esad Arnautović, *Prilozi za istoriju Trebinja u XIX stoljeću,* Trebinje, 1986, p. 9; *Neretva,* God. 1. Br. 27 (6 September 1876).

57 For a contemporary account of Bileća's seizure, see Milo Vukčević, *Sauervaldov dnevnik,* Beograd, 1931, p. 43 f.

58 Arthur G. Evans, *Ilirska pisma,* Sarajevo, V. Masleša, 1967, pp. 140–50.

59 For a description of this battalion that also participated in the seizure of Nikšić and Bileća, see Mirko Radoičić, *Hercegovina 1875–78. Istorijska građa,* Nevesinje, OOSB NOP-a, 1961, p. 19. Later on, the members of this battalion also became eligible for some pension payments. In the Zavođe-villages, three members of the Tadić kinship group received such payments. See Radivoje Tadić, *Tadići. Geneologija pivskog bratstva Tadić i druga bratstva prezimena Tadić,* Beograd, GIP Slob. Jovan, 1990, p. 229.

60 All fallen soldiers of this "Zavođanski bataljon" are documented. The losses during the war were very high; in all, 54 members of this battalion were killed in the fighting, Radoičić, *Hercegovina,* p. 19.

61 The k.u.k. troops entered Bileća on 16 September 1878; at this time the Zavođe also came under Austro-Hungarian rule. See Mihovil Mandić, *Povijest okupacije Bosne i Hercegovine 1878,* Zagreb, Matica Hrvatska, 1910, p. 69.

62 See here FHHG (Field work Hannes Grandits) 2000–2001, Interview collection Budoši/Vrbno/Dubočani (Lj. Anđelić), 2–8; also Tadić, *Tadići*, p. 232.

63 Until 1874 the selling of tobacco was not subject to specific state control. Only in the summer of 1874 were more controls introduced in the Bosnian *vilayet*. See Muvekkit*, Tarih-i Bosna*, p. 1169. resp. in detail also *Bosna,* Br. 406 (25. III./6.IV. 1874), Br. 419 (24.VI./6.VII.1874), Br. 425 (5./17.VIII.1874).

64 The spectacular journey of Franz Joseph across Dalmatia would last for almost two months. His stay was greeted with particular enthusiasm by the Catholic Herzegovinian population. Several Herzegovinian delegations, usually led by Franciscans or Catholic priests (like Ivan Musić), were received in audience by Franz Joseph. The Bosnian Vizier Derviş-paşa, also travelled to Dubrovnik for a reception by the Austrian emperor. See Buconjić, *Povijest ustanka u Hercegovini*, p. 79 f.; Vego, *Don Ivan Musić i Hrvati u Hercegovačkom ustanku*, p. 15 f.; Bračković, *Tarihce-i vukuat-i Hersek*, p. 177; Grga Martić, *Zapamćenja 1829–78,* Zagreb, Naklada Gjure Trpnica, 1906, p. 87.

65 At the suggestion of Vizier Derviş-paşa, Bishop Kraljević from Mostar, accompanied by senior Catholic and Muslim *meclis* members, even travelled to a mediation mission in order to subdue rebelling Catholics near Gabela. See Hadžibegić, *Turski dokumenti,* p. 106 resp. *Bosna,* Br. 475 (21.VII./2.VIII).

66 See here the interesting legacy of one of the leading members of one of the "committee" in Dubrovnik, Pero Čingrić. See (DA)/Dubrovnik, Pisma i ostavština dra Pera Čingrija.

67 Marko Vego, *Historija Brotnja od najstarijih vremena do 1878. godine,* Čitluk, Sour Svjetlost, 1981, p. 268.

68 But isolated smaller incidents nevertheless took place, like the one in September 1875, when a squadron led by the Franciscan Pavo Petrović briefly occupied the village of Klobuk. For more details, see Vego, *Don Ivan Musić i Hrvati u Hercegovačkom ustanku*, p. 33f.

69 Petar Božić was born into a peasant family in 1849. Like his comrade Ivan Musić, he was educated in the Franciscan monastery Široki brijeg. With support from the French consulate (for the background to this event, see again footnote 42) he received an Ottoman state scholarship for studying medicine, but soon left the capital of the Ottoman Empire for Belgrade. Martić, *Zapamćenja*, pp. 54–56; Vego, *Historija Brotnja,* 1981, pp. 263–91.

70 Marko Vego, "Korespondencija ustaničkih vođa u Hercegovačkom ustanku 1875-76. god. s don Perom Bačićem iz Stona", in *GZM. N.S.* Sv. XI, Sarajevo, 1956, No 47, 48, 53; Ljubibratić and Kruševac, *Prilozi za proučavanje hercegovačkih ustanka, Iz arhiva vojvode Mića Ljubibratića IX*, pp. 272–75.

71 Among them were also leaders of the Italian legionnaires like Carlo Faella or Cesar Ceretti. All of them were sent back to their native countries or interned. Among the arrested was also a Dutch woman named Merkus, who, as a woman among the insurgents, was regarded with a certain curiosity by contemporaries. Cp. Šarl Irijart: *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopis iz vremena ustanka 1875–76*, Sarajevo, Masleša, 1981, pp. 149–50. See also *Neretva,* God. 1, Br. 1 (3 March 1876).

72 Ljubibratić and Kruševac, *Prilozi za proučavanje hercegovačkih ustanka*, pp. 149–72.

73 He was interned in Pag and then in Hvar. After being released in the summer of 1877, he lived as a poor refugee in Dubrovnik until the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Vego, *Historija Brotnja,* pp. 286–90.

74 Cp. here also the local oral tradition, FHHG 2000/01, interview collection Ograđenik, pp. 21f, 255 f.

75 Vego, *Historija Brotnja*, pp. 291–95, 321. See also Mandić, *Povijest okupacije Bosne i Hercegovine*, p. 42.

76 Bračković, *Tarihce-i vukuat-i Hersek/Mala*, p. 177, Radomir Bulatović et al., *Bune i ustanci u Bosni i Hercegovini u XIX. veku,* Beograd, Vojnoistorijski institut, 1952, p. 73.

77 Hadžibegić, *Turski dokumenti,* p. 102.

78 Vego, *Pisma o hercegovačkom ustanku 1875. godine*, pp. 193–94 and Vego, *Korespondencija ustaničkih vođa*, pp. 43–44.

79 Bulatović *et al.*, *Bune i ustanci u Bosni i Hercegovini*, pp. 82–85. Jovan Džombeta fled with his brothers to Montenegro after the death of Mustafa-aga. After the declaration of a general amnesty for Herzegovinian refugees, he returned home in early 1875, like other refugees from the Nevesinje area. Later he became the commander of the so-called "Dabarski bataljon"; here Hadžibegić, *Turski dokumenti*, pp. 87–88 resp. Radoičić, *Hercegovina*, p. 14. See also *Bosna,* Br. 474 (14./26. VII.1875) and Br. 475 (21.VII./2.VIII).

80 This took place on 29 August 1875. The fighting cost many lives. More than a hundred people would die on this day. See Korać, *Trebinje,* p. 87.

81 Bračković, *Tarihce-i vukuati-i Hersek*, p. 184.

82 From the beginning, there were repeated bottlenecks in the delivery of supplies, and payment for the soldiers also often failed to come. Hadžibegić, *Turski dokumenti,* pp. 105–16. For confiscations in the Stolac area, cp. Muvekkit, *Tarih-i Bosna,* p. 1192 f.

83 Dipatch from V. Vrčević from 18 October 1875. HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschaften- und Konsulate. Konsulat Mostar, Kt. 4, 1875/567.

84 See HHStA/Wien, Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatsarchive. Konsulat Mostar, Kt. 3, Mission Wassitsch 1875–1876 e.g. 1875/4 or 8/187; Bračković, *Tarihce-i vukuati-i Hersek, pp.* 180–81.

85 A particularly dramatic event occurred after an amnesty proclamation by Server-paşa in October 1875. Server-paşa offered full immunity to all those who would hand over their weapons and would go back home to their villages. Among those who agreed to this offer were also seven village *knezes* from the Popovo. Like many others, they came to Stolac and gave up their weapons without any problems. But on the way home they were attacked by *başıbozuk* troops and massacred. This event triggered a mass emigration from the area to Dubrovnik. During

the following days, more than 2,800 people fled to the area near Ombla alone. See here the diary notes in Grujić, *Dnevnik iz Hercegovačkog ustanka,* p. 221.

86 This was reported on 22 October 1875 in a letter from the Austrian military commander in Dubrovnik to the governor of Dalmatia. See Vego, *Pisma o Hercegovačkom ustanku,* No 36.

87 Buconjić, *Boj kod Stoca*, pp. 60–68.

88 See FHHG 2000–2001, interview collection Ošanjići. (DOK 2).

Chapter 6

1 Alexander Burmov (ed.), V*assil Levsky i negovite spodvizhnitzi pred turskiya săd,* Sofia, NBKM, 1987 (1st ed. 1952).

2 Stoyan Zaimov, *Vassil Levsky Dyakonăt*, Sofia, Hr. Oltchev, 1897, 2nd ed., p. 6; Inna Peleva, *Ideologăt na natziyata. Dumi za Vazov*, Plovdiv, PUI, 1994, p. 8.

3 Nikola Obretenov, *Spomeni za bylgarskite văzstaniya,* Sofia, Bălgarska kniga, 1938, p. 77; Nikola G. Danchov and Ivan G. Danchov, *Bălgarska entziklopediya,* Sofia, 1936, p. 1198.

4 Hristo Stambolsky, *Avtobiografiya, dnevnitzi i spomeni,* vol. II, Sofia, Dărzhavna petchatnitza, 1927, pp. 158–60, 235; Ivan Undzhiev, Vassil Levsky. *Biografiya,* Sofia, MII, 1947, pp. 438–41, who otherwise found many discrepancies in Stambolsky's memoirs, accepted this statement as true and dated the visit back to the summer of 1871. Undzhiev did not give up this thesis in the next publication of the book either: I. Undzhiev, Vassil Levsky. *Biografiya,* Sofia, Nauka i izkustvo, 1980, 2nd ed., p. 217; see also: Krumka Sharova, "Midhat pasha i bălgarskoto revoliutzionno dvizhenie prez 1872 g.", *Istoricheski pregled,* 7 (1991), p. 13–17. This statement could not be taken for granted. In the 1880's Ivancho Penchovich on two occasions spoke about Levsky with Konstantin Jireček, but did not mention such a meeting with Levsky: Konstantin Jireček, *Bălgarski dnevnik*, Plovdiv, Sofia, Hr.G. Danov, vol. II, pp. 195–97, 415–17. Among the contemporary testimonies there are statements that Ivancho Penchovich tried to help those on trial by advising them to admit nothing: Dimităr Strashimirov, Vassil Levsky – *Zhivot, dela, izvori,* Sofia, Naroden komitet "Vassil Levsky", 1929, p. 596, in a letter by Danail Hr. Popov; however, this does not directly affect the present topic.

5 S*alname-i Vilayet-i Tuna. Defa* 1, Sene 1285, p. 74 (these yearbooks reflected the composition of the local authorities at the beginning of the respective year to which they referred. The year 1285 started from 12/24 April 1868, but that yearbook was published with a bit of delay: *Tuna*/Dunav, No 273/5–17 May 1868); *Sn Tuna. Defa* 2, Sene 1286, p. 47 (starting at 1/13 April 1869). In these two yearbooks he is entered as Haci Manos Ağa; *Sn Tuna. Defa* 3, Sene 1287,

p. 63 (21 March/2 April 1870); *Sn Tuna. Defa* 4, Sene 1288, p. 66 (10/22 March 1871); *Sn Tuna. Defa* 5, Sene 1289, p. 67 (28 February/11 March 1872); *Sn Tuna. Defa* 6, Sene 1290, p. 67 (16/28 February 1873); *Sn Tuna. Defa* 7, Sene 1291, p. 77 (6/18 February 1874).

6 S*alname-i Vilayet-i Tuna. Defa* 9, Sene 1293, p. 96 (16–28 January 1876); *Salname-i Vilayet-i Edirne. Defa* 8, Sene 1294, p. 103 (4–16 January 1877).

7 Tzonko Genov, "Proyavi na natzionalnoosvoboditelnite borbi v Sofia", in *Sofia prez vekovete,* Sofia, BAN, 1989, pp. 213–22, here p. 217; Georgy Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite i bălgarskata natzionalna revoliutziya,* Veliko Tărnovo, Vital, 1993, p. 137.

8 Tz. Genov, "Proyavi na natzionalnoosvoboditelnite borbi v Sofia", p. 217.

9 S*alname-i Vilayet-i Tuna. Defa* 7, Sene 1291, February 1874, p. 77; *Sn Tuna. Defa* 8, Sene 1292, February 1875, p. 91; *Sn Tuna. Defa* 9, Sene 1293, January 1876, p. 96.

10 A. Burmow, V*assil Levsky i negovite spodvizhnitzi...,* p. 110*;* According to Stoyan Zaimov's memoirs, Pesho Todorov himself personally knew Dimităr Obshti: S. Zaimov, *Minaloto*, Sofia, BZNS, 1983 (1st ed. 1884–88, 2nd revised ed. 1898–99), pp. 224, 226–27.

11 Petăr Dinekov, *Sofia prez XIX vek do osvobojdenieto na Bălgaria,* Sofia, 1937, p. 299, who quotes: S. Zaimov, *Minaloto,* p. 158.

12 S*alname-i Vilayet-i Tuna. Defa* 1, Sene 1285 (May 1868), p. 74; *Sn Tuna. Defa* 4, Sene 1288, March 1871, p. 66; *Sn Tuna. Defa* 7, Sene 1291 (February 1874), p. 77.

13 I. Undzhiev, *Vassil Levsky,* p.167; Tz. Genov, "Proyavi na natzionalnoosvoboditelnite borbi v Sofia", p. 217; G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite,* p. 137.

14 It is claimed that together with Pesho Todorov Zheliavetza, Mito Kaymaktchi, and Mano Stoyanov, he took part in the investigation of Dimităr Obshti: P. Dinekov, *Sofia prez XIX vek*, p. 299, who quotes: S. Zaimov, *Vassil Levsky vek*, pp. 158, 190. However, in another famous book by Stoyan Zaimov, Dimităr Mitovich was mentioned as the fourth Bulgarian in that commission: S. Zaimov, *Minaloto,* 1983, p. 219. The same sources again mention Dimităr Hadzhi Kotzev as being a member of the investigative commission during its initial stage. He was also related to the revolutionary organization in Sofia: I. Undzhiev, *Vassil Levsky*, 1947, p. 344, also in the 2nd ed., 1980, p. 167; quotes the first edition of the Zaimov's book on Levsky 1895, p. 140. Unfortunately, this issue cannot be clarified, as not all protocols since the beginning of the investigation have been found.

15 S*alname-i Vilayet-i Tuna. Defa* 1, Sene 1285, 74, May 1868; *Salname-i Vilayet-i Edirne. Defa* 8, Sene 1294, 103, January 1877.

16 Matei Georgyev, *Văzrazhdaneto na grad Sofia,* Sofia, 1920, p. 63.

17 Nikola Popov and Maria Mihaylova (eds.), *Protokoli ot sădebniya protzes sreshtu Atanas Uzunov i drugite podsădimi po haskovskoto pokushenie prez 1873 g.,* Sofia, NBKM, 1975, pp. 71–72.

18 S. Zaimov, *Minaloto*, p. 441 sqq. Zaimov is one of the convicted in this trial and we can trust his memoirs about this case to a greater extent.

19 Zahary Stoyanov, *Zapiski po bălgarskite văstaniya,* Sofia, Bălgarski pisatel, 1983, 1st ed. 1884, 1887, and 1892 for the respective volumes, pp. 638–41.

20 Yurdan P. Todorov, *Văzpominaniya po văstaniyata v Tărnovskiya sandjak prez 1876 g. i po sădeneto na bălgarskite văstanitzi v Tărnovo*, Russe, 1897, pp. 100, 109.

21 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, pp. 121–25.

22 P. Dinekov, *Sofia prez XIX vek,* p. 299.

23 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite,* 1993, p. 137.

24 S. Zaimov, *Minaloto*, p. 657. Notes by Ana Melamed.

25 Nikola Obretenov, *Dnevnitzi i spomeni (1877–1939),* Sofia, OF, 1988, p. 60 and endnote on p. 406 (notes by Dimităr Mintzev).

26 *Batak, Almanah,* Sofia, Bulgarica, 2002, pp. 25, 27; Yanko Yanev, *Batak i Văzrazhdaneto,* Sofia, 2004, pp. 107, 117.

27 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, p. 8.

28 For an overview of the historiography including these debates: Mihail Grăncharov, "Problemăt za chorbadzhiystvoto v bălgarskata sledosvobozhdenska istoriografiya", in *Vekove,* 6 (1990), pp. 67–75; Rumen Daskalov, *Kak se misli Bălgarskoto văzrazhdane,* Sofia, LIK, 2002, pp. 167–91.

29 In his attempt at a comprehensive study of the revolutionary membership in the Fourth revolutionary district of 1876, Hristo Yonkov listed among them 16 members of mixed councils (*meclises*) and 58 "mayors, *muhtar*s, *vekil*s": Hristo Yonkov, *Chislen, sotzialen i klasov săstav na revoliutzionerite v Aprilskoto văstanie 1876. Istoriko-sotziologichesko izsledvane na IV revoliutzionen okrăg,* Sofia, BAN, 1993, p. 84. Keeping in mind that the study included 116 villages, most of them in the two *kaza*s – Tatar Pazardzhik and Plovdiv (with respectively 47 and 36 villages), this turns out to be a big involvement.

30 Mihail Grăncharov, "Sotzialna i politicheska pozitzia na chorbadzhiystvoto prez Văzrazhdaneto", in *Kultura, tzărkva i revoliutziya prez Văzrajdaneto. Materiali ot nauchnata konferentziya v Sliven, 15–16 noemvri 1995*, Sliven, Istoricheski muzei, 1995, pp. 134–46.

31 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*. Pletnyov also develops his theses in some earlier works, e.g., G. Pletnyov, "Chorbadzhiite ot Tărnovsko v natzionalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie", in *Istoricheski pregled*, 33, 3 (1977), pp. 105–09.

32 Milena Stefanova, *Kniga za bălgarskite chorbadzhii,* Sofia, UI, 1998.

33 R. Daskalov, *Kak se misli Bălgarskoto văzrazhdane*, p. 288; Hristo Gandev, *Aprilskoto văstanie 1876 g.,* Sofia, Nauka i izkustvo, 1974.

34 P. Dinekov, *Sofia prez XIX vek,* p. 230, refers to Stoyan Zaimov's biography of Levsky, 1897.

35 *Istoriya na Bălgaria*, vol. IV, Sofia, BAN, 1987, p. 321.

36 Zdravko Daskalov, *Osăden li e Vassil Levsky (Pravno-istorichesko izsledvane),* Sofia, Ogledalo, 2006.

37 Dimităr Strashimirov, *Istoriya na Aprilskoto văstanie*, vol. II, Plovdiv, 1907, pp. 21-22.

38 Nikolay Gentchev, *Vassil Levsky,* Sofia, Voenno izdatelstvo, 1987, pp. 17–19.

39 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, pp. 141–42.

40 Georgy Zelengora, *Kriminalnite elementi v bălgarskoto natzionalnoosvoboditelno dvizhenie,* Unpublished manuscript, 2002.

41 Zina Markova, *Chetata ot 1868 godina,* Sofia, BAN, 1990.

42 The instructions to the committees' members emphasized the necessity to keep the secret: Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, p. 220; During the interrogations, Levsky said that it was for the benefit of the cause to prevent spreading the committee question among the populace: A. Burmow, *Vassil Levsky i negovite spodvizhnitzi...,* p. 191.

43 As, for instance, the abbots of Dragalevtzy, Kalugerovo, Cherepish, Batoshevo, Dryanovo, Troyan and some other monasteries, *Aprilskoto văstanie i Bălgarskata pravoslavna tzărkva,* Sofia, Sinodalno izdatelstvo, 1977, pp. 29–30, 324–26, 334, 340, 349; also the abbots of Kapinovo, Plakovo and some other monasteries: Konstantin Kosev, Nikolay Zhechev and Doyno Doynov, *Aprilskoto văstanie v sădbata na bălgarskiya narod,* Sofia, AI, 2001, pp. 82, 83.

44 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, p. 160 sqq.

45 N. Gentchev, *Vassil Levsky,* pp. 17, 44.

46 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, p. 134.

47 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski,* 1983, p. 220.

48 D. Strashimirov, *Istoriya,* 1907, vol. I, see part one; Dimităr Strashimirov, "Komitetskoto desetiletie. Epoha na komitite. 1866–76", in *Bălgaria 1000 godini (927–1927),* Sofia, MNP, 1930, pp. 781–888.

49 K. Kosev, N. Zhechev and D. Doynov, *Aprilskoto văstanie* (2001), p. 4: "The April Uprising in 1876 is organically linked to the entire revival process as a culmination of the Bulgarian national revolution.... Its preparation started already in the dawn of the Revival era [i.e. around 1700]".

50 D. Strashimirov, *Istoriya*, vol. I, pp. 299–300.

51 *Ibid.*, pp. 350–51.

52 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, p. 110 sqq.

53 In the present article I am not trying to elaborate further on this problem, because there is little direct evidence about the motifs of the local notables to join the revolutionary committees and to take part in the uprising. As a whole, I would rather agree with the traditional historiography that this choice resulted from a conscious decision to contribute to the national cause, which was largely influenced by the older opposition between Christians and Muslims. Of course, individual convictions and different personal considerations played an important role, and by far not all "good Bulgarian patriots" joined the revolutionary movement. In any case, it should be underlined that, contrary to many cases of unrest during the early Tanzimat period, discontent with attempted reforms or misdeeds by local administrators are not the main reasons for the decision to revolt.

54 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, p. 134.

55 Mehmet Safa Saraçoğlu, "Sitting Together: Local Councils of the County of Vidin as Domains of Hybridization (1864–77)", 2009, http://www.cas.bg/cyeds/downloads/CAS_RIH_Saracoglu.pdf.

56 M. Hüdai Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devletınde Bulgar Meselesi (1850–75),* Ankara, TTK, 1992, pp. 124–32.

57 Z. Stoyanov, Zapiski, p. 224.

58 Nikolay Gentchev, *Sotzialnopsihologicheski tipove v bălgarskata istoriya,* Sofia, Septemvri, 1987, p. 104.

59 Konstantin Velichkov, *V tămnitza i drugi spomeni,* Sofia, Hemus, 1938, 1st ed. 1899, p. 64; G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, p. 185.

60 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, pp. 200–08.

61 P. Dinekov, *Sofia prez XIX vek*, pp. 336–37.

62 Maya Nedeva and Nikolay Markov (eds.), S*ofiiskoto obshtinsko upravlenie, 1878–79*, Sofia, GUA, 2000. p. 385.

63 *Ibid*, pp. 599 sqq.

64 *Ibid*, p. 706.

65 *Ibid*, pp. 199, 648–49, 655.

66 Zina Markova, *Bălgarskata ekzarhiya 1870–79,* Sofia, BAN, 1989, pp. 200 sqq. These two opinions are illustrated respectively by the studies of Simeon Damyanov, "Pravoslavnata tzărkva i bălgarskata natzionalna revoliutziya", in *Pravoslavieto v Bălgaria,* Sofia, 1974, pp. 153–91 and Todor Săbev, "Bălgarskata pravoslavna tzărkva i natzionalnoosvoboditelnoto dvizhenie", in *Aprilskoto văstanie i Bălgarskata pravoslavna tzărkva,* Sofian Sinodalno izdatelstvo, 1977, pp. 7–69.

67 İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat devrinde Osmanlı mahalli idareleri (1840–80),* Ankara, TTK, 2000, 1st ed. 1974, pp. 81–82, 112.

68 Y. P. Todorov, *Văzpominaniya*, p. 146.

69 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, p. 94.

70 N. Obretenov, *Spomeni*, p. 193; earlier, Toma Kărdziev, the leader of the revolutionary committee in the city, worked as chief typesetter in the printing house of the *Tuna/Dunav* newspaper, p. 80.

71 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, p. 247.

72 *Ibid*, p. 109.

73 A. Burmow, *Vassil Levsky i negovite spodvizhnitzi...*, pp. 35, 56, 57, 162, 178, 206, 216.

74 *Ibid*, p. 156.

75 Although both Zahary Stoyanov and Stoyan Zaimov used the name "April Uprising", in 1901 the "25th anniversary of the Sredna Gora Uprising" was celebrated.

76 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski,* p. 143; G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, pp. 174–75.

77 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, p. 283.

78 D. Strashimirov, *Istoriya*, vol. 2, p. 104.

79 *Ibid*, p. 287.

80 G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, pp. 178–79.

81 Boycho [Angel Goranov], *Vostanieto i klaneto v Batak,* Sofia, 1892, pp. 15–16.

82 H. Yonkov, *Chislen, sotzialen*, pp. 45, 71–72.

83 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, p. 275.

84 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, p. 109.

85 Among the 22 sentenced during the above-mentioned trial in Haskovo (*Protokoli ot sădebniya protzes sreshtu Atanas Uzunov …,* 1975, pp. 122–35*),* together with the large number of tradesmen (9) and teachers (5) we could find four called *chorbadzhiyas* (Kosta Todev, Doycho Dimov, Stancho, Yani Tonev), and besides them one called Hadzhi and two sons of some Hadzhi (thus G. Pletnyov calculates that there were seven *chorbadzhias*: G. Pletnyov, *Chorbadzhiite*, p. 138); two innkeepers (Kosta Todev, Georgy Dechev); three priests (pop Dimităr, pop Mincho Kănchev, pop Enyu Dimitrov), two of whom occupied administrative posts (Dimităr pop Stefanov was a cashier in the town municipal office in Haskovo, pp. 77, 132; Yanko Kochev was a cashier of the *kaza* of Chirpan, pp. 82, 133) and one person (Kosta Todev) who was elected to the administrative council (p. 71).

86 A. Burmow, V*assil Levsky i negovite spodvizhnitzi...,* pp. 110–11.

87 I. Undzhiev, *Vassil Levsky,* 1947, pp. 603, 1063.

88 A. Burmow, V*assil Levsky i negovite spodvizhnitzi...,* pp. 153 sqq.

89 D. Strashimirov, *Istoriya,* vol. II, pp. 167–68.

90 Z. Stoyanov, *Zapiski*, p. 220.

91 D. Strashimirov, *Vassil Levski,* 1929, pp. 32–50 (documents No 15–20).

Chapter 7

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** Note on transliteration: words in Ottoman Turkish have been rendered into Latin script according to the system employed in the *New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary,* Istanbul, Redhouse Press, 1991, 12th ed. Words in Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) have been rendered into Latin script according to the system employed in Joseph Nehama with the collaboration of Jesús Cantera, *Dictionnaire du Judeo-Espagnol,* Madrid, Instituto Benito Arias Montano, 1977. This transliteration reflects the dialect used by the Jews of Salonica. Dates are given according to the Gregorian calendar, except in the case of contemporary newspapers and books, where the stated date of publication according to the Ottoman Solar *hicri* calendar, based on the Julian calendar, is given priority, e.g., 4 October 1328 (17 October 1912).

1 Arieh Samsonov, *Ha-Balkan Ha-Bo'er: Reshimot me-Milhemet 1912,* Tel Aviv, 1932. On Ya'akov Schwartz, see also http://www.izkor.gov.il/izkor86.asp?t=506520 (in Hebrew).

2 Avigdor Levy, "The Jews of Edirne during the Balkan Wars according to the Diary of a Jewish School Mistress", in *Hamizrah Hehadash*, 39 (1997–98), p. 38, (in Hebrew).

3 Angela Guéron, *Journal du siège d'Andrinople, 30 octobre 1912–26 mars 1913,* Istanbul, The Isis Press, 2002.

4 A major exception is David Ashkenazi, "The Conscription of the Jews to the Ottoman Army in 1909-10" as reflected in *El Tiempo*, Pe'amim, pp. 105–06 (2005–06), pp. 181–218 (in Hebrew). For the Turkish War of Independence, see Leyla Neyzi, "Trauma, Narrative and Silence: The Military Journal of a Jewish Soldier in Turkey during the Greco-Turkish War", in *Turcica*, 35, Leuven, Peeters, 2003, pp. 291–313.

5 See, for example, Billie Melman, "Nation and the Construction of Gender in Peace and War – Palestine Jews, 1900-18", in Billie Melman (ed.), *Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War and Peace 1870–1930,* New York, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 121–40; Jacob Markovizky, *Conflicts of Loyalties: The Enlistment of Palestinian Jews in the Turkish Army,* Ramat Efal, Yad Tabenkin, 1995 (in Hebrew).

6 Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry: a History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th–20th centuries,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, pp. 126–27. On "Ottoman Zionism" and on Zionist activity in the Ottoman political centre in Istanbul, and its ability to draw its supporters mostly due to its local social messages, rather than by its national ideology, see also Esther Benbassa, "Zionism in the Ottoman Empire at the End of the 19th and the Be-

ginning of the 20th century", in *Studies in Zionism*, 11, 2 (1990), pp. 127–40; Michelle Campos, "Between 'Beloved Ottomania' and 'the Land of Israe': The Struggle over Ottomanism and Zionism among Palestine's Sephardi Jews, 1908–15", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 37 (2005), pp. 461–83.

7 Aron Rodrigue, "The Ottoman Diaspora: The Rise and Fall of Ladino Literary Culture", in David Biale (ed.), *Cultures of the Jews: A New History,* New York, Schocken Books, 2002, pp. 863–85.

8 Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry: A History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th–20th centuries,* Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 83.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

10 On the *Alliance* schools in the Ottoman Empire, see A. Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925,* Bloomington, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990.

11 Eyal Ginio, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–13): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream", *War in History*, 12, 2 (2005), pp. 156–77.

12 Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–14", in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire – the Functioning of a Plural Society*, vol. I, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1982, pp. 401–34, here pp. 426–27.

13 *Ibid*, p. 426.

14 On the term "middleman minority", see Walter P. Zenner, *Minorities in the Middle – A Cross-Cultural Analysis,* Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991.

15 This figure is clearly at variance with the number of a quarter of million stated above. This difference could be explained by the formal policy, reflected in this textbook, to include former Ottoman provinces, now under foreigners' sway or dependant entities, as still being part of the Ottoman realm. Among these lost provinces that harboured large Jewish communities were Tunisia, Egypt, Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Sevfet Bey, *Resimli ve Haritali Coğrafya-yı Osmani,* Istanbul, 1328/1912–13, No 5.

17 *Hayyealelfelâh*, Salonica: Rumeli Matbaası, 1326, p. 3.

18 *Millet-i Osmaniye, muhtelif din ve milletlere malik Türk, Arap, Arnavut, Kürd, Ermeni, Rum, Bulgar, ve Yehudi…gibi kavmiların bir araya gelmesinden hâsıl olan heyettir*, *ibid*, p. 4.

19 On al-Kahina, see Abdelmajid Hannoum, "Historiography, Mythology and Memory in Modern North Africa: The Story of the Kahina", in *Studia Islamica*, 85 (1997), pp. 85–130.

20 Thomas Bauer, “al-Samaw’al b. ’Ādiya”, in D. J. Brauman, Th. Bianguis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs and G. Lecomte (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (EI2), vol. VIII, Leiden, Brill, 1995, pp. 1041–42.

21 Merkado Yosef Kovo, *Los Ğiđyos kómo Soldáđos a traverso los Syéklos,* Salonica, Biblyotéka de la Famíya Ğudía, 1911.

22 On the participation of underprivileged groups in the war effort as a mechanism for social change, see Arthur Marwick, “Problems and Consequences of Organizing Society for Total War”, in Dreisziger (ed.), *Mobilization for Total War,* Waterloo, Ont., Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981, pp. 3–21.

23 Michael Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews – The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 1825–55,* Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983, pp. 13–34.

24 Ira Katznelson, “Between Separation and Disappearance; Jews on the Margins of American Liberalism”, in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 157–205, here p. 177.

25 A. Rodrigue, “From *Millet* to Minority: Turkish Jewry”, in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 238–61, here p. 255.

26 Erik Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844–1918”, in Erik J. Zürcher (ed.), *Arming the State – Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925,* London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 90.

27 Selahittin Özçelik, *Donanma-yi Osmanî Muavenet-i ’Melliye Cemiyeti,* Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000, p. 12.

28 *Ibid.*, annex No. 9.

29 “Asosyasyón Nasyonál en favór dela Flóta Otomána”, in *Estatútos,* Istanbul, Arditi, 5761, 1911.

30 Bahriye Nezaret-i Celilesi, *Bahriye Salnamesi Eylûl 1330–Eylûl 1331 Sene-yi Maliyesine Mahsustur,* Istanbul, 1330, hicri, 1913–14.

31 Raphael Yosef Florentin, *Kózas Pasađas–Epizóđyos de los Akontesimyentos ke se pasaron en Kavala del 1912 al 1918,* Kavala-Salonica, Akvaroni i Bachar, 1929, p. 4.

32 On the Balkan Wars, see Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–13. Prelude to the First World War,* London and New York, Routledge, 2000.

33 For the other Balkan states, see Herbert Friedenwald and Harry G. Friedman, *The American Jewish Year Book 5674, October 2, 1913, to September 20, 1914,* Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1913, pp. 188–206. The numbers are 4,200 Jewish soldiers in the Bulgarian army (out of 45,000 Jews living in Bulgaria), 800 in the Serb army (out of 7,000 Jews living in Ser-

bia) and 400 in the Greek army (out of 6,380 Jews in Greece). For Bulgaria, see also Avraham M. Tadjir, *Nótas Istoríkas sóvre los Ǧíđyos de Bulgaría i la Komunitá de Sofia,* Sofia, 1932, pp. 179–83.

34 See, as an example, “Por las Famíyas delos Soldáđos Ǧíđyos de Salonika”, *El Tyémpo*, 28 October 1912. On *El Tyémpo*, see Sara Abrevaya-Stein, *Making Jews Modern: The Yiddish and Ladino Press in the Russian and Ottoman Press,* Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 55–82.

35 See, for example, “Ǧíđyos otomános! korremos al sokórso de nwéstra pátria”, in *El Tyémpo*, 14 October 1912.

36 On the perceptions of the Crusades in Jewish historiography in Modern Europe, see David N. Myers, “‘*Mehabevim et Ha-Tsarot*’: Crusade Memories and Modern Jewish Martyrologies”, in *Jewish History*, 13, 2 (1999), pp. 49–64.

37 “Las Kruzadas i los Ǧiđyos”, in *El Tyémpo*, 25 October 1912.

38 “La Yamáda al Fanatísmo Reližyóso éča por los Estáđos Balkánikos”, in *El Tyémpo,* 23 October 1912.

39 See, as examples, “La Prénsa Katólika i La Gerra”, in *El Tyémpo*, 1 November 1912; “Una Fálsa Akuzasyón kóntra los Ǧíđyos de Andrinópoli”, in *El Tyémpo*, 5 May 1913.

40 “El Soldáđo Ǧiđyó Israel Mwerto por la Defénsa de Andrinópoli”, in *El Tyémpo*, 10 February 1913.

41 The journal quoted the Ottoman *tefsir-i Efkâr* and claimed that four Jewish men were present on the *Hamidiye,* as against two Armenians and one Greek. See *El Tyémpo*, 21 November 1913. The *Hamidiye* battleship served as a prominent symbol of the Balkan wars. Amidst the devastating debacles of the first Balkan war, the adventures of the *Hamidiye*, under the command of Rauf Bey, were a unique source of pride and accomplishment. The successful bombardment of the harbour of Varna, the sinking of the Greek auxiliary cruiser *Makedonya* in the harbour of Siros, and its elusive journeys between the major port towns of the Mediterranean, fostered pride that the Ottomans hoped to use in their favour. On the *Hamidiye*'s combats, see A. Cemaledin Saraçoğlu, *Gazi Hamidiyenin Şanlı Maceraları,* Istanbul, Gün Yayınları, 1960; Afif Büyükturgul, “Balkan Savaşında Deniz Harekatı Üzerine Gerçekler (1912–13)”, in *Belleten*, 44 (1980), pp. 717–52.

42 Esther Benbassa, *Haim Nahum – A Sephardic Chief Rabbi in Politics, 1892–1923*, trans. by Miriam Kochan, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1995, pp. 173–74.

43 One example is a popular song in Judeo-Spanish, apparently translated from Turkish, known under the title of *Gérras en los Balkánes* (“Wars in the Balkans”). It was recorded and published by Suasana Weich-Shahak, *Arboleras – Cancion-*

ero Sefardí del Siglo XX, Madrid, Tecnosaga, 2000. See also Weich-Shahak, "Actuality in the Judeo-Spanish Songs from Oral Tradition", in *Ladinar – Studies in the Literature, Music and the History of the Ladino Speaking Sephardic Jews*, 2 (2001), pp. 97–100; *En Buen Siman!: Panorama del Repertorio Musical Sefaradí,* Haifa, Pardes, 2006, pp. 128–30.

44 See, as examples, "Un Komité Ǧiđyó por el Kresyénte Kolorado", in *El Tyémpo*, 16 October 1912; "Un Komité Ǧiđyó por el Kresyénte Kolorádo", in *El Tyémpo*, 21 October 1912; "El Kresyénte Kolorádo i Los Ǧiđyos de Konstantinóple", in *El Tyémpo*, 23 October 1912.

45 See *Osmanlı hilâl-i Ahmer Salnamesi 1329–31*, Istanbul, Matbaacılık Osmanlı Şirketi, n.d.

46 "Gran Rabináto de Turkía", *El Tyémpo*, 16 October 1912.

47 "Hevrat Ha-Mitlamdim Ha-´Ivriyim Ha-Ottomanim Be-Kushta", in *El Tyémpo*, 8 November 1912.

48 "El Komité dela Defénsa Nasyonál – La Reunyón Patriyótika de Vyérnes Último", in *El Tyémpo*, 3 February 1913; "Gran Rabináto de Turkía–Yamáda a Nwéstros Ermános", in *El Tyémpo*, 7 February 1913.

49 *İkdam*, 5 March 1913.

50 "Myéntres el Aséđyo de Andrinópoli", in *El Tyémpo*, 21 August 1913. The *Jewish Chronicle* published the interview a little later. See "The City of Siege", in *The Jewish Chronicle*, 29 August 1913.

51 George Kennan, *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflection on the Present Record,* Washington DC, Brookings Institution Publications, 1993 [1913], pp. 113, 343.

52 Philippe Landau, *Les juifs de France et la grande guerre : Un patriotisme républicain 1914–41,* Paris, CNRS Editions, 1999, pp. 195–210.

53 See, for example, "El Servísyo Militár i los Aiđáđos de 30 a 40 Áños", in *El Tyémpo*, 16 October 1912.

54 "El Kázo de Nissim Kalma", in *El Tyémpo*, 14 October 1912.

55 Stein Abravaya, *Making Jews Modern*, p. 58.

56 "Prizonyéros Ǧiđyos Búlgaros en Turkía", *El Tyémpo*, 3 March 1913.

57 "Rengrasyemyéntos de Prizonyéros Ǧiđyos Otomanos en Filippopoli", in *El Tyémpo*, 20 January 1913; "Prizonyéros Ǧiđyos en Bulgaría", in *El Tyémpo*, 7 February 1913; "Los Soldáđos Ǧiđyos Prizonyéros en Bulgaría", in *El Tyémpo*, 26 February 1913.

58 "Soldáđos Ǧiđyos Otomános Prizonyéros en Yanina", in *El Tyémpo*, 2 April 1913; "Los Prizonyéros Ǧiđyos en Izmit", in *El Tyémpo*, 16 April 1913; "Los Prizonyéros Búlgaros Ǧiđyos en Nwéstra Sivdád", in *El Tyémpo*, 1 August 1913.

59 See, for example, “La Bravúra de Uno Soldáđo Ğiđyó en la Batálya de Kumanova”, in *El Tyémpo*, 13 November 1912; “Deklarasyónes de Uno Ğenerál Búlgaro sóvre el Eroísmo delos Soldáđos Ğiđyos”, in *El Tyémpo*, 31 January 1913.

60 “En La Kolonía Ğudía Otomána de Anversa”, in *El Tyémpo*, 1 November 1912. According to the Red Crescent yearbook, the Jewish consul was able to collect 4735 *guruş*. *Osmanlı hilâl-i Ahmer Salnamesi*, p. 399.

61 “Patriotísmo de Ğiđyos Otomános” in *El Tyémpo*, 26 May 1913; “Patriyotísmo Ğiđyó i Muhammadino”, in *El Tyémpo*, 12 November 1913. See also Selahittin Özçelik, *Donanma-yı Osmanî Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, Ankara, Türk tarih Kurumu, 2000, p. 213.

62 Katherine Lynch, *Individuals, Families, and Communities in Europe, 1200–1800: The Urban Foundations of Western Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 103.

63 E. Benbassa and A. Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry*, p. 87.

64 Esther Benbassa, *Un grand Rabbin sépharade en politique 1892–1923,* Paris, Presses du CNRS, 1990, pp. 224–25.

65 See, as examples, “En Ayúđa delas Famíyas de los Militáres”, in *El Tyémpo*, 25 October 1912.

66 The number of Jewish refugees who were registered in the community was estimated as 3,545 in April 1913. See “Los Soldáđos Israelítas i la Páskwa”, in *El Tyémpo* 18 April 1913. See, as other examples, “Los Emigráđos Ğiđyos del Teátro de la Gérra”, in *El Tyémpo*, 1 November 1912; “La Komisyón de Sukuros por la Sinistráđos dela Gerra”, in *El Tyémpo*, 3 January 1913; “La Óvra dela Komisyón de Sokórso i los Emigráđos”, in *El Tyémpo*, 18 December 1912. For the plight of Muslim refugees during the Balkan Wars, see Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (1912–13)*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995.

67 See, as examples, “Gran Rabináto de Turkía –Una Yemáda”, in *El Tyémpo*, 1 November 1912; “Yamáda a las Mužéres Ğudías”, in *El Tyémpo*, 11 November 1912. On the Balkan Wars as a catalyst for the founding of women’s organizations, see Ellen L. Fleischmann, “The Other ‘Awakening’: the Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern Middle East, 1900–40”, in Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E. Tucker (eds.), *A Social History of Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East*, Boulder, Westview, 1999, pp. 89–139, here p. 103. See also Fatma Müge Göçek, “From Empire to Nation: Images of Women and War in Ottoman Political Cartoons, 1908–23”, in Billie Melman (ed.), *Borderlines – Genders and Identities in War and Peace 1870–1930,* New York, London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 47–72, here pp. 50–51.

68 “Yamáda a las Mužéres Ğudías”, in *El Tyémpo*, 11 November 1912.

69 Eliya Elgazi, *Haggadah delos Muhağires,* Istanbul, Emprímería Ardity i Kastro, 5673/1913. See also Rabi Yotfata [sic!], *Haggadah eča apropyáda por la añađa dela gérra del año 5673,* Istanbul, Emprímería Ardity i Kastro 1913, pp. 2–3. I would like to thank Dov HaKohen and Avner Peretz for providing me with copies of these *hagadda*s.

70 David C. Jacobson, "Writing and Rewriting the Zionist National Narrative: Responses to the Arab Revolt of 1936–39 in Kibbutz Pasover Haggadot", in *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, 6, 1 (2007), pp. 1–20.

71 On their activity in Edirne, see Union des Associations Israélites, *Bericht über das Balkanhilfswerk,* Berlin, 1913, pp. 13–15, 55–60.

72 "La Populasyón de Andrinópoli i las Atrosíđađes Búlgaras", in *El Tyémpo*, 28 July 1913; "La Delegasyón Andrianopolitána", in *El Tyémpo*, 11 August 1913.; "La Deputasyón Andrinopolitána en Berlin", in *El Tyémpo*, 25 August 1913; "La Delegasyón Andrinopolitána en Paris", in *El Tyémpo*, 1 September 1913; 'La Delegasyón Andrinopolitána en Roma", in *El Tyémpo*, 3 September 1913.

73 "Dimoteka'da Bolayir Kul Ordusu Kumandanlığı Huzur-i Samisine", in *Takvim-i Vakayi*, 27 July–9 August 1913.

74 "Señor Pier Loti i el Gran Rabíno Bidjerano", in *El Tyémpo*, 29 August 1913.

75 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery*, trans. by Jefferson Chase, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2003.

76 On civilian casualties during the Balkan Wars, see Kennan, *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment*, pp. 109–35; Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi*; Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: the Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922*, Princeton, Darwin Press, 1995.

77 Selânikli Fatma İclal, *Felaketten İbret*, Istanbul, Badrusyan Matbaası, 1331, pp. 9–10.

Chapter 8

* I would like to thank Nathalie Clayer, Hannes Grandits and Robert Pichler for the critical reading of my article and for giving me much information and feedback, which not only helped me to finish this article, but also gave me many helpful suggestions for my Ph.D. project.

1 A *bayrak* (Turk. banner, Alb. *bajrak*) was a territorial unit in the Ottoman Empire, not to be mistaken with the clans or a subdivision of a clan, and as such formed special divisions within the Ottoman military organisation.

2 For the Mirdites see Peter Bartl, "Die Mirditen. Bemerkungen zur nordalbanischen Stammesgeschichte", in *Münchener Zeitschrift für Balkankunde*, Munich, 1 (1978), pp. 27–69; Maurus Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung über die osmanische Reformpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert,*

Munich, R. Oldenbourg, 2005, pp. 115–41; Preng N. Marku, *Mirdita dhe njerëzit e saj*, Tiranë, "Geer", 2004; Pal Pjetër Doçi, "Gjendja ekonomike-shoqërore e Mirditës në fund të shek. XIX dhe në fillim të shek. XX", in *Studime Historike*, 2, Tirana, 1973, pp. 63–86; P. P. Doçi, "Të dhëna rreth vetëqeverisjes dokesore të Mirditës në fund të shek. XIX dhe në fillim të shek. XX", in *Studime Historike*, 3, Tirana, 1974, pp. 101–22; P. P. Doçi, *Mirdita – vatër e qëndresës antiosmane. Veshtrim etnologjik e historik (1479–1912)*, Tiranë, Mirdita, 1999; Nikoll Toma *et al.* (eds.), *Mirdita në histori dhe etnokulturë: conference shkencore, Rrëshen, 10 tetor 2001*, Rrëshen, Shtëpia Botuese "Mirdita", 2001.

3 For the clans in Northern Albania, see Fatos Baxhaku and Karl Kaser (eds.), *Die Stammesgesellschaften Nordalbaniens: Berichte und Forschungen österreichischer Konsuln und Gelehrter (1861-1917)*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 1996. See also Karl Kaser, *Familie und Verwandtschaft auf dem Balkan: Analyse einer untergehenden Kultur,* Vienna, Cologne, Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 1995; and R. Pichler, "Gewohnheitsrecht", in K. Kaser, Siegfried Gruber, and R. Pichler (eds.), *Historische Anthropologie im südöstlichen Europa: Eine Einführung*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 2003, pp. 293–315.

4 In the following, the Albanian toponyms will be used.

5 In the following, the term Fandi will be used for the Mirdites living in Kosovo.

6 The administrative borders of the *vilayet* of Kosovo in the late Ottoman period do not correspond to the presently-existing borders of Kosovo that were only established after 1945. The *vilayet* of Kosovo, named as such, was only created in 1877 and consisted of a much larger area than modern-day Kosovo. Besides what is today known as Kosovo, it also included the *sancak* of Novi Pazar (today split between Serbia and Montenegro), until 1878 the *sancak* of Niš (today North Eastern Albanian and parts of Northern Macedonian including Skopje, Tetovo and Kumanovo), the region around Plav and Gusinje (now Montenegrin), as well as the Dibra region. These regions (up to the administrative reforms in 1867) had belonged to the eyalet of Niš, the *eyalet* of Skopje and, after 1865, to the Danube *vilayet*. In 1868 the *vilayet* of Prizren was created with the *sancaks* of Prizren, Dibra, Skopje and Niš; it only existed until 1877.

7 Cf. for the Albanian-inhabited regions in general N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais – La naissance d'une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe*, Paris, Karthala, 2007, pp. 21–58, for Kosovo see pp. 74–89.

8 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Charlotte Tacke, "Die Kultur des Nationalen. Sozial- und kulturgeschichtliche Ansätze bei der Erforschung des europäischen Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert", in Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.), *Kulturgeschichte heute*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996, pp. 255–83, here p. 266; A similar constructivistic notion of identity is

formulated by Bernhard Giesen, *Kollektive Identität: Die Intellektuellen und die Nation 2*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999. For concepts of identity see Aleida Assmann and Heidrun Friese (eds.), *Identitäten*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1998.

9 Cf. the meaningful study of Hannes Grandits about the Tanzimat period in late-Ottoman Hercegovina, the difficulties of implementing reforms and the transformation of society in this time. H. Grandits, *Herrschaft und Loyalität in der spätosmanischen Gesellschaft: Das Beispiel der multikonfessionellen Herzegowina*, Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau, 2008.

10 Cf. Schmucker to Kálnoky, Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (in the following HHStA) Politisches Archiv (in the following PA) XXXVIII/248.

11 According to Hyacinthe Hecquard, around 1855 the five Mirdite *bayraks* of Oroshi, Kushneni, Spaçi, Dibri and Fandi included 22,300 inhabitants altogether, the *bayrak* of Fandi consisted of 350 families and about 4,200 inhabitants, see H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description de la Haute Albanie ou Guégarie*, Paris, Arthus Bertrand, 1858, p. 221. Cevdet Pascha mentions 500 houses for the *bayrak* of Fandi, see Hans-Jürgen Kornrumpf, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa über Albanien und Montenegro. Aus Tezkere No. 18", in *Der Islam*, Berlin, 47 (1971), pp. 93–135, here p. 115. According to Spiridion Gopčević (1881) Fandi included 4,600 inhabitants, see Spiridion Gopčević, *Oberalbanien und seine Liga: Ethnographisch-politisch-historisch*, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1881, p. 266. For the Mirdites see H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description*, pp. 219–46.

12 Within the Mirdite clan, only the *bayraks* of Oroshi, Kushneni and Spaçi were considered to be related by blood. Probably not until the first half of the nineteenth century did Dibri and Fandi become part of the Mirdite clan, which explains that intermarriage between these two groups was allowed. P. Bartl, "Die Mirditen", p. 28; P. Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (1878–1912)*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1968, p. 48; Seiner, p. 114. Cevdet Pascha writes that the *bayraks* of Fandi and Dibri belonged to Mirdita "through relationship by marriage and vicinity" and were regarded as Mirdites, but contrary to the latter they could intermarry with the other Mirdite clans, see H.-J. Kornrumpf, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa", pp. 115–16.

13 1822–1895, Ottoman writer and statesman, who led a commission of enquiry about the situation in Northern Albania and the Montenegrin border in 1861.

14 This is also mentioned by the French Consul Alexandre Degrand, see A. Degrand, *Souvenirs de la Haute-Albanie*, Paris, H. Welter, 1901, p. 149.

15 Cavid M. Baysun, *Cevdet Paşa: Tezâkir. Yayınlayan Cavid Baysun*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986, No 18, p. 198. Quoted from M. Reinkowski,

Die Dinge der Ordnung, p. 117. For the German translation see H.-J. Kornrumpf, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa", p. 116.

16 P. P. Doçi, "Gjendja ekonomike-shoqërore e Mirditës", p. 63; P. Bartl, "Die Mirditen", p. 30.

17 H.-J. Kornrumpf, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa", p. 115. After the dissolution of the *sancak*, the Mirdita-region was incorporated into the *sancak* of Shkodra.

18 For the Mirdites in general, and in particular the question of the name of Mirdita and its origin of usage, see M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, pp. 115–41; P. Bartl, "Die Mirditen"; A. Degrand, *Souvenirs*, pp. 147–49. About different versions of oral tradition concerning the origins of the Mirdites, see H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description*, pp. 232–34; M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, pp. 121, 126–27; H.-J. Kornrumpf, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa", p. 116.

19 Stefan Mladenov mentions that Albanian Bogumils who converted to Catholicism were called "Funda". He notes this in the context of discussing the Pomaks in Macedonia that were pejoratively called Torbeši, earlier the name for Bogumils, who were carrying a sack for begging (*torba* = sack, bag). In Greek the Bogumils were called fundaíte (*funda* = *torba*). See Stefan Mladenov, "Bemerkungen über die Albaner und das Albanische in Nordmakedonien und Altserbien", in *Balkan-Archiv*, Leipzig, 1 (1925), pp. 43–70, here p. 53. P. Bartl takes up this approach and connects *Funda* with the Fandi. He refers to remarks of the albanologist Martin Camaj who believed that the Fandi did not have the same descent as the Mirdites, but, according to their own oral tradition, originally came from Ohrid, where – as Bartl points out – the existence of Bogumils is attested. See P. Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime*, pp. 29–30. Moreover, taking into account that the Austro-Hungarian Consul, Theodor Ippen, named this *bayrak* "Fonda", see Theodor Anton von Ippen, *Die Gebirge des nordwestlichen Albaniens*, Wien, Lechner, 1908, p. 44. This makes a connection between Fandi and Bogumils according to Bartl even more probable. Another argument put forward by Bartl concerns the sect "Phoundagiagits" from the Byzantine Empire, which presumably was closely connected to the Bogumils or even was identical with them. Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime*, p. 30. He also notes that some scholars connect the name of the "Phoundagiagiten" with Greek/Latin "funda" – *φούνδα* = sack, bag, see Martin Jugie, "Phoundagiagites et Bogomiles", in *Echos d'Orient*, Bukarest, 12 (1909), pp. 257–62; Gerhard Ficker, *Die Phundagiagiten: Ein Beitrag zur Ketzergeschichte des byzantinischen Mittelalters*, Leipzig, Barth, 1908. Nevertheless, due to the lack of sources, this remains a hypothesis up to now.

20 H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description*, p. 221.

21 Noel Malcolm mentions, in the context of developments in 1845, the Fandi, "who had moved into the area west of Gjakova in recent decades". Although

here the early nineteenth century is also suggested as the date of immigration, this information nonetheless remains rather vague. See Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, London, Papermac, 1998, p. 186. Lastly, see M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 117. Reinkowski also adopts the version of 1840.

22 Analysing ecclesiastical documents of the Propaganda Fide, Bartl demonstrated that until 1633 no Catholics were found in the area of Gjakova and Peja, whereas 550 Catholics were counted in the parish of Gjakova in 1637, which indicates a possible emigration from what is today Albania. See P. Bartl, "Kosova and Macedonia as Reflected in Ecclesiastical Reports", in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (eds.), *Studies on Kosova*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1984, pp. 23–39.

23 In 1638, 20 families and 150 individuals were counted in the town; in 1641–42, 26 families; and in 1703, 9 families and 27 individuals. P. Bartl, "Kosova and Macedonia", p. 25. This decline can probably be attributed to the process of Islamization.

24 Here 57 households and 720 individuals were counted in the city of Gjakova by the missionaries of the Propaganda Fide. In 1820 again only 25 households and 324 individuals were counted in the city. P. Bartl, "Kosova and Macedonia", p. 25.

25 75 households and 560 individuals. P. Bartl, *Ibid.*

26 In 1703, 11 households and 33 individuals, in 1820, 8 families and 39 individuals and in 1853, 16 families and 90 individuals were counted. P. Bartl, *Ibid.*

27 30 households and 540 individuals were counted in the parish in 1637. In 1641–42, the number of the Catholic households rose to 40, but in 1703 again only 7 households and 31 individuals were counted. Immigration waves followed after 1791 when 23 households and 167 individuals were counted, until 1820 with 68 households and 650 individuals and 1853 with 150 households and 1,200 individuals. Bartl also mentions the village Zym, where immigration waves took place in 1703 with 13 households, 1820 with 35 households and 1853 when 60 households were counted. Here, most probably, members of the Has clan settled. He further notes the villages Gur, Shegjeç and Zogaj, whose exact location is not known, but which most probably lie in the vicinity of Gjakova and Prizren in the Has region. In the first two an immigration wave took place around 1637 and 1642; in Zogaj the development was similar to Zym. P. Bartl, *Ibid.* pp. 25, 27–30.

28 The Congregation for the Propagation of Faith ("Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide") was founded in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV with the aim of spreading Catholicism in the non-Catholic areas. Its task also was to organize all the missionary activity as well as the ecclesiastical organisations of the Catholic Church. Cf. J. Metzler (ed.), *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum: 350 anni a Servizio delle Missioni, 1622–1972, vol. III/2, 1815–1972*, Rom, Freiburg, Wien, Herder, 1976. For their activities in the

Albanian and Kosovo regions cf. N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, pp. 56–57.

29 Edith Durham writes in 1908 that while twenty years ago in the city of Gjakova there still lived 100 Catholic families, in 1908 a little more than 20 Catholic families were found and of these only a few were long established, while most of them were recent refugees from the surrounding villages. She also mentions around 60 Catholic villages in the district of Gjakova, and notes that they "have few churches and no priest. Three priests and one Franciscan, resident in Djakova, ride – often at very great personal risk – from one village to another, doing their best to aid their scattered flock. These villages are offshoots of various Christian tribes that came at different dates – from Berisha, Shala, Mirdita, etc." E. Durham, *High Albania: With an Introduction by John Hodgson*, London, University of California Press, 2000, p. 243; N. Clayer, "Quelques réflexions sur le phénomène de conversion à l'islam à travers le cas des catholiques albanais observé par une mission jésuite à la fin de l'époque ottoman", in *Mésogeios*, 2, Paris, 1998, pp. 16–39; Georg Stadtmüller, "Die Islamisierung bei den Albanern", in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 3, München, 1955, pp. 404–29.

30 H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description*, p. 221.

31 P. Bartl, "Kosova and Macedonia", p. 31.

32 Karl Steinmetz, *Eine Reise durch die Hochländergaue Oberalbaniens,* Wien und Leipzig, Hartleben, 1904, p. 9. P. Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime*, pp. 29–30.

33 P. Bartl, "Kosova and Macedonia", p. 31.

34 This is also argued by the Austro-Hungarian consuls, see *Lippich to Beust*, 19 September 1870, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/189.

35 H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description*, pp. 221, 481.

36 M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 117.

37 H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description,* pp. 221; M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 117.

38 As appendix in the account of *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19 HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

39 An Austro-Hungarian statistic of 1877, for example, mentions 13,500 Catholics in the district of Prizren (including the area of Peja and Gjakova). The statistic is attached in the account *Lippich to Andrássy,* Prizren, 17 March 1877, No 9, HHStA PA XXXVIII/219.

40 *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207. See also H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description,* p. 481. The quotes throughout the paper were translated by the author.

41 *Pilinski to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 26 August 1890, No 133. HHStA PA XXXVIII/279. "Die im Districte von Djakova ansässigen Katholiken sind fast säm-

mtlich Pächter der von ihnen bewohnten Dörfer. In nur vereinzelten Fällen sind sie Eigenthümer."

42 The Ottoman *vali*, in a conversation with the Austro-Hungarian consul, mentions the "poverty" of the Fandi. See *Lippich to Beust*, Prizren, 19 September 1870, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/189.

43 H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description,* pp. 230–31, 243. M. Reinkowski points out that in contrast to this, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa notes that all mountain clans received one *okka maize* and 40 *para* per day, *cf.* C. M. Baysun, *Cevdet Paşa*, p. 205; M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 120. For the role of the Christians in the Ottoman military system, see Fikret Adanir, "Christliche Rekruten unter dem Halbmond: Zum Problem der Militärdienstpflicht für Nichtmuslime im spätosmanischen Reich", in Gerhard Grimm (ed.), *Von der Pruth-Ebene bis zum Gipfel des Ida: Studien zur Geschichte, Literatur und Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Donau-Balkanraumes. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag für Emanuel Turczynski,* München, Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1989, pp. 153–64.

44 Ottoman sources are quoted by M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 120.

45 Cf. note 6 in this chapter.

46 A *zaptieh* was an Ottoman gendarme.

47 This is also pointed out by M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 121.

48 Reinkowski refers to a letter of the Mirdite *kapetan* where he actually claims to exercise the powers of a *zaptieh*-chief without getting a salary, see M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 121. Reinkowski also notes that in the Mirdita at that time this office was not in operation, due to a non-existing state monopoly. Nevertheless it becomes obvious that the Ottoman government also planned to build up a gendarmerie in the Mirdita similar to Kosovo. Also, Cevdet Paşa notes that the chiefs of the big families in the mountainous districts in the *sancak* of Shkodra were police officials, see H.-J. Kornrumpf, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa", p. 117.

49 Consul Lippich writes, for example: "Toutes les fois qu'il s'agit d'une expédition hardie et périlleuse contre les nombreux brigands des environs, c'est à eux que le Gouvernement a recours, et il ne se passe pas d'année, où ils n'aient des morts et blessés, victimes des ces expéditions-là." *Lippich to Beust*, Prizren, 19 September 1870, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/189. See also *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 15 December 1873, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/200; *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 4 May 1875, No 5; as well as *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

50 This suggests a petition of Fandi chiefs, where it is mentioned that, with the exception of about a dozen families, all Fandi are tenants of Muslim land owners. The occupation of the other Fandi families is not further specified. See *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

51 *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 21 January 1882, No 12. HHStA PA XXXVIII/243. In a report of 1883 mentioning the functions of the Fandi, again only the service as irregular troops is mentioned, see *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. HHStA PA XXXVIII/248.

52 N. Clayer, "Quelques réflexions sur le phénomène de conversion", in Stadtmüller; Leon Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996.

53 *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 33 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

54 *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 21 June 1876, No 11. HHStA PA XXXVIII/213.

55 For the analysis of the murder of Mehmed Ali Paşa, see further below.

56 The *zaptieh-yüzbasi* was the captain of a *zaptieh* unit.

57 *Jelinek to Andrássy*, Prizren, 21 October 1878, No 27. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

58 Hanns Dieter Schanderl, *Die Albanienpolitik Österreich-Ungarns und Italiens 1877–1908*. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1971; Anna Hedwig Benna, "Studien zum Kultusprotektorat Österreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888–1918)", in *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs,* Wien, 7 (1954), pp. 13–46; T. A. von Ippen, "Das religiöse Protectorat Österreich-Ungarns in der Türkei", in *Die Kultur*, Wien, 3 (1901–02), pp. 298–310.

59 M. Reinkowski; Carter Vaughn Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte 1789–1922*, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1980; Roderic Hollet Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–76*, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1963; 2nd ed. New York, Gordian, 1973; Halil İnalcık, "Application of the *Tanzimat* and its Social Effects",in *Archivum Ottomanicum,* Wiesbaden, 5 (1973), pp. 97–127.

60 See Emin Pllana, *Kosova dhe reformat në Turqi*, Prishtina, Rilindja, 1978. For the reforms in the Albanian-inhabited areas in general see N. Clayer, *Aux origines du nationalisme albanais*, pp. 214–21.

61 About the Tanzimat reforms in the Mirdita see M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, pp. 133–41. He concludes that whereas in the 1850s the exceptional position of the Mirdites was acknowledged within the Ottoman government, in 1862 he sees a break in the Ottoman-Mirdite relations when the Mirdites refused to supply contingents for a campaign against the Montenegrins. From then on, the policy of the Ottomans was one of direct control and administration, in accordance with the principles of the Tanzimat. There probably is a direct connection between the Ottoman policy in the Mirdita and with the Fandi population in Kosovo. The same tax policy as was followed among the Fandi population was generally also followed among the Mirdita. Concerning the unsuccessful attempts of the Ottoman government to implement the new tax system in the city and the *sancak* of Shkodra and pointing out the "reform-resistant character"

(p. 150) of this region in the 1850s and 1860s, see M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, pp. 150–54. He also quotes Ottoman officials (p. 150) who point out the rebellious character and thus the difficult situation in the mountainous districts of Peja and Gjakova.

62 In one report the entire name of this tax is given as *bedel askeri vergüsü*, see *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 9 January 1883. HHStA PA XXXVIII/3. Reinkowski, referring to the *mutessarıf* of Shkodra in March 1857, mentions this tax as *i'āne-i 'askeriyye,* literally meaning "tax for the support of the army", which, according to the *mutessarıf,* had recently replaced the *cizye* . Similarly to the Fandi, the non-Muslims in Shkodra were exempted from paying the *cizye* and only had to pay an approximate equivalent. Consequently, they were resisting the new system and also turning for help to the European consuls. See M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 152. Reinkowski demonstrates that the Ottoman policy in the *sancak* of Shkodra was a reaction to the fierce opposition of the Catholic population: due to historical and geographical reasons, the reforms should be implemented only "gently", as the tax reforms would otherwise only lead to an "alienation" (pp. 153).

63 *Lippich to Beust*, Prizren, 19 September 1870, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/189.

64 For example, this happened in the year 1881, when the Fandi turned to the archbishop, Mgre. Czarev, who then contacted the Austro-Hungarian consul. See *Schmucker to Haymerle,* Üsküb, 23 June 1881, No 107. HHStA PA XXXVIII/239.

65 *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. HHStA PA XXXVIII/248.

66 *Jelinek to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 November 1878, No 29. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

67 *Peez to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 15 May 1890, No 60. HHStA PA XXXVIII/279.

68 This was the estimation of Consul Schmucker, see *Schmucker an Kálnoky*, Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. HHStA PA XXXVIII/248.

69 See M. Reinkowski for the case of the Mirdites. It is interesting that in the context of differences and conflicts within the Fandi population in Gjakova in 1882 and the developments of two parties including the involvement of the local Ottoman authorities, three Fandi chiefs, in order to win the support of the *kaimakam*, declared that they "would pay the military exemption tax (*bedelia*) despite insinuations of the priest and the archbishop, since until now they had refused only because of the advice of the archbishop and his clergy". *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 1 March 1882, No 26. HHStA PA XXXVIII/243. As in 1883, the Fandi again refused paying the tax: this was clearly a tactical step.

70 *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 4 May 1875, No 5. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

71 "Les Fandais, étant originaires de la Mirditie et se recrutant toujours de leur montagnes natales, jouissent du privilège d'être exempts de cette taxe, mais ils sont obligés à épauler le fusil et à servir gratuitement en temps de guerre ou

de paix comme troupe irrégulière. Toutes les fois qu'il s'agit d'une expédition hardie et périlleuse contre les nombreux brigands des environs, c'est à eux que le Gouvernement a recours, et il ne se passe pas d'année, où ils n'aient des morts et blessés, victimes des ces expéditions-là. De bonne foi donc les chefs fandais firent-ils valoir leurs titres à l'exemplion de la taxe, mais pour toute réponse ils furent incarcérés." *Lippich to Beust,* Prizren, 19 September 1870, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/189.

72 *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 4 May 1875, No 5. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

73 A similar argument was used by the peasant-soldiers of the Habsburg Military Borderland, when, in the course of abolishing the military system after 1881, the population was forced to pay high taxes and arms were confiscated. Similar to the Fandi, the bordermen regarded their weapons as a marker of social status. See Hannes Grandits, "'From Reliable Bordermen to Good Taxpayers'– Problems of Economic and Social Integration of the Former Habsburg Military Borderland into Croatia", in Miroslav Jovanović, Karl Kaser and Slobodan Naumović (eds.), *Between the archives and the field: A dialogue on historical anthropology of the Balkans,* Belgrade, Graz, Čigoja štampa, 1999, pp. 115–24, here pp. 122–23 as well as Hannes Grandits, *Familie und sozialer Wandel im ländlichen Kroatien (18.–20. Jahrhundert),* Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau, 2002, pp. 227–35.

74 *Jelinek to Andrássy,* Prizren, 30 November 1878), No 29. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

75 The names in the Italian petition are written in the Italian phonetic system and would have to be adopted in Albanian. Here the original names as given in the documents are listed.

76 *Lippich to Andrássy,* Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19 and the petition attached to the account.

77 *Schmucker to Kálnoky,* Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. HHStA PA XXXVIII/248. See also *Telegram Schmucker,* Üsküb, 21 June 1881, No 7130. HHStA PA XXXVIII/239 and *Schmucker to Kálnoky,* Prizren, 21 January 1882, No 12. HHStA PA XXXVIII/243.

78 This is also argued by H. Grandits in his previously cited works.

79 And here the consul noted that, in contrast, the capital tax had to be paid only from adulthood until death.

80 *Lippich to Andrássy,* Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/200.

81 *Schmucker to Kálnoky,* Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. HHStA PA XXXVIII/248. As mentioned, it has to be kept in mind that Murad I died during the battle. There was possibly a time confusion and Murad II was meant. An account of the year 1882 is interesting. Here the Fandi referred to the rights not guaranteed by

Murad, but by Sultan Mahmud. See *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 21 January 1882, No 12. HHStA PA XXXVIII/243.

82 *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 21 January 1882, No 12. HHStA PA XXXVIII/243. "als ein Zweigstamm der Mirditen bisher von der Entrichtung der Militärtaxe befreit […], daß sie von Alters her die ihnen eingeräumte Ausnahmestellung genießen, als die einzigen regelmäßigen Steuerzahler jener Distrikte Rücksicht verdienen" *Lippich to Andrássy,* Prizren, 4 May 1875, No 5. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

83 *Schmucker to Haymerle,* Üsküb, 23 June 1881, No 107. HHStA PA XXXVIII/239.

84 *Schmucker to Kálnoky,* Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. HHStA PA XXXVIII/248.

85 See also Eva Anne Frantz, "Loyalitätsoptionen und Identitätsmuster von Albanern in Kosovo in spätosmanischer Zeit (1870–1913). Zur Bedeutung von Religion und Familie", in Emil Brix, Arnold Suppan and Elisabeth Vyslonzil (eds.), *Südosteuropa*: *Traditionen als Macht,* Wien, München, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2007, pp. 73–86.

86 Cf. the following quotation.

87 H. Hecquard, *Histoire et description*, p. 221. M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, p. 117.

88 See the petition of Fandi chiefs in the account of *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

89 See, for example, *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/207.

90 *Schmucker to Kálnoky,* Prizren, 9 January 1883, No 3. HHStA PA XXXVIII/248.

91 *Lippich to Andrássy,* Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA XXXVIII/200.

92 *Schmucker to Kálnoky,* Prizren, 21 January 1882, No 12. HHStA PA XXXVIII/243. For loyalty to the Sultan, see also *Schmucker to Haymerle,* Üsküb, 23 June 1881, No 107. HHStA PA XXXVIII/239.

93 For details about the relatively unreliable conduct of the Mirdites, especially regarding the question about supplying irregular troops, see M. Reinkowski, *Die Dinge der Ordnung*, pp. 133–38.

94 *Jelinek to Andrássy,* Prizren, 7 September 1878, No 22. See also *Jelinek to Andrássy,* Prizren, 21 October 1878, No 27. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

95 Initially the numbers mentioned were over 100, but then were corrected with 30 to 45, see *Jelinek to Andrássy*, Prizren, 10 September 1878, No 23. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

96 *Jelinek to Andrássy,* Prizren, 21 October 1878, No 27. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

97 Four Fandi chiefs are mentioned here: Uka i Dedbekes and Mihil Palokes from Ipek and Mark Nikol Bibes and Uka i Trokit from Gjakova. See *Adamkiewicz to Berchtold*, Prizren, 7 March 1912, No 23. HHStA PA XXXVIII/405.

98 In the Italian petitions of the Fandi these were called "*sottocapi*". See, for instance, *Schmucker to Kálnoky,* Üsküb, 27 August 1875, No 190 res. HHStA PA XXXVIII/280.

99 As chief of Oroshi, Nico Prekdoda and the secondary chiefs Col Krez Kodi – Lesc Giora, Gin Olaku – Marca Preni, Pieter Uka and Doda i Krek Dedy; the chief of Kaçinari, Lusc Nicha and the secondary chiefs Ciun Nocha, Simon Mihili, Sciaban Coriza, Nrez Uka and Nicol Mark Kalusci; the chief of Kçira, Marca Nocha and the secondary chiefs Marka Nreza and Preka i Mark Kcires; the chief of Fandi, Haidar Bala and the secondary chiefs Nrez Pietri, Lesc Milizi, Nicol Corazi and Nrega i Krek Lesc Dedej; the chief of Kushneni, Lesc Nreka and the secondary chiefs Gioca i Marca Lescit, Deda i Nrez Kalit, Krek Tahiri, Gion Vesseli, Nicol Sefi, Cola i Nout Nrekij; the chief of Spaçi, Nue Spazzi and the secondary chiefs Nicol Biba, Nue Sopoti, Troki Gin-Dodej, Mihil Sadika, Marka Gioka, Preni Col Gojanit and Dod Krena. See *Schmucker to Kálnoky*, Üsküb, 27 August 1875, No 190 res. HHStA PA XXXVIII/280.

100 On the other hand, several mountaineers, as the consul noted, supported the Fandi's participation: "Vielen der Berg-Albanesen /Malisoren/ ist es aber leid, die tapferen Fandesen nicht an ihrer Seite zu haben. Vier Häuptlinge derselben haben nun an Monsignor Erzbischof Czarev, an den englischen Consul und an mich eine türkische Zuschrift gerichtet, in der sie uns bitten, die türkische Regierung zu vermögen, die Häupter der Familie Kurzani, und einige andere namentlich angeführte Mohamedaner der Stadt Giacova, dereinst Hauptagenten /nicht Urheber/ beim Morde des Muschir Mehemed Ali, stets Hauptfeinde der Christen, und Anstifter auch der in letzter Zeit so frequenten Ermordungen katholischer Albanesen zu arretiren, zu bestrafen oder wenigstens nach Asien zu exiliren." *Waldhart to Haymerle,* Prizren, 6 March 1880, No 6. HHStA PA XXXVIII/234.

101 *Waldhart to Haymerle*, Prizren, 21 March 1880, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/234.

102 For a critical discussion of the concept of the *millet*-system cf. Michael Ursinus, "Zur Diskussion um '*Millet*' im Osmanischen Reich", in *Südost-Forschungen*, Munich, 48 (1989), pp. 195–207 (also published in Michael Ursinus, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches und ihre Interpretation*, Istanbul, Isis-Verlag 1994, pp. 185–97; Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 vols., New York, London, Holmes & Meier, 1982.

103 Emin Pllana, *Kosova dhe reformat në Turqi.*

104 Cf. the recent broad literature on border regions, among others Christophe Duhamelle, Andreas Kossert and Bernhard Struck (eds.), *Grenzregionen: Ein europäischer Vergleich vom 18. bis 20. Jahrhundert,* Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2007; Etienne François, Jörg Seifarth and Bernhard Struck (eds.), *Die Grenze*

als Raum, Erfahrung und Konstruktion: Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen vom 17. bis 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2007; Hans-Christian Maner (ed.), *Grenzregionen der Habsburgermonarchie im 18. und 19. Jahrhunder: Ihre Bedeutung und Funktion aus der Perspektive Wiens,* Münster, LIT Verlag, 2005; Michael G. Müller and Rolf Petri (eds.), *Die Nationalisierung von Grenzen: Zur Konstruktion nationaler Identität in sprachlich gemischten Grenzregionen,* Marburg, Herder Verlag, 2002. From an ethnological and historical-anthropological point of view cf. Michael Rösler and Tobias Wendel (eds.), *Frontiers and Borderlands: Anthropological Perspectives,* Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 1999.

105 *Lippich to Andrássy,* Prizren, 30 August 1875, No 19. HHStA PA PA XXXVIII/207.

106 *Rappaport to Gołuchowski,* Prizren, 25 August 1897, No 118. HHStA PA XXXVIII/398.

107 *Ibid.*.

108 *Ibid.*.

109 *Jelinek to Andrássy*, Prizren, 21 October 1878, No 27. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

110 *Jelinek to Andrássy*, Prizren, 30 November 1878, No 29. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

111 *Ibid*.

112 Of course, the moment of the personal quarrel between the respective individuals also has to be considered, but in this case it was to a lesser degree decisive, see *Lippich to Andrássy*, Prizren, 20 August 1872, No 5. HHStA PA XXXVIII/197.

113 *Jelinek to Andrássy,* Prizren, 19 May 1879, No 6. HHStA PA XXXVIII/229.

114 *Waldhart to Haymerle,* Prizren, 21 März 1880, No 7. HHStA PA XXXVIII/234. A further account states: "Die Fandesen, welche ihrer Minderheit bewußt, bisher gegenüber den herrschenden Mohamedanern sehr geduldig waren, fangen aus Verzweiflung an, von ihren Waffen Gebrauch zu machen. Am 18. d. M. wurden im Bezirke von Giacova einige von ihnen, als sie Getreide in das Dorf Dol führten, von Bergalbanesen überfallen und beraubt. Die Malisoren, stärker an Zahl, entführten das Getreide, aber ließen zwei der ihrigen todt auf dem Platze. Von den beraubten Fandesen wurden drei getödtet und zwei schwer verletzt." *Waldhart to Haymerle*, Prizren, 21 April 1880, No 28 as well as *Waldhart to Haymerle,* Prizren, 30 June 1880, No 57. HHStA PA XXXVIII/234.

115 See *Jelinek to Andrássy,* Prizren, 21 October 1878, No 27 and *Jelinek to Andrássy,* Prizren, 30 November 1878, No 29. HHStA PA XXXVIII/225.

116 *Jelinek to Andrássy*, Prizren, 19 May 1879, No 6. HHStA PA XXXVIII/229.

117 *Peez to Kálnoky*, Prizren, 15 May 1890, No 60. HHStA PA XXXVIII/279.

118 *Pilinski to Kálnoky,* Prizren, 26 June 1890, No 83. HHStA PA XXXVIII/279.

119 *Pilinski an Kálnoky*, Prizren, 19 August 1890, No 124. HHStA PA XXXVIII/279.

120 In this report the context of the killing of the Bosnian was also explained: "Wie nun ganz bestimmt feststeht hat Gör Beg, welcher hier als Wunder-Doctor

thätig war, und die Behandlung der Unfruchtbarkeit bei Frauen zur Spezialität hatte, die an diesem Übel leidende Frau des bewussten Mirditen, über dessen Ansuchen vor einem Jahre in Behandlung genommen und sie zu diesem Behufe für einige Tage in seinem Hause beherbergt. Vor kurzem gebar diese Frau ein Kind für dessen Vater jedoch Gör Beg allgemein gehalten wurde. Aus Ärger darüber erschoss nun der Mirdite diesen Letzteren, dem er zufällig auf dem Wege begegnet war. Aus Scham über den wahren Grund seiner That, motivirte er dieselbe anfänglich mit einer ihm von dem Ermordeten zugefügten Beleidigung." *Pilinski to Kálnoky* (Prizren, 26 August 1890), No 133. HHStA PA XXXVIII/279.

Chapter 9

1 Jevrem Grujić, *Zapisi I,* Belgrade, 1922, p. 21. Translated and cited in Milenko Karanovich, *The Development of Education in Serbia and Emergence of Its Intelligentsia (1838–58),* Boulder, New York, East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 166. See also the recent article of Ljubinka Trgovčević "Čežnja za domovinom i svetlosti velegrada. Studenti u stranim zemljama", in Ana Stolić and Nenad Makuljević (eds), *Privatni život kod Srba u devetnaestom veku. Od kraja osamnaestog veka do početka Prvog svetskog rata,* Belgrade, Clio, 2006, pp. 483–506.

2 Olga Zirojević, "Das Amselfeld im kollektiven Gedächtnis", in Thomas Bremer, Nebojša Popov and Heinz-Günther Stobbe (eds.), *Serbiens Weg in den Krieg. Kollektive Erinnerung, nationale Formierung und ideologische Aufrüstung*, Berlin, Verlag A. Spitz, 1998, pp. 45–61. Here pp. 49–50, 56.

3 Milica Bakić-Hayden, "National Memory as Narrative Memory: The Case of Kosovo", in Maria Todorova (ed.), *Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory*, London, Hurst, 2004.

4 O. Zirojević, "Das Amselfeld", pp. 54–55. Thomas A. Emmert, *Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389*, New York, East European Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 134.

5 This article is based on archival work I did for my Ph.D. research. See Nataša Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards: Belgrad im 19. Jahrhundert*, Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau, 2008.

6 Mary Edith Durham, *Through the Lands of the Serb*, London, Edward Arnold, 1904, 2nd ed., pp. 143–44.

7 N. Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards*, pp. 200, 287–88. See also Maximilian Hartmuth, "Negotiating Tradition and Ambition: A Comparative Perspective on the 'De-Ottomanisation' of Balkan Cityscapes", in Klaus Roth and Ulf Brunnbauer (eds.), *Urban Life and Culture in Southeastern Europe: Anthopologi*

cal and Historical Perspectives, Berlin, LIT-Verlag, 2007, pp. 15–33. Branko Vujović, *Beograd u prošlosti i sadašnjosti*, Belgrade, 1994.

8 Cited in Branko Maksimović, “Urbanistički razvoj od 1830. do 1914. godine”, in Vasa Čubrilović (ed.), *Istorija Beograda*, vol. II, Belgrade, Prosveta, 1974, pp. 299–322, here p. 307.

9 Milovan Radovanović, “Kretanje broja stanovnika, domova, domaćinstva i porodica”, in V. Čubrilović (ed.), *Istorija Beograda*, pp. 270–88, here pp. 270–71; M. Radovanović, “Poreklo doseljenog stanovništva i razmere mehaničkog priraštaja”, in V. Čubrilović (ed.), *Istorija Beograda*, pp. 289–98, here pp. 290, 297.

10 See Marie-Janine Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens 1815–1941: Der aufhaltsame Fortschritt während der Industrialisierung,* München, Oldenbourg, 1994; Holm Sundhaussen, *Historische Statistik Serbiens 1834–1914. Mit europäischen Vergleichsdaten,* München, Oldenbourg, 1989, pp. 129–276.

11 The Jews comprised 0,18 per cent of Serbia’s population in 1850, and 0,23 per cent in 1900. Ženi Lebl, *Do “konačnog rešenja”: Jevreji u Beogradu 1521–1942,* Belgrade, Čigoja, 2001, pp. 168–69; H. Sundhaussen, *Historische Statistik Serbiens*, p. 80; Vidosava Stojančević, “Etnički sastav stanovništva 1815–30. godine”, in V. Čubrilović (ed.), *Istorija Beograda*, pp. 513–33, here p. 517; Vidosava Nikolić-Stojančević, “Etnička, demografska i socijalno-ekonomska struktura Beograda, 1867. godine”, in *Godišnjak grada Beograda*, XIV, 1967, pp. 23–44, here p. 25.

12 Nikola Vučo, *Raspadanje esnafa u Srbiji*, vol. I, Belgrade, Naučna knjiga, 1954, pp. 18, 22.

13 About the interesting topic of clothing, how it changed after the Muslims’ departure and how it showed the stratification of the Serbian population, see Mirjana Prošić-Dvornić, *Odevanje u Beogradu u XIX i početkom XX veka,* Belgrade, Stubovi culture, 2006.

14 Đorđe Vajfert, *Manifestacija u čast srpskih žena, njihov kulturan rad za 50 godina, 1875–1925,* Belgrade, 1926, p. 9.

15 Chedomille Mijatovich, *A Royal Tragedy, being the story of the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga of Servia,* London, Eveleigh Nash, 1906, pp. 16–17.

16 Chedomille Mijatovich, *The Memoirs of a Balkan Diplomatist,* London, Cassel, 1917, pp. 34–35.

17 M.-J. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, pp. 124–27.

18 C. Mijatovich, *Memoirs*, pp. 39–45.

19 The Radicals’ leader and later prime minister, Nikola Pašić, had met the Russian anarchist Mihail A. Bakunin during his studies at the Polytechnical School in Zurich. Bakunin introduced him to the Narodniki movement’s ideal of the *obščina* (village community) and their belief that the Russian autocracy would

be overthrown by the peasants. Heiko Haumann, *Geschichte Russlands,* München, Zürich, Piper, 1996, pp. 379–82.

20 Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Kraljica Natalija Obrenović: Moje uspomene,* Belgrade, Srpska književna zadruga, 1999; C. Mijatovich, *Memoirs*, pp. 103–33.

21 See Latinka Perović, "Politička elita i modernizacija u prvoj deceniji nezavisnosti srpske države", in Latinka Perović, Marija Obradović and Dubravka Stojanović (eds.), *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX veka,* Belgrade, 1994, pp. 235–45; Karanovich, *The Development of Education*; Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Planirana elita: O studentima iz Srbije na evropskim univerzitetima u 19. veku,* Belgrade, Istorijski institut, 2003.

22 Vojislav Bakić, *Srpsko rodoljublje i otačastvoljublje*, Belgrade, 1910.

23 An unemployed intelligentsia developed only after World War I. See H. Sundhaussen, "Eliten, Bürgertum, politische Klasse? Anmerkungen zu den Oberschichten in den Balkanländern des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts", in Wolfgang Höpken und Holm Sundhaussen (eds.), *Eliten in Südosteuropa: Rolle, Kontinutiäten, Brüche in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, München, Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1998, pp. 5–30, here pp. 23–24.

24 Traditionally, the Serbian Orthodox Church had little influence on peasants' lives. The most important religious rituals (*slava*) were performed at home by the head of the family. The relatively few churches were generally situated outside the villages, not in the centre, as is usual in Catholic areas.

25 Vuk invented the term *zadruga* to describe the rural Serbian family, using it for the first time in his *Lexicon serbico-germanico-latinum* of 1818. The peasants themselves usually talked of their *kuća* ("house, home") or a *zadružna kuća* (house collective). Maria Todorova, "Myth-Making in European Family History: The Zadruga Revisited", in *East European Politics and Societies,* 4, 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 30–76, here p. 38. For his famous description of a Serbian peasant household, see Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, "Geograficesko-statističko opisanje Srbije", in V. S. Karadžić and Slavko Vukomanović (eds.), *Srpska istorija našega vremena*, Belgrade, Nolit, 1972, pp. 57–58. Karadžić's work marks the beginning of Serbian modernity, recording the oral Serbian culture for the first time. It conformed to the European scholarly discourse of the time, and served as the foundation for the developing Serbian nationalism. His song collections were successful in Germany, Austria, France and Britain, and he corresponded with people like the Brothers Grimm. See also N. Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards*, pp. 93–109. About the politicians' symbolic communication with the rural pop ulation, see Slobodan Naumović, "Opanken im Parlament. Betrachtungen über die Bedeutung bäuerlicher Symbole in der serbischen Politik", in *Historische Anthropologie,* 1 (1999), pp. 63–82.

26 V. Bakić, *Rodoljublje*, p. 77.

27 V. Bakić, *Rodoljublje*, pp. 148–49; N. Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards*, p. 258. See also Ana Stolić, "From Childhood to Womanhood: The Ideological Basis of the Upbringing of Female Children in Serbia at the End of the nineteenth Century", in Slobodan Naumović and Miroslav Jovanović (eds.), *Childhood in South East Europe: Historical Perspectives on Growing Up in the nineteenth and twentieth Century*, Belgrade, Graz, Čigoja, 2001, pp. 97–110.

28 V. Bakić, *Rodoljublje*, p. 78.

29 C. Mijatovich, *A Royal Tragedy*, p. 18.

30 King Lazar was the medieval Serbian leader killed in the battle of Kosovo. Ana Stolić, *Kraljica Draga,* Belgrade, Udruženje za srpsku povesnicu, 2000, pp. 99–104. For Draga's picture in medieval attire by court photographer Milan Jovanović see, for example, Goran Malić, *Milan Jovanović fotograf.* Catalogue of the exposition at the Gallery of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Belgrade, Publikum, 1997, p. 222; C. Mijatovich, *A Royal Tragedy*, table pp. 156–57.

31 C. Mijatovich, *A Royal Tragedy*, pp. 173–74; Wayne S. Vucinich, *Serbia Between East and West: The Events of 1903–08,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1954; David MacKenzie, *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator: The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević,* Boulder, East European Monographs, 1989.

32 C. Mijatovich, *A Royal Tragedy*, pp. 173–74.

33 The royal couple's dead bodies were mutilated, thrown out of the palace window and left lying there for some hours. C. Mijatovich, *A Royal Tragedy*, pp. 184–215. Vladan Đorđević, *Kraj jedne dinastije,* Belgrade, 1905. D. MacKenzie, *Apis*, pp. 105–22.

34 H. Sundhaussen, *Historische Statistik*, p. 291.

35 For an account of Serbia's political history during this period, see Dubravka Stojanović, *Srbija i demokratija 1903–14,* Belgrade, Čigoja, 2003.

36 John R. Lampe uses the term "mini spurt" to describe the limited duration of modernising industrial initiatives in the Balkans before 1914, which failed to promote self-supporting economic growth. John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations*, Bloomington, 1982. Cited in M.-J. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, p. 175.

37 Dragiša M. Đurić, *Popis kuća i stanova u Beogradu od 6. novembra 1906 do 15. marta 1907,* Belgrade, Štamparija "Merkur" Milorada Stefanovića, 1912. The commission worked according to the standard investigation of the Swiss town of Basel by the German economist Karl Bücher. See K. Bücher, *Wohnungsenquête in der Stadt Basel vom 1. bis 19. Februar 1889,* Basel, 1891.

38 The record was broken only in the 1930s. D. M. Đurić, *Popis*, pp. 65–73, 82–89, 94, 111, 116–18, 132, 144; Slobodan Vidaković, *Naši socijalni problemi,* Belgrade, 1932, cited in M.-J. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, p. 342.

39 D. M. Đurić, *Popis*, pp. 70–71.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 144.

41 Milivoje M. Kostić, "Uspon Beograda", Milena Radojčić, Mirjana Čavić, Mirna Kovačević and Gordana Gordić (eds.), Belgrade, *Biblioteka grada Beograda* etc., 2000, pp. 73–78. See also N. Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards*, pp. 309–10.

42 Svetislav Predić, *Pitanje o stanovima u Beogradu*, Belgrade, 1914, p. 4.

43 See Hans-Michael Boestfleisch, *Modernisierungsprobleme und Entwicklungskrisen: Die Auseinandersetzung um die Bürokratie in Serbien 1838–1858,* Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 1987.

44 About the inner organisation of rural Serbian families see, among others, the writings of Karl Kaser and Andrei Simić: Karl Kaser, *Familie und Verwandtschaft auf dem Balkan: Analyse einer untergehenden Kultur,* Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau, 1995; Andrej Simić, "Machismo and Cryptomatriarchy: Power, Affect, and Authority in the Traditional Yugoslav Family", in Sabrina Ramet (ed.), *Gender Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States,* University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, pp. 11–29.

45 M.-J. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, pp. 139–42.

46 Sundhaussen, *Historische Statistik*, p. 70.

47 M.-J. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, pp. 342–44.

48 The migration into cities reached its peak only after World War I, the strong local attachment of Serbian peasants preventing their departure for a long time. M.-J. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, p. 80ff.

49 M.-J. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, pp. 340–45.

50 Vladimir Jovanović, "Državna vlast i pojedinac", in Ana Stolić, and Nenad Makuljević (eds.), *Privatni život kod Srba u devetnaestom veku: Od kraja osamnaestog veka do početka Prvog svetskog rata,* Belgrade, Clio, 2006, pp. 54–88, here p. 72.

51 D. M. Đurić, *Popis*, pp. 71–72.

52 V. Jovanović, "Državna vlast i pojedinac", p. 72.

Chapter10

* Acknowledgements: in my work on this paper I benefited from critical readings by the three editors, as well as by comments of Bernard Lory and Tchavdar Marinov. I alone am responsible for the interpretations and facts.

1 In the 1905 Bulgarian Census, Stanimaka had 14,157 inhabitants, of whom 50 per cent (7,139) declared being Greek (sources in M. Hristemova, "Antigrăckoto dviženie v Assenovgrad prez 1906" ["The anti-Greek movement in Asenovgrad in 1906"], *Godišnik* ["Annals"] of the Plovdiv Historical Museum, Plovdiv, vol. II, 2004, pp. 102–13, here p. 103. For Melnik, the 1873 Ottoman census shows 1,030 hanes (households) with, respectively, 560 "Greeks", 650 "Muslims" and 2,000 "Bulgarians" (Statistics 1873, p. 141); in 1891, V. Kănčov found a total of 900 hanes, of which 610 were "Christian" (410 Greek and 200 "who speak Bulgarian at home"), 180 Turkish, 105 Gypsy and 5 Vlach. See Vasil Kănčov, "Pătuvane po dolinite na Strouma, Mesta i Bregalnica" ["Journey in the valleys of Struma, Mesta and Bregalnitsa"], in V. Kănčov, Izbrani Proizvedenija ["Selected Writings"], vol. I, Sofia, Nauka i Izkustvo, 1970, first published in SbNU, t. X-XIII, 1897–1900, pp. 29–373, here p. 149; cf. V. Kănčov, "Makedonija. Ethnografija i statistika" ["Macedonia: Ethnography and Statistics"], in Izbrani Proizvedenija, vol. II, 1970, pp. 285–600, first published Sofia, Knižovno Družestvo 1900, p. 389. According to Theodoros Vlachos, *Die Geschichte der Byzantinische Stadt Melenikon*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1969, p. 16, in 1910 its population amounted to 13,000. For the biases in the Ottoman census see Daniel Panzac, "La population de la Macédoine au XIX^{e} siècle", in *Revue du Monde Musulman et méditerranéen,* Paris, n° 66, special issue: "Les Balkans à l'époque ottomane", 1992/4, pp. 113–29, here p. 118; for biases in the national census, *ibid.*, pp. 120–25.

2 My interest in both towns was oriented toward anthropological issues, such as kinship and marriage, migration and displacement, religion and identity. For the project "Islands of Hellenism in Bulgaria: patterns of kinship, ideas of descent and marriage strategies acting for cultural assimilation" carried out in Melnik in August 1997, I benefited from a grant by the Austrian Academy of Science and Research. Work on "Women's Religion and identity" in Stanimaka was sponsored by an Open Society Fund grant (RSS #996/2000).

3 The classical works in this sense are: Stylpon Kyriakides, *The Northern Ethnological Boundaries of Hellenism,* Thessaloniki, Etairia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1955, and Yorgios Vakalopoulos, *O Voreios Ellinismos kata tin proimi phasi tou Makedonikou Agona (1878-94)* ["Northern Hellenism during the Early Stages of the Macedonian Struggle"], Thessaloniki, IMHA, 1983, who showed the association between Northern Hellenism and the Macedonian conflict. Most of the Greek works on Melnik use the metaphor of the fallen soldier (cf. Petros Pennas, *Melenikos, o akritas tou Ellinikou Borra* ["Melenikos, the guardian of the Hellenic North"]), Athens, 1964.

4 See Milica Bakic-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", in *Slavic Review*, LIV, 4 (1995), pp. 917–31.

5 For the late shaping of the *millet*-system I follow Benjamen Braude, "Foundation Myths of the *Millet* System", in Benjamen Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christian and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, The Functioning of a Plural Society*, vol. I, New York, Holmes & Maier, 1982, pp. 69–88; for its interference with the concept of nation, see Kemal Karpat, '*Millet*s and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era', in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christian and Jews*, pp. 141–69, and Roger H. Davison, "The *Millet*s as Agents of Change in the nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire", in Braude and Lewis (eds.), *Christian and Jews*, vol. II , pp. 319–38.

6 Traian Stoianovitch, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", in *The Journal of Economic History*, XX, 2 (June), pp. 234–313.

7 Among the large number of publications I prefer Hans Vermeulen, "Greek Cultural Dominance among the Orthodox Population of Macedonia during the Last Period of Ottoman Rule", in Anton Blok and Henk Driessen (eds.), *Cultural Dominance in the Mediterranean area*, Nijmegen, Katholieke Universiteit, pp. 225–25; Paschalis Khitromilides, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans", in *European History Quarterly*, 19 (1989), pp. 149–94; Despina Vlami, 'Commerce and Identity in the Greek Communities: Livorno in the eighteenth and the nineteenth Centuries", in *Diogenes* 177, XLV, 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 73–92.

8 See the suggestion of Laszlo Kürti, *The Remote Borderland: Transylvania in the Hungarian Imagination,* Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001, about territoriality in the work of nationalism and modern state-making, both characterized as "territorial animals" (pp. vii–viii).

9 Archaeological research and paleo-botanical data attest to the practice of vine growing since ancient times, as well as the preservation of highly specific local vintages up to recent times. The "old tradition" of wine export used to be traced back to the seventeenth century for Melnik (as recorded by Evliya Celebi) and to the beginning of the eighteenth century for Stanimaka (as indicated by the French Dr. Paul Lucas), without recasting data against context. For an overview, see Lili Peneva-Vince, "Srednoevropejski vlijanija za văznikvaneto na vinarskite izbi v grad Melnik" ("Central European Influences on the Appearance of the Wine Cellars in Melnik"), in *Balgarska Etnografija,* IX, 1 (1984), Sofia*,* pp. 21–28.

10 Field notes from visits to the local museums in Melnik (October 1990, July-August 1997, July 2006) and Assenovgrad (February 1988, August 1997 and April 2006).

11 For Stanimaka, see M. Hristemova, "Un registre obituaire du Monastère de Bačkovo du XVIII^{e} siècle", in *Etudes balkaniques,* Sofia, 4 (2005), pp. 3–20, here pp. 1–12, 19: between 1786 and 1813, sixteen *esnafs* dominated by Christians have made donations to the Bačkovo monastery; for Melnik, see note 57.

12 In his influential book Georges Prevelakis, *Les Balkans: cultures et géopolitique,* Paris, Nathan, 1994, p. 62, quotes the following description of the "Greek catastrophe" in Melnik by French geographer Jean Bruhnes, *Géographie de l'histoire*, Paris, 1921: "Melnik est située au-delà, vers le Nord [...] petit point perdu de l'hellénisme au milieu des Bulgares. Les Grecs [...] représentaient les usages méditerranéens et pratiquaient la culture de la vigne. Melnik était entourée de vignes splendides; la population, parce que méditerranéenne, excellait dans les soins à donner aux arbres et aux arbustes, et savait faire le vin. Lorsque les habitants de Melnik, effrayés par les Bulgares, se sont enfuis, ces derniers n'ont pas détruit la ville, comme on l'a dit; ils s'y sont installés; eux, les Bulgares, ce sont des laboureurs ou des pâtres; ils ne savent pas travailler la vigne; ils ne savent pas faire la vendange; or, ils se sont emparés de Melnik au moment où les vignes étaient surchargées de magnifiques grappes de raisin... L'on n'improvise pas le savoir-faire, l'art délicat et traditionnel qu'implique la vinification: la récolte a été perdue."

13 Al. Khitroeff, "Emigration transatlantique", in Stewart Woolf (ed.), *Espaces et familles dans l'Europe du Sud à l'age moderne,* Paris, Editions de la MSH, 1993, pp. 241–70, here pp. 248–50.

14 Vine growing is related to high specialisation; it requires not only and not so much physical efforts, but precise knowledge and technical skills that cannot be mastered within the framework of "basic" agricultural activities. The cycles of vine growing impose different peaks of activity throughout the year than, for example, crop-oriented or the average survival economies.

15 Contrary to the usual vineyards owned by Christians in an average Balkan Ottoman town (less than one ha), the winery owners in Stanimaka had up to 40–50 ha, while some winery owners around Melnik – all of them Greek *čiftlikcis* –owned up to 90 ha: cf. Valentin Lazarov, "Lozarstvoto i vinarstvoto po balgarskite zemi prez XV–XIX vek" ("Vine-growing and wine making in Bulgarian lands in the fifteenth–nineteenth centuries"), in *Hemus*, 1 (2001) (http://www.slovo.bg/old/haemus/101/h200101008.htm). With the escalation of Bulgarian-Greek rivalry in and around Melnik, "Turkish" guards were hired to protect wineries at the approach of the grape harvest: see Veličko Georgiev and Stajko Trifonov (eds.), *Istorija na bălgarite v dokumenti* ("History of the Bulgarians through Documents"), 1878–1944, t. 1: 1878–1912, part 2, Sofia, Prosveta, 1996, p. 271 (data from 1907).

16 A conclusion drawn from oral histories from Melnik (see G. Valtchinova, "'Melniski gărci': bračni strategii i konstruirane na etno-kulturna identičnost" ["'Melnikiote Greeks'; Marital Strategies and the construction of the ethno-cultural identity"], in *Bulgarska Etnologija,* 3-4 (1999), pp. 34–55 and Stanimaka (Konstantin Jirecek, *Knjažestvo Bălgarija* ["Principality of Bulgaria"], Plovdiv, HG Danov, 1899, pp. 134–135; Haralampi Stančev, *Ah tezi asenovgradchani* ["People of Asenovgrad"], Asenovgrad, EkoBelan, 2003, pp. 23, 30–40.

17 Langera meant "bad wine" in the local Greek dialect. See, Jirecek, *Knjažestvo Bălgarija*, pp. 133–34.

18 See Sherif Mardin, "Some Notes on Normative Conflicts in Turkey", in Peter Berger (ed.), *The Limits of Social Cohesion, Conflict & Mediation in Pluralist Societies,* Boulder, Westview Press, 1998, pp. 207–32, here p. 213.

19 Even outside the Ottoman Empire, Greek merchant communities kept functioning in the *millet* logic: see Vlami, "Commerce and Identity", pp. 73–74.

20 The Bulgarian discourse on Grecomaniacs was constructed around the case of Plovdiv (Gr. Philippoupolis, *Turkish Filibe*), before being generalized. On nineteenth-century Plovdiv see Nadia Danova, K*onstantin Fotinov v kulturnoto i politicesko razvitie na Balkanite prez XIX-ti vek* ["Konstantin Fotinov in the cultural and political development of the Balkans in the nineteenth century"], Sofia, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Publisher, 1994, pp. 78–80, 85–89; Raymond Detrez, "Relations between Greeks and Bulgarians in the Pre-Nationalist Era: The Gudilas in Plovdiv", in Dimitris Tsiovas (ed.), *Greece in the Balkans: Identities, Perceptions and Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment,* Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003, pp. 30–46; Bernard Lory, "Immigration et intégration sociale à Plovdiv au XIX^{e} siècle", in *Revue du Monde Musulman et Méditerranéen,* 66 (1992–94), pp. 95–103.

21 R. Detrez, "Relations between Greeks and Bulgarians", pp. 32–33.

22 See Ernestine Friedl, "Lagging Emulations in Post-Peasant Society", in *American Anthropologist*, 66, 3, 1 (June 1964), pp. 569–86, for this and the following quotations.

23 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge University Press, 1977; see also P. Bourdieu, *Le sens commun*, Paris, Minuit, 1980, pp. 191–207.

24 B. Lory, "Immigration et intégration sociale", pp. 101–02.

25 For the Greek dowry, cf. Juliet Du Boulay, "The Meaning of Dowry: Changing values in Rural Greece", in *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, I, 1 (May 1983), pp. 243–70, and the contributions in John Peristiany (ed.), *Le prix de l'alliance en Méditerranée,* Paris, Editions du CNRS, 1989. For Melnik, this process is

discussed in G. Valtchinova, "Melnishkite gărci", pp. 43–48, and Văltchinova, "Ökologie, Familienstruktur und Konstruktion der ethno-kulturellen Identität", in Ulf Brunnbauer and Karl Kaser (Hg.), *Vom Nutzen der Verwandten: Soziale Netzwerke in Bulgarien* (19. und 20. Jahrhundert), Wien, Köln, Böhlau, 2001, pp. 254–79, here pp. 265–70.

26 Hypogamy, or marrying into a lower social stratum from ego's point of view, supposes hypergamy for ego's partner. The process is attested in specific circumstances in many Mediterranean societies; for Greece, cf. Du Boulay, "The Meaning of Dowry", pp. 246–56. While objectified in Moravenov's account (B. Lory, "Immigration et intégration sociale") for Plovdiv, in Melnik it could be traced back only as a subjective feeling with regard to women (cf. Văltchinova, "Melni skite gărci", pp. 366–67). Hypogamy was induced by sudden or severe restrictions of the matrimonial pool, due to social or political change (including war), which could largely vary within a region for men and for women, thereby fostering different attitudes to marriage. For instance, V. Kănčov, "Makedonija", p. 377, observes that in some towns in late nineteenth-century Macedonia, Greek men used to not marry but rather lived with 'their servants' – a fact attributed to the lack of proper spouses for them.

27 V. Kănčov, "Pătuvane", p. 252, observes that wives of "grecomaniacs" refused all things Bulgarian.

28 Melnik was the seat of a bishopric (mitropolites) from Byzantine times until 1913; a record of bishops was kept between 1434–1895 (T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte der Byzantinische Stadt Melenikon*, pp. 82–94). Stanimaka Greeks were the main supporters of the Bačkovo monastery.

29 The "model" of a Greek town backed by a big Orthodox abbey directly subor dinated to the Patriarchate (a *staropegy*) is a simplification made for the purpose of comparison. In fact, there were two big monasteries near Melnik, the closer one, the Virgin *Spileotissa*, existing up to the end of Ottoman times: T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte der Byzantinische Stadt Melenikon*, pp. 69–73; Violeta Nesheva (ed.), "Melnik", II. *Manastirat Bogoroditsa Spileotissa,* Sofia, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1994. For the history of the Rožen abbey, see Elka Bakalova, *Roženskijat manastir*, Sofia, DI Septemvri, 1990, pp. 5–14 and Alkis Prepis, "Roženskia manastir prez perioda XVI – nachaloto na XX vek"["The Rožen monastery in the sixteenth–early twentieth century"], in *Palaeobulgarica*, 11, 2 (1987), pp. 85–107.

30 In Rožen, *Theotokos Iveriotissa* or *Portaitissa* was a replica of the miracle-working Virgin's icon of the Iviron monastery in Mount Athos: see E. Bakalova, *Roženskijat manastir*, pp. 19–20; for Bačkovo, see M. Hristemova, "Un registre obituaire", p. 6.

31 See M. Hristemova, "Un registre obituaire", pp. 9–10, 12–13.

32 See Svetlana Ivanova, “Muslim Charity Foundations (*Vakf*) and the Models of Religious Behaviour of Ottoman Social Estates in Roumeli (late fifteenth to nineteenth centuries)”, in *Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit*, 5, 2 (Special Issue: Islam am Balkan) (2005), pp. 44–68, here pp. 46–47 (*vakıfname* of 1663 established by the *beylerbeyi* of Rumeli by “the order of the *padishah*”). See also Marc Baer, “The conversion of Christian and Jewish souls and space during the ‘Anti-Dervish’ movement of 1656–76”, in David Shankland (ed.), *Archaeology, Anthropology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia: The Life and Times of F.W. Hasluck, 1878–1920,* Istanbul, Isis Press, II (2004), pp. 183–200, here pp. 191–92.

33 S. Ivanova, “Muslim Charity Foundations”, p. 48.

34 For Melnik, various authors’ estimates are between seven and nine parish churches (T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte der Byzantinische Stadt Melenikon*, pp. 74–78); for Stenimachos, numbers oscillate between eight and twelve. Such numbers are rather exceptional for parishes in the Ottoman period, and even later: see Olga Todorova, *Pravoslavnata Cărkva i bălgarite, XV-XVIII vek* [“The Orthodox Church and Bulgarians in the fiteenth–eighteenth centuries”], Sofia, “M. Drinov” Academic Publisher, 1997, pp. 78–86.

35 See Zina Markova, *Bălgarskata Ekzarhija*, 1870–79 [“The Bulgarian Exarchate”], Sofia, The Academic Press, 1989, pp. 14, 107–09.

36 *Citalište* is a community institution that appeared during the Bulgarian National Revival; it was run by the local communities for the purpose of educational and cultural activities, as well as charity.

37 In a non-Ottoman context this principle is ‘translated’ into the locally available form of religious community: cf. Vlami, “Commerce and Identity”, pp. 76–77, 82–83 for the “religious brotherhood” as the core of community life of Greeks in a state of diaspora.

38 For the Stanimaka area in earlier times, see Catherine Asdracha, *La région des Rhodopes aux XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles: Etude de géographie historique* (Texte und Forschungen zur byzantinisch-neugriechische Philologie, 49), Athènes, 1976, pp. 58–75; Joëlle Dalègre, *La Thrace grecque: Population et territoire,* Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997, pp. 19–21.

39 See M. Hristemova, “Un register”, p. 102.

40 The same logic was at work in Stanimaka and in Plovdiv, the neighbouring big city; however, Stanimaka was more notorious with its *grecomania* and the local Greek profile remained in place several decades after it had disappeared in Plovdiv. See M. Hristemova, “Antigrăckoto dviženie” and Borislava Daskalova, “Sociokulturnata rolja na pravo¬slavnija hram Sv. Bogorodica Blagovestenie v Asenovgrad” [“The Socio-cultural Role of the Orthodox Shrine Sv. Bogorodica

Blagoveshtenie in Assenovgrad"], in *Malkijat svjat na socialnite procesi* ("The Small World of Social Processes"), Sofia, Institute of Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences & Alya, 1996, pp. 77–93, here pp. 81–82.

41 The church of St. Atanas (*Athanasios*) where the first liturgy in Bulgarian was held (1857), used to be called *Argat klissi* ("the Servant's Church"); the creation of a separate Bulgarian church community dates back to 1886, but even after this date, the Greek *syllogos* was largely dominant.

42 The struggle for the church of "Annunciation" (see B. Daskalova, "Sociokulturnata rolja", pp. 78–84) is among the most dramatic moments in the nineteenth-century history of Stanimaka. The coming of Father Ivan Bukhlev, from a Bulgarian Exarchist family living in the village of Gorno Brodi/Ano Vrondi in the Serres area (cf. V. Kănčov, "Pătuvane", pp. 53–54), marked a turning point in the struggle against "Grecomaniacs". In 1897, Father Bukhlev was also the treasurer of the local branch of the IMRO, see Svetlozar Eldărov, *Makedono-Odrinskata organizacija v Balgarija 1895–1903* ("The Macedonian-Adrianopolitan organi zation in Bulgaria, 1895–1903"), Sofia, "M. Drinov" Academic Publisher, p. 298. Greek defiance took multiple forms, from armed attacks to symbolic gestures by women, who allegedly lamented "Poor *Theotokos*, you have been Bulgarized."

43 Even then, newcomers could preserve a different identity for some time: the earliest attested group of an immigrant Bulgarian-speaking population from Macedonia came in the mid-eighteenth century; the construction of their "own" church ("Assumption of the Virgin", 1765), made possible with group donations and the choice of specific religious symbols suggests that they kept a separate identity for some decades.

44 On Pejo Šišmanov see Hristo Karamandzhukov, *Rodopa prez Ilindensko Preo brazhenskoto văstanie* ['The Rhodopes during the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising'], Sofia, Otečestven Front, 1986, pp. 36–39, 75–84. He was considered an important member of the IMRO, and was among the regional delegates at several congresses until 1908: see Hristo Siljanov, *Osvoboditelnite borbi na Makedonija* ("The struggles for liberation of Macedonia"), II, Sofia, Nauka i Izkustvo, 1983 [1943], p. 481; Kiril Părlichev, *Kjustendilskijat kongres na VMRO 1908* ("The Kjustendil IMRO Congress of 1908"), Sofia, Vega MG, 2001, p. 16, 169.

45 Cf. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities", p. 170, for the politics of Greek citizenship. The demand for Greek passports was very high between 1888 and 1892 and a Greek consulate was temporarily opened in Stanimaka: see Georgios Kazamias and Xanthippi Kotzageorgi, "Ta ethnika charakteristica ton Ellinon tis Voulgarias" ("The ethnic characteristic of the Greeks in Bulgaria"), in B. Kondis (ed.), *Oi Ellines tis Voulgarias. Ena istoriko tmima tou peripheriakou Ellinismo*

("Greeks in Bulgaria. A Historical Part of the Greek Diaspora"), Thessaloniki, IMHA, 1999, pp. 133–96, especially pp. 170–71.

46 R. Detrez, "Relations between Greeks and Bulgarians", pp. 35–36. The autonomous principality could not issue passports; Bulgarian passports were introduced after independence from the Ottoman Empire was proclaimed in 1908.

47 Spyridon Ploumidis, "Social and Cultural Life in Plovdiv (1879–1906)", in *Etudes Balkaniques*, 4 (2005), pp. 129–39; X. Kotzageorgi and G. Kazamias, "Ta ethnika charakteristica".

48 Drawing on the local press and archives, M. Hristemova, "Antigrackoto dvizenie", p. 106, speaks of 800 conscripts from Stanimaka serving in the Greek army, against only 60 enrolled in the Bulgarian army. After 1903, Greeks from Stanimaka also joined the andartes' groups in Macedonia.

49 See X. Kotzageorgi, "The Profile and Activities of Greek Womens' Associations in Bulgaria. Late nineteenth–Early twentieth Century: The Case of Eurydiki (Philippoupolis, 1874–1906)", in *Etudes Balkaniques,* XXXI, 3–4 (1995), pp. 196–205; M. Hristemova, "Grăcki kulturno-obrazovatekni druzhestva v Plovdiv ('Greek cultural-educational associations in Plovdiv'), (1867-1906)", in *Plovdiv on the road to the modern world,* Plovdiv, University 'P. Hilendarski'/ Historical Museum, 1998, pp. 126–34; The culture or women's sociability was considered as "Greek" even in "Bulgarian" (or mixed) associations, like "Annunciation"; see *infra*.

50 Cf. Jirecek, Knjažestvo, pp. 137–39; Nikola Filipov, *Voden prerz vekovete. Iz istorijata na Gorni i Dolni Voden i manastira "Sv. Kirik"* ("Voden through the centuries. History of the villages of Gorni and Dolni Voden and the monastery St. 'Cyr'"), Assenovgrad, Ekobelan, 1996, pp. 58–64.

51 Cf. Vihra Baeva, *Razkazi za cudesa* ("Tales for Miracles"), Sofia, Dios, 2001, pp. 80–82; B. Daskalova, "Sociokulturnata rolja", pp. 88–91, shows the inscription of this new feast in a broader scheme of religious patronage and celebrations centred on the *Theotokos/Sveta Bogorodica*.

52 I am indebted to M. Hristemova for these unpublished data from the Historical Museum of Asenovgrad.

53 As shown by Peter Deliradev, *Antigrackoto dviženie* ("The Anti-Greek movement"), Sofia, 1906, the pogroms, conducted with "patriotic" slogans, were intent on disrupting Greek economic supremacy. Emigrants from Macedonia and from Thrace were the driving force behind these armed actions: cf. J. Dalègre, *La Thrace*, pp. 51–56; S. Eldărov, *Makedono-Odrinskata organizacija*, pp. 297–304. For Stanimaka see M. Hristemova, "Antigrackoto dviženie".

54 For the ethnic mixture, see Nicolas Svoronos, *Le commerce de Salonique au XVIII^{e} siècle,* Paris, PUF, 1965, pp. 28–29; Ivan Katardžiev, *Serskata oblast (1780–1879). Ekonomski, politicki i kulturen pregled,* Skopje, Institut za Nacionalna Istorija, 1961, pp. 16–17, 28–30; Antonis M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou. I diahroniki poreia tou Ellinismou* ("A History of Melenikon. The historical development of Hellenism"), Ekd. Oikos Aphoi Kyriakidi, 2005, pp. 87–92 and passim.

55 For the data, see P. Petrov, "Poseshtenia na dvama bulgarski ucheni v Melnik v nachaloto na XX vek" ("Visits of two Bulgarian scholars in Melnik in the early twentieth century"), in V. Nesheva (ed.), *Melnik*, II, Sofia, 1994, pp. 114–17.

56 N. Svoronos, *Le commerce de Salonique*, pp. 210–11, 213, 242; I. Katardžiev, *Serskata oblast*, pp. 60–65, 81–84; it appears that cotton, as well as oil plants, were important in the economy of Melnik up to the end of the nineteenth century.

57 See T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte*, pp. 97–98; A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, pp. 98–99 (numbering more than 24 *esnafs* by the early 1890s).

58 In his solid study on trade, N. Svoronos does not mention wine from Melnik among the goods exported. For data for early commercialization of wine in Peneva-Vinze, see "Srednoevropejski vlijanija", pp. 21–24.

59 A. M. Koltsidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, p. 144 sq.; in this same year, a Bulgarian source reports on huge damages at vine and tobacco plantations due to the Bulgarian-Greek struggles (V. Georgiev and S. Trifonov [eds.], *Istorija na bălgarite*, pp. 71–72). Bulgarian studies insist on a later date, 1912–13, for the crash due to *phylloxera*.

60 See T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte*, pp. 107–08; A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, pp. 193–209. The merchants' contributions were the main support for the renowned Greek school that opened at the turn of the eighteenth century (and multiple schools in the nineteenth), as well as for the construction of parish churches (A M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, pp. 213–29).

61 The Charter of 1813 is published by Petros Penas, *To Koinon Melenikou kai to Systima Dioikiseos tou, Symboli eis tin Istorian tis Organoseos ton Ellinikon Koinotiton epi Tourkokratias* ("The Commune of Melnik: A Contribution to the History of the Functioning of Greek Communities under Turkish rule"), Athinai, 1946; see T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte*, pp. 102–06; A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, p. 630 for the quote.

62 For this action, see T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte*, pp. 96–99; A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, pp. 93–95.

63 For the exclusively Greek social life and associations in Melnik during 1906–10, see A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, pp. 144–66, T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte*, pp. 106–07.

64 See data in V. Kănčov, "Patuvane", pp. 144–45; Mercia McDermott, *Za svoboda i săvărshenstvo. Biografija na Jane Sandanski* ("For Freedom and Perfection: A Biography of Jane Sandanski"), Translated in Bulgarian by V. Izmirliev, Sofia, Nauka i Izkustvo, 1987, pp. 149–51.

65 See V. Kănčov, "Makedonija", pp. 389–405; according to I. Katardžiev, *Serskata oblast*, pp. 37, 52 of the 71 villages that composed the Melnik *kaza* were "Bulgarian" by 1878.

66 E. Bakalova, *Roženskija manastir*, p. 9.

67 The events are described in Hristo Siljanov, *Osvoboditelnite borbi na Makedonija*, I, Sofia, Nauka i Izkustvo, 1983 [1st ed 1933], pp. 58–59, (http://promacedonia.com/obm1/2_3.html); see T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte*, pp. 100–01; A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, pp. 99–103.

68 In 1904, Melnik welcomed French observers for the implementation of *Murzsteg* reforms. They insisted, in their official reports, on the "peaceful cohabitation" in the town (T. Vlachos, *Die Geschichte*, p. 101).

69 Manol Kordopulos is mentioned on the commemorative plaque of Bulgarians "killed by the Turks on the eve of the Liberation", the first monument that a visitor of Melnik sees on the way into the town. The Kordoupala family house, built in 1754, was one of the rare old Greek houses to survive the ruin of 1913, and was transformed into a museum during socialism. This house, with its Viennese furniture and Venice glasses, as well as the cave and the tunnel dug into the sandy rock, is a good example of Central-European influences, at the same time bearing witness to an intense cultural exchange with South-Western Macedonia (cf. A. Prepis, "Rožensklja", pp. 91–95).

70 For this information, fitting well with the Bulgarian nationalist appropriation of the personage, I am indebted to the local museum. Though repeated by local histories, I was unable to trace this fact to a credible source.

71 About his friendship with Sandanski, cf. M. McDermott, *Za svoboda*, pp. 151, 171–72; 384 (for his death). In the 1970s–80s, tourists used to visit "Sandanski's hiding place" in the Kordopoulos Museum-house. He was reported to have attended Bulgarian marriages, which was an aberration, given the carefully constructed cultural and social separation between Melnik's Greeks and Bulgarians. Cf. the Greek record in A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, pp. 267 (as a donor of the Greek school), 348, 448–49.

72 Contrary to the "life-cycle servants" in Western Europe, here being an adult female servant was regarded as a durable social condition; see Michael Mitterauer, "Servants and Youth", in *Continuity & Change* 5, 1 (1990), pp. 11–38, especially pp. 29–33. Considered as agents of moral corruption, such female

servants are nevertheless represented in oral histories as social and cultural brokers; this is especially true for Kordoupala's favorite, Agnitsa (cf. G. Valtchinova, "Melniskite gărci", pp. 41, 43).

73 According to V. Kănčov, "Makedonija", pp. 489–90, all three villages were "100 per cent Bulgarian"; ethnographic field data show that Greek cultural impregnation was sizeable in material features. V. Kănčov, "Makedonija", p. 377, hints that Greek bachelors living without marriage with 'Bulgarian servants' is indicative of the persisting social abyss.

74 Christos Psilas, "From Cooperation to Alienation: An Insight into Relations between the Serres group and the Young Turks during the Years 1906–09", in *European History Quarterly*, 35, 4 (2005), pp. 541–57, here p. 544; cf. A. M. Koltzidas, *Istoria tou Melenikou*, p. 139; M. McDermott, *Za svoboda*, p. 187 sq.

75 I.e. the villages that supported the Sofia-based Supreme Macedonian Committee and their militia (*vărhovisti*) were called *kotzkarski sela* ("lecherous villages"), and executions there were justified by their "relaxed morality". For the rules on marriages and morality, cf. McDermott, *Za svoboda*, pp. 173–74, 195–96.

76 The ruin of Melnik in the summer of 1913 is still a controversial topic: if outsiders, both Bulgarian and foreigners, have noticed the desolation, or "semi-ruin", of the abandoned town (cf. P. Petrov, "Poseshtenieto na dvama", pp. 116–17; G. Prevelakis, *Les Balkans*, p. 62), local people insist that the fire was "set by Greeks on their own houses" (cf. Văltchinova, "Ökologie, Familienstruktur", pp. 364–65).

77 For the feasts of *Theotokos/Sveta Bogorodica*, cf. V. Baeva, *Razkazi*, pp. 58–82; B. Daskalova, "Sociokulturnata".

78 The story was reported in a newspaper (1899) by the local Greek historian K. Apostolides and reproduced in his history of Stanimaka; see Doroteja Dobreva, "Die Geistermesse in Stanimaka. Politische Implikationen eines internationalen Erzählstoffes", in *Bayerisches Jahrbuch für Volkskunde,* 2005, Munich, pp. 93–101.

79 See David Sutton, *Memory Cast in Stones: The relevance of the past in everyday life,* Oxford, Berg, 1998.

80 There are two chronologies of the event: according to oral tradition, the association was founded in 1907; the first publication about the events dates from December 1909; cf. G. Valtchinova, *Balkanski jasnovidki*, pp. 182–85.

81 For this and other publications of the priest's account, see D. Dobreva, "Die Geistermesse", pp. 93–95. The evocation of King Ferdinand makes sense after 22 September/5 October 1908, when Bulgarian independence was proclaimed.

82 D. Dobreva, 'Die Geistermesse', pp. 97–101.

83 By this time, the very term "association" (gr. *adelfotita*), when applied to cultural and charity organizations, had political connotations. See X. Kotzageorgi, "The Profile", p. 198; M. Hristemova, "Grăcki kulturno-obrazovatelni", p. 128.

84 Oral information and photographs present the association as created by 12 (or 13) "maidens" who lived in a separate house built near the homonymous church. It should be emphasized that the similar Greek associations included mostly mothers of families. See X. Kotzageorgi, "The Profile", pp. 199–201; Lucy Rushton, "The Angels: A Women's Religious Organisation in Northern Greece", in A. Blok & H. Driessen (eds.), *Cultural Dominance in the Mediterranean Area*, Nijmegen, Katholieke Universiteit, 1984, pp. 55–81, here pp. 56–58.

85 Sultani's paternal lineage split into two branches, one claiming a Greek identity and moving to Greece, the other (her father's) embracing a Bulgarian identity (but attending a Greek school). For details see G. Valtchinova, *Balkanski jasnovidki*, pp. 193–99.

86 A mirror image of the role of Slav-speaking women in Greek national acculturation is given in Anastasia Karakasidou, "Women of the Family, Women of the Nation: National Enculturation among Slav-speakers in North-West Greece", in Peter Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis (eds.), *Ourselves and Others: The Development of a Greek Macedonian Cultural Identity since 1912*, Oxford, Berg, pp. 91–109.

87 See Statistika 1873, *Makedonija I Odrinsko. Statistika na naselenieto ot 1873 g.* ("Macedonia and Adrianople District. 1873 Population Census"), a Bulgarian translation of "Ethnographie des *vilayet*s d'Andrinople, de Monastir et de Salonique", extrait du *Courrier d'Orient, Constantinople, 1878*, Sofia, Makedonski Nauchen Institut, 1996, p. 140 (42 households, 150 males – all "Bulgarians"); according to V. Kănčov, "Patuvane", p. 148, in 1891 it had 60 Bulgarian households.

88 Cf. McDermott, *Za svoboda*, pp. 54–56, 96–99, 364–67. According to oral data communicated to me by P. Ivanov, one of the IMRO executioners, known as "the headman of Rožen", was a native of this village.

89 When doing fieldwork in 1997, an informant reported to me about a forced marriage of her widowed mother to one of Sandanski's *četniks*. This practice was confirmed in the mountainous tobacco-growing village of the Melnik area.

90 The main work on "Holy" Stoyna is done by Bulgarian folklorist Petko Ivanov (who had discovered Stoyna's vita), summarized in Petko Ivanov and Valentina Izmirlieva, "Betwixt and Between: The Cult of the Living Saints in Contemporary Bulgaria", in *Folklorica. Journal of Slavic and East European Folklore*, VIII, 1, pp. 33–53.

91 Haznatar was a relatively small village; in 1873 it had 15 households, all "Bulgarian", *Statistika 1873*, p. 120. It was quoted as "turning to the Patriarchate under heavy pressure" and back to the Exarchate in late 1904: cf. V. Georgiev and S. Trifonov (eds.), *Istorija na bălgarite*, p. 180. The chronology of Stoyna's coming is unclear; while P. Ivanov & V. Izmirlieva, "Betwixt and Between",

p. 35, opt for 1912–13, the miracles in her vita are dated between 1905–06 and 1912. For an earlier chronology, around 1903, see G. Valtchinova, “Balkanski”, pp. 59–62.

92 According to an inscription, “St. George” of Sušica was built in 1857; I am grateful to Petko Ivanov for this information. Despite its location near the cemetery, its dimensions suggest it was conceived as a parish church.

93 This “teaching” consisted mainly of relating “legends” about popular saints (the oral narratives transforming the respective vitae), quoting passages from popular literature (incl. apocrypha) about Our Lady, and singing folk songs for saints (for details, see G. Valtchinova, “Balkanski” pp. 74–76). It is the opposite of the institutionalized religious teaching and learning provided in the framework of the Greek koinon in Melnik, where church and school cooperated.

94 Cf. P. Ivanov and V. Izmirlieva, “Betwixt and between”, pp. 35–36; see also G. Valtchinova “Balkanski”, pp. 63–73.

95 I don’t insist on the ‘ethnic’ name here; several decades later, some of the local inhabitants could well –and did– perceive their identity as a “Macedonian” one (impressions from fieldwork carried out in 1997).

96 For the incident and its developments, cf. James Barros, *The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970.

97 Cf. Davison, “The *Millet*s as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire”, p. 333, for a similar statement: “The conservatism of separate religious identity developed, paradoxically, into the most explosive agency for change that the modern world has known.”

98 For the construction of comparable units in historical and anthropological research, see Marcel Detienne, *Comparer l’incomparable*, Paris, Seuil, 2000, chap. 4.

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